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
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HISTORY
OF THE
CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE
OF
FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON.

FORMING A SEQUEL TO
"THE HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION."

BY
M. A. THIERS,
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VOL. XV.

LONDON:
WILLIS AND SOTHERAN, 136, STRAND.
1857.

237. a. 345.

LONDON :
M. S. MYERS, PRINTER,
12, GREAT NEWPORT STREET, LONG ACRE.

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BOOK XLVI.

WASHINGTON AND SALAMANCA.

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HISTORY
OF
THE CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE
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BOOK XLVI.

WASHINGTON AND SALAMANCA.

WHILST the unexampled catastrophe which we have been describing was taking place in the north of Europe, the distant shores of the Atlantic and the burning plains of Spain were the theatre of events which, although doubtless less extraordinary, were still extremely serious; resembling, in this respect, all the results of Napoleon's exorbitant policy, and thus proving the ill-advisedness of the principles on which it was conducted. We may herein perceive a clear manifestation of the truth which we have already enunciated. And if, instead of attempting to vanquish Europe at the bottom of Russia, Napoleon had persevered in combatting it on the theatre, difficult, indeed, but selected by himself on the Peninsula and the Atlantic, he would probably have compelled England to yield, and at the same time have disarmed the whole of Europe, at least for many years, and would

thus have obtained time, more judicious views having taken possession of his mind, to make such sacrifices as his greatness would have allowed him to make with the utmost safety, and would have rendered his government endurable by rendering it supportable. It is necessary then, that before entering upon the consideration of the consequences of the fatal Russian expedition we should retrace the course of events in Spain and America during the year 1812;—some of them disastrous, and some fruitlessly fortunate, since they were the results of the rash and careless will of a great but undisciplined genius.

When Napoleon, disgusted with the Spanish war, at the moment when perseverance might have rendered it successful, resolved to carry his forces to the north, England was, as we have already seen, in a position of extreme difficulty. The success which the errors committed on our part had enabled Lord Wellington to obtain, had, doubtless, in some degree tranquillized the public mind in Great Britain, but it was still overwhelmed by the constant fear that Napoleon might direct against it some decisive effort, and the painful position of its commerce was in no degree ameliorated. Enormous quantities of colonial produce, sugars, coffees, cottons, accumulated in the docks, or in the vessels which blocked up the Thames, and a no less considerable quantity of unsaleable manufactures caused the emission of an immense number of bills, which the Bank discounted, giving in exchange paper money which was depreciated 20 or 25 per cent. At the same time the national expenses began to rise to a hundred millions sterling a year against a revenue of ninety millions, of which twenty millions were the produce of an annual loan; and dearth of provisions, which during the year had fallen upon France, had been so severe in England, that bands of workmen, bursting into the shops and sometimes plundering the manufactories, demanded bread with clamorous cries which would have terrified any government less accustomed to the clamours of a free people, but could not fail to distress every government which was wise and humane.

It is true, that a hundred vessels of war, and two hundred frigates, bearing her victorious flag over every sea, an army, small in numbers, indeed, but valiantly and skilfully conducted, and finally, a cabinet which was the only one in Europe which had refused to be dictated to by Napoleon's despotic will, recompensed, in some degree, glorious England for her sufferings; but every thoughtful mind perceived that her existing position was one which concealed great perils, and that should the terrible genius with which she was con-

tending, carry out his designs with prudence and forethought, he might reduce the commerce and finances of England to the last extremity, and even terminate the interminable war in Spain, driving Lord Wellington and his brave army into the sea. One hundred thousand of the six hundred thousand men lost in Russia, and his own presence in the Peninsula, would have sufficed to have obtained this result. This was everywhere the general opinion, and everywhere found expression in words coloured by the peculiar opinions of the various speakers. The opposition in the British Parliament expressed it in the language of party; the populace vociferated it in the streets in popular fashion, and the enlightened members of the government whispered it in the recesses of the cabinet, from which the Marquis of Wellesley, brother of the celebrated Lord Wellington, and sharing the opinion above alluded to, had withdrawn on account of his antipathy for the character and inflexible policy of Mr. Percival. But a state of warfare may become as much a habit as one of peace, and after having been long accustomed to such a state it was found as difficult to escape from it in England as in France. Great Britain had become used to being at war and at war it remained; the actual result being such as to testify to the good judgment of those who persisted in maintaining the war policy; but yet, the exercise of a little wisdom on the part of Napoleon might have produced a result of a very different nature.

A sentiment, partly honourable and partly interested, had gained possession of the minds of the bulk of the nation, consisting partly of sympathy for the Spanish insurgents and partly of anxiety to prevent Napoleon from establishing his influence over the Peninsula. Had Napoleon made some sacrifice in this respect, or by a prodigious victory set England free from the obligations in which she felt bound in honour towards Spain, peace would have been immediately accepted, leaving France in possession of immense aggrandizements. Two men alone in England displayed invincible resolution, and those were Mr. Percival and Lord Wellington. The former, a most able advocate, of an upright heart, and so strict and resolute as to be much disliked by his colleagues on account of his obstinacy, had obtained by this characteristic the chief place in the cabinet, and his resolution not to make peace was simply one of its manifestations; whilst the latter, partly because the conduct of the war in the Peninsula raised his glory every day to a greater height, and partly because his extraordinary sagacity enabled him to perceive the commencement of some confusion in the management of affairs in

Spain, on our part, was anxious that the war should be continued, declaring, that although he could not be quite certain of being always able to maintain his footing in the Peninsula, that he could, nevertheless, see that ruin was about to overwhelm Napoleon's vast empire. The Prince Regent who, a year since, had obtained the reins of government, hesitated between the heads of the opposition, his old friends, and the ministers, who were the old confidential advisers of his father. He had gradually become accustomed to the latter and alienated from the former ; but he perceived the danger of persisting in a system of unlimited war ; and was, at the same time equally conscious of the danger of suddenly placing the power of the nation in the hands of men who had never conducted this war, and who even condemned it, at the very moment when its successful conclusion, perhaps, could only be accomplished by a skilful perseverance in it for some time longer. In the midst of these perplexities, he had attempted at the commencement of the year 1812, to effect a reconciliation between the ministers and Lords Grey and Grenville ; but failed, notwithstanding his strenuous endeavours to effect his object ; when suddenly an unexpected event which, under any other circumstances, would certainly have caused some change in the English government, removed the principal minister from the scene. A man named Bellingham, a sort of madman, who believed that he had rendered his country good services in Russia, and who continually demanded some reward for them of the Ambassador, Lord Gower, and of the various members of the cabinet, daily frequenting the lobbies of the Houses of Parliament with the purpose of interesting powerful patrons in his favour, at length determined to kill one of the persons whom he had vainly solicited, and wished that this object of his vengeance should be Lord Gower, but meeting Mr. Percival, shot him instead. He surrendered himself, acknowledged his crime, and died with the tranquillity of a madman. An opinion at first prevailed that this crime had some political cause, and although this was soon found to be erroneous, it became evident that it had a political significance, when the ferocious cries of the populace exasperated by suffering, arose in favour of the wretched being who had struck down a man who was amenable to history but not to the assassin.

Had this event taken place before the Russian war had become probable, it would have changed, there is good reason to suppose, the system of English policy. But Mr. Percival was killed on the 11th of May, at the moment when Napoleon was marching towards the Niemen ; and this war between

France and Russia opened to it such new perspectives, that when entrusting the ministry of foreign affairs to Lord Castlereagh, the Prince Regent intimated his determination to persevere in the policy of Pitt and Percival.

Thus was a first fortunate chance snatched from Napoleon by the Russian war, and he was soon to lose another not less to be regretted, being that which might have arisen from the war which had just been declared between England and America.

As Napoleon was obliged to oppress the nations of Europe by the measures he was forced to adopt for the purpose of compelling them to submit to the rigours of the continental blockade, so was England forced to oppress even more cruelly the maritime nations in the exercise of her supremacy on the seas. To compel, indeed, all the commercial nations to send their vessels to London or Malta for the purpose of receiving permission to sail, to pay tribute, and to receive cargoes of English merchandise; and to compel them to regard as blockaded ports those which had never really been so, required the exercise of an insupportable tyranny on the ocean which was as odious as that of Napoleon on land.

This was one of the circumstances from which Napoleon might have reaped great advantage, and by which he might have gained allies in exchange for those whom he had given to England by the rigours of the continental blockade, had he known how to await the benefits of patience.

The greater number of the maritime powers of the old world had disappeared, absorbed in his immense empire; but beyond the Atlantic existed one which, inaccessible to European armies, silently increased, day by day acquiring a strength which was suspected but not thoroughly understood. This power was America, a real Hercules in the cradle, and destined to astonish the world as soon as it should begin to exert its natural vigour; and with respect to this country, on the subject of maritime rights, both France and England committed the gravest errors, at the very moment when to each of these countries friendship was of the utmost importance. As, however, the British government had committed these errors to a greater extent than Napoleon, the balance of American good-will turned in favour of the latter, and its hostility became directed solely against England.

We have already seen how America, irritated by the *Orders in Council*, which declared it necessary that all vessels should touch at London or Malta for the purpose of obtaining a license to navigate the ocean, and also declared a vast extent of coast to be blockaded when no semblance of an actual blockade existed there, had been almost immediately after-

wards equally disgusted by the decrees of Berlin and Milan, which declared denationalized every vessel which had submitted to these orders of the British council, and had responded to these two acts of tyranny, of which the second was the necessary consequence of the first, by a measure of a very similar nature, the law of *Non-Intercourse*. It will be remembered that this law prohibited American vessels from frequenting the European seas, and that many American ship owners, attracted by the chances of obtaining enormous profits, had disregarded its provisions ; and submitting, on the contrary, to those of the English *Orders in Council*, had thus formed that race of *pretended neutrals* of whom Napoleon had made such large captures, and of whom he had desired all the other European states, including Russia, to make seizures. It will be remembered also that when this state of things had lasted somewhat less than two years, the American states, weary of injuring themselves for the purpose of causing injury to others, declared that it would abandon the system it had adopted in favour of that one of the two powers, France and England, which should renounce all pretensions of controlling the navigation of the oceans. Napoleon had cleverly taken advantage of this circumstance, and declared that from the 1st November 1810 the decrees of Berlin and Milan should be annulled in respect to the United States, provided that the Americans on their part, should either obtain of England the revocation of the *Orders in Council*, or compel her to respect their rights. On this occasion Napoleon displayed unusual consideration for the rights of others, refraining from dictating too openly to America the course which she should pursue, by actually demanding that she should declare war against England ; whilst nevertheless his meaning was sufficiently manifest under the formula in which he clothed it.

America, eagerly responding to this overture, had declared by an act of the 2nd of March 1811 its maritime relations re-established with France, and the law of *Non-Intercourse* maintained with respect to England until she should revoke her *Orders in Council* ; and in answer to this act the British cabinet, which clung to the *Orders in Council* more from a feeling of vanity than on account of any advantage to be derived from them, had modified certain of their details whilst it still maintained their principle intact. It annulled the obligation which had been laid upon merchant vessels to visit the ports of London or Malta, and restricted its paper blockade to the coasts of the French Empire, from the Elba to the Saint Sebastian in the ocean, and from Port-Vendre to Cattaro in the Mediterranean and Adriatic, but at the

same time persisted in its resolution to confiscate enemy's goods in neutral vessels ; and thus maintained almost in its entirety the maritime tyranny which Great Britain had arrogated to itself, and those usurpations which had called forth in reply the decrees of Berlin and Milan. And if this system, and if these orders in council were contrary to every principle of right, in a still greater degree were they productive of actual inconvenience to the citizens of the United States, for the English not only made them the pretext for seizing silks and wines belonging to Americans on the ground that they were enemy's goods, but at the same time pressed into their service American sailors, on the pretence that as they spoke English they were deserters from the British navy. Every vessel freighted with a cargo of French merchandise was pillaged, every sailor speaking the English language was arrested as a deserter, and many English frigates pursued this system even on the very shores of America, in the sight of indignant populations. Doubtless there were at this time a certain number of deserters from the English naval service in America, for it usually happens that when a country is engaged in warfare some of its sailors emigrate for the purpose of avoiding being forced to exchange the commercial service for the governmental, which is far less lucrative. Fortunately, however, for the honour of nations those who act in this manner are always but few in proportion to the whole number ; and whilst the number of men lawfully seized in the manner above mentioned amounted at most to six thousand, there is good reason to believe that at least double that number were seized on board American vessels, on the pretence, only, that they were English sailors. The right of search, therefore, being thus exercised, whilst the coasts of the French empire which comprised the best part of Europe were blockaded, it is evident that, notwithstanding the relaxation which had been made in the Orders in Council, the commercial intercourse of America with England was rendered impossible.

The Americans were too jealous of the right of free navigation of the ocean, and too careful of their own interests not to resist these intolerable pretensions, and to point out the illusory nature of the pretended modifications in the *Orders in Council*. The impressment of their sailors, especially, which was obstinately continued by the English frigates at the mouth of the Chesapeake and Delaware, was the source of unanimous indignation, and in the course of 1811 the dispute between England and America had reached the utmost degree of violence. Lord Castlereagh maintained with incredible arrogance and an obstinate sophistry little worthy of England,

that the modifications made in the Orders in Council were more considerable than those made by Napoleon in the decrees of Berlin and Milan ; that in reality these decrees had not been revoked, that America could furnish no proof of their revocation, that testimony to the contrary was furnished every day by the seizure of numerous American vessels by the French marine ; and that, finally, to claim for neutral vessels the right of freely conveying any species of merchandise, save contraband of war, was to demand in fact the free circulation of French products throughout the whole world ; whilst the Americans had not in return obtained an equal freedom of circulation for English products. With regard to the impressment of sailors, Lord Castlereagh displayed inflexible firmness, declaring that with regard to sailors, her most precious species of property, England would take possession of her own wherever she could find them.

The Americans rejoined, with much reason, that the modifications made in the *Orders in Council* were of no effect, since they still maintained the right of searching neutral vessels for enemy's property, and the fictitious blockade ; that the revocation of the decrees of Berlin and Milan was a matter which concerned them alone, and of the sincerity of which they alone could be the right judges, since it concerned only their own commerce, and not that of any other nation ; that they possessed, moreover, the official declaration of the French minister, ready to be converted into a decree as soon as the concession demanded of America by France should have been fulfilled ; that some arbitrary proceedings, indeed, had been taken by the French, but were partly due to the unsettled state in which the affair stood, and partly to the violent course pursued by the English, and that America both could and would prevent their repetition ; that the reproach that America had not obtained from France the recognition of her right to traffic freely in English merchandise was puerile and unworthy of a serious discussion ; that, in short, America, asserting the right of neutrals to take in whatever freight they might choose on their own coasts, did not claim the right to introduce into England, for example, the wines or silks of France, which would have been an impertinent pretence, but did claim the right to convey such silks and wines to whatever countries might desire to receive them ; since it was the undoubted right of every neutral nation not to be injured by the war which might be waged between others ; that the right which it claimed for neutrals was, not that they should have liberty to introduce into other countries such merchandise as it might be contrary to their interests to receive, but that they might traffic without restriction with

those countries which were willing to receive it; that to complain that America had not demanded of France the privilege of introducing into that country English products was unreasonable even to folly.

With regard to the impressment of sailors, the Americans added, that whilst England had an undoubted right to pursue and punish deserters from her services on her own territory, she had, nevertheless, no right to pursue them on the territories of other nations; that on the seas, which are the common property of all nations, and the exclusive property of none, a ship sailing under its national flag was a portion of the territory of the nation to which it belonged, according to the recognised principles of international law; that for England, therefore, to seize any sailor, whether English or not, on board an American vessel, was as gross a violation of American territory as would be committed, should an English constable seize an English culprit at Washington itself.

The truth of these principles was so evident that Lord Castlereagh and his civilians were wholly unable to answer them, and in the course of the year 1811, war was declared between England and the United States, a circumstance which would doubtless have been very greatly to our advantage had not France, still, unfortunately, executed rigorous measures with respect to the commerce of the latter country which furnished the partisans of British influence in America and the friends of peace at any price with specious arguments against a war between the two countries.

Napoleon had been unwilling to withdraw his decrees immediately, and had limited himself in the first place to a formal promise to revoke them as soon as America should have taken some decided measures against England. As soon, therefore, as the American act of the 2nd March 1811, which re-established commercial relations with France, whilst it left them suspended with regard to England, became known in Europe, Napoleon replied to it by an act passed on the 28th April 1811, which revoked the decrees of Berlin and Milan in respect to America; and thus utterly destroyed the principal of the assertions made by the English. But unfortunately he partly destroyed the good effects thus produced by maintaining certain exceptions to the free right of commerce belonging to neutrals, and subjecting American commerce to certain restrictions of a nature peculiarly inconvenient. In the first place, he was unwilling to restore the celebrated cargoes which had been seized in Holland, not only because they were of great value, but because, also, they belonged to that class of American traders which had more particularly

engaged in commercial relations with Great Britain, and for which he had more aversion than even for the English themselves. He excused this rigour by two good reasons, the first of which was, that the proprietors of those cargoes had violated the law of *non-intercourse* by sending them to Europe, and having thus broken the laws of their country had become denationalized; and the second, that the confiscation of these vessels was the natural result of the seizure in America of French vessels, on the ground that they had violated the law of *non-intercourse*. With regard to this latter reason, indeed, it is true that the French vessels seized numbered three or four, whilst the American vessels seized by Napoleon numbered several hundreds; but on the point of honour, Napoleon declared that the mere number could not be held in any account, and that the capture of a thousand American vessels would not compensate in his eyes for any ill treatment of a single French vessel in the ports of the United States. Nevertheless, he had consented to release some of the American vessels seized since the declaration of the 1st November 1810, that is to say, since the date of the offer made to America to revoke the decrees of Berlin and Milan, if America should accept the conditions on which this offer was made.

Whilst re-establishing the rights of neutrals in respect to the Americans, Napoleon still maintained some exceptions to these rights, declaring his intention to seize any American vessel which should be found sailing under an English convoy, as having become an enemy by association, and, in reprisal for the blockade of the shores of France by the English, to prevent any vessel from visiting the shores of England;—directing this interdiction, he said, not against the ships of America, but against the shores of England. And finally, as he had armies before Lisbon and Cadiz, he asserted that to convey provisions to either of those places, would be to violate a real blockade, and therefore forbade it. All these restrictions upon the enjoyment of the simple rights of neutrals were capable of being supported by sound reasons, but this fact in no degree diminished the bad effect produced by them in America.

With regard to commerce, Napoleon, who was always anxious whilst permitting commercial relations between France and America, to keep away from the former country both English ships and English merchandise, had devised the most minute precautions for enforcing his wishes. In the first place, he directed that the ships sailing from America to France, should depart only from New York or New Orleans, and should touch the French shores only at Bordeaux,

Nantes, or Havre. In addition to this regulation, he ordered that every cargo before its departure from America should be verified and inventoried by his consuls, for the purpose of preventing any change being made in it *en route*, and that neither sugar nor coffee should form a portion of such cargoes, the origin of those articles being always doubtful. At the same time he endeavoured to compel the American merchants bringing cargoes to France, to take back in return two thirds of the value of such cargoes in French silks and wines; and, finally, he had rendered all goods imported from America subject to the famous tariff of the 5th of August, 1810, which consisted in substituting a tax of 50 per cent. for the absolute prohibition which had been pronounced against the importation of any exotic produce.

As soon as the American merchants found themselves exposed to these restrictions, they uttered bitter complaints against them, which unfortunately caused the most unfavourable impressions in the United States, and the result was, that Napoleon deprived himself for the sake of a slight gain of the immense advantage which he must have derived from a declaration of war between England and America. He was quite right to be unwilling to permit English goods to gain admittance into France by means of neutral vessels, but had war been declared between England and America, the ships of the latter country would have obtained but a small portion of their cargoes from the dépôts of the former; and the rule that the vessels trading between France and America should only sail between three ports of the former country and two of the latter, was simply to facilitate the blockade of our coasts by the English, and might well have been exchanged for strict examinations of the cargoes by consuls of integrity. With regard to the prohibition relative to sugars and coffees, a certain portion of those articles was so absolutely necessary to France, that Napoleon had permitted them to be brought even from England by means of licences; and it would have been much simpler to have received them at the hands of the Americans, who might have obtained them from the English colonies. And finally, with respect to the obligation imposed upon American merchants to buy in exchange for their imports a certain portion of the wines and silks of France, it was to be remembered that too much solicitude for the welfare of Bordeaux and Lyons might be rather injurious than beneficial, and, moreover, that the Americans might well be left to select such French products for export as might seem best to themselves.

The great object to be obtained was the creation of a state

of war between Great Britain and America, not only because the loss of the trade of the latter country would be one of the greatest blows which could be inflicted on the former, but because, also, from the firing of the first cannon shot in anger between them, the American flag would at once cease to be the secret agent of England; and without the aid of such secret agency it may be well imagined what the effect would have been to her of the continental blockade.

No sacrifice could have been too great on our part for the purpose of obtaining such a result as this, and it was evident that it could only be obtained by removing in the first place all causes of complaint against us on the part of the Americans, that their irritation might be solely directed against England, and in the second place by leading them to hope that an extensive commerce with France would compensate them for that which they were about to lose with England. But unfortunately a spirit of distrust, pride, and obstinacy rendered Napoleon unwilling to grant the concessions demanded of him, and induced him, when he did yield them ungraciously one by one, to destroy their effect by untimely rigour. When therefore the advocates of a war with England cited in the American congress the number of vessels seized by the English or on board of which they had impressed into their service American sailors, those who were opposed to the declaration of war were able to cite in reply the number of American vessels captured by the French ships of war at the mouths of the Thames or the Tagus; and when the former set forth the vastness of the French commerce which America would enjoy in compensation for that of which she would be deprived by a state of war with England, the latter were able to state in reply the restriction which had been imposed on this commerce by its limitations to two ports in America and three in France, and the many inconveniences and excessive taxes to which it was exposed.

The state of public opinion in the United States, and the division of parties in this free country, still more complicated this question.

At the time of which we speak, as well as before and after it, the people of North America were divided into Federalists and Democrats. The former, although formerly eager for war with Great Britain for the sake of severing America from connection with it, had, when this severance was once effected, permitted themselves to entertain a species of predilection for the mother country, which led them to desire both its commerce and alliance. Motives of interest also had considerable influence in strengthening the hold of this feeling upon those

minds which entertained it; for, being almost entirely established on the north east coasts of America, at Philadelphia, at New York, at Boston, they had been long engaged in the English trade, and were naturally anxious that America should receive those English products in which they trafficked. This party was composed of wealthy merchants, whose manners, tastes, and ideas were those of that great English commercial class of which they had once formed a portion; and whilst they held the reserved, severe opinions of a commercial aristocracy, they delighted in the wise, cautious conservative policy of Mr. Pitt, and altogether resembled the merchants of the city of London, who had always been the adherents of this illustrious British minister. With regard to America they gave their willing support to the Federal government, and were anxious that it should be at peace with the rest of the world. The France of Louis XVI. was scarcely to their taste, that of the convention not at all, and that of Napoleon but little. They deplored the rigorous measures enforced by England against their commerce, but they were unwilling to make them a cause of war: and they were especially distrustful of the government of Napoleon, whom they regarded as revolutionary, despotic, ambitious, and the general disturber of the world's peace.

The Democrats, or Republicans, as they were called at this period when the republic had not been long proclaimed, were both by feeling and interest precisely opposed to the Federalists. Inhabiting for the most part the interior of the country, and spread over Virginia, Carolina, Ohio, Kentucky, territories rich in cotton, tobacco, sugar, cereals, and woods of all kinds, their interests led them to desire free commercial relations with France, where there was a great demand for their agricultural products; and at the same time not only preferred themselves French goods to English, but also, having both the manners and the opinions of the planters, entertained the most extravagant liberalism. Eager, formerly, in provoking the revolt against England, they had, unlike the Federalists, continued to hate Great Britain even after they had obtained the triumph they sought, and desired to complete their independence by renouncing all connection with the mother country, whether in alliance, trade, or manners, and whilst they thus hated Great Britain, they naturally bestowed upon France an equal degree of good-will, preserving a lively consciousness of the services received at her hands, and readily pardoning her revolutionary excesses, at which they had been less revolted than the Federalists, and, although she had become subject to a temporary despotism, always regarding her as an active, enterprising nation,

destined in every age to quicken the development of the human intellect. Irritated in the highest degree by the outrages offered to their flag, they were impatient to avenge them; filled with ambition they longed to effect the conquest of Canada, and excited by these various motives, were eager for war with England. They were anxious, therefore, that France by freely opening her ports to American commerce, and receiving their agricultural products from the south and the west, should furnish them with arguments in support of their vehement and passionate policy.

Whenever news arrived from Europe of some excess committed by England against the honour of the American flag, the Democrats triumphed, but when, on the other hand, information was received of the seizure by the French of some ship belonging to the United States, the Federalists declared that it would be most unjust to make war against England without at the same time commencing hostilities against France, and as it would be mere folly to make war against both these powers, that, therefore, war should be declared against neither of them. The Democrats replied, that only persons void of any sentiment of honour or patriotism could be willing to suffer the impressment of their sailors and the violation of their flag, and that it was evident that the Federalists wished to become once more British colonists; to which the Federalists rejoined that the Democrats were turbulent fellows completely under the sway of French influence.

The head of the executive power of the United States at this moment was Mr. Maddison, the friend and disciple of Jefferson, a moderate Democrat, well informed, keen sighted, thoroughly conversant with the conduct of affairs, and serving by means of his personal intelligence to correct the extravagant opinions of his party. Thoroughly persuaded, as he was, that commercial relations with France were more advantageous to America than those with England, he regarded a war with the latter power as inevitable, although he would have been glad that his country should have remained neutral, and have derived all the advantages which must have accrued to her in a state of neutrality. But whilst he considered that the maintenance of her rights as a neutral power must inevitably lead America into a war with England, he was anxious to be forced into it by public opinion, and that the United States should be supported in it by France, and receive from this power the commercial advantages which should fitly reward the enforcement of the maritime rights of neutrals. Full of wisdom, but loving power, he entertained that ambition which was the only one the presidents of the United States

had up to that time permitted themselves to indulge, and was anxious to be elected a second time to the presidency, thus extending his term of power from four years to eight, and obtaining a dignity which had been the glory and recompense of Washington and Jefferson, the full satisfaction of their modest and patriotic desires. But whilst he had before his eyes these two illustrious examples, he had also to remember that of Mr. John Adams, who, desiring in 1798 to provoke a war with France, had failed to obtain his re-election. It behoved him, therefore, to behave with great circumspection, and he had selected as his minister for foreign affairs Mr. Monroe, who entertained democratic views similar to his own, was equally accustomed to the conduct of affairs, had acted as American envoy both in France and England, and hoped to be one day the successor of Mr. Maddison, as Mr. Maddison himself had been that of Jefferson. In order, however, to appoint Mr. Monroe to this post, Mr. Maddison had been compelled to dismiss Mr. Smith, a distinguished and violent democrat, a member of a powerful family, and he now had to meet the opposition not only of the Federalists, but also of the extreme Democrats, who were much discontented with his circumspection and deliberate caution.

All that was requisite to bring the struggle between the two American parties to an end was the arrival of a despatch from Paris containing a complete and definitive acknowledgment of the rights of neutrals, and the concession of valuable commercial advantages. But, unfortunately, it was now the close of the year 1811, when Napoleon was already occupied with his projects against Russia, and his ardent intellect, although immensely great, was not capable of carrying out two projects simultaneously. Passionately desirous in 1810 of enforcing the continental blockade, he had then regarded a war between Great Britain and America as capable of affording a thousand combinations agreeable to his plans, and he had neglected no means which might tend to bring it about. At the close of the year 1811, however, being full of the idea of destroying at one blow all resistance to his power, he had treated Mr. Barlow, the American minister, and an intimate friend of President Maddison, with much neglect, sometimes making him wait for an audience during whole weeks. In addition, moreover, to this characteristic of Napoleon's mind, which led him to devote its attention to any one object to the exclusion of all others, another of its peculiarities consisted in a species of political avarice, which led him to endeavour to obtain as much as possible whilst giving as little as possible in return, and

which not unfrequently defeated itself, causing the loss of what a more liberal spirit might have obtained. Still anxious, although less eagerly so, to enforce the continental blockade, fearful that should he change his system in any way he would open paths to English commerce, and fearful also of being deceived by the Americans, he was unwilling to make any concessions to this latter people until they should have declared war against England. He continually said to Mr. Barlow, "Declare yourselves, cease to indulge in these protracted hesitations, and you shall obtain of me all the advantages you can desire.

In the meantime, the French frigates destroyed every American vessel carrying corn to Lisbon or Cadiz, whilst the French corsairs bore down upon all ships that attempted to enter the mouth of the Thames.

It was thus that the war which might have been declared in 1811 was deferred, and that the whole of this year was occupied by violent discussions between the various American parties. On the arrival of any vessel from Europe, application was immediately made to M. Serrurier, the French minister, whom Napoleon had sent to America to induce that country to declare war against England, to know whether he had received any satisfactory information; upon all which occasions this diplomatist, who was as zealous as he was prudent, repeated the lesson which had been sent to him from Paris, and replied, that as soon as the Americans should have abandoned their policy of tergiversation, they would receive the reward due to their assertion of the free navigation of the seas. The American congress had, therefore, been adjourned to 1812 without having taken any decided measures; a circumstance which was most unfortunate for us, since a war between England and America would have rendered the continental blockade so efficacious, and affected Great Britain to such a degree, that the policy of its government would have probably undergone an entire change.

It was impossible, however, that this state of affairs should continue. England persisted in enforcing her *Orders in Council*, and exasperated the American public to the highest pitch of anger, by a declaration which was made by the British cabinet, at the moment when the full exercise of the royal power was committed to the Prince Regent. This Prince, as has already been stated, on assuming the regency in 1811, had been obliged to submit to certain restrictions of his prerogative, which, although of slight importance, seemed to be in some degree the adjournment of his definitive installation; and an opinion had universally spread throughout Europe and America, that his real policy would not appear until he

had been fully invested with the royal power. The English opposition, therefore, had not despaired of his return to his old friends, and the United States, continually deferring the commencement of a serious war, indulged in the idea that he might yet restrict that naval despotism of Great Britain, which had been one of the characteristics of the policy of Mr. Pitt and his followers. The restrictions, however, upon the Prince's authority, having been removed at the commencement of 1812, and no change having thereupon taken place in the course of British policy, the United States determined at length to offer effectual resistance to the vexations imposed upon her commerce by England, and to await no longer the favours so often promised by Napoleon. And singular was the spectacle now presented by the two great powers France and England, the former enlightened by all the lustre of genius, the latter by all the light of liberty, falling with respect to America, through the blindness of passion, into similar errors, for it must unfortunately be acknowledged that free countries are as subject to the blindness of passion as others, although we may still say that of all safeguards against the blindness of passion, liberty is the most certain and the most ready of effect.

The American government, discontented with France but indignant at the conduct of Great Britain, made preparations for a series of military measures, which manifestly indicated an intention to commence a war, and at the same time took great pains to avoid entering into any communications with the French legation, in order that its resolutions might not be attributed to French influence. It proposed to raise the permanent army to twenty thousand men, to enrol fifty thousand volunteers, to establish a fleet of twelve ships of the line and seventeen frigates, and to borrow eleven millions of dollars (fifty-five millions of francs). These measures were discussed by the American politicians with great ardour, and from the points of view proper to each of the two parties into which they were divided. The Federalists desiring an increase of power for the Central Authority of the State, favoured, since war was inevitable, the augmentation of the permanent army and the navy, but at the same time were opposed to the enrolment of volunteers. The Democrats, on the other hand, having an instinctive distrust of central authority, were opposed to the creation of a permanent army, and were willing that the war against England should be carried out only by throwing a host of volunteer troops upon Canada, for the purpose of snatching that country from England and annexing it to the American Federation. A vote passed the American congress, however, in favour of the

measures above detailed, with some modifications in favour of the views of the Federalists, the strength of the permanent army being raised to thirty-five thousand men. To these measures was added another, being the law of *Embargo*, by which all American vessels were prohibited during two months from leaving the American ports, in order that the English might be able to make but few captures. After these two months war itself would be declared.

In the meantime, various incidents furnished arguments both to the Federalists and Democrats in support of their particular views. Certain revelations having been made by an intriguer, which appeared to show that certain Federalists had had culpable communications with the English government of Canada, their party, although unjustly accused, fell for a time into disrepute. Another incident, however, speedily altered this state of affairs, for information arriving that the French had sunk in the neighbourhood of Lisbon several American vessels which were conveying corn for the use of the English army, the Federalists once more took a prominent position, asserting that the decrees of Berlin and Milan had not been withdrawn, that the decree of the 28th April, 1811, was but a pretence, and asking how it would be possible to declare war against England for not having revoked the Orders in Council, when France had not on her part revoked the decrees of Berlin and Milan.

It was necessary, however, for the government of President Madison to determine upon some definite course of conduct, lest the continual tergiversations in which it had hitherto indulged should injure it in public estimation. And accordingly, as the American public began to consider, after some reflection, that it was not unnatural that the French should endeavour to prevent the conveyance of provisions to the English army, and as, moreover, Mr. Barlow's despatches contained assurances of the excellent disposition of France towards the United States, in the middle of June, at the very time when Napoleon was marching from the Niemen upon the Dwina, the question of war with Great Britain was solemnly submitted to the American congress. The discussion which ensued was violent and prolonged. Some Federalists declared that if America were really resolved to enforce respect for her flag, and to play an heroic part, she ought to declare war against both France and England. But slight attention, however, was bestowed upon the sallies of persons who thus attempted to decry a course of policy by carrying it to excess, and by a majority of seventy-nine votes against thirty-seven in the chamber of representatives, and of nineteen against thirteen in the senate, war with England was

voted by the American congress. The official declaration was dated the 19th June, 1812.

Whilst the errors committed by Great Britain were leading to this result, which might have had for her such disastrous consequences, the English Cabinet, willing to act with prudence when it was too late, revoked at length the *Orders in Council*. The news of this act reached Mr. Forster at the moment when he was about to take his departure, and he left to a chargé d'affaires the duty of communicating it to President Madison.

The Democrats, however, were eager for the commencement of hostilities, and two facts occurred in connection with the war to fill the American people, the one with joy, and the other with sadness. General Hull, at the head of three thousand men, hastening imprudently to cross the Canadian frontier near fort *Detroit*, to spread insurrectional proclamations amongst the Canadians, had been surrounded by the English troops between lakes Huron and Erie, and compelled to lay down his arms. But at the same moment the brother of this General Hull, captain of the *Constitution* frigate, obtained a triumph which exalted in the highest degree the spirit of American patriotism. Several English frigates had for the space of a year insulted the coasts of America, and insolently exercised the assumed right of *impressment* at the mouths of her ports. The frigate *La Guerrière*, formerly belonging to the French, had especially braved the American Commodore, Rogers, and he sought for an opportunity to punish it. Captain Hull, commanding the *Constitution* frigate, encountered the *Guerrière*, and having in thirty minutes totally dismantled her, compelled her to surrender with three hundred men, some fifty being killed or wounded. The manœuvres and firing on the part of the American frigate during this engagement had been of the most admirable description, and her officers and sailors had displayed an intrepidity which announced the advent of a new race of heroes on the sea. The enthusiasm excited by the one of these events, and the confusion produced by the other, rendered utterly vain all attempts to bring about a reconciliation with Great Britain.

Such had been the events on the other side of the Atlantic, whilst the tragic catastrophe was overwhelming our army in Russia. And what might not have been the result of these events, of this declaration of war against England, had it been made a year earlier? When England, without allies in Europe, would have beheld a new enemy arising beyond the ocean, when the Americans, the sole violators of the continental blockade, would have become ardent co-operators in its enforcement, when it would have been, consequently, im-

possible to reproach Russia for her favour for them, and war with her on that account could not have occurred; when twenty thousand men might have been sent under a new La Fayette, in one of the numerous squadrons lying idle in our ports; when finally, our unbroken forces might, by striking a last blow in Spain, have put an end to the maritime war! But after the disaster of Moscow, the occurrence of a war between England and America was no longer an event from which France could derive any real advantage.

In the meantime the course of events in Spain had been equally serious, flowing from the same causes, and almost uninterruptedly unfortunate. It will be remembered that the wise captain who commanded the English armies in the Peninsula, and by remaining there kept alive the Spanish insurrection, had successively recaptured the important fortresses of Cuidad-Rodrigo and Badajoz, and thus annulled all the advantage we had gained by two sanguinary campaigns. Nor will it be forgotten in what manner he had inflicted upon us this double affront. Whilst Napoleon, sending his commands from a distance, giving his attention to the matter one moment, and withdrawing it the next, had abruptly advanced all our corps d'armée upon Valencia, Lord Wellington, always well informed of our movements by the inhabitants of the country, had taken advantage of the occasion to surprise Cuidad-Rodrigo in the face of the army of Portugal, which was much enfeebled by the withdrawal of the detachments which had been marched upon Valencia. And when, in the next place, Valencia having been taken, Napoleon had withdrawn the French forces in all haste towards the north of the Peninsula, for the purpose of securing the communications with France, and driving towards the Niemen the detachments he required, Lord Wellington, always lying in wait for any favourable opportunity, had rapidly advanced towards the south of Portugal, had taken Badajoz by assault, and had thus subjected the army of Andalusia to an affront more bitter even than that to which the army of Portugal had been subject on the occasion of the loss of Cuidad-Rodrigo. It was immediately after having sustained this double check that Napoleon had departed for Russia, leaving Joseph in command of all the French armies in Spain, after having withdrawn from these armies, the Polish troops, the young Guard, a portion of the squadrons of dragoons, and many excellent officers, such as Generals Eblé, Montbrun, and Haxo. The twenty-four millions of francs, which Napoleon had promised to devote annually to the pay of the troops in the Peninsula, had not been paid in 1812 for 1811; and of the million francs a month allowed to Joseph to assist him in

creating an administration, there were due two and a half millions on account of 1811, and six millions on account of 1812. The only directions which Napoleon had left with Joseph were, that he should be careful to preserve the communications with France, and to keep the armies of Portugal and Andalusia always ready to unite against that of Lord Wellington. But how was this precaution, on which, in fact, the whole success of the war depended, to be secured? Napoleon flattered himself that with the general command of three hundred thousand excellent troops, Joseph, if indeed he failed to accomplish marvels, would have been able to maintain his ground; for although he held the military talents of his brother in but little account, he relied upon the wisdom and experience of Marshal Jourdan, whom he esteemed at his true value, whilst he regarded him with but little personal favour, and he ceased, therefore, to bestow his attention upon this Peninsular war, at a moment when it had become a matter of the utmost importance. Had Joseph and Jourdan been able to obtain obedience to their commands they would certainly have accomplished all that Napoleon expected of them, and probably more, but we shall presently see how far the state and position in which the French armies were at the time, rendered it probable that this obedience would be accorded to them.

General Dorsenne, at this time, occupied with forty-six thousand men, Navarre, Guipuscoa, Biscaye, Alava, and Old Castille as far as Burgos. About twenty-one thousand of this number formed the garrisons of Bayonne, Saint-Sebastian, Pampeluna, Bilboa, Tolosa, Vittoria, Burgos, and some other intermediate posts, and there remained, therefore, only twenty-five thousand active troops to operate against Mina, who ravaged Navarre, and against Louga, Campilo, Parlier, and Mérino, who overran Guipuscoa, Biscaye, and Alava as far as Burgos, communicating with the English, and intersecting the routes to such a degree, that a despatch was often two months on the road from Paris to Madrid. The twenty-five thousand troops at Dorsenne's disposal, or even a less number, might have sufficed under an active leader to destroy those guerrilla bands, or at least, to have reduced their operations to insignificance; but General Dorsenne, brave as he was, and well-fitted as he was to act in general warfare, under the direction of an able superior, was neither active enough nor keen enough to compete with guerrilla warfare. Cold and proud, he acknowledged no chief but Napoleon, and relying on the old instructions furnished by the latter to the commandant of the provinces of the north, directing him to occupy himself exclusively with their

pacification, unless the English should place the army of Portugal in danger, General Dorsenne devoted himself too exclusively to the precise duties of his position, to be readily willing to submit to the commands of Joseph. When, therefore, the latter informed his lieutenants of the Emperor's orders, which constituted him commander in chief of the French armies in Spain, General Dorsenne replied that these orders did not affect him, since he had a particular mission, the extent and objects of which had been determined at Paris, and were quite incompatible with the execution of the orders sent to him from Madrid.

The remainder of Old Castille, the kingdom of Léon, the province of Salamanca as far as the bank of the Tagus, were occupied by the army of Portugal, which had to perform a very extensive task, since the line along which it might have to encounter the enemy extended from Astorga to Badajoz, and was at last a hundred and fifty leagues in length. It had no longer any connection with Portugal save in name, and its sole duty was to make head against the English, especially, should they, advancing, attempt to throw themselves into Old Castille, and threaten our line of communications, as had been formerly done by General Moore. In this case, Marshal Marmont, who commanded the army, was directed to check the English with the utmost resolution, General Dorsenne and Joseph being directed to succour him, the latter by sending from Madrid a portion of the army of the centre, and Marshal Soult having orders to send him by the bridge of Almaraz, a reinforcement of fifteen or twenty thousand men. If, on the contrary, Lord Wellington should move upon Madrid by the Tagus, as he had formerly attempted at the time of the battle of Talavera, Marshal Marmont was to cross the Guadarrama, to descend upon the Tagus by Avile, and thus to cover Madrid. If, finally, Lord Wellington should threaten anew lower Estremadura, Marshal Marmont was to pass the Tagus at the bridge of Almaraz, and to advance as far as Badajoz itself, accomplishing for this purpose a long march of a hundred leagues, which he had already effected in the course of the previous year, for the purpose of affording succour to Marshal Soult. Having very little fear that this latter supposition would occur, Napoleon had removed Marshal Marmont's ordinary position from the Tagus to the Douro, from Placencia to Salamanca, by which means he had rendered it easy for Lord Wellington to seize Badajoz. Napoleon considered, with good reason, that our position in Spain, could only be effectually maintained by the zealous co-operation of the generals of the various French armies in the Peninsula, and he constantly, therefore, urged

upon them the necessity of affording mutual succour ; but, unfortunately there could be but little hope that Marshal Soult, who had been always averse to affording assistance to the army of Portugal, would at this time be very willing to aid Marshal Marmont, who had now the utmost need of such support, since it was evident that Lord Wellington, possessed as he was of Ciudad-Rodrigo and Badajoz, the real gates opening from Portugal into Spain, would pass by the former and not by the latter, since the latter led to Andalusia, where he could execute no advantageous operation, whilst the former led into Castille, from whence he might take our armies à revers, and by a single blow snatch Spain from our hands. Lord Wellington, whilst failing to manifest those vast, profound, and daring views, which constitute genius, had, nevertheless, given evidences of a judgment so judicious and firm, that there could be little doubt of the course which he would adopt, and Napoleon showed through all his instructions to his generals that he had divined it.

The British army numbered this year sixty thousand excellent troops, two thirds of whom were English and the remainder Portuguese, and to oppose them, Marshal Marmont had no more than thirty-seven thousand men, for of the fifty-two thousand men who composed his army, seven thousand had been sent, in accordance with Napoleon's directions, under General Bennet into the Asturias to take up a position at Oviédo, whilst some eight thousand more were posted in detachments at Astorga, Zamora, Léon, Valladolid, Salamanca, amongst some lesser posts, such as Benevento, Taro, Polencia Avila, &c., and along the routes. Marshal Marmont had sent, therefore, his aide-de-camp, Jarret, to represent to Napoleon this state of his forces, and to point out to him that whatever might be his danger, General Dorsenne, occupied with the guerilla bands in the north, would find a thousand reasons for declining to come to his assistance ; that Joseph would neither be bold nor active enough to send at the critical moment ten thousand, or even six thousand, of the fourteen thousand men who composed the army of the centre ; that Marshal Soult would find in the distance which separated him from the army of Portugal more than sufficient reasons for not quitting Andalusia ; and that, consequently, the enemy would have time to overwhelm the army of Portugal, and by overwhelming it to uncover the frontier of France, before succour could arrive. This being the state of affairs, therefore, the Marshal declared that unless he were, at least, placed in chief command of the two armies of the north and of Portugal, he could not make head against the English, and would be glad to quit Spain, to accompany the Emperor on his expedition to Russia.

Napoleon had listened to Colonel Jardet, had appeared to be much struck by his representations, and had promised to attend to them, at the same time ridiculing the ambition which led Marshal Marmont to desire a command so superior to his talents. As, however, to satisfy Marshal Marmont's necessities it would have been requisite to have adopted very serious measures, to have recalled such and such of his lieutenants, to have altered the distribution of the French forces in the Peninsula, and perhaps to have evacuated important territories for the purpose of concentrating them, he departed from Paris, leaving unchanged the general arrangement which conferred upon Joseph the command in chief, always hoping that he was about to act in Russia, in a manner which would place on a satisfactory basis the whole system of his affairs.

Notwithstanding his just apprehensions, Marshal Marmont had remained at the head of the army of Portugal, bestowing great solicitude on the requirements of his soldiers, taking pains to place Salamanca in a state of defence by means of large convents converted into citadels, and endeavouring to remount his cavalry, and repair his artillery. In the meantime, Joseph, commanding the army of the centre, had at his disposal thirteen thousand or fourteen thousand troops, with whom, reinforced by about three thousand Spaniards, whom he paid out of his own pocket, and who were faithful as long as they were paid punctually, he had to guard Madrid, together with the province of Toledo on the right, and that of Guadalaxara on the left, to maintain, in the rear, his communications with the army of the north, and to preserve, in front, across La Mancha, some relations with the army of Andalusia. It was even necessary for him to extend one of his wings as far as Cuença for the purpose of communicating with the army of Aragon posted at Valencia. Had one of these points been left unarmed, Joseph would have immediately been cut off from one of the important portions of his kingdom, and lost the slender resources he was still able to obtain, and which consisted in some grain and forage procured at the period of the harvest, and of the taxes levied on the city of Madrid. At this moment, especially, compelled to satisfy the pressing demands of Marshal Marmont, and to send grain to the province of Toledo, from which province he usually obtained supplies of it, he had impoverished Madrid to such a degree in respect to provisions, that the pound of bread cost there from twenty-six to twenty-seven sous; and the consequence was an extreme state of misery which was ill calculated to reconcile the Spaniards to the new dynasty.

Andalusia, invaded so prematurely, was in the hands of

Marshal Soult, who had under his command the best portion of the French forces ; and the fifty-eight thousand troops at his disposal were stationed as follows.—Twelve thousand before Cadiz, to continue the semblance of a siege ; ten thousand at Grenada for the defence of that province ; five thousand at Arcos, to patrol between Seville, Cadiz, and Tarifa ; fifteen thousand in Estremadura under the Count d'Erlon, for the purpose of watching General Hill, who was posted at Badajoz ; and two or three thousand cavalry in the neighbourhood of Bæza, occupied in scouring the country towards the defiles of the Sierra-Morena ; the remaining thirteen thousand or fourteen thousand men being under Soult's immediate command in Seville.

Being posted in so rich a country, Soult was able to procure ample sustenance for his troops, but he entirely neglected to comply with Napoleon's directions to the various Generals, to reserve for the King a portion of the war contributions they might levy, declaring that he could command no more resources than were actually necessary for the supply of his own army and the requirements of the siege of Cadiz. As, moreover, communications had entirely ceased between Soult and the general staff, since the former had drawn in all the posts which had been the means of keeping up any communications with Madrid across La Mancha, asserting that the defence of this province properly devolved on the army of the centre, he had some grounds for declaring that he was ignorant that Joseph had become his commander in chief, for no dispatch containing information of the fact had reached him either from Paris or Madrid.

This state of things proved how great an error Napoleon had committed in prematurely invading Andalusia, the conquest of which procured him none of the results which he had anticipated from it. The siege of Cadiz consisted only in the occupation of some redoubts, from which our artillery directed no cannonade, and to hurling from time to time a few bombs against the town which never reached it, whilst the succour afforded to the army of Portugal had been limited during the march of Masséna upon the Tagus to the capture of Badajoz, which was almost immediately afterwards lost again, and had been reduced, since, to the establishment of Count d'Erlon with fifteen thousand men at Llerena, where he was more than a hundred leagues from Marshal Marmont ; whilst, as for the pecuniary resources which Napoleon had hoped to obtain by the occupation of Andalusia, it is sufficient to mention that Marshal Soult was constantly and eagerly demanding his share of the twenty-four millions of francs which Napoleon had determined to devote to the troops in Spain.

Napoleon frequently and bitterly complained that no real advantage was derived from the occupation of Andalusia, or the ninety thousand troops by which it was held ; but his reproaches and counsels alike lost their effect in the immense distance through which they had to pass, and the ill consequence of having uselessly and prematurely extended operations to the south, remained.

We must now direct our attention to the kingdom of Valencia, and the vast establishment formed there by Marshal Suchet. Since the capture of Valencia, the great concentration of forces which Napoleon had ordered on this side had broken up, and the various contingents had returned to their several provinces. General Reille had returned to Aragon with fourteen thousand men, for the purpose of guarding Saragossa, Lerida, and Tortosa, assisting the army of the north to repel the incursions of Mina, Villa-Campa, Duran, and l'Empicinado, and affording assistance as occasion might require to the army of Catalonia. General Decaen, who commanded the troops of Catalonia under the superior authority of Marshal Suchet, had twenty-seven thousand men with whom to guard Figuières, Hostalrich, and Barcelona, and to appear from time to time under Tarragone, the most important of the conquests of Marshal Suchet, since it prevented the English from establishing themselves in the north-east of Spain. The latter, knowing that we had great difficulty in provisioning our fortresses, endeavoured to cut off communication by sea, while General Lacy endeavoured to cut off on the land side, and they flattered themselves that they would thus be able to reduce it by means of famine. Should this place be lost by us, and General Lacy established in it with his army, he would become, reinforced and provisioned as he would be by the English, a most dangerous enemy, threatening Tortosa, the route of Valencia, and render the evacuation of this city almost inevitable. Marshal Suchet had in the three provinces of Catalonia, Aragon, and Valencia, fifty-eight thousand actually under arms at his disposal ; of these fourteen thousand were consigned to General Reille, twenty-seven thousand to General Decaen, whilst sixteen or seventeen thousand, under his own immediate personal command, watched the long route which follows the coast of the Mediterranean from Tortosa to Valencia, held a position in front of Alicante, and communicated by Cuença with the troops of the central army ; six or seven thousand of them at the most being available as a column mobile, ready to be thrown upon any point which might be more immediately threatened.

Amongst the dangers which threatened the army of Aragon was the appearance of the Anglo-Sicilian army, which had been formed in Sicily by Lord William Bentinck, one of those simple, generous and liberal minded Englishmen who become very grasping when concerned in matters relating to their country. He had made himself the real king of Sicily ; for, finding himself much impeded in the promotion of his objects by the Bourbons, who, having been deprived of Naples by the French, found themselves reduced to mere ciphers by the English in Sicily, and naturally neglected no opportunity of relieving themselves from the yoke of their protectors, he had disembarrassed himself of the king and queen by forcing them to consign the royal power to a young prince, who, invested with the regency at an age when he had himself need of the services of a regent, had summoned the Sicilian nation to his aid, by bestowing upon it a constitution similar to that of Great Britain. Freed, then, from the court of Palermo, and being no longer under any apprehension of attempts on the part of Murat, since he had been compelled to take part in the Russian expedition, Lord William had been able to dispose of a corps numbering about twelve thousand men, consisting of an English and a Sicilian division, and from its power to effect rapid movements by means of the English fleet, producing effects superior to its numerical strength. It was carried to the Balearic Isles, which were in the hands of the English, and to the Murcian coast, which was almost equally in their power, and at which places respectively General Wittingham and General Roche organized two Spanish legions intended to be placed under English command ; and here the Anglo-Sicilian army, being in a position to move either to Catalonia towards General Lacy, or to the kingdom of Murcia towards General O'Donnell, became a real and most disquieting danger.

Marshal Suchet, very attentive to the dangers of his position, had employed in the most judicious manner the sixteen thousand men reserved to the kingdom of Valencia. Having placed little garrisons well provisioned, in Tortosa, Peniscola, and Saguntum, and having kept at Valencia another little garrison, which by means of the soldiers at the depôts and the invalids might be doubled if there were need, he had left about five thousand men under General Harispe in front of Alicante. Having reserved to himself an active division of six thousand or seven thousand men, he was ready to throw himself either upon Tortosa or upon Alicante, or even to move towards Cuença in the direction of Madrid.

The success which attended Marshal Suchet was chiefly the result of his powers of administration. On the day

succeeding the capture of Valencia, that city, trembling at the remembrance of the massacre of the French, feared that it had fallen into the power of a pitiless avenger; but it speedily found, on the contrary, that their vanquisher was a gentle, adroit man, who took pains to re-assure the inhabitants of the conquered city, inviting them to take a share in its government, as he had previously done at Saragossa. Already inspiring confidence by his conduct in Aragon, he had successively brought back the archbishop and the ancient municipal magistrates of the province, had formed a junta, arranged with it the re-partition of the impost, effected several useful reforms, and at the same time, without in any manner oppressing the country, procured for his soldiers the enjoyment of all its abundance. Napoleon desired that Valencia should pay in money for the French blood which had been shed in 1808, and he had demanded a ransom of fifty millions. This was an excessive contribution to be levied upon a country in the midst of the disorders of war, and which, although rich, was of but small extent; but, nevertheless, there was good reason to suppose that the whole of it would be obtained, should the French troops occupy Valencia for the space of twelve months. Already had Suchet clothed, paid, and armed every one of his soldiers, filled his magazines, prepared a reserve, and sent to Joseph an instalment of three millions, with the promise of a speedy remittance of a sum of much larger amount. No other army in Spain was in such a good state as Suchet's; it served its General well, for it loved him, and it was ready to accomplish at his bidding even greater achievements than those which it had already accomplished.

Information of the new authority which had been bestowed upon Joseph had speedily reached Valencia, the communication with that city being well maintained, and had somewhat displeased Marshal Suchet, who, although of a most amicable disposition, was vexed at any interference with his just and tranquil reign. He was able and even ready to afford Joseph money, but he was quite unable to spare a single soldier, for the provinces which he guarded were the sole resource of the French armies, if, by any misadventure in Castille or Estremadura, they lost their communications with Bayonne. He was supported, moreover, in his refusal to relinquish any of his troops, by the instructions which had been secretly sent to him by Napoleon, in authorising him to regard the staff at Madrid with a deference which should be simply formal; nevertheless, always moderate, and ever refraining from complicating existing difficulties by adding to them those arising

from personal temper, he took care to render to Joseph all the services which were in his power, displaying towards him the most complete apparent deference, and resolving to refer to the secret instructions only in case the new commander in chief should require of him the performance of something which might be injurious to the provinces which he had been commanded to preserve for the empire.

The command in chief which had been conferred upon Joseph and Marshal Jourdan, his major-general, was in fact, it must be confessed, a very singular one. Of the five armies occupying Spain, that of the north refused to obey him; that of Portugal obeyed him that it might obtain the support of the army of the centre, which obeyed him absolutely and directly, but was of very insignificant strength; that of Andalusia, the most considerable of all and the least prevented by circumstances from yielding him obedience, was resolutely determined to withhold it, even ignoring his authority, and for a considerable time feigning to be ignorant of its existence; whilst, finally, that of Aragon, testifying towards him much respect and placing at his disposal sums of money, was yet prevented by circumstances from affording him any further services. Marshal Jourdan's keen judgment and profound experience soon pointed out to him the vice of the position, and he pointed it out to Joseph in a complete and startling report. But what could be done? To send a despatch to Paris would be a means of obtaining nothing but a reply, after a lapse of two months, from the Duke de Feltre, as long as insignificant; nevertheless, Marshal Jourdan sent to the minister of war a circumstantial account of the position of the staff at Madrid, that the responsibility attaching to it might be reduced to just limits.

The only enemy to be feared was the English army, which, having taken Ciudad-Rodrigo in January, and Badajoz in March, and reposed during April and May, was ready to act in June. As there were no more fortresses for it to besiege, it became a question what would now be its course, and there existed certain indications which rendered this question a matter of easy solution to a man of Marshal Jourdan's discernment.

In fact, Badajoz having been captured, Lord Wellington had advanced to the north of Portugal with the bulk of his troops, and had taken up a position at Fuente-Guinaldo, at some leagues from Almeida and Ciudad-Rodrigo, thus threatening old Castile and the army of Portugal, to which was entrusted its defence. In addition, moreover, to the presence of Lord Wellington at Fuente-Guinaldo there were several very striking secondary indications of what were his

real projects, such as the movements of troops in Le Beira, Tras-os-Montès and Léon, of immense magazines in Corogne, and numerous mule trains in Galicia. These various preparations were manifest indications of projects directed against Old Castille. But there was one great general reason, which, independently of those several details, sufficiently proved what Lord Wellington's intentions really were, and it consisted in the fact, that by advancing northwards he placed himself in a position to cut off our communications, and to overthrow by a single success the whole of our military system in the Peninsula, whilst, by advancing southwards he could obtain no other result than to disquiet the army of Andalusia, to compel it perhaps to abandon the pretended siege of Cadiz, each of which objects might be obtained, moreover, with much more certainty by operations in the north, since the menace of any serious result in Castille would force the French to evacuate Andalusia, La Mancha, and perhaps Madrid. Neither Joseph nor Marshal Jourdan failed to perceive their true position, and had they not done so, Marshal Marmont, whom the impending danger more immediately threatened, would not have left them in any doubt respecting it. He hastened, at the commencement of May, to announce to them that the English were in motion towards him, and earnestly demanded succour, at the same time making preparations to concentrate his forces. Both Joseph and Marshal Jourdan immediately perceived the course which should be adopted, and displayed on the occasion a keenness of judgment which was natural to the Marshal, who had been engaged in the profession of arms from his youth, but was highly creditable to Joseph who was a stranger to the art of war. Had their authority at this moment been respected nothing would have been easier than to have frustrated Lord Wellington's project, and not only to have frustrated it but even to have made it the means of procuring for us a brilliant triumph, which would have placed our affairs in Spain on a surer footing, and probably have counteracted in a certain degree the ill consequences resulting from the Russian expedition, for a great reverse in the Peninsula would have had a very important effect upon the English, and by England in reality was the whole of Europe influenced.

To meet the danger which had become so imminent, it was only necessary to concentrate for the common defence the available forces, which were far more than sufficient both as respected number and quality. The army of the north, although no longer numbering the forty-six thousand men with whom it had commenced the campaign, still consisted of

twenty thousand active troops, and could well have spared ten thousand of them for some weeks, as was proved by the fact that it eventually did so, but in an inopportune manner, for although our communications would have been thus rendered more difficult, they were already so much obstructed that the evil could scarcely have been increased. Joseph, who had at his disposal thirteen thousand or fourteen thousand active troops, and three thousand Spaniards, might have afforded ten thousand of them, and a total reinforcement would thus have been provided of twenty thousand men. Finally, there was no reason why the army of Andalusia should not contribute the whole of Count d'Erlon's corps, or at least ten thousand of the sixteen thousand men of whom it consisted. Five or six thousand men would have sufficed to watch General Hill at Llerina, and had this General, as was very improbable, committed the imprudence of marching upon Andalusia, Marshal Soult, with the six thousand men of Llerena, would have been able to meet him at the head of about twenty-five thousand men; General Hill's numbering no more than about half that number. By moderate contributions of troops, therefore, from the armies of the north, the centre, and Andalusia, a reinforcement of thirty thousand men might have been afforded to Marshal Marmont, whose army would thus have been raised to seventy thousand, and have become sufficiently powerful completely to overthrow the army under Lord Wellington, or at least to force it to retire into Portugal.

The necessary resources existed, then, and Jourdan and Joseph lost no time, it must be acknowledged, in endeavouring to utilise them, as soon as they were convinced that Lord Wellington was about to march upon Old Castille, and, consequently, to threaten the army of Portugal, they wrote to the two Generals who were alone able to succour it, and who were General Caffarelli, the successor of General Dorsenne in the command of the army of the north, and Marshal Soult, at the head of the army of Andalusia. Pointing out to each of these commanders the danger which manifestly threatened Marshal Marmont, they enjoined General Caffarelli to move a detachment of twelve thousand men upon Salamanca, and urged Marshal Soult to furnish Count d'Erlon with considerable reinforcements, to order him to watch the movements of General Hill with the utmost vigilance, and, should the latter proceed by the interior routes to reinforce Lord Wellington towards Old Castille, to follow him, crossing the Tagus by the bridge of Almaraz, and thus carrying to Marshal Marmont a reinforcement equal to that which would be supplied by General Hill to Lord Wellington.

This order was, unfortunately, not the best which might have been given, and had it not been subsequently modified the proposed movement would have been an absolute nullity as far as regarded the army of Portugal. It was planned in fact on the supposition that General Hill had in advance of Badajoz considerable forces, that his position there was only a temporary one, and that he would be recalled towards Fuente-Guinaldo as soon as Lord Wellington should be ready to commence operations. But every portion of this supposition was erroneous; instead of thirty thousand men, General Hill had under his command no more than fifteen thousand, amongst whom there was scarcely an English division, and his position was a stationary one, intended to mask the designs of his chief, and occupy Marshal Soult until Lord Wellington, having assembled seven English and several Portuguese divisions at Fuente-Guinaldo, should march upon Salamanca; Count d'Erlon, therefore, however much he might have been reinforced, must necessarily, if under orders to remain stationary before General Hill's position, have left Marshal Marmont to perish unaided. It is only the very highest ardour of genius which can foresee completely and immediately an enemy's designs, and Marshal Jourdan, whose judgment was very sure but somewhat slow in its operations, required time to develop the resources of his military skill. Had he visited the scene of operations, he would doubtless have very speedily discerned the true position of affairs; but sick, disgusted, and in personal attendance upon a King who, although brave, was unwilling to quit Madrid, he had remained in the palace, and, judging of the state of affairs from afar, had not succeeded in forming an exactly true opinion respecting them. He was speedily undeceived, however, and in the meantime the first orders were sufficient for the occasion, since they enjoined each of those who were in a position to be of any assistance, to prepare to give it. Marshal Suchet being at too great a distance, and too poor in troops to send contributions of men, was directed to render to the common cause a species of service which he could afford without any difficulty, and which was to move up the forces under General Reille de la Navarra, in order that it might be easier for the army of the north to furnish the contingent which had been demanded of it, and to relieve at Cuenca the troops of the army of the centre, that the latter were the most concentrated and the most readily available.

We may easily imagine what was the reception accorded to Joseph's orders, which were given with much firmness but without that air of authority which was peculiar to Napoleon. General Caffarelli, who commanded the army of the north,

was upright, devoted, and brave, as were all the Caffarelli, but endowed with a quiet obstinacy of disposition, and although personally courageous, somewhat timid in action and very inferior in intelligence to the illustrious officer who had made the fortune of this distinguished family. Of the forty-six thousand men who had composed his army, ten thousand had been withdrawn for the Russian expedition, and, moreover, the indefatigable Guerilla bands of the Basque Provinces kept him in continual apprehension with respect to the safety of the posts of the interior and on the coast. Persisting, as General Dorsenne had persisted, in considering himself independent of the commander in chief, he did not actually refuse to afford assistance to Marshal Marmont, but refrained from stating any precise method in which he would succour him, and confined himself to promises which, although made in good faith, the exercise of a little foresight might well have estimated at their true value.

In Andalusia Joseph's orders were received in a manner still less satisfactory. Marshal Soult, since he had become re-assured with respect to the consequences of his campaign of Oporto, had always hoped that he would have been appointed King Joseph's major general: and when Napoleon, who was not only very dissatisfied with the operations in Andalusia, but was also unwilling to force upon his brother a major general who, he knew, would be displeasing to him, appointed Marshal Jourdan to this post, the discontent of Soult had been extreme, and there was small probability, therefore, that he would pay much attention to a demand of succour for the army of Portugal, with which he had been in continual contention. He had formed, moreover, an opinion respecting the projects of Lord Wellington which was entirely different from that entertained by the staff at Madrid, believing that the English General instead of directing his operations towards Castille, was intending to carry on the campaign in Andalusia. He replied, therefore, to Joseph's orders that the army of Portugal and its General were mistaken, that Lord Wellington was not preparing to march upon Salamanca and Marshal Marmont but upon Andalusia, and that it was necessary to succour the army of Andalusia rather than that of Portugal, since General Hill was but the head of the great British army which was ready to advance in its entire strength upon Seville for the purpose of relieving Cadiz; that the language held at Cadiz in the insurrectionist journals proved that this was the case; and that there could be no doubt that it was necessary to reinforce Count d'Erlon, but for the purpose of affording assistance, not to the army of Portugal which was in no danger, but to that of Andalusia.

To attribute to Lord Wellington an intention of acting in Andalusia for the purpose of relieving Cadiz which was in no danger ; and to judge of the enemy's projects by the statements of the insurrectionist journals, was in itself unreasonable ; but the real reason which proved the improbability that any attempt would be made by the English against Andalusia, consisted in the fact that Lord Wellington had no object to attain there, whilst a single success in Castille would enable him to take all our armies in the rear. Marshal Soult, however, was not of this opinion, for he remained persuaded that General Hill was at the head of thirty thousand men, that Lord Wellington was about to join him with forty thousand more, and that he, Soult, alone required succour.

In the meantime Marshal Suchet desired to do nothing which could endanger the safety of the provinces entrusted to his care, and being very unwilling to enter into a conflict with the authorities at Madrid, had complied with the orders which had been sent to him, making General Reille's Italian division replace at Cuenca the troops of the army of the centre, although there was considerable inconvenience in its being moved to so great a distance.

The danger, however, became at each instant more pressing and more apparent, and it became impossible any longer to entertain any doubt with respect to the direction in which Lord Wellington intended to execute his attack. Joseph, acting as usual under Marshal Jourdan's advice, wrote to General Caffarelli to the effect, that however independent he might consider himself of the staff at Madrid, he ought not to forget that military duty bade him hasten to the succour of a comrade in peril ; that his former instructions expressly directed him to succour the army of Portugal against the English ; and concluding by formally demanding of him the assistance rendered necessary by the fact that Lord Wellington was actually marching upon Salamanca and the army of Portugal. With respect to the army of Portugal, Joseph for a moment entertained a resolution which, carried into effect, might have saved Spain, and with Spain the whole French empire ; and this was, to order the evacuation of Andalusia, the occupation of which procured for us but slight advantages, and which absorbed ninety thousand men, sixty thousand of them being active troops and sufficient to overwhelm the English army. To have carried out this idea it would have been necessary to have deprived of his command Marshal Soult, who would probably have refused to consent to the evacuation, or at least have failed to effect it sufficiently soon to have been of use to the army of Portugal. But to abandon a vast province, to make a decidedly retrograde

movement, and to deprive an illustrious Marshal of his command, were resolutions which Joseph was sufficiently talented to conceive, but not sufficiently firm to put into execution, and the course which he really adopted was, to send Colonel Desprez, an officer who was in his confidence and possessed of considerable talent, to watch all that took place in the army of Andalusia, to point out to Soult the error of the opinion which he entertained with respect to the projects of the English, to make him understand that it was towards Salamanca and not towards Seville that Lord Wellington was marching, to renew, on the ground of this fact, the imperative order that he should move General Drouet d'Erlon to the Tagus, without waiting for any movement on the part of General Hill, and to declare to him, as he had threatened to resign his command should displeasing orders be sent to him, that his resignation, should he make it, would be immediately accepted. At the same time he sent dispatches to Clarke, the minister of war, in which he pointed out in detail all the dangers, we might almost say all the absurdities, attending the position of a royal commander in chief disobeyed by all his generals and unable to induce them, either on the grounds of duty or interest, to assist that one of their number who was in the most imminent danger.

In the meantime Joseph himself sent a first reinforcement to Marshal Marmont. When this Marshal, in accordance with the Emperor's orders, quitted the valley of the Tagus for the purpose of taking up a position in the valley of the Douro, he left one of his divisions, that of General Foy, on the Tagus at the bridge of Almaraz; attaching, with good reason, much importance to this bridge, and the numerous works with which it was surrounded. A faulty arrangement having divided our active forces into two parts, one in Andalusia the other in Castille, very complete means of communication were necessary to enable our troops to move from the one province to the other. The Tagus being the chief obstacle to such facility of communications, Marmont had constructed a bridge across it with fortified works and magazines. It would have been unpardonable, in fact, not to have taken advantage of the example presented to us by the English, whose single army under a single general, advanced alternately northwards and southwards by means of a fine road well maintained, furnished with bridges and magazines, and affording every facility for the rapid movements of troops.

This instructive example it was which rendered Marmont very unwilling when he advanced from the Tagus to the Douro, to abandon the works of Almaraz, and induced him to leave there the division Foy. But as five or six days must elapse before this division could be brought back, on any

emergency, to the main body of troops, the Marshal now requested Joseph to undertake the defence of the bridge of Almaraz, and Joseph hastened to comply, sending to the required position the division d'Armagnac.

And now a rash attempt, little in conformity with the character of the English army, indicated the great projects with which Lord Wellington commenced this campaign and how important he considered it to prevent the army of Andalusia from proceeding to the aid of that of Portugal.

General Hill having, by command of his chief, secretly advanced upon and ascended the Tagus, presented himself before the bridge of Almaraz on the 18th of May. This bridge was situated at the very foot of the mountains which separate the valley of the Tagus from that of the Guadiana, and after having crossed it the great Estremadura road arose and passed over the mountains a col de mirabète. Marshal Marmont had constructed on the summit of the hill a strong work, which would prevent the passage of the cannon of an enemy coming from Estremadura; and at the foot of the height, on the bank of the stream, had established two lesser works, forming têtes de pont on the left and right bank. A bridge of boats, which was not always in position, afforded a passage between the two banks.

General Hill, who had already two years before surprised General Girard in the neighbourhood, at Arroyo del Molinos, and who was accustomed to this species of expedition, having arrived almost without having been perceived, at the foot of the Mirabète work, perceived that it was too strong to be taken by assault, and devised the plan of sending by a cross road a column of infantry to endeavour to escalate the têtes de pont, whilst the remainder of the English troops feigned an attack on Mirabète on the height. This bold plan met with perfect success; the works on the left and right banks were almost immediately taken, the troops who defended them, composed of men of all nations, at once giving way, and being either captured or drowned. Having destroyed the works and burned the boats the English retired, very proud of an expedition which had gained them more honour than profit, since at the best they had only temporarily interrupted our means of crossing the river. As soon as he heard of this exploit General Foy, who was marching with his divisions towards Castille, immediately retraced his steps and hastened after the English, but failed, however, to overtake them.

This misadventure, although in itself far from irreparable, caused great excitement in Madrid, for it revealed Lord Wellington's intention to separate the armies of Andalusia and Portugal; and it was, in fact, an indication which should

have had great weight with that one of the two armies which was summoned to the aid of the other ; but although Joseph renewed his entreaties to this effect they were in vain, as we shall speedily see.

Marshal Soult had received Colonel Desprez, had intimated to him his extreme displeasure at not having been appointed Joseph's Major-General, had scrupulously refrained from renewing his offer to resign his command, and persisted in maintaining that the impending danger threatened Andalusia and not Castille. Finding it impossible to alter the Marshal's opinion on this point, Colonel Desprez had endeavoured to obtain from him some explanation with respect to his execution of the orders relative to the corps of Count d'Erlon, which Soult had reinforced in accordance with Joseph's orders, but which he had absolutely declined to send to Castille to the aid of the army of Portugal. To all the representations of Desprez the Marshal replied, that if he were deprived of any portion of his forces he could no longer guard Andalusia, and that the only order, therefore, he could obey, would be one directing him to evacuate this province.

These messages and replies, this obstinate resistance, caused the loss of valuable time during which Lord Wellington hastened to march upon the army of Portugal. In fact, information was received during the first days of June, that he had raised his cantonments and was about to cross the Agueda for the purpose of proceeding to the province of Salamanca by the Cuidad-Rodrigo route ; and upon learning these facts General Caffarelli, whose disobedience to the orders which had been sent him arose rather from a want of the power of energetic action in the midst of difficulties than from a desire to dispute Joseph's authority, informed Marshals Marmont and Jourdan that he was on the point of marching to the aid of the army of Portugal with ten thousand men. In the meantime Joseph sent to Soult the order which he should have given to him at first, namely, to march a detachment of ten thousand men upon the Tagus immediately, to evacuate so much territory as would be necessary for the purpose of rendering this measure possible, and, finally, if he were disinclined to obey this order, to resign at once his command into the hands of Count d'Erlon.

Trusting to the execution of an order so precise, to the promises of General Caffarelli, and to the power he himself had of sending some thousands of men to Marshal Marmont, Joseph flattered himself that the arrangements he had made would raise the army of Portugal to seventy thousand men, and felt at ease with respect to events in Castille ; felt at ease

because, although endowed with good sense, military skill, and courage, he was not endowed with that quenchless ardour and sleepless vigilance which permit the man of action to believe only that which he has seen, to trust to those promises only which have been performed, and to give no order without carrying it himself into execution. These were the qualities which Napoleon possessed in the highest degree, and to which he chiefly owed his success.

Whilst the most valuable time was thus being lost on our side Lord Wellington had put his troops in motion towards Castille, the only portion of Spain in which, for reasons which we have already mentioned, he could act advantageously. Although in undivided command of the English forces, and employed by the richest nation in Europe, he was far from satisfied with his situation, especially as regarded matériel. The pay of his troops was very much in arrear, for the English government had some difficulty in providing it, since they had for this purpose to convert the paper money into coin at a loss of at least twenty-five per cent. ; and in fact the six thousand muleteers, who transported the provisions of the English army, had not been paid for six months and complained bitterly. Had these men refused to continue their services for only a single day the British army must have been lost, for had not its troops been supplied every evening with provisions at their bivouacs, and allowed time to cook and eat them, they would no longer have remained in their ranks. Lord Wellington never ceased, therefore, to write to his government, that if he were at the head of those admirable French soldiers, as he called them, who could dispense with regular rations, could run here and there to procure food for themselves, and then returning to their quarters cook with the utmost expedition what they might have been able to procure, he, Lord Wellington, might be able to carry on the war without money, but that to expose the troops actually under his command to the same system would be to leave him within a few days without a soldier. At the same time he complained that his army was not sufficiently numerous, especially as regarded the Spanish troops, who might have been furnished to him he said, to the number of thirty or forty thousand, instead of the ten thousand ill-disciplined and ill-officered men who were at his disposal, and of so little real service.

The forces assembled on the Agueda under Lord Wellington's command at the commencement of June were as follows:—seven divisions of English infantry, numbering altogether thirty-five or thirty-six thousand men of tried courage, (an eighth division under General Hill at Estrema-

dura) five or six thousand excellent English and German cavalry, two brigades of Portuguese infantry, and a Spanish division under General Don Carlos d'Espagne. Reckoning these latter auxiliary troops as amounting to fourteen or fifteen thousand men, Lord Wellington's whole army numbered about fifty five thousand men, being strengthened, although it is impossible to judge in what exact degree, by the assistance of the Guerilla bands. It is evident, therefore, that had our Generals acted together with cordiality, they might have easily overwhelmed with the two hundred and thirty thousand active troops of the three hundred thousand French soldiers in the Peninsula, the handful of English which, although certainly of good courage and well led, owed its chief strength to the wisdom of its chief and the disunion of our Generals.

Lord Wellington was so conscious of the true state of affairs that it was not without trembling, if we may use such a word in speaking of such a man, that he advanced into Castille. The conquest of Cuidad-Rodrigo and Badajoz having been accomplished it was necessary that he should undertake some measure, and the only one open to him was, as we have before said, a march on the offensive in Castille. But whilst his clear judgment pointed out to him the course which he ought to pursue, it could not fail at the same time to render him somewhat apprehensive of the danger he was about to incur by throwing himself upon the rear of the French between the armies of the north and of Portugal on the one side, and of the centre and of Andalusia on the other. The chief considerations which could induce him to enter into the midst of such perils were, in the first place, that it was necessary to attempt to accomplish something at the favourable moment of Napoleon's absence, and secondly, that the wretched dissensions between our Generals, of which he was well informed, would prevent them from overwhelming him by the union of their forces.

Although fully resolved to advance, the English General had nevertheless written to his government, that they must not indulge in hopes of any great results from the approaching movement, since the French Generals had only to combine against him to throw him back into Portugal. He demanded, therefore, in the most express terms, that the Anglo-Sicilians should attempt a descent upon the province of Murcia, or on that of Catalonia for the purpose of preventing the army of Aragon from sending detachments to the aid of the army of the centre; and at the same time required of the English ships which cruised in the Bay of Biscay and communicated with the leaders of the Guerilla bands, that they should feign a dis-

embarkation for the purpose of preventing General Caffarelli from proceeding to the assistance of Marshal Marmont. Having taken these precautions, he passed the Agueda at the commencement of June, and marched towards Salamanca. Knowing by means of very accurate reports with which he was furnished through the zeal of the Spaniards, that Marshal Marmont had been compelled to scatter his divisions, for the purpose of enabling them to procure the means of subsistence, and that he had received as yet no reinforcement, he hoped to be able to compel him to evacuate Salamanca and to fall back behind the Douro; and proposed, should he effect this success at the commencement of the campaign, to act afterwards as might be suggested by the course of events.

Marshal Marmont, although ill served by his ships, speedily became aware of the approach of the English army, and took measures to guard against a surprise. Having had time to assemble four or five divisions by reason of the return of the division Foy, he was at the head of a body of troops of considerable strength, and such as could not fail to force the enemy to act with considerable caution. He had profited by the lessons he had received from the administrative measures of Napoleon, whose aide-de-camp he had been, and had employed the winter in taking care of his men, in repairing his artillery, in renewing as far as possible his *attelages* and in placing his fortified posts in a good state of defence. In the absence of great magazines, which he had no longer the means of forming, he had established with each division a little store of biscuit, which permitted him to engage in manœuvres of a fortnight's duration, without incurring any anxiety with respect to his soldiers' subsistence. He had fortified three convents which commanded Salamanca, and the passage of the Tormès, and having placed there a garrison of a thousand of men, could leave them without fear of their falling into the hands of the enemy. The line of the Douro which was in the rear of Salamanca, and which, with its tributary the Esla, covered both Old Castille and the kingdom of Léon, was furnished throughout with well garrisoned posts, Toro, Zamora, Beneventé, and Astorga, promised to offer a certain amount of resistance, and there was every probability, the enemy acting with great caution, that the French troops would be able, by means of well considered manœuvres, to carry on the campaign for some time without a decisive action.

Marshal Marmont, having made the arrangements above enumerated, broke up his camp at Salamanca, and established it at some distance from that city, that he might be

able to devote his whole attention to the concentration of his divisions, and watching the operations of the enemy. He refrained from hastening to retreat behind the Douro, because his position was already covered by the Tormès, and he wished to remain in sight of Salamanca for the purpose of affording moral support to the little garrison left in the three convents.

On the 16th of June, Lord Wellington appeared before Salamanca, where he was received by the inhabitants, with that enthusiasm which always burst forth at the departure of the French and the arrival of the English, and devoted a day or two to reflection and the enjoyment of the honour he had obtained of acting on the offensive without having incurred its dangers. The inhabitants desired him to relieve them from the hostile occupation of the three convents which commanded their city, and as, upon inspection, he considered that it would be necessary to attack them by regular siege operations, he determined to devote ten or fifteen days to this purpose, being in no way displeased at having such an opportunity of delay in a country when each step in advance might be one step nearer to some overwhelming catastrophe. As he had brought with him some pieces of heavy artillery, he commenced the siege immediately, sending to Cuidad-Rodrigo, in the meantime, for additional supplies of ammunition.

Of the three convents, the principal and largest was that of Saint Vincent, a great building resembling a fortress, on one side commanding the Tormès, which flowed at the foot of Salamanca, and on the other Salamanca itself. The two other convents, named respectively San-Gaetano, and de la Merced, were situated a little below, and towards the city, and completed our command of it.

Lord Wellington opened trenches in front of the Saint Vincent convent, but determined to take the two others by an assault, which he ordered to take place immediately. The troops which garrisoned these two posts, however, aided by the fire of the St. Vincent convent, succeeded in repelling the attack of the English, and compelling them to retreat with a loss of several hundreds of men; and Lord Wellington determined to await the arrival of the siege matériel, which he expected from Cuidad-Rodrigo.

On the 28th of June, the siege train having reached the English camp and been directed against them, the French troops after a most valiant defence, were compelled to yield the improvised citadels, by means of which Marmont had hoped to preserve Salamanca, or at least to have been enabled to repossess it at will; the result of the affair being, that we had lost a thousand men in slain and prisoners, whilst

the English had lost at least as many, and, in addition, twelve days, which were a gain to us as advantageous as the loss of them was the contrary to the English.

Salamanca having been taken, it would not have been wise of Marshal Marmont to have retained a position so close to the English army as the one he held then was, and he passed the Douro at Tordesillas, determined to dispute his line within it. Lord Wellington followed him to the bank of the Douro, which at this season was somewhat shallow, but still unfordable save in very few places. The line of the Douro was protected, as we have already stated, by various strong posts, and of these, if we regard the Esla and Orbigo as a prolongation of the line of the Douro, that of Astorga was one of the most considerable, being well fortified and containing a garrison of one thousand five hundred resolute troops, and forming a strong support to our right. Lord Wellington, therefore, arriving on the bank of the Douro on the 1st of July, paused there to allow time to the Spanish army of Galicia to sieze Astorga, thus giving to the French some fifteen days, during which, had they not been blinded by extraordinary passion, they might have concentrated seventy thousand men against the English army. And so conscious, indeed, was Lord Wellington of this fact, that as long as he remained on the bank of the Douro, he never ceased to urge, on the one side the Anglo Sicilian army to give the utmost possible occupation to Marshal Suchet, and on the other, the English naval forces cruising in the Bay of Biscay to keep General Caffarelli in continual dread of a great disembarkation of forces on the Austrian coasts.

In the meantime, Marshal Marmont, established behind the Douro, had employed himself in the concentration of the eight divisions which formed the army of Portugal, and as, after he had recovered the first of these divisions, that of General Foy, there remained to be recovered the eighth, that of General Bonnet, he sent an order to this division to evacuate the Asturias, which it occupied, and his message found General Bonnet en route, for this officer, as intelligent as he was brave, perceiving what so many men of higher rank than himself failed to perceive, had rightly judged that every other consideration ought to be sacrificed to the necessity of repelling the English. The reinforcement of this division, which consisted of six thousand excellent troops, inspired Marshal Marmont with a great increase of confidence, and raised the number of his infantry to thirty-six or thirty-seven thousand men. The arm in which he was most deficient was that of cavalry, his troops having been exhausted in pursuit of the Guerilla bands, but nevertheless, he had been able,

by seizing all the available riding horses of the country, to raise the number of his cavalry to three thousand well mounted horsemen, and with his artillery, which was well served and numbered one hundred pieces, his forces numbered altogether forty-two thousand men. By the addition of a reinforcement of ten thousand, they would have been very superior in strength to the English; and even without they might have made head against them, had they been wisely and fortunately led.

Marshal Marmont was endowed with many of the qualities of a good General, but was far from possessing all of them, and in addition to this want, was far from being a favourite to fortune. He was not clothed with the indefinable attribute which, whether it exist merely in human superstition or be a reality, brings to one opportunely and to another inopportunely, cold and heat, rain and sunshine, unexpected arrivals, all those various circumstances which so often enable inferior combinations to succeed and frustrate those of real merit. And after all, may not this attribute, we may ask, be simply the result of that just proportion of qualities in a man's mind, which enables him, even without the possession of superior genius, to form those simple and decided resolutions which save armies and empires?

Ought Marshal Marmont, sheltered as he was by the Douro, to have remained immoveable? Doubtless it would have been his better course to have left the initiative in the enemy's hands, to have disputed with him the passage of the Douro as long as possible, and then to have fallen back methodically upon the army of the north, which must necessarily, when the enemy was at hand, have united with his own. But he was young, vain, and was at the head of an army of proved courage, over which the English had obtained no ascendant, and which retreated before them with great unwillingness; besides which he received news which entirely put an end to all his hopes of succour. On the one side General Caffarelli, after having announced the approach of a reinforcement of ten thousand men, now sent to inform him of the appearance of the English fleets between Saint-Ander and Saint-Sebastian, and the probability of an immediate disembarkation of the enemy, thus intimating that Marmont should no longer expect the promised reinforcement. At the same moment, Joseph, by a letter written on the 30th of June, and which reached the head quarters of the army of Portugal on the 12th of July, informed its chief of the exertions he had made to induce the army of the north and of Andalusia to aid him, and of the little expectation he had of prevailing upon them to do so; at the same time refraining,

either because he was not prepared, or because he considered that the right moment had not yet come, from expressing any intention of depriving himself in Marmont's favour of one of the divisions of the army of the centre.

Compelled thus to rely on the forces actually under his command, Marshal Marmont, comparing his army with that of Lord Wellington, which, taking into account only the English troops, was not more numerous than his own, and remembering that the battles gained by the former had only been so gained, because the French had injudiciously attacked them in positions where their manner of fighting rendered them invincible, he considered that he might be able so to manœuvre around them without compromising himself, as to force them to abandon the line of the Douro, and fall back upon the frontier of Portugal without giving them battle; and also that, whilst endeavouring to force the enemy to retreat, he might be able to establish his own army on one of those defensive positions, the advantages of which had always hitherto been left to the enemy. The French, who scaled so well almost inaccessible positions, such as those of Talavera and Busaco, would be almost certain of victory, if instead of having to carry, they had to defend such. To these reasons for an immediate active movement, was added another of great weight, consisting in the fact that the Spanish army of Galicia was besieging Astorga, which contained no more than fifteen days' provisions, and that whilst on the one hand the army of Portugal could not proceed to its relief without danger, its loss on the other hand, would expose this army to be turned on its right and forced into an indefinite retreat.

Such were the ideas which induced Marshal Marmont to leave the asylum which he had found behind the Douro; and his first step, which was to repass this river in the presence of the English army, was effected with as much skill as good fortune. The banks of the Douro were of such a conformation, that all that took place on the one could be seen on the other; and Marshal Marmont, under cover of a pretended descent of troops on his right towards Toro, prepared on his left, in the environs of Tordesillas, the means of really crossing the river by several ponts de chevalets. During the night of the 16th, the left and centre of his army successfully accomplished the passage, and on the following day the right also, taking advantage of the surprise and confusion of the English.

Lord Wellington was no more anxious than was Marshal Marmont to risk a battle, but he was resolved not to permit himself to be cut off from Ciudad-Rodrigo, which contained his provisions and war matériel, and was at the same time

an excellent plan of entrance into Portugal. He now hastened, therefore, to break up his camp and to retreat towards Salamanca, by the road which he had already followed, and thus rendered Marshal Marmont successful in his project of making a retrograde movement.

As it fell back towards Salamanca the English army encountered several tributaries of the Douro, first the Guarena, and then the Tormès, on which is situate Salamanca itself; and behind each of these in turn Lord Wellington withdrew with as much prudence as deliberation. Each army passed the evening of the 19th on the banks of the Guarena, the troops on each side braving the enemy's cannon for the purpose of bathing in its waters, the heat of the weather being extremely oppressive.

During the night, Marshal Marmont ascended the Guarena by his left, and crossing it at a point where it was a torrent of insignificant size, suddenly found himself in the presence of the English, who were not a little surprised that they were separated from us by no intervening obstacle, and immediately began to retreat with admirable order and steadiness, along a rather extensive plain, whilst our army followed them along a plateau parallel to the one they occupied with equal steadiness and greater confidence, its light artillery frequently stopping to cannonade the retreating enemy. On the evening of the 20th the English repassed the Tormès, and our troops bivouacked on its bank.

On the 21st the French army crossed this river at a point a league and a half above Salamanca, and took up a position opposite the Arapiles heights, on which the English forces were established, and where it was not easy to attack them; and accordingly, Marshal Marmont, almost elated by the success which had attended his movements in the face of the enemy, resolved not to imitate the errors of his predecessors, of attacking the English in positions where there could be no chance of vanquishing them, and took up a position opposite the enemy but separated from them by a valley, and supported on the right by the village Calvarossa de Ariba, and on the left by woods of which he had hastened to take possession.

On the following morning, the 22nd July, Marshal Marmont mounted his horse at an early hour for the purpose of endeavouring to find out by personal examination what might be the designs of the enemy, and what course, consequently, he should himself pursue. No movement, however, on the part of the English had yet taken place which could throw any light on Lord Wellington's projects, with the exception that he had somewhat altered his position and

fallen back a little more thoroughly on Salamanca and the Cuidad-Rodrigo route. A species of valley which, although not very deep, was of some extent, separated the two armies, and rendered the position of each equally secure. The village of Calvarossa de Ariba, occupied by the division Foy, served as a pivot for our right, whilst our centre and left rested on the woods. Each of the armies might have remained in their positions without fear of the enemy encamped in front of it, and each was equally unwilling to engage, except under the most advantageous circumstances, but, nevertheless, Marshal Marmont devised a movement on his left for the purpose of outflanking to some extent the English right, threatening, consequently, their communications with Cuidad-Rodrigo, and placing the French army in a position, when the English should leave their present position either for the purpose of rejoining Cuidad-Rodrigo, or approaching Salamanca, which would enable it to attack, and even to seize a portion of their rear guard. The plan was feasible but far too ambitious, and it would have been wiser to have afforded the enemy a bridge of gold than to have entered upon movements which might force us into engaging him in battle. At the same time it must be acknowledged that, by the exercise of great prudence in their execution these movements might have been effected without any very disastrous consequences.

Leaving his right under General Foy at the village of Calvarossa de Aribi, and strengthening it by the addition of the divisions of General Ferry, Marshal Marmont made his centre and left defile behind this position along the woods by which it was adossé, and following the line of the heights on which he had encamped. Between the English and French troops towards the right of the latter, arose two mamelons, named the Arapiles, the one of which nearest to us was also the loftiest, and commanded, consequently, the lesser one, of which the English had taken possession. He carried forward his divisions, the left being in front, defiling opposite the English, and keeping the valley beneath them and his own troops. The division Thormières, forming his extreme left, advanced a little *en flèche*; the division Sarrut and Maucune being in the centre, the division Clausel in reserve, and the division Bremier in the rear with the baggage and artillery.

Whilst Marshal Marmont was executing these movements, Lord Wellington, perceiving that they were directed against his communications, immediately ordered the execution of an exactly similar movement by his own troops, so that his right might be as much advanced as his left, and have the

road before it open and unclosed by our forces. Leaving, therefore, his left stationary before our right which was also stationary, and leaving his centre (which was formed vis-à-vis with ours, between the Lesser Arapile and the village of the same name was formed of four English divisions, numbering altogether more than twenty thousand excellent infantry. In the first line, having their left resting on the Little Arapile, were the fourth division under General Cole and the fifth under General Leith; in a second line being the fifth under General Clinton and the seventh under General Hope) Lord Wellington carried his right, which was composed of the Portuguese brigade, Bradford, and the Spanish division Don Carlos, the third English division, and the remainder of his cavalry, to the village of Les Torres opposite our left.

It was now noon, and there was every probability that the day would have been passed by the two armies in mere manœuvres, without the occurrence of any great loss on either side, and that Lord Wellington would have retreated before night-fall towards Ciudad-Rodrigo, resigning Salamanca to us without a struggle, when, unfortunately, a fatal spirit of impatience induced Marshal Marmont to attempt to seize the enemy's rear guard. With this end in view he moved forward his left, which was already so far advanced that it now began to descend the heights before the 3rd English division which, with a large body of cavalry, was intended to hold it in check. At the same time he carried his centre still closer to the side of the valley which separated us from the English, ordering General Clausel to support it, and advanced also the division Bremier. He gave no orders for an attack on the English lines, for, as we have already said, his object was simply to cut off their rear guard when they should be in retreat, but the execution of such manœuvres as these requires the possession of extreme skill, and of an authority sufficiently powerful to have its orders obeyed with precision, and it unfortunately happened that Marshal Marmont was in neither of these respects qualified to contend with so bold an adversary as Lord Wellington. General Maucune, commanding the division of the centre which was most in advance on the left, was an officer of tried courage and of extreme boldness on the field of battle, and now, believing that the English were in full retreat, he thought that it was the right moment to attack them; sending, therefore, to ask permission to attack the enemy, but failing to await its arrival, he drove back the enemy's skirmishers, descended into the hollow which separated the two armies, engaged the divisions forming the English centre, being those of Cole and

Leith. Perceiving this, Lord Wellington, who was willing to retreat but not to fly, accepted the challenge to battle which appeared to be offered to him, and ordered his centre to receive and repulse the attack of ours.

Whilst General Maucune was committing this rashness, General Thormières, on the left, continuing to advance, descended also into the plain without being supported, and exposed himself to be attacked in front by Picton's infantry, and on his flanks by a cloud of cavalry. And thus, therefore, the two armies were engaged throughout their entire length contrary to the intentions of the two leaders.

Unfortunately, the division of General Clausel, which was strong and well commanded, was still behind and unable to afford that support of which the divisions which had imprudently engaged the enemy had so much need.

Marshal Marmont perceiving with his glass from the top of the Greater Arapile, on which he had taken up his position for the purpose of directing the various movements, the faults which had been committed, hastened to mount his horse and to proceed himself to restrain the impatience of his lieutenants, but was scarcely in his saddle when he was struck by a shot which broke his arm and opened his side. The unhappy Marshal fell covered with blood, and only just able to name General Bonnet as his successor in the chief command.

Whilst news of this event was being sent to General Bonnet on the right, the battle raged with the utmost fury, and on our side without the direction of a commander in chief. General Maucune, supported by General Sarrat, commander of one of the divisions of the centre, attacked the English vigorously, drove them back upon the village of Arapiles, but then, suffering great losses from the fire of the enemy, who were more numerous and individually stronger than our own troops, he was forced to fall back. General Clausel however, coming up and taking the place of the division Maucune, again forced the English to retreat; upon which, Marshal Beresford, who was present at this part of the battle field, ordered the second line to form en potence upon the first in such a manner as to take the division Clausel in flank. At the same time, Lord Wellington attacked on his left the Greater Arapile with General Packenham's Portuguese, and, towards his right, threw upon the divisions Thormières, which had very imprudently descended into the plain, the infantry of the division Picton and the whole mass of his cavalry. Still, in spite of the redoubled efforts of the enemy our troops remained firm and held their ground. The division Bonnet, although deprived of its general, who had

hastened towards the centre to assume the command in chief, checked the advance of Packenham's Portuguese, and remained in possession of the greater Arapile. General Clausel supported with great firmness the attack in front made by the division Clinton, but suffered cruelly from the flank fire of the division Leith. The two armies encountered each other at such close quarters that the Generals on each side were wounded; on that of ours, Generals Bonnet and Clausel receiving severe injuries; whilst on the side of the English, Marshal Beresford and Generals Cole and Leith were wounded more or less dangerously.

On our left, the English right, the combat was no less violent. The division Thormières was attacked in the midst of the plain by the enemy's cavalry, lost its leader, who fell dead upon the field, and fell back in confusion. The division Bremier hastened to its aid, but became so involved in the retrograde movement that General Clausel, who, although wounded himself, remained on the field of battle and replaced General Bonnet in the command in chief, ordered a retreat, and directed it very judiciously towards the plateau which we ought not to have quit. Summoning thither the division Ferry, which had remained behind the division Foy, on the extreme right, and the division Sarrut, which had remained behind the division Foy, which had been less engaged than the divisions of the centre, he successfully rallied behind them the divisions Thormières and Bremier, Maucune and Clausel; the division Bonnet which, posted at the greater Arapile, had covered the foot of the mamelon with the bodies of the foe, at the same time retreating in the most regular order. An attempt on the part of the English to climb the heights to which we had retired having been repulsed with the loss on our part, however, of General Ferry, who was mortally wounded, our divisions defiled in succession behind the divisions Sarrut and Ferry, passed behind the division Foy which had remained stationary at Calvarossa de Aribi, and returned by the road which they had followed in the morning. The division Foy which, not having as yet been engaged, was ordered to cover the retreat, was charged by the whole of the English cavalry, but received it in square, and inflicting considerable loss upon it, retreated in good order. Towards night our troops reached the river Tormès and effected its passage without being pursued.

Such was this unfortunate and involuntary battle, known as the battle of Salamanca or Arapiles, the result of which was to the English army an unhoped-for victory in the place

of an inevitable retreat, and to us the commencement of the ruin of our affairs in Spain. And this result, without attempting to deny the merits of Lord Wellington, we must certainly attribute in great part to his good fortune, for it was out of all proportion to the merits of the English General or the errors of our own. To be unexpectedly engaged in a battle, to have three commanders in chief wounded in succession, and to be involved in extraordinary confusion, after a march which had been continued for many days with the greatest success, and in the best order, were severe, and we may say undeserved blows. But this battle is an eminent proof that the moral effect of events in war is generally far superior to their material effect; for if we had generals killed and wounded in this engagement, the English on their side suffered a similar loss; if the number of our killed and wounded amounted to five or six thousand, almost as many had fallen on the side of the enemy; and, in short, although we had certainly lost nine pieces of cannon, which, having been drawn from the heights down into the plain, had there lost their horses and could not be carried off, the difference between the material results of the battle to either side was very inconsiderable. By its moral effects, however, the position of the two forces was completely changed. We had no longer any chance of being able to force the English to retreat, and were, on the contrary, ourselves compelled to make a retrograde movement, with an army in the highest degree irritated by its long series of misfortunes, from which neither its incomparable bravery, nor resignation to the cruelest sufferings had preserved it. And now, whilst Marmont was compelled to withdraw behind the Douro, or even to a greater distance, as one of the first steps necessary in attempting to restore confidence to his army, Lord Wellington, on the contrary, was henceforth able to carry on the campaign in Castille, and on the French rear, for there was nowhere any force capable of making head against him. The army of Portugal would be compelled to fall back before him till it came up with the army of the north; the army of the centre was far too feeble to dare to approach him; the army of Andalusia was at a distance; and he was, therefore, at liberty to determine whether he should pursue General Clausel, or throw himself upon Madrid and enter it as a conqueror. Such were the ill consequences resulting from the want of good will on the part of those who had neglected to reinforce the army of Portugal in time, and of the imprudence of those who had engaged in a useless battle.

Fortunately for the army of Portugal it had now become commanded, too late, but still in time to be of

great advantage to it, by a chief worthy of leading it. General Clausel was young, vigorous both in mind and body, without much experience, it is true, and frequently careless, but imperturbably self-possessed, by turns cool and impetuous, keen-sighted on the battle field, and, although he had never hitherto commanded in chief, as well fitted to bear the anxieties of such a position as the most experienced officer; esteemed by the soldiers on account of his valour, and loved by them on account of his *bonhommie*, he was the only one of their officers qualified to retain their obedience, and preserve their discipline by severity, without causing them to revolt.

The calmness with which Clausel, wounded as he was, assumed the command in chief in the midst of a route, speedily restored calm to his troops, and with calm discipline. On the 23rd of July he retreated behind the Douro, receiving the English cavalry which pursued him in square, and repulsing them with considerable loss, the only casualty being in a square of the 6th Leger, which, having failed to form in time, suffered some damage. Behind the Douro Clausel found himself free from any attacks on the part of the English, but exposed to a swarm of Guerilla bands, which, unable to inflict any serious damage, destroyed our wounded, stragglers, and foragers; and our troops, irritated by the cruelties to which they saw their comrades thus exposed under their very eyes, and being in want of provisions, having exhausted during their late manœuvres all the resources with which Marmont had provided them, began on their side to pillage, not only greedily but even barbarously, an inhospitable country which they could not preserve, and which they expected never to revisit. General Clausel made great but fruitless endeavours to restrain these excesses.

At this moment arrived at length a portion of the reinforcements so earnestly demanded, so vainly awaited. On the first day of the retreat, General Clausel came up with a thousand men sent by General Caffarelli, consisting of two regiments of cavalry and a detachment of artillery attélée; a reinforcement so absurdly small that it might have been just cause for anger, had not General Caffarelli had for his excuse, his good faith and the anxiety which was caused to him by the appearance of the English fleets on the coast of Biscay. Another reinforcement, which must have had a decisive effect on the course of the late events, had it arrived in time, was announced by a despatch from Joseph, which arrived at the moment when the army of Portugal had re-passed the Douro, and consisted of about thirteen thousand men, comprising almost the whole of the army of the centre,

which Joseph, in a species of despair, had determined to lead in person to Salamanca. He had set out from Madrid on the 21st, and this would not have been too late, had he only sent word of his intention to Marmont three or four days before, for in that case the Marshal would doubtless have awaited his arrival, and the reinforcement he brought would probably have induced Lord Wellington to make an immediate retreat, or have given rise to different manœuvres. In any case it could scarcely have happened that fifty-five thousand Frenchmen such as would have formed the army of Portugal, would have been vanquished by an army of forty thousand English and fifteen thousand Spaniards and Portuguese.

We must now turn our attention to the circumstances attending the arrival of the reinforcement which Joseph now brought to the army of Portugal, and more especially to those which had prevented that arrival from being more opportune. When Joseph had sent orders to Marshal Soult directing him to send ten thousand men immediately to the assistance of the army of Portugal, or to resign his command, at the same time authorizing him to cease to occupy a portion of Andalusia should he find himself too much enfeebled by the withdrawal of those ten thousand men to continue to do so, it seemed that such orders admitted neither of tergiversation nor refusal, and they certainly could not have met with either had they emanated from a power so capable of making itself respected as Napoleon's. But as it was, Marshal Soult, repeating an argument already employed, declared that he was quite willing to obey, but on condition only that he might at once and completely evacuate Andalusia, since the withdrawal of ten thousand men would leave him utterly incapable of continuing to occupy it—an assertion very open to dispute; for the army of Andalusia, numbering as it did sixty thousand active troops, would have been quite sufficient to have guarded this province for some time even after the withdrawal of ten thousand of them. Together with this species of disguised refusal Marshal Soult submitted his views on the best method in which to conduct the campaign against the English, to the effect that the object in view being to turn the English from the north of the Peninsula, it was necessary, so far from diminishing the army of Andalusia, to reinforce it, joining with it the army of the centre and even that of Portugal, so that Lord Wellington, becoming fearful for the safety of Lisbon, might feel compelled to withdraw from the north to the south.

In the first place this plan was precisely opposed to the instructions of Napoleon, who had ordered that everything

should be sacrificed to the maintenance of the communications with France by the provinces of the north, and in the next place, independently of Napoleon's orders, what would have happened in Spain, if, the north and interior of the Peninsula being given up to the English, and Lord Wellington ruling from Vittoria to Baylen, rousing the whole population to insurrection by his presence, our armies had been confined in Andalusia?

What Joseph required of Marshal Soult, however, was not advice, but reinforcements for the army of Portugal, and finding that he could not obtain them of him, and that Marshal Marmont's danger increased every moment, he at length determined to proceed himself to his assistance. He might have been ready by the 17th of July, and had he set out at that date, would have arrived before Salamanca in time. But Marshal Suchet having placed Polombini's Italian division at his disposal, and it being possible to march this division upon Madrid, Joseph thought that it would be better to wait till the 21st of July, when he could set out with thirteen thousand men, than to depart immediately with ten thousand. Reinforced by three thousand Italians, he would have eighteen thousand men at his disposal, and of these he determined to leave five thousand at Madrid, marching to Salamanca with the remainder. And even now this measure would have been effectual had he written to Marshal Marmont immediately, informing him of his intended movement; but he delayed to send information of it until the very moment of his departure. Arriving at Villa-Castin on the 23rd, he received on the 24th vague rumours of the terrible battle of Salamanca. Unwilling to come into too close contiguity with the English, but at the same time equally unwilling to retrace his steps without being of some service to the army of Portugal, he entered into communication with General Clausel, and learning that the latter was anxious that he should remain within sight of the English for the purpose of somewhat distracting their attention, he remained upon the farther side of the Guadarrama, only departing when the army of Portugal had peaceably retreated upon Burgos, and that the danger of his own position compelled him to fall back upon Madrid, which he re-entered on the 9th of August, profoundly dispirited.

The course which had now to be taken by the French, was, unfortunately, but too plainly pointed out by circumstances. Since they had been vanquished, by not uniting in time against the common enemy, it had become still more evident that it was now necessary to unite as soon as possible, for the

purpose of expiating the reverse suffered at Salamanca, by a great battle fought on the part of the French by an army composed of all their available troops then present in the Peninsula. But this concentration of troops could only have been obtained by means of the immediate evacuation of Andalusia, a measure much to be regretted, since its moral effect could not but be most injurious to our cause, as a source of great encouragement to the government at Cadiz, and as a means of interrupting or even breaking off the intrigues which were being carried on there in our interest with great probability of gaining over important persons to our side. Nevertheless, the sacrifice of this province had become absolutely necessary, its complete and immediate evacuation being the only means of avoiding the greatest disasters. Joseph wrote, therefore, a severe letter to Soult, in which he peremptorily ordered him (directing him to resign his command to Count d'Erlon, should he be unwilling to obey) to evacuate the lines of Cadiz, Grenada, and Seville, and to fall back upon La Mancha. The annexation of the army of the centre to the sixty thousand troops of Marshal Soult, would form a force sufficient for the defence of Madrid, and by the further addition of the army of Portugal, the means would be provided of proceeding to meet Lord Wellington, wherever he might be, and to offer him battle with such a superiority of force, that the issue could not be doubtful. On these conditions Madrid might well be abandoned; and if Lord Wellington, who was now able to choose whether he would pursue the vanquished army, or enter the capital in triumph, should determine to march upon Madrid, it was evident that it would be necessary to evacuate it, since Marshal Soult could not arrive in time to save it.

Lord Wellington's movements shortly put an end to these sad doubts, for after having pursued the army of Portugal, during some days, he paused in the environs of Valladolid, and retraced the road towards Madrid. Had he continued to pursue the army of Portugal, it is very doubtful whether General Clausel would have been able to preserve it from total destruction. And as, in that case, the army of the north would but have arrived to be vanquished in turn, the illustrious English captain would have had an open road before him, for it is very improbable that the armies which occupied the south of the Peninsula, would have assembled in sufficient time to check his progress. Had Napoleon found himself in a similar position, he would have freed Spain from the enemy within the space of two months—Such is the difference between genius and simple good sense. But good sense is attended by so many other advantages, that we should pause before we accuse its possessor of an error; and

with respect to the present case, moreover, we must pardon the weaknesses which are associated with even the most solid character. Lord Wellington, clear-headed as he was, concealed under an air of calm reserve, an inordinate vanity. The idea of making a triumphant entry into Madrid, was one which had for him an irresistible attraction, and on the 10th of August accordingly, he directed his march upon the Spanish capital. As soon as information of this movement of the British army reached Joseph, he was profoundly affected by it, and it was natural that he should be, for no course was open to him which was not attended by serious disadvantages. The only feasible plan was to march to join either Marshal Soult at Seville or Marshal Suchet at Valencia; and the choice between these two measures could not be very doubtful. In addition to the fact that Seville was the most distant of the Spanish provinces, it was also deprived of all means of communication with France, whilst Valencia had easy communication through Tortosa, Tarragona, Lerida, and Saragossa, with the Pyrenees. Another inducement for adopting the latter course was, that at Valencia Joseph would find himself in the midst of a rich, submissive, and well administered country, and would also meet with a cordial reception, the relations between Joseph and Marshal Suchet having been always friendly. But a conclusive reason for marching to Valencia instead of Seville was, that whilst it was quite possible to carry the army of Andalusia to Valencia, it would have been in the highest degree unwise to attempt to march the army of Aragon to Seville, since independently of the loss of Aragon and Catalonia, which must have been the result of such a movement, all communication with France would at once have been closed against our troops.

Directing his march, therefore, upon the Tagus, in the direction of Valencia, Joseph rescinded the orders he had previously sent to Marshal Soult, and ordered him to effect his retreat by Murcia upon Valencia. But Joseph had now to take leave of Madrid, and his leave taking was a sad one. In the midst of this Spain, which was now being torn from his grasp, he had met with a certain number of Spaniards, some of them men of high birth and considerable fortune, who partly, perhaps, from affection for his own gentle and affectionate disposition, partly because they were anxious to spare their country from the horrors of a desolating war, and partly because convinced that Spain had derived all its civilization from foreign dynasties, had rallied round him. There were many persons also filling the inferior public offices, who had remained in his service simply in accordance with their habits of obedience, and who, known by the name

of *afrancesados*, and most numerous at Madrid, amounted to some ten thousand. To leave these persons exposed to the ferocity of the Spaniards was equivalent to condemning them to death; to lead them in the month of August across the plains of La Mancha and the sterile mountains of Cuenca was to lead them to perish of want and exposure. The alternative was sad, but as human nature generally seeks to avoid the evil which is most imminent, the *afrancesados* were all eager, at the first rumour of the evacuation of the city, to depart; and on the 10th of August at least two thousand carriages set out from the gates of Madrid escorted by the army of the centre; the fugitives and troops together forming a mass of some twenty-four thousand individuals, of whom only one half were provided with arms and a scanty supply of provisions. When he had arrived on the banks of the Tagus, in the neighbourhood of Aranjuez, Joseph was anxious to know whether the whole Anglo-Portuguese army was marching upon the capital or only a simple detachment of one or two divisions, for in this latter case he might have disputed possession of the capital with the enemy, or at least have refrained from removing to any great distance, awaiting in its neighbourhood the arrival of the army of Andalusia.

In the meantime, General Treilhorn, who commanded an excellent division of Dragoons, was directed to reconnoitre the English army, and executed this order in the environs of Majadahonda, on the banks of the Guadarrama torrent, with so much skill and vigour, that he surprised the English advanced guard, and took four hundred men, with three pieces of cannon. The report of the English officers leaving no doubt that Lord Wellington with his whole army were at the gates of Madrid, it was at length definitively settled to set out for Valencia by way of Orcana, Albacete, and Chinchilla. The sick and wounded whom it would be necessary to leave behind, were placed in the Retiro, which had long since been fortified against the *Guerillas* and the people of Madrid, but not in such a manner as to resist the attacks of a regular army, and was now furnished with a garrison of twelve thousand men under Colonel Laffond.

The departure from the Tagus took place about the 15th of August, in the midst of a stifling heat and with very slender resources, and hundreds of the fugitive families speedily encumbered the roads in badly horsed vehicles, entreating the soldiers for some portion of their plunder. The inhabitants were everywhere in flight, the granaries burnt or empty, and no one was to be found of whom could be purchased any kind of food. In the place of inhabitants, pitiless *Guerilla* bands hovered around the retreating

column, and worn out with fatigue, sick and famished, it had to pursue its way, or stay to be slaughtered, under the very eyes of the French rear guard. And this was all that remained of Joseph's government, which it had appeared so easy to substitute for that of Charles, and the attempt to establish which had already carried six hundred thousand Frenchmen into Spain, of whom scarcely three hundred thousand survived.

After the continuance of the retreat for some days, many of the unhappy fugitives perished, whilst others, unable to proceed any further, withdrew into the villages for concealment, and to implore a pity which they seldom found. A portion of Joseph's Spanish Guard deserted, and, altogether, the mass of persons which had retreated from Madrid had much diminished when it arrived before Chinchilla.

On the confines of Valencia were encountered Marshal Suchet's advanced posts, and those who had had strength to continue this difficult journey had the satisfaction of finding themselves at length in a country which was tranquil, inhabited, rich, and friendly, whilst Marshal Suchet, to whom this visit was a heavy charge, received his royal visitor with the utmost respect, and with thorough cordiality the fugitives by whom he was accompanied. The Marshal accompanied Joseph into Valencia, procured him a much better reception there than he had ever obtained at Madrid, and liberally bestowed upon his followers the abundance of his magazines. The entrance into Valencia was made on the 1st of September, and it was resolved to await there the arrival of the army of Andalusia.

Although Marshal Soult was very unwilling to quit Andalusia, he could no longer refuse to evacuate it, for, having refused to weaken his army, he had lost the only means of maintaining his position there. To have remained there any longer would have been to expose himself to the fate of General Dupont. It was more advisable for him to retreat upon Valencia than to retreat upon La Mancha, for he thus avoided the English army, of whose march and strength he was ignorant, and went, moreover, to a friendly district which was tranquil and provided with all kinds of resources. When, therefore, he received Joseph's new orders, he was ready to obey them, for he had already determined to take the route which they pointed out; but at the same time it was not without some anxiety that he prepared to present himself before Joseph and two Marshals who were perfectly capable of judging how far his own conduct had led to the late misfortunes. It was no doubt quite true that General Caffarelli had allowed himself to be too much alarmed by the appearance

of the English ships ; that Joseph had committed a fault in setting out from Madrid too late, and a still greater fault in so tardily announcing his departure ; and that Marshal Marmont had imprudently manœuvred in the presence of a skilful and resolute enemy ;—but yet to how great an extent were these misfortunes caused by Marshal Soult, who, in spite of repeated advice and evidences of the most striking nature to the contrary, had obstinately persisted in believing that Lord Wellington was marching upon Andalusia and not upon Castille, had refused any succour to the army of Portugal, from which he had received so many services, and had not only refused to succour it, but in so doing had disobeyed the king, who was his military chief, without that excuse of having reason on his side which may in some rare instances justify disobedience. To justify all these acts to Joseph and his Marshals, who were completely acquainted with the whole of the circumstances, would be sufficiently embarrassing ; but a tribunal of a still more formidable nature awaited Soult at Valencia, the judgment of Napoleon, who had remained silent respecting the affair of Oporto, but who could scarcely be so respecting the events which had lately taken place in Castille. The excuse which the Marshal devised for the purpose of excusing his disobedience was a singular one, being founded on an assumption that the orders which Joseph had given him, and which he had refused to execute, were given in accordance with a secret understanding between himself, Bernadotte, England, and the Russians. The reasons upon which this asserted supposition was founded was that, according to the English journals, Bernadotte had taken many hundred Spaniards into his service, that Joseph's ambassador had remained in Russia, that Moreau had arrived from America to Sweden, &c. By adding to these facts the fact that Joseph was Bernadotte's beau-frère, he considered himself authorized to believe that Joseph had entered into a conspiracy against France, of which the first act was to be the abandonment of Spain, and that the order to evacuate Andalusia was the first step towards the execution of this criminal design. Entertaining, therefore, this strange idea, he believed it necessary to send information of the supposed plot to Napoleon, and accordingly wrote a despatch on the subject, which for greater safety he consigned to the charge of a captain of a merchant vessel, directing him to convey it to one of the French ports in the Mediterranean.

Having sent his despatch to the Emperor, Soult in the next place replied to Joseph's orders, reiterating his opinion respecting the plan on which the campaign ought to be con-

ducted, but adding, that in accordance with the Royal command, he would concentrate his scattered troops and proceed to the kingdom of Valencia by Murcia; and in fact, after having destroyed or thrown into the sea the immense war matériel which had been collected with so much toil in the lines of Cadiz, and formed a great convoy of munitions, provisions, and baggage, the Marshal commenced his retreat on the 25th of August by the Murcian route. That portion of his troops which was at Grenada would naturally join the bulk of the army on the road; whilst that which, under the command of Count d'Erlon, uselessly occupied Estremadura, was to descend to the banks of the Guadalquivir, ascend it by Cordova as far as Beaza, and join the main column at Huescar. Towards the end of September, Soult's advanced guard perceived in the environs of Almaraz that of Marshal Suchet, experiencing the greatest delight at meeting them once more; for in those dangerous and distant regions, the French soldiers, always regarding themselves as destined to perish to the last man, seldom met without throwing themselves into each others' arms, and manifesting the deepest emotion.

During the month of September, vague rumours had reached Joseph of the approach of Marshal Soult, and he had impatiently awaited the details of his march, and the explanation of his projects. Suddenly he learnt that the captain of a merchant vessel, the bearer of French despatches, had touched at Grao, (the port of Valencia,) and desired to resign his charge, being hotly pursued by the English; and having, therefore, hastened to receive and open the despatches in question, eager to learn what information they might contain respecting Andalusia, Joseph was filled with surprise on reading them to find himself denounced in them by Marshal Soult as a traitor towards his family and country. The sentiments with which he perused this accusation may be easily imagined; convinced as he was of his devotion to his brother, and also to the fact that Napoleon's brothers owed their whole fortunes, however dearly they might pay for them, to Napoleon himself, and that by the preservation of his, theirs could alone be preserved, he was indignant of being accused of treason which, if it had entered into Bonaparte's family, had certainly not done so through him, and immediately sent off Colonel Desprez to Moscow to carry to the Emperor this tissue of strange ideas, and to demand both the removal and the punishment of the General of Andalusia.

Impatient to meet Soult, and to have the army of Andalusia under his own control, Joseph hastened to meet him, and appointed a rendezvous with him on the Murcian frontier, at Fuente de Higuera. Joseph was accompanied by

Marshals Jourdan and Suchet, but at their request, as they were unwilling to be present at what would most probably be a very painful interview, he met Soult alone, and very unpleasantly surprised him, by the information that the subject of his late despatches to Napoleon was known. The incident produced this advantage, that Soult was eager to atone for his offence by zealous obedience, which was all, at that moment, that Joseph desired to obtain, and after an angry interview, therefore, with the commander of the Andalusian army, Joseph endeavoured to form in concert with the three Marshals a plan of campaign which, the whole of the French forces being concentrated to execute it, might make the English expiate their recent triumph by an overwhelming defeat. The chief part which Soult took in the conference was to intimate that he considered, not that his army was annexed to the others, but that the others were annexed to his; whilst Marshal Suchet seemed to be almost solely desirous for the preservation of Valencia, and Marshal Jourdan's good sense and want of any decided views on the subject, led him to hold a middle course. At length it was arranged that in the course of the following day each of the Marshals should submit to the King a written opinion respecting the course which it would be most advisable to pursue.

Marshal Soult proposed that an army composed of the army of Andalusia, the army of the centre, and a portion of the army of Aragon, should be marched across la Mancha upon the Tagus and Madrid. To this plan Marshal Suchet's memoir offered great objections, on the ground that, as the number of active troops at his disposal only amounted to thirteen or fourteen thousand, of whom six thousand were absolutely necessary for the defence of Valencia, and the principal posts of San Felipe and Saguntum, he could only contribute to an army intended to march upon Madrid some eight thousand men, and that for the sake of so small a reinforcement would probably be lost Valencia with all its abundance of resources, the advantage of keeping at a distance from Catalonia and Aragon the armies of Murcia and Sicily, and finally the only certain means of communicating with France. And in addition to these objections to the proposed movement was the consideration that, should it take place, and result in an encounter with the French and English armies behind the Tagus to the disadvantage of the latter, the French troops would find themselves in a cul-de-sac, the Tagus being closed against them in front and the kingdom of Valencia in the rear. It was in the highest degree important, therefore, Suchet's memoir proceeded to

declare, that Valencia should be well guarded, and for this purpose the whole of Marshal Suchet's troops were not only not too numerous but on the contrary scarcely sufficient, for rumours were everywhere current that the Anglo-Sicilian army was of very considerable strength, and fourteen thousand men, therefore, were by no means too many to make head against that army and the army of Catalonia, especially as it would be necessary to march them from San-Felippe to Tarragone, a distance of a hundred leagues. Marshal Suchet's plan, for the conduct of the campaign, therefore, being entirely founded on the idea of the importance of defending Valencia, consisted in marching the armies of Andalusia and the centre into the province of Guadalaxara, forcibly effecting the passage of the Tagus there, then marching the army of the centre upon Cuenca, where it would always be ready to afford support to the army of Aragon on the frontier of the kingdom of Valencia, and establishing the army of Andalusia in the province of Guadalaxara, its base resting on Calatayud, its head on Madrid, and its right in constant communication with the army of Portugal. Thus, according to this plan, the four principal armies, those of Aragon, the centre, Andalusia, and Portugal, supported by each other and resting on the Pyrenees, would be always able to meet the enemy with a force composed of two of their number at any time that he might march against one of them; and at the same time, having secure possession of Valencia, Tortosa, Tarragona, Barcelona, Lerida, Saragossa, Burgos, and Valladolid, provinces from which a good system of administration would be able to procure an ample supply of resources, they would be firmly established in their positions, and be capable of preserving, uninterrupted, their communications with France.

According to Marshal Jourdan's plan, it was above all things necessary to ascend towards Madrid by the upper Tagus, for the purpose of joining the army of Portugal, and then, with the three united armies of Portugal, the centre, and Andalusia, to march upon the English at the head of eighty thousand or ninety thousand men and a hundred and fifty pieces of cannon. Admitting, that were there any great danger of encountering Lord Wellington, established with all his forces on the Tagus, before the army of Portugal had been joined with the other two, it would be advisable to proceed by Valencia, Teruel, and Calatayud, and from thence to Aranda, where, without having incurred any risk, the union with the army of Portugal might be effected, he nevertheless declared against the adoption of this route, which was both long and badly sup-

plied with resources, on the ground that the chance of encountering Lord Wellington on the upper Tagus was a very improbable one, and that it was far more likely that the British General would be found with two or three divisions guarding Madrid, the remainder of his army being engaged in Castille against General Clausel. Should this latter supposition be the case there would be but slight difficulty in forcing the line of the Tagus, which in this part was by no means a serious obstacle, and the army of Portugal having been rallied, the united French force would enter Madrid with a decisive superiority of strength. At the same time, as it was possible that this supposition might be erroneous, and the Tagus in fact strongly guarded, it was necessary to retain the power of returning upon Valencia, and for that end to leave to Marshal Suchet his army undiminished by the withdrawal of a single battalion. Marshal Jourdan was of opinion, therefore, that the two armies of the south and centre alone being united, and thus forming a force of about fifty-six thousand men, should be marched in two columns, the one, consisting of the army of Andalusia, by the la Mancha route which passes Chinchilla, San-Clemente, Ocana, and Aranjuez; the other, consisting of the army of the centre, by the Cuenca route which passes Reguena, Cuenca, Fuenti-Duena, both being ready at any time to support each other, and equally proceeding towards the point of the Tagus at which they were to effect the passage. At the same time, as the right column (the army of the centre) would, Jourdan considered, be too feeble, he proposed to add to it six thousand or seven thousand men of the army of Andalusia, and to place it under the command of Count d'Erlon.

This plan was so wise and so appropriate to the situation, that Joseph, who placed habitual confidence in Marshal Jourdan's advice, immediately adopted it, and immediately ordered Soult to prepare to march from Almaraz, where he was encamped, upon Chinchilla, San-Clemente, and Aranjuez, whilst the army of the centre marching from La-Huerta de Valencia, by the Las-Cabrillas defile, should reach the Tagus at Fuenti-Duena, at which place it would be sufficiently near Aranjuez to support the army of Andalusia. He also ordered Marshal Soult to give up to the army of the centre Count d'Erlon, with six thousand men, at the same time informing him that Marshal Suchet would supply him with such quantities of rice and biscuit and eau-de-vie, as his troops might require.

These measures were particularly disagreeable to Marshal Soult, for they brought him under the direct orders of the

King, and deprived him of a portion of his forces; and he accordingly began to raise new objections, declaring that Joseph had no right to withdraw from his command any portion of the troops with which he had been entrusted by the Emperor. But as Joseph assumed at length the tone of a master, and intimated that he must either obey or resign his command to Count d'Erlon, he submitted, and during the 18th, 19th, and 20th of October, the united armies, well provided with munitions and provisions, set out in two columns, numbering altogether about fifty-six thousand men, leaving with Marshal Suchet the embarrassing retinues which had accompanied the two armies on their departure from Madrid and Seville, and leaving with him also the whole of his army.

On the 27th and 28th of October, the two columns reached the banks of the Tagus, between Fuente-Duena and Aranjuez, without having been stopped by any serious obstacle, and it then became an important matter of consideration, whether they were about to encounter Lord Wellington in front of Madrid, resolved to defend his conquest—this being very probable, since the entry into the Spanish capital had created a great sensation throughout Europe, and it was natural that he should be unwilling to relinquish his prize. But fortunately, all the rumours which reached the French head quarters were of a reassuring nature, generally concurring in leading Joseph and Marshal Jourdan to hope that the two or three divisions under General Hill were the only hostile force between themselves and Madrid. It is now time that we should turn our attention to the movements of the English and the army of Portugal since Joseph's march to Valencia and the union of his army with that of Andalusia.

On the 12th of August Lord Wellington had entered Madrid surrounded by all the Spanish chiefs, who were eager to share his triumph; and when we consider that it had but lately required the exercise of their utmost strength to prevent us from driving them from the small portion of the Peninsula which they still occupied into the sea, we may well understand that their joy and surprise on this occasion almost amounted to madness; Lord Wellington himself aggravating the barbarous or indiscreet conduct of his auxiliaries by the ostentation with which he exercised his authority. The first care should have been to have reassured the inhabitants of Madrid, to have forgotten some things, and to have tolerated or even adopted others.

Don Carlos d'Espana, and l'Empecinado, who had now become to a certain extent the masters of Madrid, as the first

exercise of their authority made the inhabitants swear fealty to the constitution of Cadiz, which was far from being agreeable to many Spaniards, who were but little prepared to receive the institutions which were being thus forced upon them, and did this, not so much with the intention of binding their countrymen to the constitution, as of forcing them to submit to the insurrectional government of Cadiz. Their next proceedings were to express themselves in the harshest manner with respect to the *afrancesados*, and to withdraw from circulation and destroy at a loss all the coin bearing Joseph's effigy. Then, neglecting to procure the arrival of provisions at Madrid, they gave themselves up to extravagances of faction which were as dangerous as foolish, whilst the extremest misery prevailed around them. In the meantime, Lord Wellington added to these errors those resulting from British pride, wounding the haughty spirit of the Spanish nation by lodging in the palace of their kings; having already destroyed in capturing the Retiro, which Colonel Laffond had been compelled to give up for the want of water, the china manufactory, which answered to that of Sevres in France and that of Meissen in Saxony.

In the meantime, General Clausel had rallied, reorganised and reinstated the army of Portugal, and boldly marched it upon the Douro, although now reduced to only twenty-five thousand men, in the presence of the English army, of which the principal portion was posted on the banks of that river. He had, moreover, driven back the enemy's advanced posts, and sent General Foy with a division to collect the garrisons of Astorga, Benevento, Zamora, and Toro, which were uselessly dispersed along a line which could no longer be defended. General Foy had arrived too late to save the garrison of Astorga, which had been forced to surrender to the Spanish army of Galicia, but he had been in time to succour its sick and wounded, and he had gathered together the troops occupying the other little posts on the Douro and the Esla.

Lord Wellington finding himself thus braved had been obliged to quit Madrid for the purpose of marching against the young adversary who, with the wrecks of a recently vanquished army, had so daringly posted himself before him; and accordingly, after having established General Hill at Madrid, he had departed for Old Castille, and having joined with his own troops the army of Galicia had marched upon Burgos with fifty thousand men.

Compelled once more to retreat, General Clausel had fallen back successively upon Valladolid, Burgos, Briviesca,

and the Ebro; Lord Wellington, pausing in his pursuit when he had reached Burgos, for the purpose of taking the castle by which this city was commanded, and without the possession of which, that of the town could not be considered secure. The siege was commenced towards the close of September, almost at the same time that Joseph was preparing to march upon Madrid.

The fortress of Burgos was an ancient edifice, erected during the period of the supremacy of the Moors in Spain, and crowned a height, at the foot of which lay the city of the same name. Two strong entrenched lines had been constructed around its Gothic walls, and armed by numerous and heavy cannon. A horn-work had been constructed on the height called St. Michel, which commanded the position of the castle. General Dubreton occupied this improvised fortress with two thousand men, and being provided with provisions and munitions, resolved to make a vigorous defence.

Lord Wellington, disdaining to attack such a place, by a regular siege, resolved to attempt to carry the work on the St. Michel height by assault; and on the night of the 19th of September he succeeded in effecting this object with the loss of four hundred men, the loss on the side of the French being no more than a hundred and fifty.

As soon as the English had gained possession of the St. Michel position, they established a battery there and opened fire upon the fortress, but as their artillery was of less calibre than ours, it was soon dismounted and reduced to silence. The difficulties attending the transport service had rendered it impossible for them to bring up great cannon under the walls of Burgos, and the only available cannon were some sixteen-pounders which the Guerilla bands of Avala and Biscaye had received from the English squadron, and had laboriously conveyed to Burgos.

Perceiving at length that it would be almost impossible to breach the walls of the fortress with his cannon, Lord Wellington resolved to have recourse once more to an assault, and, accordingly, on the night of the 22nd of September, his columns planted ladders against the first *enceinte*, but were driven back by our troops with great loss, one of them, composed of Portuguese troops, being partly destroyed before it had even approached the foot of the *enceinte*.

It was necessary once more to have recourse to regular approaches, and to undermine the works in the absence of the artillery necessary to breach them. Two mines were accordingly prepared, and one of them having been exploded on the 29th of September, a column of the enemy

rushed to the assault, but were repulsed, as were those which had already made similar attempts. On the 4th of October the second mine was fired, causing an extensive breach, whilst that which had been the effect of the first was considerably enlarged by the fire of the enemy's artillery; and the besiegers, throwing themselves upon these two breaches with the utmost fury, succeeded in carrying and effecting a secure lodgment in one of them. Having thus gained a footing on the first enceinte, the English began to open approaches towards the second in the hope of gaining possession of that also, but on the 8th of October, the garrison, executing a general sortie, overthrew their works, and driving them beyond the first enceinte regained possession of all that had been lost, with the exception of the work on the St. Michel height.

Having thus lost twenty days and two thousand five hundred men without having made any advance towards the capture of the fortress, the English General determined to make a last attempt, and after some preliminary works on the 19th of October the besiegers threw themselves once more on the outer line of works, and having succeeded in gaining possession of them hastened towards the second; but the brave garrison rushing forth en masse, charged them at the bayonet's point, and a third time drove them back with great slaughter beyond the enceinte of which they had for a moment obtained possession. And thus during thirty or forty days two thousand men, now reduced by the enemy's fire and fatigue to fifteen hundred, entrenched behind some ill-constructed works, had held in check fifty thousand of the enemy. Eternal honour to those brave heroes and their commander, General Dubreton! Their heroic resistance proved of what service in certain decisive circumstances may be well defended fortresses, for it afforded time to the army of Portugal to place itself once more in line, to the armies of the centre and Andalusia to advance upon the Tagus, and to all to concentrate for the purpose of overwhelming Lord Wellington.

In fact, General Clausel, who was now posted on the Ebro, had received the depôts established along the Pyrenees as well as the little garrisons on the frontier, together with horses for his cavalry and artillery, and had already thus become possessed of thirty-five thousand available troops. General Caffarelli, who, as we have already seen, being held in constant fear by the English fleets, had neglected the principal danger for one which was merely accessory, had at length pursued a better course, and reinforced the army of Portugal with ten thousand men. Unfortunately, just as General Clausel was about to march at the head of forty-five thousand

men who now composed his army, the effects of his recent wound compelled him to resign his command to General Souham, an old officer of the republic, who was as brave as he was experienced, and who now advanced to the succour of the intrepid garrison which had defended during thirty-four days the paltry fortifications of Burgos.

Lord Wellington, situated between the army of Portugal which marched northwards and the armies of the centre and Andalusia which marched southwards, was in one of those difficult and critical positions from which General Bonaparte had always extricated himself by some wonderful triumph. Had he been less circumspect and more active, the English General might, probably, by concentrating the army of Italy with his own at the right moment, have vanquished in turn each of the armies which threatened him, and remained definitively master of Spain. But Lord Wellington was not formed by nature for wresting Spain from our hands in a single campaign; and it was sufficient for the triumph of the English policy, and for our misfortune, that he was endowed with the qualities calculated to enable him to effect its conquest in several.

Finding that the army of Portugal was approaching him greatly reinforced, the English General abandoned the wall of Burgos, before which he had lost three thousand men and the prestige of victory, and which would probably be the means of his losing Madrid; and after encountering our troops in several rear-guard combats withdrew in his turn behind the Douro, sending orders to General Hill to join him at Salamanca, if Madrid should appear to him to be untenable in the presence of the armies which were now marching upon it.

Such were the events of which Joseph and Marshal Jourdan received information on their arrival upon the Tagus, and on the 30th of October, the armies of the centre and of Andalusia, forcing the line of the Tagus, passed sur le corps of General Hill's rear-guard, and on the 2nd of November entered the Spanish capital, astonished at the sudden changes of fortune. Joseph was well received in Madrid, for its inhabitants, disgusted by the violence of the Guerillas and the pride of the English, began to think that the new dynasty, represented by so gentle and wise a prince, would be as beneficial to them as that of the degenerate Bourbons under the sway of factious chiefs.

With a very unusual display of activity Joseph set out from Madrid, after a sojourn there of no more than forty-eight hours, for the purpose of effecting the junction with the army of Portugal, and pursuing Lord Wellington at the

head of eighty thousand men, by which means he hoped, and with good reason, that he would be able to drive the English back into Portugal, and re-establish himself, in spite of the evacuation of Andalusia, in his former position. Some anxiety, doubtless, began to be experienced respecting the Russian expedition, the silence of the *Moniteur*, which ceased to publish any bulletins from the grand army, being considered very ill-omened; but no idea was entertained of the extent of the disasters which had fallen upon us, and Joseph, therefore, expecting no ill news from Paris, hoped to find a recompense for the misfortunes which had befallen him at Salamanca in the environs of Salamanca itself.

Arriving on the 6th of November beyond the Guadarrama with his faithful major-general, he was in a position to turn to the left towards Penaranda, by taking which direction he would have come upon Lord Wellington's traces, but he preferred to turn to the right towards Arevolo, for the purpose of effecting his junction with the army of Portugal, being unwilling to attack the English until he had concentrated the whole of his forces; nor was it long before this object of his desire was effected, for Lord Wellington, eager to fall back upon Salamanca, made no attempt to prevent even the junction of the armies of the north and the south; and the rear-guards meeting almost in the environs of the Douro, Joseph had under his command, by the junction of the three armies of Andalusia, the centre, and Portugal, ninety thousand men, and one hundred and fifty pieces of cannon; a force which would have been still larger had not General Caffarelli hastened to recall the ten thousand men he had furnished, that they might again take part in the struggle with the bands under Mina, de Longa, Merino, and Porlier.

The army of Portugal, which had numbered thirty-five thousand men, had lost a certain number during the pursuit of Lord Wellington; and the armies of the centre and Andalusia, which on their departure from Valencia had numbered fifty-six thousand men, had left some on the road and had furnished, moreover, a detachment for the garrison of Madrid; but the force now under Joseph's command still numbered eighty-eight thousand of the best troops in the world, men who were as full of indignation at the successes which the English had been permitted to obtain, as they were rejoiced at the approach of an opportunity to avenge them.

Lord Wellington, separated from the Spanish army of Galicia but reinforced by Hill's corps, was at this period at the head of no more than sixty thousand men, of whom forty thousand were English, who were far less self-confident than on the morrow of the victory of Salamanca; and how could

such a force as this make head against eighty-five thousand Frenchmen even tolerably commanded? That it could do so, was believed neither by French nor English.

Our three armies advanced, therefore, upon the Tormès by precisely the same route as that which had been followed by Marshal Marmont, when about to fight the battle of Salamanca; marching so as to turn the Salamanca position and to place themselves upon Lord Wellington's line of communications.

On the 11th November they found themselves in a line at some distance from the Tormès, the army of Andalusia on the left, that of the centre, in the centre, that of Portugal on the right; Lord Wellington tranquilly awaiting their approach at the Arapiles, since, trusting in a position, the strength of which had already been proved, and, having his line of retreat secure towards Ciudad-Rodrigo, he believed that he should always be able to fall back in time. But he had committed a fault which might have cost him dear, and which Marshal Jourdan's keen glance immediately discerned.

The Tormès which, although of considerable size in winter, was at this time fordable in several places, flowed in front of us across the little city of Alba de Tormès, situated on our left, and then describing a semicircle proceeded to our right towards Salamanca. Lord Wellington had left General Hill at Alba de Tormès, and with the bulk of his army occupied Salamanca; the three leagues which intervened between himself and Hill being occupied only by a feeble detachment posted at the position of Calvarossa de Ariba; and the idea which now presented itself to Jourdan was, to advance between the English generals, and at least cut off the fifteen thousand men under General Hill.

This project, the details of which were explained to Joseph in the presence of his generals, on the very ground on which it was to be executed, was regarded as one which could not fail of success, by all except Soult, who considered that it would be better to cross the Tormès above Alba for the purpose of turning the Salamanca position, and thus compelling the English to resign it. To this it was replied that this movement would have the effect of forcing General Hill to quit Alba, to fall back in succession upon Calvarossa de Ariba and Salamanca, and would thus be the means of pointing out to the English the error which they had committed, and of causing the concentration of all their forces in the neighbourhood of Salamanca. The too modest Marshal Jourdan and all the Generals present were firm supporters of this latter view, but it was determined, out of respect to Marshal Soult's rank and position, to defer the final decision

on the subject until after a fresh reconnaissance should have been made of the upper course of the Tormès.

On the following day Marshal Soult again brought forward his project of passing the Tormès on the left above Alba, the river having been found to be fordable there, and insisted so strongly on the advantageousness of this plan, that Marshal Jourdan, when consulted by Joseph on the subject, advised him to submit to Soult's opinion; alleging that it would be dangerous to attempt the execution of the plan he had himself proposed in opposition to the wishes of the General of the principal army; and that although the temptation to strike the English a decisive blow in the manner pointed out in his own plan, was very great, still the adoption of the course proposed by Marshal Soult would be less hazardous.

That the whole responsibility of the adoption of the measure proposed by Marshal Soult might be thrown upon him, and that he might be compelled, at least, to carry it into execution, in the best manner he was able, the army of the centre was placed under his orders, and that of Portugal entrusted to Count d'Erlon. On the 13th, the French crossed the Tormès above Alba, and advanced as far as Nuestra Senora de Retiro. Marshal Soult had already fifty thousand men under his command, including the whole of the cavalry, and on the following day he would be able to pursue the forward movement uninterruptedly. On this day, however, the weather became very unfavourable, and when Joseph and Jourdan insisted upon the advisability of throwing the French cavalry upon the English army, which was visible through the mist defiling from our right to our left, Marshal Soult, become circumspect at the last moment, objected to the measure on account of the obscurity of the atmosphere, being in truth unwilling to advance until he should have been joined by the whole army of Portugal; and the result was, that when the eighty-five thousand French troops were assembled, the English were already out of their reach, and in full retreat upon the Cuidad-Rodrigo route.

The confusion and irritation which now arose in the three armies was extreme. The pursuit of the English was continued for a day or two, and then, having obtained by this formidable concentration of force only the capture of some three thousand stragglers, Joseph re-entered Madrid, and placed his three armies in cantonments, the army of Portugal in Castille, that of the centre in the environs of Madrid, and that of Andalusia on the Tagus, between Aranjuez and Talavera.

Such was the disastrous Spanish campaign of 1812, which after having begun by the loss of Cuidad-Rodrigo and

Badajoz, was signalized by the loss of the battle of Salamanca, and ended with the retreat from Madrid, the evacuation from Andalusia, and the disgrace of permitting forty thousand English to escape from eighty-five thousand French troops, posted on their line of communication. The English had, in fact, in this year of 1812, not only taken from us the two important fortresses of Ciudad-Rodrigo and Badajoz, gained a decisive battle, deprived us, for a moment, of Madrid, and forced us to evacuate Andalusia, but had also braved us by advancing as far as Burgos, and by returning uninjured from so bold a proceeding, had exposed all the weakness of our position in Spain, a weakness attributable to many immediate deplorable causes, but to be traced eventually—to the negligence of Napoleon, who, great as he was, being unendowed with the power of ubiquity, was unable to direct judiciously the course of affairs in Spain whilst in Paris, and still less whilst in Moscow,—to that spirit of distrust which prevented him, whilst delegating his authority to his brother, from bestowing it upon him in full confidence,—and, finally, by that eagerness of mind which impelled him to carry on every measure simultaneously, to endeavour to exercise his authority everywhere at the same time, and to regard as executed, what circumstances had rendered it necessary to neglect—Such had been, and such was still, the secret of our disasters during this terrible Spanish war.

In the meantime, the occurrence of events so disastrous to us in the north, and so unfavourable in the south, produced, as might have been expected, an immense sensation throughout Europe. How great was the surprise, how intense the satisfaction which now spread amongst the innumerable enemies whom we had raised up against us on every side! England, especially, surrendered itself to what was almost the delirium of joy, whilst, in spite of the credulity of hatred, it scarcely dared to credit the news of our disasters, which began to spread throughout Europe. Germany, stupified by the spectacle which was presented under its very eyes, began to believe that we had been vanquished, but was slow to believe that we had been destroyed, and long awaited the arrival of the skeleton of the grand army before it could credit the declarations of the Russians, and comprehend that no skeleton even of it existed. Day by day, during the month of December, hope began to revive in the breast of the German nation; with hope, courage, and with courage a species of furious rage. All the secret societies which were in existence amongst its populations began to ferment and to prepare for a general rising, and through the midst of this excitement of popular feeling,

Napoleon pursued his clandestine journey towards Paris, where he was to find the adversaries of his government filled with ill-omened joy, his flatterers overwhelmed with despair, honest men struck with grief and surprise, and clear-sighted men regretting what it had been impossible for them not to foresee. But even at this time neither our vanquished in their pride, nor our enemies in their hatred, nor our faithful citizens in the depth of their affliction, were capable of imagining the whole extent of our misfortunes. Yet the moment was but too close at hand, alas! when they were to be known universally.

BOOK XLVII.

THE COHORTS.

NAPOLÉON's rapid journey—Lays aside his incognito only at Warsaw and Dresden, and then to none but the French ministers—His sudden arrival in Paris at midnight on the 16th of December—Reception on the 19th of the ministers and great personages of the empire—Napoleon assumes the air of an offended sovereign who has cause to utter reproaches rather than to receive them, and affects to attach great importance to the conspiracy of General Malet—Solemn reception of the Senate and Council of State—Violent invective against the ideology—For the purpose of directing public attention to the Malet conspiracy and turning it from the Russian campaign, M. Frochot, prefect of the Seine, is accused before the council of state of having failed to display presence of mind on the day of the conspiracy—M. Frochot is condemned and deprived of his office—Napoleon impressed by the danger which would be incurred by his dynasty in case of his own death, takes care to make arrangements for the assumption of the regency by Maria Louisa—The Arch-chancellor Cambacérés is directed to prepare a *senatus consultum* for this purpose—The more important cares which absorb Napoleon's attention—Activity and administrative ability displayed by him in re-organizing his military forces—His projects for the levy of men, troops, and the re-organization of the corps which had been almost entirely destroyed during the Russian campaign—He receives news from the banks of the Vistula which convinces him that the state of the grand army is utterly hopeless—Joy of the Prussians upon receiving information of our disasters—This joy succeeded by an extraordinary outburst of hatred against us—Arrival of the Emperor Alexander at Wilna, and his project of presenting himself as the liberator of Germany—Active plotting of the German refugees collected around his person—The Prussian auxiliary corps abandons Marshal Macdonald and joins the Russians—Dangerous position of Marshal Macdonald at the head of some thousands of Polish troops in the midst of armed enemies—He succeeds in retreating in safety upon Tilsit and Labiau—The French head quarters are withdrawn from the Niemen to the Vistula—There remain at head quarters only nine or ten thousand troops of various nations and of all armies to resist the pursuit of the Russians—Murat quits the army, resigning the command to Prince Eugene—Effect produced throughout the whole of Germany by the defection of the Prussian auxiliary corps—Immense popularity of the Emperor Alexander—Embarrassment of the King of Prussia between the engagements contracted towards France, and the constraint exercised upon him by the public

opinion of Germany—He withdraws into Silesia, and takes a species of neutral position, from which he offers to Napoleon certain proposals—Influence in Vienna of the general tending of public feeling—Position of the Emperor Francis, who had married his daughter to Napoleon, and of M. de Metternich who had advised the marriage—Their desire to modify the policy adopted by them of alliance with France, to bring about peace between France and Russia, and to take advantage of the state of affairs, to re-establish the independence of Germany—Their judicious advice to the Emperor of the French, and offers of Austrian mediation—The manner in which Napoleon receives the news of the disasters which had fallen upon him—He gives a new development to his plans for the reorganization of the French forces—Employment of the Cohorts—Levy of five hundred thousand men—Napoleon convokes a council for the purpose of submitting these measures to its consideration, and consulting with it respecting the position which it would be advisable to take with respect to Europe—He is unwilling to make peace until victory should have returned to him the position which he had lost—The majority of the council pronounces in favour of great armaments, and at the same time advises that negotiations should be immediately entered upon through the mediation of Austria—Napoleon accepts the mediation of Austria, but such bases of the arrangements of a peace as were little likely to conciliate this power—A response of a discouraging nature addressed to Prussia—Immense administrative activity displayed during these negotiations—State of public feeling in France—It deplores Napoleon's errors but is anxious that a great effort should be made to repulse the enemy, and that then peace should be immediately made—Manner in which Napoleon employs the five hundred thousand men placed at his disposal—Re-organization of the corps of the old army under Marshals Davoust and Victor—Creation by means of cohorts and provisional regiments, of four new corps, one upon the Elbe, under General Lauriston, two upon the Rhine, under Marshals Ney and Marmont, and one in Italy, under General Bertrand—Re-organization of the artillery and cavalry—Financial methods devised for supplying the expenses of these immense armaments—Napoleon, whilst occupied with these military preparations, is anxious to do something towards restoring public confidence, and proceeds to put an end to his quarrel with the pope—Removal of the pope from Savoy to Fontainebleau—Napoleon sends there the cardinals of Bazane and Maury, the archbishop of Tours, and the bishop of Nantes, for the purpose of preparing Pius VII. for an arrangement—The pope, already agreed with Napoleon with respect to the canonical institution, is disposed to accept an establishment at Avignon, provided he be not compelled to reside at Paris—When the preliminary arrangements are completed, Napoleon proceeds in person to Fontainebleau, and by the influence of his presence induces the pope to sign the concordat of Fontainebleau, which contains the resignation of the temporal power of the Holy See—Fêtes of Fontainebleau—Favours granted to the clergy—Recall of the exiled cardinals—The cardinals once more surrounding the pope, inspire him with regret for what he has done, and render him inclined to refuse to execute the concordat of Fontainebleau—Napoleon pretends not to observe this inclination—Content with what he has obtained, he convokes the legislative corps, and announces to it his resolutions—Progress of events in Germany—Increasing enthusiasm of the Germans—The King of Prussia, under the influence of his subjects, displays extreme irritation at Napoleon's refusals, and alienates himself more and more from our

alliances—The Russians determine upon a forward march, for the purpose of compelling the King of Prussia to adopt decided measures against us—They advance upon the Oder, and compel Prince Eugene to evacuate successively Posen and Berlin—New retrograde movement of the French armies, and their definitive establishment on the line of the Elbe—The King of Prussia, separated from the French and surrounded by the Russians, joins them, and withdraws from his alliance with France—Treaty of Kalisch—Arrival of Alexander at Breslau, and his interview with Frederick William—Effect produced in Germany by the defection of Prussia—Insurrection of Hamburg—Partial defection of the court of Saxony, and withdrawal of this court to Ratisbon—Effect of the news of these events in Vienna—The people of Austria, strongly excited, begin to demand the declaration of war against France—The Austrian court, firmly resolved to regain its lost position and that of Germany, without the risk of a war, resists the excitement of popular feeling, and endeavours to bring France to some arrangement—Counsels of M. de Metternich—Napoleon, little troubled by these events, makes them the reason for demanding fresh levies—The manner in which he responds to the views of Austria—Proposes to this nation to destroy and take possession of Prussia—M. de Narbonne chosen to replace M. Otto at Vienna, and to render that capital favourable to Napoleon's policy—Napoleon before quitting Paris, determines to confer the regency upon Maria Louisa, and to delegate to her the interior government of France—His interview with the arch-chancellor Cambacérès upon this subject, and his ideas with respect to his family and the prospects of his son—Solemn ceremonial of the investment of Maria Louisa with the title of regent—Before his departure Napoleon has time to see the Prince of Schwarzenberg, to whose communications he scarcely listens—His perfect confidence—Chagrin of the empress—Departure for the army.

BOOK XLVII.

WHILST Europe, agitated by hope, fear, and hatred, asked what had become of Napoleon,—doubting whether he had perished or were still alive,—he was traversing in a sledge, in company with the Duke of Vicentia, the Grand Marshal Duroc, the Count Lobau, General Lefèvre-Desnoettes, and the mameluke Rustan, the vast plains of Lithuania, Poland, and Saxony, keeping himself completely hidden under thick wrappings of fur, since the slightest breach of his *incognito* might have drawn upon him some immediate and tragic catastrophe. The man who had so greatly excited the admiration of the populations of the countries which he now traversed, who had, in fact, been but lately the object of their superstitious submission, would at this moment have scarcely been able to escape destruction at their hands. In two places alone, Warsaw and Dresden, did he make himself known. At Warsaw, he paused to address the Poles yet once more, and to endeavour to induce them to make one great and final effort. The Duke of Vicentia, hurrying in his travelling costume to the Archbishop of Malines, who was greatly affected by the news of Krasnoé and the Berezina, and but little qualified to inspire the Poles with a courage to which he was himself a stranger, and having almost forced the door of his residence, being very unwilling to be recognised by the Archbishop's servants, appeared before him with an unexpectedness which was almost spectral, and filled him with astonishment, by declaring who he was, with whom he had come, and by conducting him to the modest hotel at which Napoleon had secretly alighted. M. de Pradt found Napoleon in a wretched dwelling, where he had difficulty in procuring even a fire, and attempting to conceal, beneath an affectation of mirth, the immense humiliation suffered by his pride. And how great, indeed, was the difference between his position at this moment and that which he had held six months before, when he had coolly issued instructions for the re-establishment of the kingdom of Poland, and the re-

arrangement of the European territory ! But, nevertheless, Napoleon, strong in the firmness of his will, affected to be neither overwhelmed nor surprised, nor even seriously affected, by his misfortunes. "From the sublime to the ridiculous there is but a step," he said to the prelate-ambassador, with a forced smile. "Who has not suffered reverses ?" he added. "It is true, that none have hitherto endured so great ones ; but it is fit that my misfortunes should be in proportion to my fortunes, and for the rest, they will speedily be repaired." Then he went on to boast of the good state of his health, of his personal strength, and to repeat that he was formed to encounter extraordinary adventures ; that a world in ruins was his natural abode, but that at the same time it was his province to restore it to order, and that he would speedily return to the Vistula, with three hundred thousand men, and exact vengeance from the Russians, for a victory which had been not the triumph of their arms but the work of nature. He then had the principal Polish ministers summoned to his presence, and, recommending them to observe the utmost secrecy with respect to his presence in Warsaw, endeavoured to inspire them with fresh courage, declaring that Poland should not be abandoned by him, and that he would speedily reappear in the midst of them at the head of a powerful army ; adding, that the losses on the side of the Russians had been greater than those on his own, and that the essential difference between the power of France and Russia would be displayed within three months, in such a manner as to restore all that might have been lost.

After having thus attempted to restore some feeling of confidence to the Polish ministers, Napoleon resumed his journey across the snow, and having arrived in Dresden, alighted at the residence of his minister, M. de Serra, and having summoned thither the poor King of Saxony, who was filled with terror by the Emperor's strange reverse of fortune, assured him that he need suffer no alarm on account of the recent events, since they were but to be reckoned amongst the ordinary accidents of war, and that he would return within a few weeks, more powerful than ever, to secure for him, the King of Saxony, that kingdom of Poland which had ever been for the Saxon princes an old and cherished dream. Having succeeded in almost reassuring the King of Saxony, and desiring him to keep the secret, the preservation of which would be still necessary for forty-eight hours longer, he wrote to his father-in-law, informing him that he had returned safe and well, and full of hope and confidence ; that the state of affairs was as had been described in the 29th bulletin ; that he was about to assemble a formidable army on the

Vistula ; that he continued to rely on the cordial alliance of Austria ; that he was anxious that the Austrian corps should be promptly recruited, and that he wished that an Austrian diplomatist, of some consideration, should be immediately sent to Paris (the presence of the Prince of Schwarzenberg being necessary in Galicia), since it would be necessary to enter upon the discussion of affairs of importance.

As the sledge would be of no further service in the country he had now to traverse, Napoleon borrowed the carriage of his minister, M. de Saint Aignan, and posted on to Paris. When he had reached the banks of the Rhine, he had no longer any reason to preserve his *incognito*, for if he was for France an absolute, an exacting, and even a tyrannical master, he was at the same time its general and defender, and could with perfect safety present himself before her. That his arrival might not cause too great a surprise, he sent forward an officer bearing a few lines, which were to be printed in the *Moniteur*, to the effect, that on the 3rd of December, he had assembled his generals at Smorgoni, conferred the command-in-chief on King Murat, for so long, only, as the cold should render military operations impossible ; that he had passed through Warsaw and Dresden, and that he was about to return to Paris for the purpose of bestowing his attention on the affairs of the empire.

Napoleon followed very closely the bearer of the announcement of his arrival, and on the 18th December, at half-past eleven o'clock, he entered the Tuileries, to the surprise of his wife, who was by no means alienated by, but, nevertheless, was perfectly astonished at, the change in his fortunes, since, in uniting herself to him, she had believed that she was not only espousing a favourite of Fortune, but even, so to speak, Fortune itself. Napoleon tenderly embraced the Empress, and keeping up with her the comedy which he had played with every one else, repeated that the cold, and the cold alone, had been the cause of his extraordinary misadventure, and that it could be easily repaired, as would soon be seen.

On the morning of the following day, the 19th, he awaited his ministers, and the great personages of his court, the first interview with whom, under existing circumstances, could not but be a painful trial. But Malet's conspiracy, in conjunction with the baseness of the greater number of these persons, had provided him with a resource at this moment ; for having freely denounced each other with respect to the errors committed in this affair, and being full of anxiety with regard to the manner in which Napoleon might now receive them, they scarcely thought of the five hundred thousand men who had

perished, or the change in the fortunes of their country ; and the effect was that Napoleon, who had, in justice, a heavy account to render, was able to assume the position of one who had only explanations to demand. He received, therefore, the persons composing his court and government with extreme hauteur—assuming a manner which was at once tranquil and severe ; appearing to await explanations rather than to be under the necessity of affording them ; treating the external affairs of the empire as of but little importance, in comparison with those of its internal administration ; and, in a word, taking care to question so that he might not be questioned. Certainly, he said, now addressing one group and now another of those present, certainly, the French army had met with misfortunes, and had even suffered to a considerable extent, but not more than the Russian army. That it should have done so, he contended, was only amongst those ordinary chances of war which should cause no astonishment, and which were for finely tempered spirits but opportunities for the display of the grandest qualities of the soul. Only those men, he said, who were capable of triumphing over all trials, whatever they might be, were worthy of esteem ; and he then proceeded to pay a deserved tribute of praise to Marshal Ney, but in such a manner as to direct his observations towards the men who had neither the courage nor the health of this marshal, rather than to the circumstances of the late campaign. In the next place, treating the Russian war as a matter of quite secondary importance, he demanded of those around him, how it was that they had permitted themselves to be surprised, and, especially, how it was that when they supposed him to be dead, they had permitted themselves to believe so readily that the existing order of things was abolished, and had failed to resort immediately to the empress and the King of Rome ?

To these well founded but imprudent questions, for it was quite certain that every one had regarded his death as the most natural of events, and the fall of his throne, after his death, as the most natural of revolutions, to these questions none of the persons interrogated knew how to answer,—save by assuming an humble appearance of acknowledgment that there was something inexplicable in the whole affair. No one dared to give the true answer—to declare that his empire was not established, and that although his genius had been able to endow it with an appearance of stability, such as is rarely possessed by new establishments, it could not be supposed that it would last longer than his own life, even if so long.

Whilst Napoleon was uttering these momentous questions,

each seemed to signify by his eyes that the Minister of Police was the real culprit, the man who ought properly to expiate not only the conspiracy of Malet, but even, perhaps, the Russian campaign also. But when Napoleon, after the general and formal reception, conversed with each of those present in turn, he listened, both long and patiently, to the observations of the Duke of Rovigo, for whose courage, spirit, and sincerity, he had a certain sort of esteem; and the duke, whose manner had something of that hardy familiarity peculiar to old servants, who are accustomed to tell their masters what they may dislike to hear, but what it is good that they should know, entering thoroughly into the details of the transaction in question, succeeded in perfectly justifying himself in the eyes of his master, whose talent always enabled him to be just, when anger or calculation failed to render him the contrary. He acknowledged to the Duke of Rovigo that he alone had seen the real nature of the affair; and whilst adding that his arrest was a matter to be regretted, taking place, as it did, in the midst of a people given to raillery, he at the same time plainly showed that he was far from having any intention of disgracing him, and at the conclusion of the audience astonished every one, by bestowing the most evident marks of favour upon a minister, whom he could not but with great difficulty have replaced, and whom he certainly would not have replaced by M. Fouché, at a moment when fidelity in his servants would be their most precious quality.

Remaining alone with the Prince Cambacérès, and feeling some embarrassment in the presence of a man of such great good sense, he demanded of him what he thought of the terrible disasters of the Russian campaign, and whether they had not astonished him. The arch-chancellor acknowledged that he had been extremely surprised, but at the same time declared that he had long since begun to believe, that so many wars must have some calamitous issue. Napoleon then proceeded to attribute all that had occurred to the sudden and extraordinary cold which had smitten his army, at a period so unusually early; as if a genius such as his own might not have anticipated the possibility of such an event as this, and as if, moreover, his enterprise were not, without any reference to the cold, entirely unfeasible by reason of the enormous distance which had to be traversed in its execution. He also attributed this tragic misadventure partly to the barbarous folly of Alexander, who, he declared, had done himself more injury by burning his own cities, than he, Napoleon, had any intention of causing him, since his only object had been to impose very acceptable

conditions of peace; as if Alexander could be expected to manage the war so as to suit the calculations of his adversary, and as though he had reason to regret a course of conduct which had overthrown the man who wielded the destinies of Europe, and substituted himself in his place. Having discussed this subject, Napoleon reverted to the matter which he wished to make the great event of the day—Malet's conspiracy; declaring, and the observation became a sentiment in the mouths of all the high functionaries of the state, that he needed not only brave soldiers but also firm magistrates, as capable of dying for the defence of the throne as soldiers in defence of their country. He then spoke of the personal dangers he had run, of those which he would still have to incur in the course of re-establishing his affairs, of the necessity, therefore, of securing the succession to his son in the case of his own death, pointing out that the best means of attaining this end would be by crowning him as heir presumptive, a ceremony which often took place in the Western Empire, which would advantageously strike the popular imagination at the present time, and be a means of teaching the civil magistrates the language of duty.

The latter of these observations implied a threat directed against M. Frochot, the prefect of the Seine, who had certainly displayed, with respect to the Malet conspiracy, a credulity which had caused as much amusement as the arrest of the Duke of Rovigo, and whom, although he respected him, and was far from regarding him with any animosity, Napoleon was resolved to make one of the objects towards which he intended to draw public attention, that it might not brood too intently on the events of the Russian campaign. He determined, therefore, that M. Frochot should be tried by the council of state, and that all the great public bodies should visit the Tuileries for the purpose of presenting to him solemn addresses on his return, and the affairs of the moment. And, accordingly, on the 20th of December, the day following the morrow of his arrival, Napoleon received the senate, the council of state, and the great administrative bodies; the arch-chancellor Cambacérès having previously suggested to their several heads what should be the general terms of their addresses.

M. de Lacépède, president of the senate, who was one of those writers who are ever willing to devote their pens to the service of any one capable of liberally rewarding them, knew very well how to clothe the ideas suggested to him by the Prince Cambacérès, in that affected rhetoric of which he had learnt the usage in the school of the mediocre imitators of

Buffon. Commencing his address by congratulating Napoleon on his propitious return, and congratulating France on the occasion, because, in the absence of her Emperor, the beneficent influence of his genius on her fortunes became relaxed, he then proceeded to speak of the subject of the day, which was not the Russian campaign, but the Malet conspiracy. The men, he said, to whom the Emperor had pardoned their past crimes, had attempted to throw back the empire into the midst of that anarchy from which his genius had rescued it; but their chastisement had been prompt, and France, warned by their past attempt, had had fresh occasion for considering what it owed to the Napoleon dynasty, and had promised to remain unvaryingly faithful to it; whilst the senate, established to preserve it, was resolved to die in its defence. One passage of the president's address deserves some particular attention, and is as follows:—"At the commencement of our old dynasties, the monarch, more than once, ordered that every Frenchman, of whatever rank, should bind himself by a solemn oath to observe fealty to the heir to the throne; and sometimes, when the age of the young prince permitted it, a crown was placed upon his head as the pledge of his authority, and the symbol of the perpetuity of the supremacy of his family." The address concluded with a few words respecting the Russian expedition, alluding to the sole source of our misfortunes, the barbarous conduct of the Russians, who had burned their towns rather than permit them to fall into our hands; to the chagrin of Napoleon at the character which the war had borne, since his only object had been to obtain an equitable arrangement; and finally, to the courage of the French troops, who were ever ready to rally round their flags to conquer for their Emperor a glorious peace.

Napoleon, seated upon the throne, replied with a few words, which were of a totally different character to those of his wretched flatterers.

He certainly had very much at heart, he said, the glory and grandeur of France, but he considered it his duty, before all things, to secure her domestic tranquillity and happiness. To save her from the desolation of anarchy had ever been, and would ever be, the constant object of his efforts. He asked of heaven, therefore, the gift of courageous magistrates as earnestly as of heroic soldiers. The noblest form of death, he said, would be when a soldier falls on the field of honour, if the death of a magistrate, perishing in defence of his sovereign, the throne and the law, were not more glorious still. Our fathers had for a rallying cry, "*Le roi est mort—vive le roi!*" and in these few words are intimated all the prin-

cial advantages of the monarchy Alluding to the wish which had been expressed by the senate, Napoleon said ; " I have studied the disposition manifested by my people in various ages, I have reflected on what has taken place at various epochs of our history, and I continue to do so."

That portion of the imperial reply which referred to the Russian expedition was evidently carefully worded, so as not to aggravate the quarrel with the Russian Emperor. " The war which I wage with Russia," said Napoleon, " is a political war. I undertook it without animosity, and should gladly have spared her the evils which she has drawn upon herself. I might have armed against her a portion of her own population, by proclaiming the freedom of the serfs. This measure was frequently demanded of me, but I refused to adopt a course which would lead to the destruction of thousands of families." Having repeated his allegations that the catastrophe which had overwhelmed his army was solely attributable to the weather, and thanked the senate for their address, with considerable hauteur, he received the council of state, which, after referring to the Malet conspiracy, in terms very similar to those employed by the senate, proceeded to speak more freely than the senate on the subject of the late misfortunes, declaring that they had discovered in them something which filled them with confidence and admiration, since they had been the means of developing to the utmost an august genius, which had never appeared grander than when in the midst of these misadventures ! . . . And, with respect to these misadventures, they were but a passing trial, for France was arming *en masse* ; and, as the enemy could not fail to compare his forces with ours, a peace would speedily ensue. . . . The address concluded with the usual highly laudatory remarks. The reply given by Napoleon to this address has become celebrated. He was touched, he said, by the sentiments displayed in it. If France displayed so much affection for her son, it was because she was convinced of the benefits of monarchy . . . He then added these famous words :—" It is to that ideology, to those gloomy metaphysics, which, endeavouring to prosecute subtle investigations into first causes, are eager to make themselves the foundation of the national legislation, to which we ought to attribute all the misfortunes of France . . . From hence arises the regime of those men of blood who proclaimed the principle of the insurrection as a duty, who paid court to the people by inviting it to assume a sovereignty for the exercise of which it was unfitted ; who destroyed the sanctity of the laws, and the respect due to them, by making them depend, not on the sacred principles of justice, but simply on the will

of an assembly, composed of men entirely ignorant of the first principles of legislation, or administration of politics, or the art of war . . . Those who are summoned to the task of regenerating a state, should follow an entirely different order of principles, and be at all times ready to perish in defence of the sovereign, the throne, and the laws."

What a spectacle was this exhibition of hatred to philosophy; what a spectacle to display before the eyes of the most intelligent people of Europe! Because, forsooth, the French army had been foolishly compromised in Russia; with the French army, the imperial throne; and, what was far worse, the greatness of the French nation—philosophy was to bear the blame! Was it philosophy, also, which, at that very moment, held the unfortunate Pius VII. captive at Savoy, and, day after day, plunged hundreds of priests into dungeons? And it was a man of prodigious intellect who could say these things in the face of France and the world, in the very presence of events most calculated to contradict him. Such is the effect of faults, and especially of great faults! Beside the direct evil which they cause, they also have a tendency to weaken the judgment of those who commit them, to such a degree, that genius itself wears the undignified aspect of angry infancy.

The real object, however, of these proceedings was to cover, as far as possible, the immense echo of the catastrophe of the Russian campaign, and to prepare for the immolation of an honest man, the sacrifice of whom was intended as a means of attracting public attention from events of more importance. The council of state was, in fact, assembled on the very day after the occurrence of the puerile solemnities above described, and charged with the examination of the conduct of M. Frochot. Of the result of such a proceeding there could be little doubt; and M. Frochot was convicted by each section of the council, not of treason, of which he was declared incapable, but of a want of presence of mind: and, on this ground, Napoleon was requested to remove him from his office. And there can be no doubt that this was a proper measure; for M. Frochat had certainly failed to act judiciously on the occasion of the Malet conspiracy; but, under any other circumstances, the government, without consulting the council of state, would simply have pronounced his deprivation on its own authority, and without adding the humiliation of a solemn judgment.

Leaving these sad scenes, we must now follow Napoleon to other occupations more worthy his genius, and better calculated to repair his faults. And, indeed, whilst he had appeared to be entirely employed with the matters described

above, he had been in reality occupied incessantly in a more noble work, and had never before displayed so eminently his grand qualities as an intelligent and active administrator. On quitting the army at Smorgoni, he had failed to imagine the true extent of the loss which it had suffered, supposing, in fact, that it only amounted to two-fifths, and that although all the cavalry horses were destroyed, there still remained from twenty-five to thirty thousand troopers, whom it would be easy to supply with chargers, purchased in Poland, Germany, and France. He knew that the artillery was almost wholly destroyed, both as respected men and matériel, but he knew that he could procure abundant supplies of the latter from his arsenals, and France herself would afford him sufficient numbers of excellent draught horses. Before marching for Moscow, he had ordered the levy of the conscription of 1813, which had arrived in October with remarkable exactness, and filled the dépôts with one hundred and forty thousand troops, who had already received three months' drilling, and were quite ready to recruit the battalions which were about to re-enter France. Napoleon had a year since formed a hundred cohorts of national guards, which, by the very nature of their constitution, consisted of the most vigorous persons of the population; and now, by contriving that some of these should demand the honour of being permitted to join the grand army (for by the laws of their institution they were not compelled to serve beyond the frontiers), and by having this wish consecrated by a decree of the senate, he procured an addition to his army of a hundred thousand men in the prime of life. He had, therefore, already two hundred and forty thousand men at his disposal, who might be marched in one month on the Rhine, in two months on the Oder, and in three months on the Vistula; and if, as Napoleon at this time believed, there should remain at the worst only two hundred thousand troops, of the six hundred thousand which had composed the grand army, he would have at his command four hundred and fifty thousand men already in line, a force that would be raised to five hundred thousand by the addition of the contingents due from the allies, and would be very sufficient to overwhelm the Russians, who had suffered almost as greatly as ourselves from the severity of the weather, and who were less able than ourselves to repair their losses. In the meantime, his foresight had already provided the means of checking the advance of the enemy, during the three months which would be required for the completion of his arrangements. On his march from Smolensk to Moscow, he had ordered an excellent corps of

from fifteen to eighteen thousand men, taken from the old regiments of the army of Italy, to proceed from Verona to Berlin, and it was now there under General Grenier. He had also formed, under Marshal Augereau, a corps charged with the occupation of the line of the Elbe. Of this corps, a division, that of General Durutte, had been sent to General Reynier on the Bug, and had half perished; another, under General Loison, had been sent to Wilna to meet the grand army, and still existed when Napoleon quitted Smorgoni. Its two other divisions, those of Heudelet and Lagrange, remained intact, and had proceeded to Dantzic. By joining these troops with those which had come from Italy, a total force of forty-five thousand fresh troops would be formed, and would constitute an effective support for the retreating army. When Napoleon had quitted Smorgoni, the guard still numbered seven or eight thousand men, Victor's corps was still in existence, Loison's division had not been engaged, and forty thousand men returned from Moscow, of whom the number would be daily increased by the addition of disbanded soldiers. He had, moreover, on the left, Macdonald's corps, consisting of seven or eight thousand Poles, and fifteen thousand Prussians; and on the right Reynier's fifteen thousand Saxon and French troops, and Schwarzenberg's twenty-five thousand Austrians. Finally, he had at his disposal Poniatowski's corps, which had been sent into cantonments for the purpose of recruiting. M. de Bassano, who had been directed on his return from Wilna to proceed to Warsaw and Berlin, brought assurances that Poland was about to rise en masse, and that Prussia swore to remain faithful, and was even disposed, if assisted with certain supplies of money, to increase the contingent; and that Prince Schwarzenberg, as well as all the other Austrians with whom he had come in contact, whilst full of eagerness for an immediate peace, had nevertheless promised to remain faithful to the French alliance. Supposing, therefore, that only forty thousand men should return to Wilna of those who had penetrated into the interior of Russia, by adding to them the forty-five thousand fresh troops which, under Augereau and Grenier, guarded the Elbe, the twenty thousand which would return from Riga under Macdonald, and the forty thousand which, under Reynier and Schwarzenberg, would return from the environs of Minsk, Napoleon might hope to assemble one hundred and fifty thousand men at least, who would probably be increased to the number of two hundred thousand by the successive arrival of stragglers, and be enabled, therefore, successfully to oppose the march of the Russians, of whom certainly no more than one hun-

dred and fifty thousand could have escaped the rigours of the winter. By adding to these the two hundred thousand troops, the two hundred and forty thousand who would proceed to the dépôts on the Rhine within the next two or three months, together with the fresh levies which France could not fail to furnish in the presence of danger, Napoleon might reasonably hope to be able to retain the Prussians and Austrians in his alliance, to drive back the Russians beyond the Niemen, recover continental peace without too great sacrifices, and even, perhaps, render it complete by a maritime peace also.

But, unfortunately, from the 5th of December to the beginning of January, a change had taken place in everything, both military and political. From the moment of Napoleon's departure, the army, as has been previously described, fell into a state of the most frightful dissolution. The same fate had overwhelmed the detachments which formed the garrison of Wilna. The Saxons under Reynier, and the Austrians under Schwarzenberg, having remained in the environs of Minsk, in the want of any precise orders, Wilna had been completely uncovered, and it had been found necessary to evacuate in disorder, and in such haste as compelled the abandonment even of the clothing and provisions with which its magazines abounded. Murat, being no longer obeyed or capable of commanding, had fled from Wilna in the middle of the night, and had lost the army treasury at the foot of the mountain which had to be traversed on first setting out from the town. At Kowno, collecting a few officers, and a marshal, and a thousand soldiers, he had directed Ney and Gérard to dispute for a moment the enemy's passage at the Niemen; but these two heroic men, having been left almost by themselves, had been compelled to fly to Kœnigsberg.

Other misfortunes awaited us at Kœnigsberg: for the inhabitants of this city cherishing against us, in common with all Prussians, a violent hatred, had no sooner seen Murat arriving alone, the guard reduced to some hundreds of men, and the wreck of our army to consist only of a few wretched fugitives, flying over the ice of the Niemen before the pursuit of the Cossacks, than they displayed the utmost joy and exultation, and would doubtless have risen in insurrection, had they not been held in check by one of Augereau's four divisions, the division Heudelet, which, consisting of seven or eight thousand serviceable troops, was very capable of enforcing respect, and protected the twelve thousand sick and wounded who filled the hospitals, and the multitude of generals and other officers who had come, as had Generals

Lariboisière and Eblé, to Königsberg, to die of the fever *de congelation*. The inhabitants of this city were unable as yet, therefore, to rise against us; but resolving to do so at the first approach of the Russians, they employed themselves in the meantime in extorting from our unfortunate troops all the money they possessed, in return for the most scanty supplies of provisions or clothing. At the same time, nevertheless, there were amongst the inhabitants of Old Prussia, men of the greatest humanity, who, notwithstanding their severe patriotism, respected our troops as brave men in misfortune, and soothed the miseries of their oppressors.

An event now took place which was of extreme importance, and proved to be a great addition to our reverses. Marshal Macdonald, having with him the Polish division Grandjean, consisting of seven or eight thousand excellent and faithful troops, followed at some distance by the auxiliary Prussian corps, had long awaited in vain at Riga orders to retreat, and at length, on finding the Russians advancing on all sides, had, on his own responsibility, retreated towards Tilsit, still followed by the Prussians, but so slowly, now on this pretext and now on that, that the Marshal had become, with how much reason will presently be seen, very distrustful of their fidelity.

The Russians, after the passage of the Berezina, had continued their movement; Wittgenstein, with the army of the Dwina, advancing upon Königsberg, for the purpose of intercepting if possible the corps under Marshal Macdonald, whilst Tchitchakoff with the army of Moldavia, pursued the wrecks of our army towards Kowno, and Kutusof afforded the principal army some repose at Wilna. The Russians had suffered as much as we had from the cold, but very little from want, and being supported by joy at our misfortunes, and the hope of our total destruction, and being retained in their ranks by regular supplies of rations, had reached their present positions in a good state of discipline and full of ardour, although numbering only one hundred thousand in place of the three hundred thousand men who had filled their ranks at the commencement of the campaign. The Emperor Alexander, on receiving information of our disasters had hastened to Wilna, and having overwhelmed with well-deserved rewards Marshal Kutusof, had assumed the direction of affairs which would henceforth be as much political as military. Judging from conjectures which he could not fail to form, and some indirect communications received from Prussia, and even from Austria, he was tolerably certain that the adoption of a suitable line of conduct on his part, would result in alienating from the French

alliance Prussia, at least, and probably Austria; and he immediately adopted, therefore, the language which was best suited to the existing state of affairs. He had not come, he said, to make conquests in Germany, or even in Poland, but to hold out the hand of friendship to the oppressed inhabitants of Germany, whether people or kings, bourgeois or nobles, Prussians or Austrians, Saxons or Bavarians, to aid them, to relieve them from an intolerable yoke, and to return to each, as soon as this work should have been accomplished, what belonged to each, taking nothing for himself, but what he had been unjustly deprived of. He proclaimed a general amnesty for all the acts committed against the Russian government, and even spread abroad an intimation, that if the Poles were anxious for the restoration of their nationality, he was quite ready to gratify this inclination, by forming Poland into a separate kingdom, of which he would himself be the element monarch, ever ready to promote liberal and civilizing institutions. Alexander's natural keensightedness and benevolence of disposition, sufficiently inclined him to adopt this policy, and had they not, the Germans, who now thronged around him, could scarcely have failed to do so. The Prussian minister Stein, the celebrated author, Kotzebue, and many other Germans, men of letters or military men, constantly uttering the most liberal sentiments, besieged Alexander with entreaties that he would proclaim the independence of Germany, and boldly march forward, since every part of Germany which should be freed from the domination of the French, would instantly become his ardent and enthusiastic ally. This course, however, was opposed by the veteran Kutusof, whose circumspection, justified by events, had become excessive; and by some Russian officers, who, keenly sensible of the exhausted state of their army, feared lest it should fall to pieces in the same manner as the French army, and were eager, therefore, to halt and secure a peace with France, which at this moment might be obtained under very advantageous terms. But Alexander, profoundly wounded by having been the object of Napoleon's contempt, and inordinately elated by having become his vanquisher, now aspired to a still higher rôle, and desired to become his destroyer, and the liberator of Europe. He authorised, therefore, the minister Stein and his compatriots to traverse the reconquered Prussian provinces, spreading abroad his promise, to effect, without delay, the emancipation of Germany.

In the meantime, General Diebitch, chief of Wittgenstein's staff, followed Marshal Macdonald, step by step, in the hope

of depriving him of the Prussian contingent ; and, at length, after having carefully fomented the dissensions which were continually taking place between its commander, General d'York, and Marshal Macdonald, he proposed to the former to pass over to the Russians, under the pretence of being compelled to capitulate ; upon which, General d'York, who was a good patriot, but very fearful of compromising himself with his court, transmitted to it an account of the communications which had taken place between himself and the Russian General. Failing, however, to obtain any reply from his court, which had been thrown into a state of great embarrassment by his communication, he finally adopted a decided course, and, permitting himself to be surrounded by the enemy, on the 30th of December, in accordance, as he said, with circumstances of a military nature, which left him no alternative, he signed a convention of neutrality, on the part of his corps d'armée ; which was only to be of force, however, on being ratified by the Prussian monarch. The real meaning of the convention was very apparent ; and it was, in fact, an agreement that the Prussian corps should, after the lapse of a few days, be incorporated with the Russian army. A detachment of this corps, which, under General Massenbach, had followed Marshal Macdonald, and proceeded as far as Tilsit, on receiving information of the convention, departed from the place secretly, during the night, and rejoined the main body, by which it was viewed with the greatest enthusiasm.

The writer of these pages, of these sad details, is a Frenchman, and dares declare himself, without fear of contradiction, to be most deeply interested in the greatness of his country ; but yet he cannot blame those German patriots, who, serving unwillingly in a cause which was not their own, hastened to aid a cause which they believed to be that of their country, and which had unhappily become so through the errors of the man who was then our ruler.

The effect of the defection of General d'York was instantaneous ; and, from the Vistula to the Rhine, he was called the saviour of Germany. The Baron de Stein, and his companions, hastened to offer him their congratulations, and to urge him to march upon Königsberg, to assemble there the states of Old Prussia, proclaim the independence of Prussia, and declare that the king, being under the coercion of the French, should no longer be obeyed. But General d'York was unwilling to take any such precipitate steps ; and, although he consented to march to Königsberg, determined to await there the arrival of orders from the Prussian court.

In the meantime, Murat had paused at Königsberg with a

crowd of generals and officers without troops, of whom some were dying, and the remainder, exasperated by suffering, indulged in language which was almost seditious. Marshal Ney, in spite of his heroism, and of the caresses lavished upon him by Napoleon, could no longer restrain himself, and openly spoke out against the imprudent chief, who had, he said, precipitated the French army into an abyss of destruction. And Berthier, confined to his bed by sickness, and worn out with chagrin at the absence of Napoleon, knew not what counsel to give with respect to a state of affairs which was perfectly unexampled. When, therefore, news was received of the defection of the Prussian corps, and the hostile demonstrations against us, which it excited amongst the inhabitants of Königsberg were perceived, it was resolved to quit Königsberg, and to abandon the line of the Niemen, which being frozen over, had ceased to be a defence. Marshal Ney was still charged with conducting the rear-guard, consisting of the division Heudelet, and the two thousand men which remained of the division Loison; and the march was commenced upon Braunsberg, Elbing, and Thorn. Marshal Macdonald, who was at Tilsit, twenty leagues from Königsberg, surrounded by enemies, earnestly demanded that his arrival should be awaited, as by that means a force would be formed amounting to fifteen or sixteen thousand men, and sufficiently strong to enforce respect. But his letters were disregarded, and the march was continued until the 15th of January; the wrecks of the old army proceeding in detachments of fifty or a hundred men, who compelled the inhabitants of the districts through which they passed, to give them provisions when they were the stronger, but died of hunger or cold when they had neither strength or money sufficient to enable them to procure the necessaries of life. Towards the middle of January they arrived on the banks of the Vistula, and threw themselves into the fortified posts which Napoleon had supplied abundantly with provisions. General Rapp had preceded the army of Dantzic, and was surrounded by a mingled mass of five or six thousand troops of all nations and all arms. Murat sent thither the Polish division Grandjean, that of General Heudelet, and all that remained of the division Loison; and Rapp had thus at his disposal twenty-five thousand men, well provisioned, and he determined to defend with them the fortifications of Dantzic to the last extremity.

On the reiterated advice of Marshal Davoust, places on the Vistula were named as rallying points for the various corps of the old army—and were Dantzic, Thorn, Marienwerder, and Mariebourg. The head-quarters were estab-

lished at Thorn; but after having been there two or three days, Murat thought that it would be impossible to remain there; for, after the division Heudelet, Loison, and Grandjean, had been thrown into the fortress of Dantzic, there remained only ten thousand men to accompany the staff, and to defend the immense number of flags which had been collected, and were carried along with it for safety: these ten thousand men consisting of eighteen hundred recruits, who had been met en route, and were intended for Davoust's corps; twelve hundred d'élite Neapolitans; four thousand Bavarians, who had recently set out from their country; and, finally, three thousand men of the imperial guard, who had been gradually rallied since the departure from Königsberg. As such a body as this, therefore, could not defend the Vistula, which was now frozen over, as were all the rivers of Poland and Russia, or even defend Murat and his staff, should the Russians, under Tchitchakoff, united with those under Wittgenstein, endeavour to surround them, Murat proceeded to Posen, situated equally distant from the Vistula and the Oder. And thus, the whole of Old Prussia, and the whole of Poland, were evacuated.

A fresh event was now to increase the excitement of the German populations. The mistake had been committed, in spite of the advice to the contrary of Marshal Macdonald, of leaving a garrison, consisting almost entirely of German troops, at Pillau, a little maritime fortress, defending the entrance of the Frische-haff; and it had now declared against us, amidst the vehement applause of the Prussians, and to the great satisfaction of the English, who hastened to penetrate into the Frische-haff with their ships of war, and soon afterwards introduced the merchant convoys, by which means the inhabitants of Old Prussia procured not only the gratification of being freed from their conquerors, but, also, that of being able to engage once more in that traffic in colonial produce from which they had been so long debarred.

Whilst the state of affairs on our left was thus unsatisfactory, the news received from our right, on the upper Vistula, showed that they were in that direction, also, equally disastrous. General Reynier and Prince Schwarzenberg, seeing no advantage in remaining any longer at Minsk, had marched upon Warsaw. General Reynier, indeed, had wished to engage the enemy with the Saxon and French troops under their command; but Prince Schwarzenberg had earnestly dissuaded him from this course, declaring that to attempt to carry on warfare during the winter would simply be the means of suffering useless losses; and that it would be better to await at Warsaw the arrival of the forces which Na-

pooleon could not fail to send there in the spring. Whilst giving this advice, the Prince had fallen back himself; thereby compelling Reynier to do so likewise; and receiving at head-quarters the visits of Russian officers, under the pretence that he could not avoid them, he permitted himself to engage in discussions respecting an armistice; and without precisely betraying Napoleon, whose marriage he had negotiated, and to whom he owed his marshal's baton, he prepared to act in conformity with the change which he foresaw was about to take place in the policy of the Austrian cabinet. At the same time, he constantly advocated the conclusion of a peace; being sincerely anxious for this, both as an Austrian and as a favourite of the French court.

Brave, as was Murat's heart, his feeble head could not long endure such a state of affairs as this. No artillery could daunt him, but he trembled at the idea of losing his crown. A thousand sinister images thronged his excited brain. Sometimes he saw the populations of Italy, excited by the priests and the English, rising up in insurrection, and overthrowing the Bonapartist thrones throughout the country; sometimes he saw himself abandoned by Napoleon, whose affection for him was but cold—abandoned, as the sacrifice by which he might obtain peace. From the moment that these images obtained possession of his brain, he lost his *sang-froid*, and was only anxious to depart for the purpose of endeavouring to save that crown, which had been the object of such eager desire, and the reward of so much heroism. His distrust had become so great, that he had begun to fear that even his wife was implicated in Napoleon's supposed designs against him; and this was a new motive for his anxiety to return to Naples. Tormented by these suspicions, and overwhelmed by the disastrous news which continued to arrive, hour after hour, of the retreat of the army, he suddenly summoned Prince Berthier and M. Daru to an interview, and communicating to them his intention of immediately quitting the army, on the ground that the state of his health rendered this step necessary, he resisted all their entreaties to him to alter his determination, and informed them that he should send for Prince Eugene to assume the chief command.

When Prince Eugene arrived, both his modesty and his indolence induced him to urge Murat to remain with the army, but failing in this endeavour, he at length reluctantly consented to accept a duty which he considered far above his powers, and to remain at Posen, with the ten thousand men of all nations, already enumerated, entreating General Reynier, and Prince Berthier, to preserve

their position at Warsaw, which covered his own position on the right; and considering it certain, that on his left the Russians would delay some time at least, before Thorn and Dantzic, he ordered General Grenier with his eighteen thousand men, and Augereau with the nine thousand or ten thousand men of the division Lagrange, to hold himself in readiness to advance to his aid, immediately circumstances should render it necessary.

These then were the sole remaining fragments of what had once been the grand army! twenty-five thousand men at Dantzic, ten thousand in the second rate fortresses of the Vistula, fifteen thousand of all nations at Posen with the staff, a few Saxon and French troops at Warsaw, and finally, at Berlin, Grenier and Augereau, with twenty-eight thousand men, who could only be removed at the risk of giving rise to a general insurrectionary movement throughout Germany. These were all that remained, instead of the two hundred thousand troops, whom Napoleon believed to be still established on the Niemen, disputing with the Russians the possession of Königsberg, Kowno, and Grodno, and awaiting the arrival of the three hundred thousand fresh troops, to organize whom he had committed the grave fault of abandoning companions in arms whom he had plunged into an abyss of dangers. At the same time it must not be forgotten, that had he remained on the Niemen, he would have allowed himself to be separated from Paris by insurgent Germany, and by allowing himself to be separated from the seat of his widely extended government, would have been guilty of a great political and administrative error. And this dilemma, this painful necessity of committing some great fault, was the just punishment of errors already committed as great as they were irreparable.

And at this moment, the political consequences of those errors were as calamitous as their military consequences. The chief of the German exiles, Baron de Stein, was with General d'York at Königsberg, convoking the estates of the province, calling the whole population to arms, and employing, without reserve, the pecuniary resources of the country. A spirit of universal devotion responded to these proceedings, and thousands of pamphlets, proclamations, and popular songs helped to excite against us the popular indignation. Germany had been filled, during some years past, with secret societies, of which the principal was one bearing the name of the *Union of Virtue*, (Tugend-Bund). A spirit of enthusiastic love for Germany, a conviction that, once united into a single empire, it would be invincible, and instead of being by turns the victim of the states of the north, and then of the south,

would be their lawgiver, and be the first nation in the world ; the necessity, therefore, of no longer considering the German peoples, as Austrians, Bavarians, Saxons, Prussians or Hamburgians, as princes, nobles, bourgeois, or peasants, as Lutherans or Catholics, but simply as Germans ; everyone and all ready to die for their country ; and the duty of ever giving the preference to that which might be of German origin, whether in works of industry, matters of custom, or literature. Such were the ideas and sentiments, which it was the purpose of those societies to propagate, and which they had propagated with the most extraordinary success. Nor were they less successful in now carrying from Königsberg to the extremities of Germany, not only those patriotic emotions which were natural and intense, but also advice respecting the course which was now to be pursued, and which was to the effect that everywhere the German populations should rise in arms, devoting both their persons and their possessions to the national cause ; that they should ally themselves with the Emperor Alexander, deliver the kings who were in bondage to the French alliance, and depose as no longer worthy of reigning, those who were capable of renouncing it, and yet still remained faithful to it. *Vive Alexander ! vive les Cosaques !* were the cries which everywhere arose from the midst of the general excitement ; and there were even young Germans who in the fervour of their patriotism adopted the fashion of the Cossack beards ; but what is especially worthy of remark, is the fact that the princes and nobles themselves, helped to excite this movement, which, despite its monarchical loyalty, was in reality essentially democratic, resembling in this respect, the movement in Spain, the exciting causes of which had been partly a passionate love of liberty, and partly loyalty towards the captive king.

We may well understand how great at this time were the surprise, embarrassment, and perplexity of the unhappy King of Prussia and his principal minister, M. de Hardenberg. This just and wise monarch, in fact, had never, since the commencement of his reign, ceased to be involved in positions which could not fail to be, in the highest degree obnoxious to an upright and prudent man. Compelled in 1806 to place himself in opposition to the French, and having almost lost his crown by so doing, he had resolved in 1812 to avoid a similar fault, and had allied himself with France, at the same time endeavouring to persuade the Russian Emperor to approve of the course which he had adopted, through the mouth of M. de Knesbeck, who, whether authorised or not, had carried his excuses to the extent of duplicity towards France. And, now, after having

believed that he had been far wiser in 1812 than in 1816, he found himself compelled either to be guilty of a breach of faith towards France, or to fight in the aid of France which oppressed him, against the friends who offered to become his liberators. Nor was M. de Hardenberg, who, equally with himself, had passed from a hostile policy towards France to one of alliance with her, less a prey to all the perplexities which beset the king; these being increased in his own case by anxieties which arose out of his personal position. Should the progress of events condemn the policy of alliance with France, the Prussian monarchy might readily be excused as having merely committed an error of judgment; but the case was far different with M. de Hardenberg, whose conduct in the matter would be imputed to ambition, and to that basest species of ambition, which leads a statesman into intrigues with the enemies of his country.

The first step taken by Frederic William upon hearing the defection of General d'York, was to exclaim against such a breach of faith. He was equally averse to becoming compromised with France, which he greatly feared, and to being regarded as disloyal, for he was, in fact, a thoroughly honest man, and took pride in being regarded as such. He hastened, therefore, to disavow to the course adopted by General d'York to M. de Saint Marsan, the French minister, who readily permitted himself to be persuaded of the Prussian monarch's fidelity, and consoled and charmed him by all those flatteries which most delighted him, being expressions of confidence in the uprightness of his nature. He promised to make a public disavowal of what had been done by General d'York, and to have him tried before a military commission; promises which M. de Saint Marsan carried away as a species of trophy, and regarded as useful replies to the declamations of the enemies of France.

When these promises become known, the German patriots were excessively irritated against the king, against M. de Hardenberg, and the policy of the Prussian cabinet, and everywhere declared, as formerly our emigrants, that the king was not free. His ministers indicated, that they thought the step he had taken somewhat too decided, and after having disavowed General d'York's proceeding, he refused to publish his disavowal.

Whilst the popular excitement in Berlin was at its height, the French troops quartered in this capital, preserving their accustomed pride, replied to expressions of German patriotism by others which were equally provocative of hostility, and were in the highest degree imprudent, irritating the Prussians, and after in the first place terrifying

their monarch, leading him into a course of subtle policy. He did not as yet entertain the idea of abandoning the French alliance, but all his thoughts were directed to the means of becoming more independent of her, and of gaining a neutral position between her and her enemies, from which he might be able to aid in the arrangement of an advantageous peace.

The only means by which these views could be realised, were, the departure of the King from Berlin, towards which the Russian troops were already marching, in their pursuit of the French troops in their retreat, and the establishment of his court in some town in Silesia, such as Breslau, for example; and, also, the organisation of vast bodies of troops; a measure calculated in the highest degree to please the German patriots, who flattered themselves that they should be able to turn those troops against the French, whilst the latter could make no objection to their being raised, since they had themselves demanded that Prussia should double her contingent.

The Prussian King proposed to supply the expenses of those armaments, by demanding of Napoleon the price of the matériel of all kinds, which he had supplied to the French army. It had been agreed, in fact, at the time of the last treaty of alliance, that should the value of this matériel exceed the forty-eight millions still owing from Prussia, the surplus should be paid to that government in money; and as the Prussian ministry calculated that there was such a surplus in favour of Prussia to the amount of forty-six millions, the king supposed that he would have sufficient available funds to triple his army, raising it from forty thousand to one hundred and twenty thousand men, and be in a position, in conjunction with Austria, to force the belligerent parties to accept reasonable terms of peace. As France, from being a creditor had become a debtor, she would have, by virtue of former treaties, to surrender immediately the fortresses of Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau, and the Prussian King would thus, he expected, find himself established in Silesia, at the head of one hundred and twenty thousand men, raised without any expense to his kingdom, and supported by all the fortresses of the Oder.

M. de Hatzfeldt, sent to Paris to clear the Prussian court from the suspicion of any complicity with General d'York, was directed to submit to the French government the following propositions:—The removal of the Prussian court to Breslau, that it might be removed from the theatre of hostilities; the extension of the Prussian armaments, for more effectually serving the interests of the alliance; and,

finally, the restoration of the fortresses on the Oder, for the purpose of fulfilling the existing treaties, and conciliating Prussian popular feeling. He was at the same time strictly enjoined to avoid any discussion on a singular proposition which Napoleon, on his return from Russia, had indirectly addressed to the Prussian court, to the effect, that France and Prussia might be more closely allied, by the marriage of the heir to the Prussian throne with a French princess ; and to declare very plainly, that if the propositions, of which he was the bearer, were not accepted, Prussia would consider herself free from all engagements she might have entered into with France.

The Austrian court was involved in perplexities exactly similar to those of the Prussian court, but it had the advantage of being surrounded by a less excited population, of being encumbered by less distracting scruples, and of being endowed with a larger share of ability. After having maintained with France four obstinate wars, and displayed an almost incredible perseverance in hatred, the Austrian Emperor had at length fallen into the belief that he had been deceived, and that it would be better to form an alliance with France than to court destruction by contending with her. The conduct of the various courts of Europe was of such a nature, as to relieve him of all scruples with regard to the adoption of such a course, and in accordance with the advice of M. de Metternich, he had become not only the ally, but the father-in-law also, of the French Emperor. It was now a question whether Austria had not a second time fallen into error, and renounced a hostile policy, just when it must have produced most advantageous results. The Emperor Francis, however, who was a clear headed, tranquil-minded man, and a good father, only saw in the catastrophe of Moscow, a means of making France appreciate more highly the Austrian alliance, of imposing peace on the belligerent party, of rendering Austria more powerful and Germany more independent. At the same time M. de Metternich, who had founded all his personal elevation on one course of policy, now resolved to make it rest on another, which had, moreover, the recommendation of conducing to the interest of his country. But although according to the last news from Poland, Napoleon appeared to have been more thoroughly vanquished than had been at first supposed, he might still be able to inflict terrible punishment and even probably recover his whole power, and it was necessary, therefore, to act with prudence ; passing from the one line of policy to the other, in such a manner that the safety of Austria, the dignity of its Emperor, and the reputation of his minister, might be equally secured.

from injury. M. de Metternich at once perceived, with rare political keen-sightedness, the advantages to be derived from the existing state of affairs, and he resolved not only to redeem his own fortunes from the consequences of a fatal step, but to resuscitate also those of Austria and Germany, whilst still remaining faithful to France, of whom he was really, as well as avowedly, the ally. Thoroughly agreed on all points, with the Emperor Francis, he immediately began to carry out, with promptitude and fairness, resolutions which had been well considered and unreservedly adopted. Simultaneously he commenced the organisation of the Austrian forces, the establishment of a secret understanding with Prussia, Bavaria, and Saxony, speaking to them all of a peace to be concluded on terms favourable to Germany, and then a discussion with France, respecting the advantageousness of an immediate peace. M. de Bubna, who had been sent to Paris in accordance with Napoleon's demand that there should be present at his court some Austrian diplomatist of mark, was directed to declare most earnestly the fidelity of Austria to the French alliance, but at the same time strongly to recommend peace in the name of Europe, who had need of it, in the name of France herself, to whom it could not be less necessary, and further, to hint, that if peace were not speedily arranged, the latter country might speedily find the whole world in arms against her; giving this information in a tone which, whilst free from any appearance of being a threat, should, nevertheless, give it an air of proceeding from a profound conviction of its truth, and subsequently afford reason to Austria for renouncing an ally deaf to all wise counsels. M. de Bubna, was even positively directed to offer the intervention of Austria, for the word mediation was not, as yet, considered appropriate, with the various belligerent powers.

Such were the communications which, during the first days of January 1813, simultaneously demanded the attention of Napoleon's genius. In the place of formidable fragments of the grand army, united on the Niemen, and holding the Russians in check, from Grodno to Königsberg, awaiting the three hundred thousand fresh troops, who, he had declared were soon to join them, he now saw only a few scattered troops falling back upon the Oder, without power to check the enemy at any point, and as ominously threatened by the Germans in the rear, as they were relentlessly pushed by the Russians in front. At the same time his ears were filled by the enthusiastic shouts of Germany, ready at any moment to rise up against him, and found himself surrounded by allies, who had asserted their fidelity, as a matter of form,

whilst they gave counsels which were but conditions under another form, and not only afforded him reason to doubt their own good faith, but made him perceive that they suspected that France, weary of the bloodshed of her children and of despotism, was equally unfaithful.

Napoleon's heart was a soldier's heart by nature, and, as such, capable of resisting the influences of any change of fortune; but he was now deeply affected. Nevertheless, he was resolved that none should perceive the emotions of his soul, and that, under an air of icy indifference, should remain hidden its agitations, caused by the influence of the sinister presentiments, or blind illusions, which by turns besieged it.

After having yielded to a sudden impulse of irritation against Murat, to whom he unjustly attributed the misfortunes attending the retreat—at one moment even entertaining the idea of having him arrested—he grew calm, confirmed the nomination of Prince Eugene, whom he would have himself selected had he been upon the spot, and had the change announced by an article in the *Moniteur*, in the following terms:—"The King of Naples having been compelled to resign the command of the army through indisposition, has transferred it to the hands of the viceroy. The latter is more accustomed to the conduct of a great administration, and has the Emperor's entire confidence." Manifesting confidence in Prince Eugene, for the purpose of encouraging him, Napoleon also took care to reassure him with respect to his position, pointing out to him that the Russians would not dare to advance, when they perceived forty thousand French troops on their right, in the fortresses on the Vistula; and on their left, around Warsaw, forty thousand Saxons and Austrians, who were still faithful, although inactive. Although he was unwilling to fatigue or compromise by premature movements the troops assembled at Berlin, he authorised Prince Eugene to summon to his own immediate command, the division Lagrange, as well as the corps of General Grenier; and as the exertions he had made during the twenty days he had been in Paris would enable him to despatch to the Elba a reinforcement of sixty thousand fresh troops, which would raise Prince Eugene's forces to one hundred thousand men, he rightly considered that the latter would be safe against the attacks of any enemy whatever.

A supply of cavalry was the most pressing necessity, for the Russians were immensely strong in this arm, and spread far and wide a continuous terror, throwing forward bands of Cossacks who were feared because they were strange, and because it was not known that a handful of infantry could readily put them to flight. It was necessary, therefore, to

provide, immediately, several thousand horse—Prince Eugene having no more than three thousand at his disposal—and Napoleon ordered General Bourcier, who had been directed to procure in Germany and Poland remounts for the dismounted cavalry troops, to purchase horses, for this purpose, at any price, and even, if necessary, to seize them by force where they could not be purchased. At the same time, he invited the princes of the confederation of the Rhine to place at his disposal, even for the sake of their own states, all their available cavalry. The King of Saxony had kept two regiments of cuirassiers and two regiments of hussars and chasseurs, forming together a corps of about two thousand four hundred excellent troopers, and these Napoleon earnestly demanded of him for the purpose of throwing them upon Posen.

Napoleon recommended Prince Eugene, after he should have furnished the two principal fortresses of the Vistula, Thorn and Dantzic, with strong garrisons, to throw the wrecks of the old corps, which had at first been directed to rally upon the Vistula, upon the fortress of the Oder, to provision Stettin, Custrin, Glogau, and Spandau, procuring the necessary supplies, either by purchase or force, and should there be any lack of wood, to have no hesitation in even cutting down the trees on the public promenades, paying no attention to the Prussian authorities, to whom explanations would be given at some future time. He should then, Napoleon continued, arm and provision the fortresses of the Elbe, Torgau, Wittenberg, Magdebourg, and Ham-bourg, which were to form a third line of defences; to march upon the Rhine almost all the remaining battalions of the grand army, and to send away that crowd of generals without troops, who indulged at head quarters in the most injurious language, retaining only Marshal Ney, to hurl him upon the first Russians who should appear. Finally, he directed him to proceed, as quickly as possible, with the re-organisation of the Polish troops, furnishing them with such money as they might require, and assuring them that whatever might be the destiny of Poland, the Poles should be in the pay of France, and should be Frenchmen if they could not be Poles.

Having taken these preliminary measures, Napoleon turned his attention to those which were to be the foundation of all his plans; and, in the first place, resolved to raise the force of two hundred and fifty thousand men, which was almost immediately available, to five hundred thousand.

By taking advantage of the system of the national guard, by which it was divided into three classes, comprising the citizens of from twenty to twenty-six years, those from twenty-

six to forty, and those from forty to sixty, it had been possible to form of the men of the first class, cohorts composed of men of full strength, but who, being unmarried, were less necessary to their families. Napoleon now resolved to raise another hundred thousand men of this quality, by making a fresh selection from the classes of 1809, 1810, 1811, 1812. At the same time he determined to demand immediately, the conscription of 1812, that it might replace in the dépôts the men of the conscription of 1813, and he hoped by this means to have three hundred and fifty thousand troops at his command, who might be immediately marched to join the hundred thousand who still remained on the Vistula and Oder, whilst a hundred and fifty thousand would be in the dépôts ready to defend the interior and frontiers—the armies of Spain being still of undiminished strength. He intended also to procure the offer to himself of voluntary aid which, besides being of material advantage, would be of far higher importance as a great national demonstration.

As it was necessary to obtain legislative sanction, for the employment of the hundred thousand men, of the *cohorts*, beyond the frontiers, to draw the hundred thousand men who were to be taken from the four last classes, and, finally, to levy the conscription of 1814, a *senatus consultum* was prepared, embracing the various measures, and to it was added the report of M. de Bassano, detailing at length the particulars of the defection of General d'York, describing the movements taking place in Germany as anarchical agitation, excited by the various sovereigns at the instigation of England, and comparing the systematic order which prevailed in France with the state of disorder which was imprudently favoured throughout the rest of Europe, by the princes of old dynasties—the object of this report, in fact, was to excite throughout France, besides a hatred of foreigners, an excessive terror of revolutionary troubles; a terror which, indeed, had been already rendered general by the occurrence of Malet's conspiracy.

Before submitting this *senatus consultum* to the senate, Napoleon resolved to convoke an extraordinary council, in which he might receive the advice of certain eminent personages, respecting the state of European affairs, and the measures best calculated to put an end to the struggle in which the French empire was then engaged. He had become more communicative with his ministers since his misfortunes, and although as disinclined as ever to follow any advice opposed to his views, he was now disposed to appear to do so. At the same time he resolved to lay aside the air of sovereignty, and to become once more, that General Bona-

parte, who had obtained at the price of infinite exertions those favours which fortune had appeared to bestow upon him of her own liberality. But although he was resolved to expiate his faults by prodigies of energy and application, it never occurred to him, unfortunately, to expiate them by the exercise of moderation, as was still possible.

Since his return, the wishes of all those who surrounded him, had been, whether publicly expressed, or secretly entertained, directed towards an immediate peace. The arch-chancellor, with his usual gravity and reserve; M. de Talleyrand, with his sometimes affected, sometimes real insouciance; the Duke of Rovigo, with the boldness of a favourite accustomed to perfect liberty of speech; and Mollien, with the chagrin of a perplexed financier, and finally, of the great officers of the court, the grand Marshal Duroc, with discreet wisdom, and M. de Coulaincourt, with the firmness of a good citizen, severally hinted, or openly declared that it was absolutely necessary to obtain an immediate peace; an advantageous peace, if possible, but at any price, peace. And to this universal opinion, Napoleon replied that he was equally desirous for peace, but that it was to be gained by a firm and supreme effort, and that whilst France desired it, she must refrain from manifesting this desire too openly, since all would be lost, if Europe once believed that her courage had begun to fail.

Of the great personages surrounding Napoleon, who now, either because they were emboldened by peril, or because the Emperor's prestige was somewhat lessened, began to manifest their opinions, M. de Bassano alone reposed as much confidence in the Emperor's fortunes, as though the late events in Russia had never occurred. According to him, Napoleon, still invincible, although vanquished, would speedily repair the disasters, which were, after all, but the result of an unfavourable winter, lay Europe once more at his feet, and dictate to her the conditions of a general peace. And Napoleon, whilst appreciating these vain words at their true value, was pleased by them, for he loved to hear it declared that he was still as powerful as ever.

In the meantime, Napoleon was far from rejecting the idea of negotiations for peace, and disputed only the manner in which they should be opened. It was, in fact, an important question, and one which was eagerly discussed by Napoleon's court, in spite of the habitual reserve of its members, whether the negotiations should be opened in such a manner as to forward the views of Austria, by permitting her to assume the officious part for which she seemed so anxious, or whether, entirely declining the offices of mediators, France

should not herself, directly, and openly endeavour to come to an understanding with Russia, and thus put an end to a useless and disastrous struggle. M. de Coulaïncourt, who was well accustomed to the conduct of negotiations with Russia, and full of the souvenirs of 1810—1811, and acutely sensible of the efforts made by the Emperor Alexander to avoid the war, hoped that he might be able by means of a personal interview, to persuade this prince to accept a peace, which to each party should be equally honourable. Yet it was not from the desire to assume an important diplomatic position, which he had voluntarily renounced, that he put forward this opinion, but simply from devotion to a dynasty to which he had attached himself, and to France, which he believed to be in danger. M. de Bassano, on the other hand, gave very different counsels. Having many private ties with the Austrian court, since Napoleon's marriage with Maria Louisa, he was anxious that negotiations should be carried by means of Austria, that he might thus himself become the author of a peace which all the world desired, and for which he himself was anxious, but, as was the case with Napoleon, on conditions which could not possibly be obtained. M. de Talleyrand, who employed the time which was no longer devoted to the service of the state, in laughing at M. de Bassano, was now for very plausible reasons, and on account of his aversion to M. de Bassano, contrary to his usual custom, opposed to the advocates of the views of Austria, and deprecated the importance which they endeavoured to attribute to her influence.

There was certainly great reason to fear that Austria, accepted as a mediator, would speedily assume the tone of an arbitrator, and if not treated with deference in this character, assume that of an enemy. To give her as little reason as possible, therefore, for interference in the important affairs of the moment, and to enter into direct negotiations with the Russian court itself, certainly seemed to be the most politic course. But an almost insurmountable obstacle to the adoption of this method of proceeding, consisted in the fact, that the Emperor Alexander, after having trembled at the idea of meeting Napoleon on the field of battle, had been led by the series of extraordinary events which had lately occurred, to consider himself Napoleon's vanquisher, and to hope that he might become the liberator of Europe. Strongly excited by the applause of Germany, he had become inaccessible, and it is probable that M. de Coulaïncourt would have ill brooked a complete and sudden change of demeanour which might have still permitted the display of personal regard towards himself, but would have failed to allow him

any consideration in his character of diplomatist. Direct negotiations with Alexander being, therefore, almost impossible, it would be necessary to have recourse to the intervention of Austria. So far then M. de Bassano's views were right; but he was greatly in error with respect to the manner in which he considered that the mediation of the Austrian court should be employed, and the payment that should be made for its good offices. The real object of this court was neither to destroy nor even humble France, but to re-establish the fortunes of her own kingdom, and the rest of Germany. This was a natural and legitimate object, and one which the commission of grave errors on our side rendered it necessary that we should acknowledge as such; more especially as to do so, would be to the real interest of France.

But should we still be unwilling to yield to circumstances, there was yet one course which we might hold, and this was to effect a good understanding with Austria, listening to her councils with apparent deference, but at the same time carefully avoiding to become in any way involved with her; abstaining to ask of her either diplomatic or military services, since to ask the former would be to authorize her to interfere in the arrangement of the conditions of peace, and to ask the latter would be to afford her a reason for arming, and to lead her one step onwards towards a declaration of war against us.

All these various questions, then, respecting peace, the method in which negotiations should be opened with the enemy, and the extent to which should be raised the armies of France, Napoleon was now anxious to discuss in a special council, to be assembled at the Tuileries in the early part of January, and to be composed of men perfectly competent for the part they would be called upon to perform. The persons summoned to it—for the most part on the recommendation of M. de Bassano, were M. de Bassano himself, the arch-chancellor Cambacérès, the Prince de Talleyrand, M. de Coulaincourt, M. the duke of Cadore, (de Champagny) an old ambassador, and minister of foreign affairs, and finally the two chief secretaries of this department. MM. de la Besnardiere and d'Hauterive, and a better selection could scarcely have been made, whether in respect to talent or the real desire of the men chosen to save both Napoleon and the French empire.

Napoleon calmly and gravely sketched in brief terms the situation of affairs, ordered the lecture of the decrees which were to be presented to the senate, and then defined as follows the question which he wished to betaken in to considration,—“I desire peace,” he said, “but I do not fear war.

In spite of the losses caused to us by the rigour of the climate, our resources are still very large. Tranquillity reigns throughout the empire itself; and its people have no desire to resign either their glory or their power. Austria, Prussia, and Denmark give the strongest assurances of their fidelity. Austria does not care to withdraw from our alliance from which she expects to reap great advantages; the King of Prussia offers to reinforce his contingent, and is about to have General d'York tried by a council of war; Russia has need of peace, and although strongly influenced by the intrigues of England, I do not think that she will be desirous of persisting in a struggle which must eventually end in her discomfiture.

"I have ordered a levy of three hundred and fifty thousand men; the *senatus consultum* is drawn up, and about to be presented. Another decree is prepared for the convocation of the Legislative Corps, of which I have no new imposts to demand, but the presence of which will be useful in the present state of affairs; especially as it may be necessary to submit to it certain legislative measures.

"The next subject for consideration, after we shall have made arrangements for the development of our forces, is whether we should await proposals of peace or make them ourselves? Again, if we take the initiative, ought we to enter into direct negotiations with Russia, or rather seek to obtain the mediation of Austria? These are the questions, respecting which I ask your counsel."

At the conclusion of this concise and decided explanation, each of the persons present gave his opinion.

M. de Coulaincourt maintained the necessity of peace and the advisability of entering into direct negotiations with Russia. The wise Cambacérés, distrusting the Austrian offers of mediation, and considering it the wisest course to discuss the conditions of peace directly with the power which must, eventually, have the chief voice in the decision, supported M. de Coulaincourt's advice; as did also M. de Talleyrand, in a few sententious words.

When these gentlemen had spoken, M. de Bassano expressed, at length, the contrary opinion, asserting the difficulty of entering into negotiations with Russia, and the facility with which they might be carried on through Austria, declaring his entire confidence in the disinterestedness of the Austrian court, its attachment to the French alliance, the affection of its emperor for his son-in-law Napoleon, and affirming that on this side the interests of France would be perfectly secure, but failing to mention at what price the services of Austria were to be obtained.

M. de Champagny, a modest, sensible man, perceiving the great difficulties in the way of entering into direct negotiations with Russia and the facility with which they might be conducted through Austria, and disposed to place confidence in its court, in which he had resided, was of M. de Bassano's opinion. M. d'Hauterive, and M. de la Besnardiere, whose talented, but somewhat caustic mind was very ready to ridicule M. de Bassano's policy, but, nevertheless, yielded, on this occasion, to the dictates of self-interest, both declared in favour of the opinion of the minister who was at the head of their department. Consequently, four voices against three were in favour of the acceptance of Austrian mediation.

To have rendered the council of real use, it should have discussed, after it had decided that negotiations could only be carried on through the intervention of the Austrian court, on what conditions this intervention should be accepted; but Napoleon was unwilling that its deliberations should, so far as this, being not only unwilling to reckon the cost, but also convinced that by means of his empress he might prevail upon his father-in-law to afford him both military and diplomatic assistance, in return for the gift of Illyria, which had already been promised to him as a compensation for Galicia. And here Napoleon committed a disastrous error, which was to prove almost as fatal as the Russian expedition.

It was Napoleon's custom in the solemn political councils, which he occasionally held, to refrain from expressing his own opinion, whilst in his administrative council, on the other hand, he was in the habit of declaring it both loudly and imperiously; he simply thanked, therefore, the members of the council, without explaining his own views, although he appeared to incline to the opinion of the majority, which was, that negotiations for peace should be commenced through the mediation of Austria, a great display being at the same time made of military force; that the projected *senatus consultum* should, at the same time, be presented to the senate for the levy of three hundred and fifty thousand men; and that the convocation of the legislative corps should be delayed for a few weeks, as this body might at the present time reflect somewhat too vividly the agitation of the public mind.

This course was, in fact, immediately followed, but in such a manner as rather to aggravate than diminish the existing dangers. Napoleon, after having listened to M. de Bubna, whom he had treated with great adroitness, and contrived to bring over to his own interests, wrote to his father-in-law in a manner which, although both affectionate and amiable, was

not well calculated to enlist him in his cause. He recounted the events of the campaign of 1812, which had been, he said, very malevolently misrepresented in the thousand accounts of it promulgated at Vienna, complained that these accounts had received far too ready belief in his father-in-law's court; and added that, whilst the Russians had never vanquished him in a single engagement, he had vanquished them in many, and especially at the Berezina, where they had been most completely beaten. Explaining the loss which he had suffered of men and cannon as simply the effects of excessive cold, he proceeded to give an imposing account of the armaments now at his disposal, threatening with vengeance, not only his enemies, but also such of his allies as should desert him; at the same time declaring, however, that although he was quite certain of being able, in the course of the spring, to drive back the Russians upon the Vistula, and from the Vistula to the Niemen, he was anxious for peace, and would have even offered it, had the late campaign terminated on the enemy's territory, and had it not been beneath his dignity to do so in the existing state of affairs. He was willing to accept, therefore, the intervention of Austria, and consented to the despatch of Austrian plenipotentiaries to the several belligerent courts. He added that, although he would not on the present occasion, state the precise conditions on which he would make peace, he would speedily do so, as he had decided what these conditions should be, and was firmly resolved to agree to no others. He would never consent, he said, to detach from the French empire, what the *senatus consultum* had declared to form its constitutional territory — Rome, Piedmont, Tuscany, and Holland, and the Hanseatic department were invaluable and inseparable portions of the empire. Refraining from offering any explanation of his views respecting the duchy of Warsaw, he did not exclude the idea that he might be willing to consent to enlarge, to some extent, the Prussian territory; but he expressly declared that he would permit no territorial aggrandisement in the case of Russia, and would only consent to free her from the obligations of the treaty of Tilsit, or, in other words, from the fetters of the continental blockade. With respect to England, with which it was not only desirable, but necessary, to treat, since Russia could not withdraw from her alliance, Napoleon fell back upon the letter sent to Lord Castlereagh, at the moment of his departure for Russia, in which he had laid down as a fundamental principle, that of *uti possidetis*; according to which principle Spain, which he then possessed, would fall to the lot of Joseph; Portugal, which he did not possess, to the

hands of the house of Bragantia; Naples, which he had conquered, to Murat; and Sicily, which he had never occupied, to the Bourbons of Naples—a deplorable arrangement for France, since it would give her territories upon the continent of which she had no need, and deprive her of all her colonies beyond the seas, which were then in the hands of the English.

It is difficult to imagine anything more important than such a declaration as this, calculated, as it was, to deprive Austria of all hope of persuading us to consent to her plans for procuring a general peace, and thus to determine her to change at once our alliance for that of our enemies. The essential object, at this moment, should have been to discover the wishes of Austria, and to have satisfied them to such an extent as should have attached her to our cause. What Austria desired was, to regain her own independence and the independence of Germany, to obtain such a position for herself as should give her the first influence in the reconstituted Germanic confederation, to recover Illyria, to obtain a better frontier on the Inn, and, finally, to be disembarrassed from the grand duchy of Warsaw, for she had no faith in the re-establishment of Poland, and in any case was unwilling to pay for it with Galicia. She had not, as yet, expressed any of these wishes, but the slightest consideration of her position, rendered it easy to perceive that she must entertain them, and ambition must have lost the power of appreciating the real nature of existing circumstances, when it proceeded to deprive her of hope, in respect to such important points as these, especially when England and Russia were offering her, not only a complete restoration of German independence, but also the restitution to herself of all those portions of territory, which had formerly been the source of her glory and power, and the loss of which she constantly brooded over with regret and grief.

To the unfortunate letter which Napoleon thus wrote to his father-in-law, M. de Bassano added one destined for M. de Metternich, in which was expressed at considerably greater length, and much more haughtily, what Napoleon had expressed in his letter with that hauteur which belonged to him. "People spoke," said M. de Bassano, in the course of his letter, "of the excitement of public opinion against France; but let care be taken that such a susceptible people as the French be not irritated too greatly, lest it should rise en masse and overwhelm Europe in its anger. In that case would be witnessed catastrophes far other than any which had ever yet been seen!"

Napoleon and his minister, accepted, they said, the media-

tion of Austria, but the arrangement of a peace was to be based on the conditions exacted from Russia after Friedland, and from Austria after Wagram. At the same time, as a means of interesting the Austrian court, it was informed with much ceremony, and as family news which must interest it, that the grandson of the Emperor Francis was about to be crowned King of Rome, and his daughter, Marie Louisa, appointed to the regency of France—news not entirely devoid of interest to the Austrian Emperor, and even calculated to afford him a certain degree of pleasure, for he loved his daughter, and could not be insensible to the advantage of seeing her in more certain circumstances at the head of the French government; but news, nevertheless, which it was strange to consider capable of inducing him to forget the state of Germany and Austria, and the twenty years of misfortunes, which he had now in one moment to repair.

It was necessary, also, that Napoleon should enter into explanations with Prussia, reply to the excuses offered by her with respect to General d'York, and to discuss the intention hinted by her, of establishing herself in Silesia, forming there an army by the aid of our money, and taking advantage of this asylum, to change gradually from the character of a friendly mediator to that of a hostile arbiter.

Although M. de St. Marsan did not despair of obtaining the good offices of the Prussian court, if due concessions were made to it at the right moment, it was evident that little was to be expected of it, controlled as it was by irresistible national passions, and to permit it to raise armies which would be speedily turned against ourselves, and at our own expense, would be a remarkable specimen of folly. To consent, also, to its withdrawal into Silesia, for the purpose of there negotiating with Russia, would be to give ourselves over to this power, towards which it was already too strongly inclined. It could no longer be a fault, in fact, to manifest distrust of the court of Berlin, for the evil on this side was already past remedy; and Napoleon, therefore, in his reception of M. de Krusemark, who was the regular Prussian ambassador, and M. de Hatzfeldt, who was the special envoy sent on this occasion, treated them with all his habitual hauteur, gave them his usual version of the late campaign, and then, expatiating on the vast extent of the armaments he was then preparing, declared that within three months he would have driven back the Russians, not only beyond the Vistula, but beyond the Niemen and the Dnieper also. With respect to the proposal of the Prussian court, that it should withdraw into Silesia, he could make no objection, he said, since it was natural that it should be unwilling to re-

main in the midst of belligerent armies, but he could not consent that it should enter into direct negotiations with Russia, for the purpose of obtaining the neutralization of Silesia, for the first condition which Russia would demand in exchange, would be the withdrawal of Prussia from the French alliance. With respect to the money demanded by Prussia, he denied the correctness of the account delivered by her, but, nevertheless, he declared his willingness to pay the forty-eight millions which she claimed, as soon as he should be satisfied respecting the manner in which, situated as she was so close to his enemies, she meant to employ them. With respect to the strong places on the Vistula and the Oder, he placed the two Russian diplomatists in a dilemma, for if Prussia, he said were his sincere ally, she could not object to see these fortresses in his hands, and if she were not, he would not restore them to her at any price, especially at the moment when an active war was about to be carried on upon the shores of the two rivers which these fortresses commanded. Then, turning his discourse to the general situation of Prussia, he declared that it was necessary to endeavour to create some intermediate power in Germany, capable of resisting Russia, and that as Prussia alone could be this power, he was much inclined, could a reasonable peace be negotiated, to reinforce her on the side of Poland, and even towards Westphalia, if the pacification, instead of being merely continental, were also maritime. To these hints Napoleon added testimonies of affection for the Prussian monarch, and of regard for his representatives, but failed to utter anything of a nature really satisfactory.

Whilst Napoleon thus entered into explanations with the German powers, his reputed allies, he neglected no exertion to render himself independent of them. He had sent to the senate the decrees of which mention has already been made, and which, to the conscription of 1813, already decreed and levied, added power to employ the cohorts beyond the French frontier, to draw a hundred thousand men from the four last classes, and, finally, to levy immediately the conscription of 1814. It was impossible to reject these measures, and the senate voted them submissively. By a free assembly they would have been voted with enthusiasm, and with the expression of sentiments which would have had the happiest effect on the public mind. That the government, by the commission of grave errors had compromised that glory of the French empire, which had already cost so much blood, could not be denied, but it was, nevertheless, the opinion of all enlightened men, that one final effort should be made, to drive back the hostile armies which now threatened

it, and that when victories should have restored, not our glory, for that was imperishable, but the prestige of invincibility which we had lost, then, and then only, we should make peace, even at the price of considerable concessions. The mass of the nation, however, which had hitherto been so submissive, and even too submissive to Napoleon, was now greatly inclined to blame and murmur against him, and to be excessively dissatisfied at the new burdens with which it found itself threatened. The parents of the children who were to become heroes on the battle-field, complained openly and bitterly of the repeated conscriptions, of the incessant wars, and of conquests which occurred so far off that patriotism could scarcely care for them. The humbler the class to which these murmurers might belong, the louder were their complaints, for not only did the lower classes suffer more heavily from the conscriptions, but they were also less capable of comprehending the political necessities of a final and immense effort. In the streets of Paris, the public boldness of expression became extreme, and reached the height which is truly surprising when we consider the nature of the government. A young man of twenty-two years of age, drawn for the conscription, having placed himself in the faubourg Saint-Antoine, directly in the path of Napoleon, who was riding through it on horseback, dared to address him, and in spite of the prestige which always surrounded his person, to make use of the most offensive language. The police attempting to seize him, were prevented from doing so by the crowd; and it often happened that young criminals, by crying out that they were being forcibly dragged away for the conscription, prevailed upon the populace to effect their liberation. When sick soldiers passed through the streets from their barracks to the military hospital, which was situated at one of the extremities of Paris, they were usually surrounded by troops of pitying women, who, overwhelming them with compassion and gentle cares, cried out, that they were fresh victims of *Bonaparte*, as he was called from the time he became unpopular, being thus in a manner deprived of the sceptre he had so cruelly used.

To this discontent of the masses was added the prevalence of the most sombre ideas, and singular terrors. Alarming reports were propagated, being the echoes of echoes which had reverberated from Moscow to Strasbourg and Mayence, and according to these, some of the French Marshals had been taken prisoners, whilst the others were mad, dying, or dead;—a bloody combat had taken place between the army and the imperial guard;—hordes of ferocious barbarians were on the point of hurling their masses upon France. At

the same time, a prediction was spread abroad in Italy which caused immense terror, to the effect, that the waters of the Adriatic and Mediterranean seas were about to submerge the whole Italian peninsula. The Italian priests, always hostile, although apparently submissive, did their utmost to propagate these alarming superstitions and to excite, as much as possible, especially in the country districts, the public mind.

In the department of Old France these discontents and fears did not excite sedition, for if the government were oppressive it was, nevertheless, national, and was not hated as a foreign tyranny. But between the Rhine and the Elbe, in Holland, in Westphalia, at Bremen, and Hambourg, the appearance of the English fleets, and the approach of the Russians, produced popular tumults, and gave cause to fear at any moment a general outbreak. In the grand duchy of Bergen and at Hambourg, open disturbances had taken place, and the French authority been defied and insulted; and although the populace in Amsterdam and Rotterdam had been less audacious, throughout the whole of Holland, the cry of "*Vive Orange*" was frequently heard, and an insurrection on the approach of the enemy had become extremely probable.

However, when the enlightened class of a country approves of the measures of its government, it gives them a very efficacious support; and as this class in France perceived that it was necessary to make an energetic defence against the foreign enemy, whatever might have been the errors of the government, the levies were carried out, and the high functionaries, sustained by a moral support which they had not always obtained, performed their duties, although they were at heart full of sadness and sinister presentiments. Napoleon himself called the manifestations of popular feeling just alluded to, *the tumults of the mob*, which it was necessary to repress with energy, and which would not occur again when once properly punished. At Paris he had a certain number of arrests made, which rendered talkers in the public places somewhat more cautious in their expressions, had the grand duchy of Berg overrun by some columns mobiles, which filled the country with terror; and in Hambourg had six persons shot for outrages committed against the French authorities.

The occurrence of these events failed to discourage him, or to deprive him of the hope that he might yet induce France to make such a manifestation of national feeling, as might be a species of reply to the patriotic ardour of the Germans, and give the lie to the assertion which was now very prevalent throughout Europe, that France was herself as weary of his despotism, as foreign nations of his yoke. With this object

in view, he conceived the idea of having offers made to himself, from the various cities and cantons, of fully equipped horsemen, as a means of repairing the loss of his cavalry, which had been immense during the late campaign. As Paris was the most suitable place to take the initiative in such a movement, as being the most populous and richest city in the empire, as well as the one most interested in public events, Napoleon, in execution of his plan, contrived that a member of the municipal council, should declare that the city of Paris, being the seat of government, and better acquainted than any other city of the empire with its necessities, should give the example in helping to replace, by forty thousand well mounted and well equipped horsemen, the twenty thousand which had been destroyed by the late extraordinary winter; that as the monarchs, the enemies of France, flattered themselves with having in their favour the public opinion of their countries, it was necessary to prove to them that the hero who had saved France from a state of anarchy, had, no less than they, the esteem of his nation, being indeed regarded by it with boundless admiration, attachment, and devotion. He accordingly proposed that the municipal council should offer to the Emperor a regiment of five hundred horse, fully equipped, and this proposition had scarcely been made, before the measure suggested was voted by acclamation, and the offer conveyed to the Tuileries by a deputation of the council. The account of this circumstance which appeared in the *Moniteur*, was sufficient to arouse the patriotism of some, the interested zeal of others, and throughout the whole of the departments situated between the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees, these offers were procured without any difficulty. Lyons offered a hundred and twenty horsemen; Bordeaux eighty; Strasbourg a hundred; Rouen, Lille, Nantes, fifty; Angers forty-five; Amiens, Marseilles, Toulouse, thirty; Metz, Rennes, Mayence, twenty-five; Pau, Toulon, Bayonne, Caen, Besançon, Tours, Versailles, Geneva, twenty; Nancy, Clermont, Dunkerque, Nîmes, Aix, fifteen. The other cities, towns, and cantons of the empire made similar offers to a larger or less extent, and the columns of the *Moniteur* were filled for some time with their several deliberations on this subject. And here it may be remarked that the foreign cities which had been violently annexed to the empire, and were consequently less favourably disposed towards the French government, almost without exception made offers which were in great disproportion to their real zeal for Napoleon, and had evidently done so either from fear of the threats employed by the prefects, or under the influence of prudent men, who thus

endeavoured to induce the government to forget certain rash acts of their fellow citizens. Thus Rome voted two hundred and forty horsemen, Genoa, eighty, Hambourg, a hundred, Amsterdam, a hundred, Rotterdam, fifty, the Hague, forty, Leyden, twenty-four, Utrecht, twenty, and Dusseldorf, twelve.

These offers having been made, it was necessary to realize them, and to find the men their horses and equipment, and the supply of the first of these requirements was more difficult of attainment than that of the two latter, since it could not be procured by the mere outlay of money. A despatch from the minister of the interior, however, informed the various prefects, that the government would be satisfied if the offers made by the various cities, towns, and cantons, were fulfilled as respected only the horses and equipment; and as it then became a mere matter of money, the prefects apportioned the cost of the contingent to be furnished by their several districts amongst the citizens, and the allotted sums, were, with the exception of a few murmurs against a method of taxation so illegal, readily paid. The funds being procured, the prefects obtained the necessary horses by paying well for them; and the supply of the equipment, was a matter of no difficulty in a country so industrious as France.

Within a few days the offers amounted to twenty-two thousand horses with equipments, and sixteen thousand troopers; a most material aid in themselves, and calculated to have a moral effect in the highest degree beneficial; for although the hand of authority was visible in the grant of these gifts, they were, nevertheless, undeniably the means of showing that the nation had adopted the opinion, that an energetic resistance should precede a speedy and honourable peace.

As soon as he was in possession of the means for recruiting his armies, Napoleon employed them with that prodigious genius for organization of which he had already given so many proofs. Of the four principal resources which he had at his disposal, two were already realized—the conscription of 1813, and the cohorts. The third, that of the hundred thousand men to be drawn from the four last classes, was to be actually obtained in February. As for the fourth, that of the conscription of 1814, it would be sufficient to obtain it in the course of the year, since it was only intended to replace in the dépôts the conscription of 1813, which was to be wholly converted into war battalions. Let us turn our attention to the manner in which Napoleon employed these resources in the reorganization of his armies.

After having deceived himself for a moment with respect

to the number of troops remaining between the Vistula and the Oder, he was now perfectly aware that there existed only a few remnants, chiefly in *cadres*. He ordered, therefore, that there should be retained on the Oder only one *cadre-de-compagnie* for a hundred men, and one *cadre-de-bataillon* for six hundred men. All the remainder was to be sent to France. But even upon this scale of reduction there could only be formed one battalion per regiment, although the regiments of the grand army upon their departure for the war had numbered five battalions actually in line. This first battalion was intended to compose exclusively the garrison of the fortresses on the Oder. Those on the Vistula, such as Dantzic and Thorn, were already blockaded, and had received, moreover, whole divisions, such as the divisions Grandjean, Heudelet, and Loison. By collecting all the straggling soldiers who could be gradually brought together, one battalion per regiment was with difficulty completed; and these battalions were then reinforced with the companies of infantry, which Napoleon had placed in garrison on his vessels of war, and which, now that he was compelled to make use of all his resources, he withdrew to land again, marching those which had been on the Scheldt and the Texel, immediately on the Oder.

When these first battalions had been completed, the troops which remained of the other battalions were assembled, part in the interior of Germany, part upon the Rhine. The French regiments of the army of Russia were thirty-six in number, sixteen belonging to Davoust's corps, six to Oudinot's, six to Ney's, and eight to Prince Eugene's; and Napoleon now decided that whilst Davoust's corps should be reorganized in sixteen regiments, the 2nd and 3rd corps should be amalgamated into one of twelve regiments, and confided to Marshal Victor; and that the 4th (Prince Eugene's) should be reorganized in Bavaria. The corps of Marshals Davoust and Victor would, consequently, consist of twenty-eight regiments, and Napoleon desired that the *cadre* of the second battalions of these twenty-eight regiments should be retained at Erfurt, sending, immediately, General Doucet to command them, and also despatching from the depôts, of the conscripts of 1813, already well drilled, bodies of men sufficient to raise these twenty-eight battalions to eight hundred men each. As soon as these battalions had been properly reorganized they were to join, some of them Marshal Davoust, and some Marshal Victor. The *cadres* of the 3rd, 4th, and 5th battalions were to be recruited on the Rhine with men who were not yet drilled, being those drawn from the four anterior classes, and these battalions, consequently,

could not be reorganized before the lapse of three or four months. Napoleon intended to send the 3rd and 4th of these battalions, as soon as possible, to Marshals Davoust and Victor, who would then have three battalions per regiment; and as these Marshals were perfectly conversant with the conduct of warfare in the north, Napoleon proposed to throw them again upon the Vistula, where he hoped to be in the following June. On passing the Oder they were to receive their 1st battalions, posted in the fortresses, and Marshal Davoust would have a corps consisting of sixteen regiments of four battalions each, Marshal Victor a corps of twelve regiments also of four battalions each; these united forces forming a body of infantry numbering a hundred and twenty thousand men. In the meantime Marshal Davoust, with the sixteen 2nd battalions reorganized at Erfurt, was to occupy the city of Hambourg, accustomed to submit to his authority, whilst Marshal Victor, with the twelve regiments to be entrusted to his command, was to garrison the great fortress of Magdebourg; both the one and the other being able, from their positions, to afford protection to Prince Eugene's rear.

The cadres of the 4th corps, being of Italian origin, were marched upon Augsburg to receive the recruits which were to come from the banks of the Po, across the Tyrol and Bavaria; and, when the nature of the ground to be occupied and the time at his disposal are considered, it must be seen, that it would have been impossible for Napoleon to have arranged his forces with greater skill.

Having thus taken measures for the reorganization of the old corps, Napoleon, in the next place, directed his attention to the new corps, which he was compelled to create in all haste, since the necessity of checking the Russians, in their forward movement, might force him to proceed to the Elbe at the end of the month of March. The most available resource, was that of the cohorts, consisting of a hundred battalions, which, having been organized during some nine months, were almost thoroughly disciplined, and destined to form a solid and intrepid infantry, though somewhat given to discontent. Napoleon distributed these cohorts into twenty-two regiments, of four battalions each, and having given them good colonels, marched them upon the Rhine towards Wesel and Mayence. The twelve first, formed into four battalions of three regiments each, composed the *corps of the Elbe*, and set out immediately for Hambourg, for the purpose of joining Prince Eugene, and reinforcing him with forty thousand of the best infantry. Napoleon appointed to the command-in-chief of this corps, General Lauriston, a sensible and determined man, who, as ambassador in Russia,

had endeavoured to prevent the war, and who, during the active progress of the war, had behaved with such courage as rendered him worthy of the appointment.

Napoleon's next care was to form two corps on the Rhine. There remained at his disposal, ten regiments of cohorts, and, in addition to these, a large number of cadres, of which some had been left in the interior, at the moment of the departure for Russia, and others successively drawn from Spain. With these latter bodies of troops, he was able to form between thirty and forty regiments, of two or three battalions each, and hastened to recruit them with the men of the conscription of 1813, who were now partly disciplined, and whose instruction it was proposed to perfect on the march. With eight of the ten remaining cohorts, and a portion of these thirty and odd regiments, he formed the first *corps of the Rhine*, distributing it into four divisions, and confiding it to the hero of the retreat from Russia, Marshal Ney, who had shared the common feeling of indignation, which had been caused by the desertion of the army by its chief, but who, upon receiving information on the Oder, of the brilliant and just recompense which had been awarded to him for his services (he had been created Prince of Moskowa), had felt himself inspired afresh with all his old ardour, and was only anxious to encounter the Russians, that he might tear from them an expiation of their successes during the late campaign. A fifth division, comprising the German troops of the allied princes, would raise his corps to the number of fifty thousand men, and even sixty thousand, taking into account the artillery and cavalry; and this corps it was which was intended to strike the first and the severest blows. It was to rally successively at Mayence, Frankfort, Hanau, and Wurzburg, and set out on its march a month after that of the Elbe, that is to say, on the 15th of March; Marshal Ney, who had been in Paris during the last few days, less for the purpose of taking repose, of which his iron constitution had no need, than for the purpose of receiving the investiture of his new title, being ordered to set out immediately for the banks of the Rhine, in order to superintend the organization of the troops which he was to command.

The second corps of the Rhine was composed of some provisional regiments and marines, which owed their creation some time since to the foresight of Napoleon, who, knowing that he never had a too great abundance of resources for the execution of the various measures he wished to carry out, had formed, at the period when he dreamed of vast maritime expeditions to be sent forth upon a hundred vessels of

the line, from the magnificent ports of the empire, from the Texel to Trieste, a troop accustomed to act either as artillerymen or as infantry, and equally fit for land or sea service. This body was quite capable of furnishing sixteen thousand well-disciplined, vigorous soldiers, inspired with the high spirit of the marine service, and Napoleon ordered their immediate departure for the banks of the Rhine; dividing them into four regiments, of four battalions each, and incorporating them, together with some of the regiments which he was hastily organizing, in the second *corps of the Rhine*. This corps, which, to replace the first corps at Mayence, was to be ready to set out on the 15th of April, consisting of four divisions, and numbering altogether about forty thousand infantry, and was to be entrusted to the command of Marshal Marmont, the vanquished of Salamanca, who, although no longer to be trusted as a commander-in-chief, might still perform good services as a lieutenant. The wound which he had received, although at first considered mortal, was rapidly healing, and he was directed to proceed to Mayence as soon as his health would permit.

Napoleon resolved to draw from the *personnel* and *matériel* of war, which had been long since accumulated in Italy, another corps of about forty or fifty thousand men, which, descending into Bavaria, whilst he himself debouched on Saxony, would complete the mass of troops, which he wished to unite upon the Elbe. He charged with the organization of this corps, General Bertrand, the governor of Illyria, who was well acquainted with the details of the organization of troops, and was both active and devoted; and directed him to employ for this purpose, all the military resources of Illyria, only leaving there some depôts and local militia, and transporting the surplus into Frioul. For as the Illyrian provinces must, if the Austrian alliance were preserved, inevitably return into the possession of that power, and as it would be impossible for France, if the Austrian alliance were lost, to dispute their possession for four-and-twenty hours, it would have been an useless dispersion of our forces to have left any part beyond the Julian Alps. With the squadrons drawn from the province, with some regiments remaining in Lombardy, some other regiments posted in Piedmont, and returned from Spain, and with two regiments of *cohorts*, which still remained available of the twenty-two, there would be sufficient troops to compose three good French divisions, of twelve battalions each, and as the Italian army, properly so called, would be able also to furnish an excellent division, the army which General Bertrand was directed to march into Germany would consist of four.

The infantry being reorganized as speedily as circumstances would permit, it was now necessary to direct attention to the special arms, which had suffered even more than the infantry. When Napoleon called from Italy the corps of General Grenier, and formed that of Marshal Augereau, he had drawn from France all the available companies of artillery, and ordered that there should be created in each cohort a company of cannoneers. In consequence of this precaution, the personnel of the artillery could not fail. To reorganize the artillery of the army, Napoleon employed the artillerymen who had returned from Russia, forty-eight companies from the ports and arsenals, and eighty companies formed in the cohorts; and thus obtained an artillery force sufficient to serve a thousand pieces of cannon. The matériel of this arm which had been carried into Russia, unfortunately remained buried under its snows, but our arsenals were well stored, and the only want was of gun carriages, for the construction of which Napoleon gave immediate orders. The loss of horses had been greater than that of either men or carriages, but Napoleon hoped that General Bourcier, who was charged with the purchase of horses, and daily urged by letter to increased efforts, would be able to obtain ten thousand draught horses in lower Germany; and he also gave orders for a levy of fifteen thousand in France, by means of requisition, which was a purchase for ready money, the owner being compelled to sell whether willing or unwilling.

The cavalry was, if possible, a more important arm than even the artillery itself, on account of the enemy's great strength in this respect, and unfortunately, not only had we lost almost the whole of our cavalry horses, but even the very means of supplying this loss, since we had no longer in our power Poland, Old Prussia, Silesia, and Mecklenburg. There remained, however, Hanover and Westphalia. Two or three thousand horses had been drawn from the evacuated countries, and there was reason to hope that nine to ten thousand might still be drawn from the countries comprised between the Elbe and the Rhine. Flattering himself with the idea that General Bourcier would be able to procure mounts for thirteen or fourteen thousand troopers, and having no doubt that at least an equal number would return from Russia, he sent to him two or three thousand troopers on foot, from the dépôts on the Rhine; and at the same time despatched Generals Latour-Maubourg and Sebastiani from Paris, for the purpose of taking the command of the remounted cavalry in Hanover. He ordered them to form two corps, partly of cuirassiers and partly of chasseurs and

hussars, and as soon as they should have six thousand troopers fit for active service to march them to Prince Eugene.

Napoleon considered that the cavalry dépôts having received of the conscriptions of 1812 and 1813 the portion which belonged to them, would be capable of furnishing ten thousand well trained horsemen: and he instructed the Duke de Plaisance to form them into squadrons answering to the old regiments of the grand army, and as soon as they should have been thus formed to conduct them to the corps of Latour-Maubourg and de Sebastiani, to incorporate each detachment with the regiment to which it belonged, and thus to re-establish the regiments in their entirety.

Horses were not wanting in France, for the ten thousand troopers, whose organization had been entrusted to the Duke de Plaisance. About ten thousand were actually in hand; orders had been given, as already stated, for the requisition of fifteen thousand more, and twenty-two thousand had been furnished by voluntary gifts. France, alone, therefore, would supply sufficient to mount forty-five thousand men; and with the addition of those which would be, it was hoped, procured from Germany, the cavalry actually available for the ensuing campaign, would amount to fifty or sixty thousand.

To all these forces, Napoleon was anxious to add the imperial guard, reconstituted in new proportions. It had suffered cruel losses in the late campaign; but numerous portions of it still existed in Germany, France, and Spain, especially in Spain, where there was an entire division of the young guard, and Napoleon resolved to employ these elements in the recomposition of the chosen troop. He was anxious to preserve the old guard, on account of its fidelity, a quality which the progress of events might render especially valuable; and he was anxious to preserve the young guard, because, admitting into its ranks none but picked men, it was capable, by virtue of the *esprit de corps*, to acquire within a brief space of time the valour of first-rate troops. He demanded, therefore, of all the corps which had not suffered from the disasters of the late campaign, and especially from those employed in Spain, a certain number of veteran troops, for the purpose of completing the old guard. At the same time, he selected from the ranks of the conscription of the four last classes, young and strong men to refill the vacancies in the young guard. He carried the number of the battalions of the guard both old and young, to fifty-three, that of the squadrons to thirty-three, and increased the reserve of artillery. The imperial guard would thus afford an army of reserve numbering fifty thousand men, capable of placing forty thousand in line.

The transport service, although a matter of less moment in Germany than in Russia, was always of great importance in the eyes of Napoleon, as rendering possible, when effective, the sudden concentration of masses of troops. He reorganized the battalions d'equipage, formed five in Germany of the wrecks of the fifteen which had made the campaign in Russia, and six more, by means of the *cadres* remaining in France. These eleven battalions would be capable of conveying ten days' provisions for two hundred thousand men, a sufficient number to fight one of those great battles by which the fate of wars is usually decided. With respect to waggons, being forced to regard as lost those which were plunged in the bogs of Poland, or the sands of Prussia, he was reduced to the old *caisson* somewhat modified, and the *char à la comtoise*, which, by its lightness had rendered most effectual service.

It was by means of these extensive armaments, that he proposed to check the enemy's forces on the Elbe, if he could not check them on the Oder, and to dissipate the hope with which they appeared to be intoxicated. Having about fifty thousand men in garrison in the fortresses on the Vistula and the Oder, and forty thousand active troops under Prince Eugene, he intended to reinforce the latter with the forty thousand under General Lauriston, and with the eighty thousand men, who would be thus concentrated on the Elbe, to stop the progress of the enemy, and prevent any invasion of Lower Germany. He would then, he proposed, in the month of April or May, join Prince Eugene with the two hundred thousand, which would at that time be in Saxony, and with a force of three hundred thousand men overwhelm the Russian army, however greatly it might have been strengthened by allies. There would remain as a reserve the old corps, which were to be reorganized under Marshals Davoust and Victor, the *cadres* arriving from Spain, and the hundred and fifty battalions in dépôt, destined to receive the conscription of 1814, and capable of affording an additional hundred or hundred and fifty thousand combatants. The principal difficulty with respect to the organization of these vast bodies of troops, was in the shortness of the time in which it had to be effected; but whether in administration or war, Napoleon was a marvellous economiser of time, having measures simultaneously carried on which are usually accomplished only in succession, seeing with his own eyes that every order given by him had been duly executed, despatching in all directions a multitude of confidential officers, whose reports he always read or heard himself every night before retiring to rest, and rigidly investigating the very slightest neglect in the execution of his orders.

But whilst collecting these enormous forces it was also necessary to provide the means of paying them; and in fact, whilst Napoleon devoted himself, day and night, to the recomposition of his armies, he employed himself no less energetically in placing the finances of the empire in such a state, as would enable them to bear the expense of the vast armament he was preparing.

We have already seen how the budget of the empire had risen in 1811 from nine hundred millions to eleven hundred millions, on account of two causes;—first, the annexation to the empire, of Rome, Illyria, Holland, and the Hanseatic provinces; and, secondly, the cost of the armaments for the war in Russia. The budget of 1811 showed a deficit of forty-six millions, and the budget of 1812 a deficit of thirty-seven millions and a half; but in the case of the budget of 1813, as it would relate to the expenses of war carried on almost upon our own frontiers, and in allied countries, in which it would be necessary to maintain our troops at the cost of France herself, there was reason to suppose that the budget would rise, to at least twelve hundred and seventy millions, and that the deficit would be one hundred and forty-nine millions. Adding, therefore, this fresh deficit to those of the budgets of 1811–1812, there would be a total deficit of two hundred and thirty-two millions, and, in fact, at the commencement of 1813, the expenses being immense, and far exceeding the realized receipts, the embarrassment became extreme. M. Mollien, minister of the treasury, a man of an ingenious, but very circumspect mind, being with good reason fearful of putting in jeopardy his personal character, should he have recourse to irregular means of obtaining financial resources, was excessively disconcerted at the state of affairs, and by reason of his scruples, became for Napoleon one of the difficulties of the moment. Being no more than the other ministers in Napoleon's actual confidence, and believing, in common with the public, that an immense amount of treasure was accumulated in the Tuileries, he was desirous that Napoleon should transfer from them, a hundred or two hundred millions to the treasury coffers, and often accused him, in the bitterness of his chagrin, of being guilty of almost personal avarice. But in this matter, as in war, Napoleon's conduct was distinguished by admirable foresight, method, and address; and it must be added, with respect to avarice he was greedy of nothing but power.

The treasure amassed in the Tuileries, consisted of the *tresor extraordinaire*, and the savings of the civil list.

The remains of the *tresor extraordinaire* had been much

diminished by the donations prodigally bestowed upon soldiers of distinguished merit, and by the aids which had been drawn from it for the war finances. Its nominal amount at this period was almost three hundred and twenty-five millions, but as a portion of this sum consisted of property which could not be immediately realized, and a larger portion was due from cities of the empire, and foreign states to which it had been lent, its actual available amount was only fifty-eight or sixty millions, an inconsiderable sum, and yet one which, properly employed, might be of the greatest service.

In addition to this *tresor extraordinaire*, Napoleon had at his disposal the savings of his civil list, amassed by prodigies of economy, and amounting to about a hundred and thirty-five millions, of which he had invested a portion in government or commercial securities, but retained about a hundred millions in coin in the cellars of the Tuileries; and as there remained at his disposal about sixty millions of the *domaine extraordinaire*, he had at this period in gold or silver coin immediately available, and lying in the coffers either of the Tuileries, or the *domaine extraordinaire*, a sum of a hundred and sixty millions.

Had Napoleon, yielding to the advice of his minister, made use of those hundred and sixty millions in the first moments of embarrassment, they would have speedily disappeared, and he would have found himself without ready money, much in the same position as a general on the battle-field without a reserve. He was wisely resolved, therefore, not to expend this resource until compelled to do so by the most imperious necessity; in the meantime, employing only such portions of it as might be necessary to support the *valeurs*, which the minister of finance would sooner or later have to create. Carefully refraining from justifying his resistance to this minister's entreaties, by informing him of the real amount (much less than M. Mollien supposed it to be), of this private treasure, he bore with equanimity, the severe insinuations in which he and others frequently indulged; remaining calm and gentle in the midst of the greatest perplexities, that he might not add by defects of temper to the troubles of those who served him. He sought then without explaining himself, the means of supplying the two hundred and thirty-two millions, remaining deficient with respect to the budgets of 1811 and 1812, and of paying, altogether, that of 1813.

Napoleon was unwilling for any consideration to increase the taxes, although an increase of the direct taxes might have been easily borne, and would have produced the

hundred and thirty millions which were wanting for 1813. The direct taxes, as re-established by him, had succeeded financially, although in a political point of view they had met with no more than the customary success; but the indirect taxes could not be arbitrarily increased, for it was by no means certain that an increase in their tariff would augment their product. At the same time, with respect to the landed property, Napoleon was particularly unwilling, after having freed it from the burdens which oppressed it, to subject it to them again; for he loved to be able to say, that in the midst of the greatest wars the material condition of France had not been deteriorated, and that they affected only the army itself, which gained by their glory, honours, rank, and riches. This army, however, had now begun to indulge in bitter complaints, and all the soldiers who returned from the banks of the Niemen, were in the habit of indulging in such language, that it had become needful to keep careful watch over them, and to separate them from the new soldiers to prevent the contagion of discontent. Moreover, the army could not be formed without the levy of the impost of blood, the cruellest of all taxes, and although the men of France when once in their ranks, become soldiers with a good grace, their parents were not so easily reconciled to their fate, and gradually stored up in their hearts a bitterness of hatred, of which the explosion was to be terrible. Napoleon was in error, therefore, when he thought, that provided his wars did not burden his people with money taxes, they would not have any evil influence on their feelings towards himself; but fondly cherishing this idea, he resolved for this reason, to make no augmentation of the imposts.

The issue of *rentes*, which might have probably succeeded in raising the required sum, had the public been earlier accustomed to such a proceeding, was actually impossible, or at least a matter of great difficulty, and now, it would, indeed have been extremely singular, after having refrained from raising money on credit in 1807 and 1808, to begin to do so in 1813. The produce of the customs which had been employed, together with contributions from the *tresor extraordinaire*, in covering the deficits of former years, and especially the cost of the great expedition of 1812, were exhausted. At the same time, the ordinary receipts of the customs were very much increased, having risen from thirty millions to eighty, by virtue of the famous tariff of fifty per cent., which had become the principal instrument of the continental blockade. Napoleon had also granted this year, so great a number of licences, that the ordinary receipts of the customs might fairly be calculated to amount to a

hundred millions.—And here we may remark that England and France had in some degree exchanged positions, for whilst, two years before, Napoleon had tortured Europe for the purpose of restraining her from holding any relations with England, it was England, now, who, perceiving the advantages derived by its enemy from the communications carried on by means of these licences, took pains to render them ineffectual.

Napoleon being unwilling, therefore, to augment the taxes, whether direct or indirect, public loans being unusual, and commercial seizures producing almost nothing, there remained only the old means of raising money, by the alienation of national domains. And this resource had itself become confined to very narrow limits, for Napoleon had restored to the emigrant families a large portion of their possessions, and he was unwilling, by selling those portions which had not been alienated, to carry out the system of confiscations to which his government had had the honour of putting an end. There remained, however, a certain amount of property held in mortmain, of which the owners might be dispossessed, being indemnified by means of annuities paid by the state; and this property was that which was in the hands of the communes. In almost all the departments, and in some of them to a much greater extent than in others, the communes possessed considerable property, which was very badly managed. To have laid hands on the whole of this property, without distinction as to its nature, would have been not only iniquitous but impracticable, and infinitely dangerous, as it would probably have excited seditions; for a portion of it consisted of buildings employed in the public service, such as the *hôtels de ville*, schools, hospitals, churches, public grounds, and promenades, of which it was manifestly impossible to deprive their owners, whilst another portion was equally, although perhaps less manifestly, a public necessity, consisting, as it did, of public pasturages, woods and turbaries. To have seized these, at the moment when the rural populations were excited to the pitch of exasperation by the conscription, would have been almost to incur the danger in some provinces of a fresh *Vendée*. But there remained a third species of communal property, being that from which the communes derived only a certain amount of revenue, which they applied to the payment of their expenses. As this property was to them in fact only so much income, it could matter but little to them whether this income were paid by a farmer or the state; the probability of due payment being made, being at least as great in the latter case as in the former. The total value of the property of which

Napoleon thus proposed to take possession, was estimated to amount to about three hundred and seventy millions; bringing in, however, only eight or nine millions to the communes. Supposing that it were really sold for three hundred and seventy millions, there would remain, after deducting the two hundred and thirty-two millions required for the service of the state, about a hundred and thirty-eight millions, which, at the price of the funds at that period (the five per cents. being at seventy-five francs), would produce the nine millions of rent which would have to be paid as indemnity to the communes.

But in spite of the manifest advantages of this plan, there were serious objections to it, on the ground that it would be an attack on the rights of property; that the source of income given to the communes in exchange for that taken away from them, would be liable to constant depreciation, whilst the latter, consisting of land, would, on the contrary, be continually increasing in value; that this method of proceeding would alienate the goodwill of the municipal administrations, which, accustomed to the management of the communal property, regarded it as their own; and, fourthly, that the realization of this property, however prudently conducted, could not fail to be difficult and slow, whilst the necessities of the state were pressing, and, therefore, that if this measure were adopted, it would be necessary to anticipate it by the emission of paper money, founded on its future profits.

The matter was daily discussed with great earnestness, between M. de Bassano, whose habit of receiving Napoleon's schemes with favour caused him to be consulted upon almost all the affairs in hand, and M. Mollien, who was somewhat too inclined to enter into subtle disquisitions on incontestable truths, and who opposed the proposed plan rather with chagrin and ill-temper than firmness. The discussion respecting the proposed plan would have been interminable, had not Napoleon, who became impatient, and discerned with the utmost clearness how much truth and how much falsehood existed in the allegations of the disputants, at length said to M. Mollien,—“All that is very well, and I fully comprehend your objections, but before rejecting one plan, it is but right to propose another in its place.” And this observation was one to which it was difficult to reply, for it was a cry of want from the lips of him who was, of all persons, the most conscious of the necessities of the state, since he had to feed, clothe, and arm a million of soldiers, and his existence, greatness, and glory, depended on the solution of the problem now under discussion. Had

M. Mollien been a man of greater firmness and readiness of mind, he would have replied to Napoleon,—“ Issue five per cent. *rentes*, at sixty francs, or even seventy if necessary; pay the capitaux eight or ten per cent., or even more, and this operation, will be in reality less dear, will excite less enmity, and will afford you speedier and better means of supplying the necessities of your soldiers, than a paper money regarded with suspicion, and unwillingly received. But M. Mollien did not dare to express such an opinion as this, and it is very probable that at this period he would not have dared even to entertain it in his own mind.

It was, therefore, at length agreed, that that portion of the possessions of the communes which we have particularized above, should be summarily valued, replaced by a rent payable by the state, and then transferred to the *caisse-d'amortissement*, which had been in the habit of executing the state sales of landed property, anticipating the receipts by a paper money which it issued for the service of the state, and gradually withdrew from circulation, as the price of the property sold was actually received. This paper money maintained an undepreciated value, because it was very inconsiderable in amount, and because its holders could always obtain in exchange for it, its full value, both capital and interest. It was now arranged with respect to the sale of the communal property, that the purchasers should pay one third on the completion of the sale, another third in 1814, and another third in 1815, paying interest on the two latter sums at the rate of five per cent., and that in the meantime, the *caisse-d'amortissement* should supply the treasury with bills to the amount of two hundred and thirty-two millions, which were to be liquidated, as the receipts on the sale of the communal property became actually realized, the treasury making use of them as it might be able; forcing or persuading the creditors of the state to accept them. At the same time, Napoleon expressed his intention of taking up with a portion of the ready money at his command, sixty or seventy millions' worth of this paper at the moment of its emission; hoping by this means to keep up its value.

Such were the financial measures by which Napoleon hoped to obtain means for carrying on his last and most terrible campaign. There being no more private or church property which could well be confiscated, he now seized the communal property, and disposed of it by a species of paper money, which was issued on a sounder basis, and within far more prudent limits than the *assignats*, but which, nevertheless, could not fail to call to mind reminiscences of a former disastrous paper money, and was issued, moreover, at a most unfavourable moment.

Whilst making every possible exertion to render himself able to repel the enemies whom he had excited against France, Napoleon perceived the necessity also, of regaining that public favour for his government which he perceived it to be gradually losing; and as the only complete means for obtaining this object, an immediate peace, was at present unattainable, he sought some other method of procuring a moral satisfaction for his people.

Of all the causes which excited an adverse feeling towards Napoleon in the public mind, the most powerful, after the war, was the quarrel with Rome, and the captivity of the pope. In the mouths of the partisans of the house of Bourbon, it was a most efficacious subject for animadversion against a tyrannical government, which, according to them, was an oppressor of consciences. With the pious portion of the population it was a serious and sincere motive for blame and even aversion; and as, in general, the men and women whose souls have a strong religious bias are of an eager and active temperament, they are formidable enemies to a government which has been guilty of injuries to religion. Napoleon was now anxious, therefore, to disarm the anger of this respectable class of citizens, to deprive the royalists of the religious pretext of which they made use to injure him, and at the same time to give hopes of an European peace, by making one with the church.

He resolved, therefore, to put an end to this quarrel with the pope; conceding as little as possible, but, nevertheless, as much as might be necessary. The pope, after having been long a prisoner at Savoy, was, at this moment, at Fontainebleau, a captive in reality, but apparently free, and surrounded with attentions and honours; having been removed to this latter place, on account of Napoleon's fear that the English might take advantage of his absence in Russia to carry off Pius VII. from Savoy. The strict surveillance under which he was here placed, was concealed under an air of the greatest respect; in addition to the attendance of his medical man and chaplain, and some old servants, on whom he could rely, he received visits occasionally from the cardinals of Bayonne and Maury, the archbishop of Tours, and the bishop of Nantes, who frequently conversed with him on the evils suffered by the church, on the means of putting an end to them, and the hope that they would cease, now that Napoleon's return to Paris would permit two princes who loved each other, to enter upon those personal explanations which were always so much more effectual than negotiations carried on through third persons. The society of these persons was all that was allowed to the pope, and the only kind

that he desired. The fact of his removal from Savoy had been kept so private, and the public attention was so wholly engrossed by the Russian campaign, that few persons had visited Fontainebleau on the Sunday, to behold him perform mass, as he was on that day permitted, in the great chapel. He passed his time, therefore, in the depths of profound seclusion, and as he refrained from either walking in the park, which had been placed at his service, or from even reading, although the library of the château was at his very door, it seemed as though he had fallen into a species of prison lethargy.

No moral or physical circumstances could be imagined better calculated to vanquish the pontiff's resistance; especially if Napoleon should suddenly appear before him and bring to bear upon him the double prestige of his power and fascinating conversation. Returning from Moscow, vanquished by nature, if not by his enemies, Napoleon would have less influence than formerly, but he still, doubtless, retained sufficient to overcome the pope, especially as he had only been permitted to receive information respecting circumstances which it was impossible to conceal, and which were explained to him in the manner most favourable to our arms.

Napoleon had hastened on the very day after his arrival in Paris, to write to the pope, expressing the pleasure he felt at his residing so close to himself, and his anxiety that the differences which disturbed the peace of the church, should be immediately terminated. To this letter he had added communications by MM. de Bayane, de Barral, and Duvoisin, endeavouring to obtain the pope's consent to an agreement by almost un hoped-for concessions. In fact, the points in dispute no longer offered such difficulties as formerly. The method of canonical institution was agreed on; and there now only remained the task, which was indeed a more difficult one, of determining the nature of the pope's temporal establishment. Pius VII., failing to entertain the idea of Napoleon's fall, and seeing no means of forcing him to restore the Roman states, might fairly consider the establishment of the papal court at Avignon, with a suitable allowance as a species of *pis aller* arrangement, for which history afforded a precedent, an excuse, and a consolation; but what especially disgusted him, and appeared to him even worse than death, was a project attributed to Napoleon, of establishing the papacy in Paris under the very hand of the French court. And herein lay a valuable means of conducting negotiations, for by refraining to enforce his establishment at Paris, insisting only that he should reside in Avignon, the pope might be induced to consent to the solution of the question, which was reputed to offer the greatest difficulties, and the settlement

of which would speedily lead to an agreement respecting the minor points in dispute.

As soon as he should have been properly prepared for the interview, Napoleon resolved to transport himself to Fontainebleau, to terminate by his presence the pope's ordinary hesitations, and to obtain from him a formal act, which he might present to his people as a pledge of religious peace ;—as the *avant-coureur*, perhaps, of an European peace.

Accordingly, on the 19th of January, pretending to be engaged in the chase at Grasbois, he suddenly changed his direction and proceeded to Fontainebleau, where the pope was at the moment engaged with several bishops and cardinals. Already excited by the consideration of the important affairs which had been lately forced on his notice, he was much agitated by the sudden arrival of Napoleon, whom he had not seen since his coronation, and whom he both desired and feared to meet. Without leaving him time for reflection, Napoleon hastened to him, embracing him and saluting him by the title of father. The pope received the emperor's embraces, addressing him by the title of son ; and thus, refraining for this day, from entering upon the discussion of affairs, these two princes, so singularly led by destiny to gratify and torment each other all their lives, appeared delighted to have met once more. The hope of a prompt and complete reconciliation played upon their countenances.

On the following day, Pius VII., surrounded by his cardinals and the bishops who had been permitted to visit him on this occasion, went in grand state to return the Emperor's visit in his apartments. From the emperor he proceeded to the empress, whom he did not know, since it was not she whom he had crowned—the empress of that throne, with respect to which all things changed so swiftly, being already another person !—But whilst the pope was engaged in this interchange of visits, and appeared to derive from it some feeling of satisfaction and hope, he could not blind himself to the facts that Napoleon had come to Fontainebleau, to force him to consent to renounce his temporal dominion, to exchange Rome for Avignon, and to receive in return for his Italian principality a magnificent hospitality, which would be in reality a gilded slavery ; to assume, in short, in the west, with a little additional wealth and air of sovereignty, the position held by the patriarch of Constantinople.

When the visits of ceremony had been concluded the interviews on business commenced, and in these Napoleon was resolved to display all his grace of manner and energy of mind, for the purpose, on the one hand, of winning over the pope to his will, and on the other, of persuading him

that there was no better course open to him, than that of compliance with the demands which had been made of him. His first care was to persuade the pope, that although he had now for the first time failed to return triumphant, he was still as powerful as ever, and as capable of enforcing the performance of his wishes; and his next, to convince the holy father that it was useless to indulge in any hope of recovering Rome. It remained for the head of the church, then, to choose either Paris or Avignon as his place of residence, "And it would be better," said Napoleon, "that his choice should fall upon the latter city, where he would be treated with the greatest reverence, be surrounded with every species of homage, and find the emperor of the French as disposed to hold his stirrup as formerly were the German emperors." But as he decidedly objected to Paris, he had no alternative but to choose Avignon, a place consecrated by having already been during a considerable period, a papal residence. The necessary orders would be immediately given, and every arrangement made to render his residence there one of sumptuous magnificence. He would have full liberty to receive there, the ambassadors of all the various powers, who would enjoy at his court full diplomatic privileges and independence, even although they might be the representatives of states at war with France, and would be able to proceed to the new pontifical court by the sea and the Rhone, almost without touching the French territory. Two millions of revenue would be paid as indemnity for the property sold in the Roman states. All the property, and it was the larger portion, which still remained unsold, would be restored and administered by the papal agents. The *suburbicaires* sees would be re-established, and the pope would have the right of nominating their occupants. In addition to this privilege he would have the right of nominating to ten dioceses, either in Italy or France, as he might prefer, as a means of recompensing the servants of his government; besides the nomination of the cardinals, which would still belong to him. The prelates of the Roman states, whose sees had been suppressed, who were still living, and who formed one of the chief of the pope's sources of anxiety, were to have the quality, title, and position of bishops *in partibus*, and to receive during their lives, from the French treasury, an income equal to the revenues of the dioceses they had lost, thus forming an important addition to the legion of great ecclesiastical dignitaries, who would contribute to the éclat of the papal court at Avignon. The Roman archives, the great administrations of the *penitencerie*, the *daterie*, the propaganda, &c., would accompany the pope to the

beautiful country of Vauclause, and be properly established in the new pontifical Rome, which was about to be wholly consecrated to its glorious destiny.

The new arrangement, it was asserted, would leave to the pope the power of controlling, as freely as ever, the affairs of the church, and would deprive him only of that temporal power which was but a vain pontifical ambition, a serious source of danger to religion, and of constant disputes with the princes of Christendom. It was in respect to this point, that Napoleon displayed all the subtle powers of his mind, for the purpose of convincing Pius VII. that the separation of the two kinds of power, the spiritual and the temporal, held by the popes, and the abolition of the latter, must inevitably take place in the course of time, and would in no-wise detrimentally affect religion, its influence or perpetuity. How many wonderful changes had taken place in the course of the last twenty years! And was not the temporal power of the popes, evidently one of those things which were destined to disappear with so many others? And was it not even a subject of thankfulness to Providence, that it should have chosen as the instrument of these revelations, such a man as Napoleon, who, born in the Catholic faith, loved it as his maternal religion, and fully convinced of its value to mankind, was resolved to defend and cherish it to the utmost? "Put an end," exclaimed Napoleon to the pontiff, "to this idle difficulty respecting temporal sovereignty, and you shall see what great things you and I, once relieved from these troublesome disputes, shall be able to do for religion." And then he proceeded to point out how the German church, deprived of its wealth by the avarice of the German princes, could only hope to be re-established through his aid; how the churches of Holland and the Hanseatic states, which had ceased to exist for two centuries, might still be restored; how the Spanish and Italian churches, in a state of utter decay, were in imminent need of a protector; and how, finally, all this ecclesiastical universe depended for its fate on the powerful will of the French emperor. "And once let them be reconciled," added Napoleon to the pope, "be restored to repose by an European peace, and the holy father and himself would, in concert, be able to effect more for religion than even Charlemagne. Within sight of such a prospect as this, how was it possible to protract discussion, to continue to hesitate? Providence had chosen a pontiff who was at once gentle, virtuous, and modest, that the purity of religion might be restored, a new example be given of the disinterestedness of the apostles, and had chosen him, Napoleon, a man of war, accustomed to vanquish

earthly obstacles, to work out this resolution in such a manner that religion should not only not be enfeebled by it, but should, on the contrary, gain in moral power all that it had lost in material power.

The worthy pope, who had often received letters filled with similar expressions, but who had never heard them expressed with such earnestness, eloquence, and airs of persuasion, as they now were by Napoleon, became almost persuaded that the sacrifice of his temporal power was one which he was called upon to make for the interests of religion itself, and that to consent to the terms proposed, would be an act of disinterestedness rather than of weakness, an honourable rather than a shameful one. But when it became positively necessary to decide, he fell into insurmountable perplexities.

When three or four days had been employed in repeated interviews, Napoleon made the pontiff understand that it was necessary to come to some decision, and as the latter was almost as anxious with respect to the form in which his agreement with Napoleon was to be drawn up, as with respect to its actual terms, Napoleon promised that the form should be such as should excite no scruple in his mind, and should not overburthen his memory. At the same time, as the pope was especially averse to express in words the renunciation of the patrimony of St. Peter, Napoleon agreed that neither his abandonment of Rome, nor his establishment at Avignon should be directly mentioned, it being expressed only that his holiness should *exercise the pontificate in France and in the kingdom of Italy, in the same manner, and with the same forms as his predecessors*, it being understood only that this should be at Avignon, and not elsewhere. It was then added in formal terms, that the pope should receive the ambassadors of the Christian powers, clothed with full diplomatic powers, that he should recover the enjoyment and administration of the property which still remained unsold in the Roman states, that he should receive two millions revenue, in exchange for the property which had already been alienated, that he should have the patronage of all the suburbicaires sees, and of ten bishoprics, which should be at a future time determined on, and which might be either in France or Italy; that the old titular bishops of the Roman states should retain their titles, under the form of bishops *in partibus*, and should enjoy incomes equal to the revenues of their several sees; that the various administrative bodies forming the Roman chancery, should accompany the pope to his new residence; that the emperor and the pope, should, in concert, create new Catholic sees in Holland and the Hanseatic departments, and that, finally, the emperor should

receive into his full favour, the cardinals, bishops, priests, and laymen who might have been compromised in the late troubles. It was stipulated that canonical institution should be given to the bishops nominated by the crown, according to the terms already agreed upon, namely,—That should the pontifical court delay to confer institution on the person nominated by the crown for six months after nomination, that then the senior prelate of the province might confer it. To these last clauses, the pope insisted on adding one which was rather in the nature of an excuse, than of a law or agreement, and was couched in the following terms.—The holy father has consented to the above arrangement in the consideration of the actual state of the church, and in the full confidence which he feels that his majesty will grant his powerful protection to the church, in the many circumstances of necessity to which in these times it is exposed.

It was finally agreed that the actual concordat, although having the binding force of a treaty, should not be published until it should have been submitted to the cardinals, who had a right to be informed of it as the natural and necessary councillors of the church.

When the text of the treaty had been fully agreed on, and drawn up in French and Italian, it was sent to the persons who were to transcribe it, and on the same evening, the 25th of January, the two courts, the pontifical and imperial, were assembled, and the pope and the emperor signed this extraordinary act, by which the temporal power of the papacy was annihilated—for ever, as thought Napoleon and the pope, but for a very brief space of time, according to the hidden designs of Providence.

Overwhelming Pius VII. with testimonies of veneration, and hastening to prove his joy on the occasion, and the complete return of his goodwill, Napoleon sent orders for the liberation of the detained cardinals, who were known as the *black cardinals*. Prodigal of acts of beneficence and favour, he summoned to the council of state the bishop of Nantes, to whom he, moreover, gave the cross of the legion of honour, and the grand cordon of the order of the *Re-union*; he made the bishop of Trèves a councillor of state, and an officer of the legion of honour, gave the grand cordon of the *Re-union* to cardinal Maury and the archbishop of Tours, the cross of the legion of honour, to the cardinals Doria and Ruffo, the decoration of the Iron Crown to the archbishop of Edesse; made the cardinal of Bayonne and the bishop of Evreux senators, gave a pension of six thousand francs to the pope's medical attendant, and distributed magnificent presents amongst all those persons who had contributed to the important act which had been just concluded.

Setting out for Paris on the 27th of January, with the conviction that he had just accomplished an act which might not, perhaps, be definite, but which would, certainly, produce at the time a great effect, he hastened to publish in the official journals, that a concordat was about to settle the differences which had arisen between the empire and the church; at the same time, having information spread abroad by word of mouth, that the pope was about to establish his court at Avignon. He wrote to Holland, Turin, Milan, Florence, and Rome, announcing to the representatives of his authority, this important arrangement, authorizing them to make known its general bearing, and to do all that might be necessary to restore a state of calm to troubled consciences.

But it was not probable that this calm would be of long duration, for it was easy to foresee that as soon as the pope's ordinary councillors should have returned to him, they would torture his soul with reproaches for what he had done, pointing out to him the serious consequences which must result from it, especially on the eve of a war which could not end to Napoleon's advantage. And, in fact, the black cardinals had scarcely been admitted to Fontainebleau when the pope fell once more into a state of despondency. The cardinals di Pietro and others did their utmost to inspire him with remorse for what he had done, placing before him such a picture of the state of affairs as the most violent passions could alone have drawn, but which, unfortunately, was soon to be realized through Napoleon's own errors.

Once more, the unfortunate Pius VII. fell into one of those states of agitation and despair, in which we have so frequently seen him, and in which he lost the touching dignity of his character. And how was he to escape from the embarrassment into which he had fallen? How deny or revoke an act which he had but just signed? Who could venture to advise him to do so? No one—not even the cardinals, who, having just recovered their liberty, by virtue of the late concordat, would have feared in giving such advice, that they were closing upon themselves the gates of the state prisons. It was agreed, therefore, between them and Pius VII., that they should dissimulate for the present, awaiting those events which must speedily occur.

But it would have required a greater power of self-command than that which the pope possessed, to conceal completely the idea which was reigning in his breast. The officer who guarded him under the term of chamberlain, Captain Lagorsse, soon perceived the state of agitation under which the pope laboured, and was not slow in divining the cause, when he

found that it ever became greatly increased by the visits of the cardinals most distinguished for their malevolence. On being informed through the minister of worship of this state of things, Napoleon exclaimed—"I fear we have acted too hastily,"—and he had speedily a certain sign, although one very closely disguised, of the secret resolutions entertained by the pope; and it consisted in the fact, that when Napoleon sent to him the agents of the imperial treasury to place at his disposal such sums as he might require, and which he had a right to draw from the revenues which had now been regularly assigned to him, he gently and unaffectedly declined the offer, as though the moment had not come for ostensibly assuming the exercise of his new sovereignty.

Nothing more was needed to enable Napoleon to divine the intentions and plans of the men who were the pope's counsellors. But Napoleon was himself as cunning as the most cunning of them. He saw that they were unwilling that the main points of the concordat should be generally known, and he was equally willing that they should remain unpublished; but, in the meantime, as it was not of so much importance to him, that the affairs of the church should be arranged, as that they should appear to be so, he had it everywhere made known, that a concordat had been signed between the pope and the emperor, that the pontiff was free, that he was about to resume the exercise of his pontifical functions; that, in short, all the religious difficulties were at an end. And in spite of the declarations of some persons that this was a falsehood—some even venturing to assert that Napoleon had dragged the venerable pontiff by the hairs of his head to the earth, in the vain attempt to force him to compliance with his wishes—the crowd of innocent and pious persons, hastened to throw themselves at the foot of the altars to thank God for the new concordat, and gave themselves up to the hope, as indeed Napoleon wished they should, that this peace in regard to the things of heaven, would be accompanied by a peace in mundane affairs.

Two months had now elapsed since Napoleon's return to Paris, and he had already, as we have seen, made great progress in his diplomatic, military, and financial arrangements, and the settlement of the affairs of the church. It was now time to open the sittings of the legislative corps, whose meeting had usually during this reign, been regarded as a mere interesting formality, but whose assembly on this occasion—and it was a striking symptom of the change which was taking place in the popular mind—was expected with the utmost eagerness; the nation being especially anxious to read the discourse which would be delivered by the emperor, if,

as was generally supposed would be the case, he should open the sessions of the legislative corps in person. And this, in fact, Napoleon resolved to do, that from the elevation of his throne—just now shaken, doubtless, but still the most elevated in the whole world—he might address France and Europe, and enable the world to judge by the haughtiness of his language, of the true state of his spirit, and the nature of his resolutions.

Consequently, on Sunday, the 14th of February, he proceeded to the legislative corps, to accord it the honour which he seldom granted it, of opening its session in person, and to make it acquainted with the state of the affairs of the empire. Surrounded by a magnificent cortège, he read the following discourse, which, unfortunately, was as imprudent as it was brilliant and energetic.

“Gentlemen, deputies from the departments to the legislative corps.—The renewal of war in the north of Europe offered an occasion favourable to the projects of the English in the Peninsula. They have made great efforts. All their hopes have been in vain. Their army has received a check before the citadel of Burgos, and has been compelled, after suffering great losses, to evacuate the territory of the whole of Spain.

“I have myself invaded Russia, where the French arms have been constantly victorious—on the plains of Ostrowno, Polotsk, Mohilew, Smolensk, the Moskowa, and Malo-Jaroslawetz. The Russian armies have in no instance been able to maintain their ground against my eagles. Moscow has fallen into our hands.

“When the barriers of Russia had been forced, and the invincibility of our arms incontestably proved, a swarm of Tartars turned their parricidal hands against the fairest provinces of this vast empire, which they had been summoned to defend; and within a few weeks, in spite of the tears and despair of the unfortunate Muscovites, they burned more than four thousand of the most flourishing villages, more than fifty of the fairest towns, assuaging an ancient hatred under the pretence of retarding our progress by surrounding us with a desert. Yet in spite of all these obstacles we triumphed! Even the burning of Moscow itself, which annihilated, within the space of four days, the fruit of the toil of forty generations, failed to change the prosperous state of my affairs. . . . But the excessive and premature rigour of the winter overwhelmed my troops with a frightful calamity. The lapse of a few nights showed a wonderful change; showed that I had suffered great losses; such losses, indeed, as would have broken my heart, if, under these serious circumstances, I had been accessible to any other

sentiments than those relating to the interests, the glory, and the destinies of my people.

“At the sight of the misfortunes which have fallen upon us, the joy of the English has been great, the height of their hopes excessive. They offer our fairest provinces as a reward to those who will betray us. They name, as the condition of peace, the disruption of our glorious empire; and thus, in other terms, proclaim *perpetual war*.

“The energy of my people in these momentous circumstances, their attachment to the integrity of the empire, the affection they have testified towards myself, have dissipated all these chimeras, and afforded our enemies a finer idea of the real state of affairs.

“The disasters produced by the rigours of the winter have but been the means of displaying, in all their extent, the greatness and solidity of this empire, which is founded on the energy and love of fifty millions of citizens, and the territorial resources of the fairest countries of the world.

“It is with extreme satisfaction that we have perceived our people of Italy, of Old Holland, and the annexed departments, vieing in loyalty with the native citizens of France, and fully conscious that their interests and well-being are identified with the consolidation and triumph of the grand empire.

“The agents of England propagate amongst our neighbours the spirit of revolt against sovereigns. England desires to see the whole continent a prey to civil war, and the madness of anarchy. But Providence designs that that country shall itself be of anarchy and civil war the first victim.

“I have signed with the pope a concordat, which puts an end to all the difficulties which had unfortunately arisen in the church. The French dynasty reigns and shall reign in Spain. I am satisfied with the conduct of all my allies. I will abandon none of them. I will maintain the integrity of their states. The Russians shall retreat to their terrible climate.

“I desire peace. It is necessary to the world. Four times since the rupture which followed the treaty of Amiens I have solemnly proposed it. Nevertheless, I shall never make any peace which is not honourable, and in conformity with the greatness of my empire. There is no mystery about my course of policy. I have made known the sacrifices which I am willing to make.

“So long as this maritime war shall last, my people ought to be ready to make every species of sacrifice; for a bad peace would involve all in destruction; deprive us even of hope, and compromise the fortunes of our descendants.

"America has taken up arms for the purpose of enforcing respect to the sovereignty of its flag. She has the goodwill of the world in the glorious struggle in which she has engaged. Should she succeed in compelling the enemies of the continent to recognize the principle that the flag covers the merchandise, and that neutrals ought not to be subject to a paper blockade—all which is agreeable to the stipulations of the treaty of Utrecht—America will have deserved well of all nations. Posterity will say, that the Old World, having lost its rights, they were restored to it by the New.

"My minister of the interior will inform you, in his report on the state of the empire, of the prosperous condition of its agricultural interests, its manufactures, and interior commerce, and the continual increase of its population. At no period of her history, have French agriculture and manufactures been in a greater state of prosperity.

"I have need of extensive resources for the supply of all the expenses which circumstances now demand of me; but, by means of the various measures which will be submitted to you by my minister of finance, I shall be able to avoid imposing any new tax upon my people."

This discourse, couched in terms calculated to excite greatly the minds of those who heard it, was received with those acclamations which ever welcome the prince, whether ignominious or great, whether his throne be firmly established or tottering, who presents himself to the crowd. But when we reflect on the situation of Europe, on the cries of excited patriotism which resounded from one extremity of Europe to the other, it is impossible not to regret that the language here employed, should throw so many difficulties in the way of the negotiations, which could alone bring about peace, and stop the effusion of human blood. What, in fact, would be said in England, with respect to the declaration that the *French dynasty reigned and should reign in Spain*? What would be said by all the states interested in the division of the grand duchy of Warsaw, of the declaration that *France would maintain the integrity of the territories of all her allies*?

Such were the sad questions excited by the nature of this discourse, and the course of events themselves will enable us to judge of its actual effects.

It would be difficult to imagine the change which the lapse of a few days had wrought in Germany, already so excited.

The King of Prussia, who had retired to Breslau for the purpose of being independent of us, and even of his own subjects, was then more master of his own will. Convinced that large bodies of troops could alone enable him to escape in safety from the chaos of existing events, he had already

ordered new levies, without awaiting answers to the questions sent by him to Paris; publishing edicts which called upon and enabled all classes without distinction, to enrol themselves in the ranks of his armies, and take part in what his people called the enfranchisement of Germany. Upon being the subject of these appeals, the public mind, already in a state of fermentation, had been seized with a general vertigo, and from every quarter M. de Goltz, the only Prussian minister who remained at Berlin, had been besieged with questions, demanding for whom and against whom the king required the aid of his subjects. To all which questions M. de Goltz, who was perfectly acquainted with the real state of affairs, had replied by exhorting the questioners to confide in the wisdom and patriotism of the king, giving themselves up to his service, and leaving him free to employ them as he might think most advisable. The minister's eyes and countenance expressed, however, what his tongue dared not utter, and his questioners left him to enrol themselves amongst the king's troops. At the same time, the leaders of the secret societies in every direction, had declared that it was necessary to take up arms, that the king, being surrounded by an armed people, might at the right moment follow the inclination of his heart, which led him to devote himself to the enfranchisement of Germany. And under the influence of these various impulses, the whole youth of the nation enrolled itself in the ranks of the king's army, assuming as a badge, a black and white cockade, the want of which in his hat, was held to prove a man an enemy to his country.

The King of Prussia, on receiving information of the above facts was both pleased and frightened; pleased at the prospect of being almost immediately at the head of a considerable force, frightened at the idea of being pressed upon by both the Russians and the French, and being compelled to declare for either the former or the latter, without being certain on which side would be found the independence and restoration of Prussia. But at this moment, when circumstances rendered him most particularly indisposed to receive them with favour, he received the replies to the communications sent by him to Paris, and was filled with indignation at the rejection of his propositions, especially of that which regarded his entering into communications with the Emperor Alexander, for he held it of extreme importance that he should have an immediate personal interview with this monarch; in the first place, because the Austrians had already sent diplomatic agents to Wilna and London; secondly, because he wished to remove the belligerent armies from Silesia; and thirdly, and lastly, because he saw at Königsberg

the Baron de Stein, General d'York, and the Russian agents, governing the province, convoking the states, acting without any reference to himself, and in a manner which might eventually be contrary to his interests. He might, it is true, have secretly despatched M. de Knessebeck, to demand of Alexander the explanations which he desired respecting these various matters, but such a proceeding would have speedily become known, and would have been such an infraction of the Prussian alliance with Napoleon, as might lead to unpleasant consequences, should another victory of Jena open the campaign.

The Prussian monarch, presenting on the occasion the sad spectacle of an honest king compelled to adopt one of two opposite courses, of which the one was in accordance with the dictates of his conscience, the other with the interests of his crown, was in a state of cruel perplexity. Although ordinarily of a very undemonstrative temperament, he now displayed even a greater degree of anger than he felt, declaring that Napoleon oppressed him, withholding from him what was incontestably his own, by refusing to pay the ninety-four millions which he demanded; that in retaining the fortresses which he had given as a pledge for what he had himself owed, the latter violated treaties and the Prussian territory, since Prussia was no longer indebted to him; and that in prohibiting him from exercising the power of negotiating with a neighbouring state, Napoleon treated him as a dependent prince; conduct for which there might have been some pretext, had he still been able to afford protection, but which, after he had lost the Niemen, the Vistula, and was on the point of losing the Oder, was both unjust and unreasonable, since it prevented him from even negotiating for the security of his royal dwelling.

And at length, after having thus made a great display of these various reasons for so acting, the king, without either publicity or concealment, despatched M. de Knessebeck to the Russian head-quarters, and from that day it may be said, he had passed from our alliance to that of the enemy. He was by no means satisfied, in his own mind, that the course he had adopted was the right one, that he had not repeated the false step of 1806; but he saw the French retreating, step by step, from the Niemen to the Vistula, from the Vistula to the Oder; he heard his subjects calling upon him to act with vehement cries, he saw the great question of the day, being hour by hour, resolved without his intervention, and he determined, therefore, to await no other light than that which his reason could furnish.

The secret of the royal heart was divined by all his

subjects, and by them reported to the Russians. M. de Kneesebeck could not but report it to Alexander. It was necessary to march forward, to force the French head-quarters to fall back from Posen to Frankfort-on-the-Oder; and necessary also to march upon Warsaw, from Warsaw to Cracow, that Silesia, enveloped thus by its two extremities, might fall, with its king, into the hands of the Russian emperor. But it was necessary to do even still more than this; to march, in fact, upon the Elbe, to disengage Berlin and Hambourg on the right, Dresden on the left; by which means not only would Prussia be freed, its whole population rising as one man, but the Hanseatic provinces also, together with Hanover, Westphalia, Saxony, and probably even Wurtemberg and Bavaria; whilst, at the same time—and this result was a thousandfold more to be desired than even the others—Austria would be freed from the bonds which shackled her.

The more cautious military men, however, with Prince Kutusof at their head, disapproved of so bold a march, for it would be impossible to leave in the rear Dantzic and Thorn, with garrisons of thirty thousand men, Stettin, Custrin, Glogau, and Spandau, with thirty thousand more, unblockaded at least; and to withdraw troops from the army for the purpose of blockading these places, would leave it too enfeebled for the field. After leaving, as would be necessary, forty thousand men on the right, before the fortresses of the lower Vistula, twenty thousand or thirty thousand on the left, before Warsaw and the Austrians, there would remain but fifty thousand with whom to carry on the offensive movements against the French. And it would be folly indeed, urged these objectors to a forward movement, to meet, under these circumstances, the first bound of that irresistible lion, against whom success had hitherto only been obtained by avoiding him.

To this reasoning it was replied, that the French were shut up in the fortresses, and could not sally forth from thence; that the Prussians and twenty thousand Russians, at the most, would be able to hold them in check, that on the left, the Poles were in a state of consternation, ready to accept from Alexander a restoration of their country, which they could not hope to obtain at the hands of France; that the Austrian soldiers were on terms of the greatest friendliness with those of Russia, would willingly fall back before the weakest Russian corps that might be directed to follow them; that this eighty thousand men at least would be available for a forward movement; that Prince Eugene had not twenty thousand; that the twenty-five thousand or thirty

thousand French troops assembled at Berlin, were threatened on all sides, and had the greatest trouble to maintain their ground; that the most simple demonstration on the part of the Russian troops, would force the French head-quarters to retreat from Posen upon Frankfort, from Frankfort upon Berlin, from Berlin upon Madgebourg; that by releasing Berlin and Dresden from the control of the enemy, Prussia would be enfranchised, and that the fact of her alliance being taken from Napoleon, and secured to Russia and England, would effect a complete change in the state of European affairs.

These assertions were truer than those who made them, or Alexander to whom they were daily repeated could suppose, but it was not so much truth that was requisite to convince the latter, as the tumult of excitement which now prevailed around him, the glitter of the sudden glory which had now come upon him, the title of king of kings which on all sides met his ears. These were motives sufficient in themselves to determine him to advance. M. de Knessebeck had not had to make a very long journey to meet him, and had encountered him on his march upon the Vistula. But what had he then to say? Nothing but what Alexander already knew, nothing but what had already been told him;—that when he should have advanced a little further, both Prussia and her king would be his allies.

Alexander had employed the month of January in advancing, between Poland and Old Prussia, upon the Vistula. Remaining from the 5th of February to the 9th at Plock, he had then set out for Kalisch, having only a short distance to traverse to reach Breslau and Frederick William. The Russian guards and the reserve, comprising about eighteen thousand men had followed him. In the meantime, Wittgenstein on the right with the old army of the Dwina, preceded by some thousands of Cossacks, had advanced at the head of thirty-four thousand men upon Custrin and Berlin, leaving in the rear the army of Moldavia to watch Dantzic and Thorn, with sixteen thousand men; whilst, on the left, Miloradovitch, Doctorof, and Sacken, with forty thousand men, directed their movements towards Warsaw, slowly following the Austrian corps. The orders given to the two columns on the right and left, were, to advance continually, whilst Alexander awaited in the centre the right moment for entering Breslau, and throwing himself into the arms of the Prussian King, and whilst the old Moldavian army, in the command of which Barclay de Tolly had replaced Admiral Tchitchakoff, watched the garrison on the Vistula.

Prince Eugene, outflanked on the left by Thorn, on the right by Warsaw, and afraid to leave Berlin unguarded by

withdrawing from it Grenier's troops ; was quite incapable of maintaining his position at Posen. He would have had, indeed, the means of doing so, had Prince Schwarzenberg been willing to fall back, with Reynier and Poniatowski, upon Kalisch ; but when this Prince was invited to make this movement, he replied, that having upon Cracow, that is to say towards Gallicia, his depôts, recruits and magazines, it was impossible for him to take the Kalisch route, but that he would cover the movements of such of his companions in arms, as might think proper to manœuvre in that direction. Upon this declaration Reynier had immediately set out for Kalisch, and had happily arrived there before the Russians, from whom he had only escaped with many rear-guard encounters. Poniatowski, collecting in all haste about fifteen thousand Poles, and leaving a garrison at Modlin, had not been able to reach the Kalisch route in time, and had been compelled to follow the Prince of Schwarzenberg upon Cracow, whither he had withdrawn with the other fugitives of the Polish government.

Prince Eugene, upon being informed of these various movements had quitted Posen, and marched towards Frankfort-on-the-Oder by the great Meseritz route ; but considering the position of Frankfort as but little more tenable than that of Posen, he had resolved to proceed to Berlin, where his own and Grenier's troops would form a body of forty thousand men, and where, therefore, a better front might be presented to the enemy, than had been possible during the last month. Whilst he was on his march, the skirmishers of the Russian army under Colonels Tottenborn and Czernicheff, having passed the Oder at Wrietzen, close to Berlin, had surprised a regiment of Italian cavalry of General Grenier's corps, and cutting it almost entirely to pieces, had filled Berlin with an immoderate burst of joy, which General Grenier somewhat calmed by immediately repelling the over-rash skirmishers of Wittgenstein's army, with two divisions of infantry.

By taking up a strong position in front of Berlin, summoning to his aid the corps of General Lauriston, and showing a firm determination to accept battle, Prince Eugene would, most probably, have succeeded in checking the Russians ; but fearing to provoke decisive events before the arrival of Napoleon, and finding himself surrounded by enemies, he determined to proceed to take up his position on the Elbe, whither General Reynier had already been compelled to fall back by the movement of the Russian centre. On the 4th of March he set out from Berlin, having despatched his sick and wounded and matériel to Madgebourg ; and now, being at the head of forty thousand men, he had no longer

reason to fear that either his prudence or his eagles would be insulted with impunity.

On the following day he was on the Elbe, and brought to a close this long retreat, which had commenced at Moscow on the 20th of October, and had been distinguished by such strange and prodigious disasters. Prince Eugene had nothing to reproach himself with since he had assumed the command, unless it were with having been a little over cautious, and he had certainly rendered indisputable services. All the marshals and generals without troops, except Marshals Davout and Victor, had quitted him. He sent Marshal Davout to Dresden with the division Lagrange to receive General Reynier, who returned from Kalisch, and to defend the important positions Dresden and Targau; and established himself at Wittenberg with the ten thousand men who had been long his sole resource, together with the troops of Grenier's corps, and drew to Madgebourg those divisions of Lauriston's corps which were ready for actual service. As he would have by these means eighty thousand men on the Elbe, besides many strong fortresses in a good state of defence, the enemy would be unable to force him from this line.

We may easily comprehend how tumultuous was the joy experienced throughout all Prussia, on the arrival of news of the definite evacuation of Berlin; and it was this event which had the chief effect in inducing Frederick William to declare in favour of our enemies, for now, at length yielding to the reasons urged by the various emissaries—the fiery Baron de Stein, an Alsatian of great acuteness, the Baron d'Austett, whose native land had long since become French, and General Scharnhorst, an officer held in great esteem by the German patriots—who had been sent to point out to him the many advantages to be derived by such a step, and yielding to the enthusiasm of his subjects, he consented to declare against the French alliance, demanding, at the same time, however, that as war it was to be, the war should be persevered in to the utmost; until the allies had exhausted upon it, if necessary, their last piece of gold, their last soldier. He authorized, then, M. de Hardenberg, to sign on the 28th of February, a treaty by which Russia engaged to assemble, immediately, a hundred and fifty thousand men, and Prussia eighty thousand (each of these powers proposing to assemble larger numbers than these without delay), for the purpose of carrying on war with France, until Prussia should have received a constitution more in conformity with her old state of existence, and the balance of power in Europe; by which the two contracting powers agreed not to lay down their

arms until this end should have been obtained; agreed to make every endeavour to induce Austria to join the common cause; and never to treat with the enemy but in concert.

Whilst entering into these engagements, neither the king nor M. de Hardenberg had dared to come to an open understanding with M. de St. Marsan, and their embarrassment with respect to him was extreme. M. de Hardenberg was sufficiently clear-sighted to perceive that he was playing a part which might have very dangerous consequences for his country, and the king had a memory sufficiently good to be conscious of the same fact, and so long as the French army had not repassed the Elbe, they scarcely dared to avow what they had done. M. de Hardenberg, indeed, was so agitated, that on the very eve of the signature of the treaty with Russia, he said to M. de St. Marsan—"Only do something in favour of Prussia, and you will save us from a cruel perplexity!" The king, against whose honesty of character we wish to say nothing, was on this occasion, however, less frank than his minister, and made use of a ruse which was little worthy of him, feigning extreme irritation at some recent proceedings which had been laid to the charge of the French army; and which were as follows. Napoleon had given orders that the troops should pay for all that they required; but the Prussians had taken advantage of their position, and demanded such prices of General Mathieu Dumas the intendant of the army, as it was impossible he should submit to. Napoleon had then seized the various goods required at his own price, ordered, also, that the fortresses on the Oder should provision themselves as they might be able, taking from the surrounding country what it was impossible to purchase. The governors of Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau had not failed to follow these directions, and had seized such quantities of cattle, grain and wood as they required. Another cause of offence was, that Prince Eugene, in those parts of the country which were dominated by his troops, had prevented the levies en masse. On the 28th of February, the day of the signature of the treaty with Russia, the Prussian monarch, affecting to be excessively irritated, desired that a note should be addressed to M. de St. Marsan, in which an immediate explanation should be peremptorily demanded of these acts imputed to the French army. M. de St. Marsan being unable to give any reply himself, despatched the note to Paris by express.

But there was, henceforth, little concealment with respect to the course which the king had resolved to adopt; and a series of measures of a sufficiently significant character speedily rendered the rupture with France almost official. Among these was a decree for the formation of a great

Prussian army in Silesia, to which the illustrious General Blucher, who had always manifested the greatest distress at the subjection of his country, was appointed commander-in-chief; General Scharnhorst, who had been the principal means of inducing the king to renounce our alliance, being nominated chief of the staff. At the same time General d'York was declared innocent of the charges brought against him, and reinstated in the command of the troops with which he had deserted from our side.

After such measures there could be no reason for any further restraint, and the interview between the two sovereigns who had thus recently become allies, took place on the 15th of March. Alexander, accompanied by M. de Nesselrode and a crowd of generals, entered the capital of Silesia, and in the midst of the plaudits of the people, and the acclamations of the army, threw himself into the arms of the friend who had formerly been sacrificed at Tilsit, and had been found again in the catastrophe at Moscow.

The city was illuminated during three days, and the king had to have M. de St. Marsan's house surrounded by his own guards, to preserve him from violence. And at length on the 17th of March, M. de Hardenberg broke the profound silence he had observed with respect to the French ambassador during Alexander's sojourn at Breslau, by transmitting to him a declaration of war with France, and, whilst overwhelming him with testimonies of personal respect, leaving him to choose the time and manner of his departure.

We need scarcely say, that this event, although foreseen, produced the greatest possible effect throughout Germany and Europe; and that it was the occasion of an increase of exultation and hope amongst the German patriots, according to whom Saxony, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and all the princes, in short, who were called our slaves, would immediately imitate the conduct of Prussia, and join the general coalition. At the same time, for the purpose of accelerating this result, Colonels Czernicheff and Tettenborn, leaving to Wittgenstein's corps the care of following Prince Eugene's rear-guard in the direction of Magdebourg and Wittenberg, descended the Elbe with the Cossacks, with the view of making a demonstration in the direction of Hambourg, and attempting, in concert with the English flotillas, to arouse to revolt those Hanseatic Frenchmen, who were French in spite of themselves, and only longed for an opportunity of ceasing to be so. At the same time the advanced guards of the Russian army of the centre, which had traversed the Oder, were directed upon Torgau and Dresden, that Saxony might

be induced to declare war against France, by the same means which had been so effectual in the case of Prussia.

Prince Eugene in his anxiety for Dresden, in falling back upon the Elbe, had carried his centre to Wittenberg, instead of carrying it to Magdebourg, and in consequence of this movement, Hambourg had been left uncovered, Colonels Tettenborn and Czernicheff had hereupon hastened with nine or ten thousand Cossacks, supported by some light infantry, towards Lubeck and Hambourg, whilst the English, on their side, had formed again an establishment on the isle of Heligoland, in which they had accumulated arms, ammunition, and matériel of war of all kinds. Their flotillas filled the mouths of the Elbe. Nothing more was wanting to inflame the already heated brains of the inhabitants of Hambourg; and when General Morand (not the celebrated Morand of Davout's corps, but an old general of the same name, who was brave, but, unfortunately, infirm), retreated at this moment with two thousand men, from Pomerania upon Hambourg, he was suddenly attacked, mortally wounded, and taken prisoner, with a portion of his troops. In another direction, General Lauriston, directed to proceed by Osnabruck, Hanover, and Brunswick, upon Magdebourg, was still forty leagues from the latter place. General Bourcier was at Hanover, in the midst of the dépôts of his cavalry. The forces which were quartered in Hambourg itself were not sufficient, either to check the Cossacks, or overawe the populace, and the French authorities, who had been very roughly treated on the preceding 24th of February, fearing they might encounter still more unmerciful usage on the present occasion, evacuated Hambourg, giving it up to the municipal officers, and fled to Bremen. At the same moment Tettenborn's Cossacks entered, amidst general rejoicings, and received the keys of the city for the purpose of carrying them to the Russian emperor. The municipal authorities appointed by the French, were replaced by the old senate. A legion named the Hambourg legion, was immediately formed, composed of all the citizens willing to fight in the cause of Germany, and equipped at the expense of the rich burgesses of Hambourg, who, within a few hours, subscribed a large amount for this purpose. The English were signalled to come up, and speedily did so, with vessels filled with sugar, coffee, and cotton, adding to the joy caused by the disappearance of the French authorities, that resulting from the abolition of the continental blockade, and the prospect of the renewal of commerce. The unhappy Hamburgians little knew to what a cruel reverse of fortune they exposed themselves by this imprudent demonstration.

On the Upper Elbe, in Saxony, and in Dresden, the same movements resulted from the approach of the Russian and Prussian troops.

The unfortunate Frederick Augustus, beginning to perceive that he was unfitted for an ambitious path in life, was ready to renounce, although naturally with some regret, Poland, provided only he were left in possession of his dear Saxony, just in the same state as he had possessed it before he was overwhelmed with greatness at the hands of Napoleon. Since the last events, although still as devoted as ever to France, he had sought a councillor who might direct his weakness, and he had considered that he had made the best possible choice in selecting for this purpose the emperor of Austria, both the father-in-law and ally of Napoleon. M. de Metternich had thereupon immediately attempted to induce him to join that coalition of German princes which he was endeavouring to form, and of which the end was declared to be the pacification of Europe, by interposing between England, Russia, and France, and forcing them to accept a peace which should be constructed with a direct view to the interests of Germany. Having been assured, and with reason, that to endeavour to re-establish peace on terms which should render Germany independent and powerful, would not be to betray France, but rather to serve her, and at the same time to fulfil the duty of a good German, Frederick Augustus had not hesitated to yield to his adviser, and began to evade the demands made by the French minister for supplies of provisions and contingents of troops by declarations of inability to procure them, partly on account of the shortness of the time within which they were required, and partly on account of the spirit of ill-will pervading his subjects. His corps d'armée having returned to the Elbe under the command of General Reynier, he had cantoned it in Torgau, and then, under pretext of recruiting it, had placed it in a strong position, to await, in a species of neutrality similar to that of Prince Schwarzenberg, the direction of Austrian policy. With respect to his cavalry, however, consisting of twelve hundred superb cuirassiers, and twelve hundred excellent hussars and chasseurs, and which, when imperiously demanded by the French emperor, he had positively refused to send to him, he was resolved to establish them in some secure position with himself in their midst, out of the way of the belligerent armies.

This being the disposition of his mind, it needed but the defection of Prussia and the approach of the Russian advanced guard, to determine him to execute the project of flight which he had resolved on. In spite, therefore, of the

remonstrances of the French minister, M. de Serra, who took pains to point out to him the inconveniences and dangers which must result from his departure, he now set out, leaving Dresden in the hands of Marshal Davoust, and the most valuable portions of his property in the fortress of Koenigstein; and proceeded by Plauen and Hof to Ratisbonne, in the territory of the King of Bavaria, who was as embarrassed as himself.

Scarcely had he departed from Dresden, when the Russians appeared in the environs of the city. The Saxon infantry enclosed in Torgau, declared itself unwilling to leave its position for the purpose of aiding in the defence of the Elbe, and Marshal Davoust, had, therefore, for the protection of the upper course of the Elbe, only the French division Durutte, some troops sent to him by Prince Eugene, and, finally, the second battalions of his corps, which were organized at Erfurt. He hastened to Dresden, and immediately carried out, with pitiless severity, although never with wanton cruelty, all those measures which military tactics rendered necessary; destroying, amongst other things, in spite of the threats and outcries of the inhabitants, the beautiful stone bridge which served as the means of communication between the old and new towns. And these measures of defence speedily took a prominent place amongst the grievances alleged against us by the Germans; engravings respecting the destruction of the bridge of Dresden by, as he was called in the north, the ferocious Davoust, being spread abroad by thousands throughout the cities and country districts.

The fresh excitement produced by the defection of Prussia was speedily felt in Vienna, in spite of the distance and its habitual tranquillity. The profound policy of M. de Metternich and the Emperor Francis, although guessed by the men of more acute intellect, was quite beyond the comprehension of the more passionate persons of the court, the army, and the people, who saw in it only a culpable dilatoriness in breaking off the alliance with France, and repudiating the disastrous engagements which had been entered into on the occasion of the marriage of Napoleon with Maria Louisa, and the irritation of this party now became extreme; the empress herself, the princess of Modena, and, which is even more astonishing, the archduke Charles, being amongst its members.

The excitement at length reached such a height, that M. de Metternich had reason to entertain some fears for his personal safety, and the government was compelled to order numerous arrests, even of persons of high position, such as

M. de Hormayer, one of the highest officials of the Austrian chancery, who was the means employed of secretly carrying on negotiations with the Tyrol. The Emperor and M. de Metternich were equally dissatisfied with this state of affairs, being unwilling to shake off Napoleon's yoke, only to become subject to that of masses of the populace ; and being, moreover, so far from certain that Napoleon's power was destroyed, that they expected to see him debouch by the defiles of Thuringia, to punish the imprudent populations that had exposed themselves to his vengeance. They were anxious, in any case, to refrain from taking any decided step, until the Austrian army should have been reconstituted, and would have much preferred that the condition of Germany should have been placed on a new and satisfactory footing by means of mediation, and without the danger of a war with France.

Such being its views and inclinations, the Austrian cabinet never ceased to counsel prudence and moderation to that of France, and was thrown into a state of despair, when it found Napoleon, as in the report addressed to the senate, demanding new levies, and the imperial address delivered on the 14th of February, announcing the determination to pursue an absolute course of policy with respect to Spain, the Hanseatic departments, and the grand duchy of Warsaw, for this was to render mediation impossible. M. de Metternich held long and frequent discussions with M. Otto on these points, endeavouring to learn from him the conditions on which France would accept peace ; and when all his efforts proved fruitless, the French minister being perfectly ignorant on the subject, he intimated the conditions on which peace would be accepted by Europe.—“ Spain,” he said, “ will scarcely be conceded to you, after the events of the last campaign. This is a matter of no importance to us Germans, personally, and only affects us with respect to England, in strict concert with whom Russia and Prussia will alone negotiate. You will be able only, at the most, to induce England to consent to the annexation of Holland to France ; but this again, is a matter which only touches us with respect to British interests. With regard, however, to the definitive annexation of the Hanseatic provinces to the French empire, you will find England, Prussia, Russia, and Germany, equally opposed to you. And why be so determined on this point ? Of what importance to you are places so distant from your real frontier, so little useful to your defences, so slightly conducive to your commercial interests, so little in sympathy with your nation, so necessary to the constitution of an independent Germany. When you attached great importance to the maintenance of the continental blockade, the possession

of these provinces might, it is true, have been valuable, but, at the present time, this blockade is disregarded on all sides, and you yourselves infringe it every day. With respect to Prussia, it is necessary that you should consent that it should become both stronger and more extensive, as being the intermediate power between Russia and the south of Europe; an intermediate state such as it would be absurd to attempt to find in Poland, since you have not succeeded in re-establishing it as a kingdom, and of which it rather belongs to us than to you to purpose the reconstitution, since we are the neighbours of Russia and you are not. Why then do you express yourselves so decidedly with respect to the grand duchy of Warsaw, which cannot possibly be maintained, which Russia will never suffer to exist on her frontier, and which is, moreover, the only means of re-constructing Prussia, without destroying your kingdom of Westphalia? Why place in our path insuperable difficulties, by expressing yourselves on these points as though your determination upon them were irrevocable?"

. Then referring to the confederation of the Rhine, M. de Metternich continued as follows. "Of what advantage to you is this strange creation, which imposes charges upon you without producing any return, which is incompatible with the independence of Germany, and is at this very moment irrevocably destroyed in the public opinion of all Germans? Is it that you are determined to persist in this matter for the purpose of preserving the empty title of protector? Is it that your emperor, possessor of the frontier which extends from Basle to the Texel, and having Strasbourg Mayence, Coblenz, Cologne, Wesel, and Groningen, as the *points d'appuis* of this frontier, has not sufficient influence over Germany, is not already a sufficient source of anxiety to her?" Disclaiming on the part of Austria, any desire but for the independence of Germany and an European peace, M. de Metternich added—"You will tell us that you are powerful, that you will again triumph over your enemies. We know that you are, we believe that you will do so, and it is even necessary that you should do so, to enable us to negotiate the peace of which we have intimated to you some of the conditions; but at least render it possible, refrain from displaying too absolute a disposition, and do not be the cause of breaking off the negotiations, when they are but scarcely begun!"

These admirable counsels, given with the utmost sincerity, and enunciated with the utmost gentleness, showed very clearly, that the peace which Austria was disposed to accept, and even, perhaps, to support by her forces, was such an one as might be described somewhat as follows.—Spain to be restored

to the Bourbons, the Hanseatic towns to be restored to Germany, the confederation of the Rhine to be suppressed, the grand duchy of Warsaw to be divided between Prussia, Russia, and Austria; a better frontier on the Inn, and the restoration of Illyria being at the same time granted to the latter. And truly France keeping the line of the Rhine, together with Holland, having the kingdom of Westphalia as an allied state or vassal, Piedmont, Tuscany, and Rome, as French departments, and Lombardy and Naples as family principalities, would be as powerful an empire as could well be imagined.

But whatever were to be the terms of the peace which was to be ultimately accepted, it was not necessary, as M. de Metternich wisely remarked, to announce absolute resolutions, which would prevent even the commencement of negotiations, and compel the cabinet of Vienna to declare at once either for or against us,—and probably against us, as was not yet declared, but might readily be divined—"Let us once," said M. de Metternich, "assemble the negotiators, and the negotiations will proceed more rapidly than is now believed possible, for the world is anxious for peace, and will demand it so vehemently at the meeting of the first congress assembled to discuss it, that this congress will be unable to refuse it."

At this very moment the perfect justice of these counsels was verified, and in the following manner. On being authorized to do so by the French government, the court of Vienna had sent M. de Wessenberg to London, and M. de Lebzeltern to Kalisch to offer the intervention of their court to the two principal belligerent powers, for the purpose of procuring a reconciliation between them and France, and a peace of which the whole world had pressing need. M. de Wessenberg, on arriving in London had been received with great politeness by Lord Castlereagh, but secretly, that the public mind might not be uselessly agitated. Whilst, however, the English minister testified great satisfaction at the presence of an Austrian agent in London, and expressed the greatest readiness to accept the intervention of the Austrian court, he said that probably he knew that his mission had lost its aim, since Napoleon's address, now known throughout the whole of Europe, left no doubt that he would refuse all reasonable conditions. He added, that England would be always ready to treat on equitable grounds, that neither she nor her allies were disposed to dispute the possession by France of the just greatness due to her efforts, and her long wars, but that she would never surrender generous Spain to Napoleon's usurpation.

At Kalisch, in the Russian camp, the reception of M. de Lebzeltern had been deferred, sometimes on one pretext, sometimes on another, until time had been gained to consult the English cabinet, after which he was received with infinite respect, told that Russia was anxious for peace, that the intervention of Austria would be gladly accepted, but that the Austrian court would itself perceive the impossibility of treating with Napoleon after the declaration which he had just made, that when Austria should have returned, as it was natural and necessary she should, to her alliance with the rest of Europe, that her alliance would then be gladly welcomed, and she would be made the arbiter of peace, of war, and, in short, of all the interests of Europe.

When the despatches announcing these things arrived in Vienna, M. de Metternich communicated their contents to the French minister, inviting him to transmit them to the Emperor Napoleon, and expressing earnest hopes that the latter would take them into serious consideration, and at once indicate to the Austrian cabinet the course which it ought now to pursue. M. de Metternich added, that he had given to the Prince of Schwarzenberg a temporary leave, his corps having entered the Gallician frontier, and that this prince was about to visit Paris, for the purpose of endeavouring to obtain from Napoleon more frank and satisfactory explanations than those obtained by M. de Bubna.

This defection of Prussia, these agitations throughout Germany, these communications from Austria, alike failed to have any great effect upon Napoleon. The defection of Prussia he had expected and regarded as inevitable, from the time that he had seen our head-quarters falling back successively upon the Vistula, the Oder, and Elbe. At the same time, being little accustomed to watch the great movements of public opinion, but slightly disposed to believe in their existence, and still less disposed to yield to their influence, he was surprised at the boldness of Prussia in declaring against him, and found her more courageous than he had believed her to be; but was, nevertheless, convinced that the King of Prussia was filled with terror at the idea of the approaching campaign, and was resolved speedily to realize all his fears. Calculating that Prussia would not be able to contribute more than one hundred thousand men to the coalition, of whom fifty thousand would be immediately available, and that Russia was not capable at that time of placing in line more than one hundred thousand, and seeing these powers advancing upon the upper Elbe and Thuringia with such forces as these, he felt certain that within three or four weeks he would be able to drive them

back into Poland more quickly than they had come. Experiencing already the joy of victory, he felt certain that he would be able by means of one or two battles to bring those powers to reason, to reinstate himself in the position from which he was supposed to have fallen, and to conclude a peace, not precisely according to the terms of his address, in which he had considered it good policy to declare himself even more inflexible than he was in reality, but still generally according to the plan therein laid down, except with respect to Spain, where he was willing at length, but too late, to make great sacrifices.

The defection of Prussia was so far from dismaying him, that he saw in it only a pretext for demanding of France fresh levies. He was very satisfied with his levy of a hundred thousand men drawn from the four anterior classes, it having procured for him, for the imperial guard, and the reorganization of the old corps, a species of excellent troops, who, although at first displaying more discontent than the other conscripts, speedily became reconciled to their lot on joining their various corps, and who, with the stature and bodily strength of twenty-five years, possessed the courage natural to Frenchmen. He now, therefore, caused a new *senatus consultum* to be prepared, for the purpose of demanding eighty thousand more men, not only of the four, but of the six last conscriptions, naturally alleging, as the reason for this fresh levy the defection of Prussia; not indeed to the senate, which had no need of it, but to the enlightened portion of the public, which, whilst sighing at the necessity for such sacrifices, could not deny that the necessity existed in the presence of the dangers with which France was now threatened.

Prussia served also as the reason for a demand of another kind. The appeal to arms in Germany had been made to all classes, but had been first made to the young nobility. In France the levies had been taken in general only from the middle or lower classes; the upper classes escaping from services by finding substitutes, for whom, so horribly sanguinary had the war become, they were compelled to pay heavy premiums. They had hitherto only contributed to the voluntary gifts by their fortunes; Napoleon had long been desirous that they should do so with their persons also, and he thought the present occasion was a favourable opportunity for prevailing upon them to do so. In Germany the young noblesse considered it its duty to run to arms at the head of all the other classes of the people; and why should not this be the case also in France? In former times the French noblesse had allowed to none the honour of preceding them on the battle-field; arms were then their profession, their glory, the greatest

passion of their life. And why should it not be so at the present time? It was possible, indeed, to give an explanation of its disinclination to serve, in the fact that it loved the old dynasty and disliked the new. Although this might be a valid reason in the mouths of the old men who were grown grey in the imbecile retreat of their châteaux, it was by no means admissible, according to Napoleon, or at least would not long be so, with respect to those young men who had blood in their veins, which could not fail to ferment with the ardour of youth, and who could not really believe that the chase was a pursuit sufficient to satisfy their age, their rank, their destiny. He had but, he believed, to form them either voluntarily or by force, into a corps, the title of which should flatter their vanity, whilst the beauty of its uniform should satisfy the frivolity of their age; and once transported to the army, he would know how to inflame their ardour, for it was not to be supposed that they were less subject than the rest of the nation to the inspiration of the cannon's roar, or of the voice of the great captain.

As it would not be possible to levy these persons by means of a conscription, since they had just satisfied a conscription by providing substitutes, and it would be necessary, therefore, to take them arbitrarily, some on account of their wealth, some on account of their names, Napoleon resolved to invest the prefects with power to select them at will, giving as an excuse for this irregular method of proceeding, the singular reason that it was chosen for the sake of equality. And by this method, Napoleon hoped that he would obtain ten thousand excellent cavaliers, distinguished for their birth and wealth, and most probably, for valour also, whom he resolved to form into four regiments of two thousand five hundred men each, under the title of guards of honour, and intended to serve by the side of the emperor himself, and to wear a brilliant uniform. He selected Versailles, Metz, Lyons, and Tours, as the places in which these regiments were to be formed, and nominated as their colonels men distinguished for their families, their rank, and their achievements. They were the Count de Pully, general of division; the Baron Lepicé, general of the horse-grenadiers of the guard; the Count de Segur, general of brigade; and the Count de Saint Sulpice, general of cuirassiers.

Having prepared to meet by this extension of his armaments the course of events in Prussia, it was necessary that he should bestow equal attention upon the proceedings of Austria, which, whilst retaining the title of ally, was gradually assuming the position of mediator, from which she might readily proceed to one of a less friendly character. Since

the defection of Prussia, she had, in fact, become very urgent in her communications, expressing an eager desire for some basis on which to negotiate the peace which she declared to be indispensable; and it would speedily be difficult to refuse to come to an explanation with her, especially as Prince Schwarzenberg was on his way to Paris, and had such access to the court of the Tuileries, that the maintenance of any reserve with respect to him would be almost impossible. At the same time Napoleon was himself disinclined to believe that Austria would declare against him for the following reasons.—In the first place because the population of Vienna was not so *exigeant* as that of Berlin, and the court of the former city not so feeble as that of the latter; in the next place because Austria had contracted family alliances with us, which, if not an indestructible bond, must at least be the means of making her hesitate to join our enemies, since shame is a yoke which is not without its strength; and lastly, because she was governed by men who had learned to fear the French arms. To a dread of war with France, and to a desire of gaining some rich territory from the turmoil in which were involved at present all European affairs, Napoleon reduced the whole policy of the Austrian court, and in doing so, unhappily for himself and us, greatly deceived himself. For he failed to perceive that Austria, although doubtless under the influence of interested motives was as wise as she was interested, and considered as far superior to the advantages to be derived from any extension of territory, the political advantage of regaining the independence of Germany, and thus establishing a better balance of power in Europe. Moreover, with regard to territorial aggrandizement, there was nothing which the European coalition was not ready to offer, and actually to give her, for the sake of inducing her to declare against us; and the sole reason which deterred her from seizing the opportunity of thus gaining a vast increase of territory, and, what she desired far more, a better arrangement of the nations of Europe, was the fear of being again at war with us—a fear which the incessant augmentation of our enemies could not fail daily to diminish.

Considering the Austrian cabinet as solely influenced by fear and interest, Napoleon sought in the defection of Prussia the means of attaching this cabinet to his own interests, and determined to offer her the following baits. Austria desired peace, and, provided he could obtain it on his own terms, he was equally anxious for it. He knew that she was arming, and that she already had about a hundred thousand available troops. She might, at the very commencement of the campaign, employ these hundred thou-

sand men in a decisive manner, and for the adoption of such a course there was now a very natural occasion. Her overtures of peace had been badly received, and she had reason, therefore, to indulge in extreme displeasure. She might now, at once, he said, constitute herself mediator between the belligerent powers, demand of these the establishment of an armistice, in order that negotiations might be conducted in peace, and then, should this demand be disregarded, debouch with her hundred thousand men from Bohemia to Silesia, taking in flank the coalition troops which the French were about to attack in front, the result of which would be that, after a month, not a single Russian or Prussian would remain between the Elbe and the Niemen. Europe would then be at the mercy of victorious France and Austria, and the division of the spoils would be easy. The Emperor Francis might have Silesia, which was the subject of eternal regret to the house of Austria, a large portion of the grand duchy of Warsaw, and Illyria. Saxony should be indemnified for the loss of the grand duchy of Warsaw, by the gift of Brandenburg and Berlin. Prussia should be thrown back beyond the Oder, and consisting of Old Prussia, and a considerable portion of the duchy of Warsaw, become a species of Poland, partly German and partly Polish, having Königsberg and Warsaw for its capitals.

It is very true that Austria, by throwing into Silesia the hundred thousand men who were ready for service, and, if necessary, the hundred thousand others who would be ready in three months, might have procured the total defeat of the European coalition, and forced it immediately to treat for peace. But what did Napoleon offer her in return for such an employment of her forces? He offered to carry back the line of the Prussian territory to the other side of the Vistula, to leave to her of her old states, only Old Prussia from Dantzic to Königsberg, adding to it the grand duchy of Warsaw, and replacing it between the Oder and the Elbe by the house of Saxony, and what he thus offered was, in fact, simply the destruction of Prussia, for this power transported to Königsberg or Warsaw, would no more become Poland than Saxony, extended from Dresden to Berlin, would become Prussia. The strength of a nation consists not only in its territory but in its history, the memories of its past. Were this plan carried out, there would no longer be a German Prussia, and Austria, which sought its own independence in the independence of Germany, would have failed to obtain what she desired, although aggrandized by the addition of a province, and that province Silesia. She would have been, indeed, but an enriched

slave; and this was a truth, which, had she not perfectly understood it, as she did, the indignant cry of the whole people of Germany would speedily have forced upon her. The idea entertained by Napoleon of the state of Europe was a fantasy, leading him to imagine that he had but to increase his battalions by an additional hundred thousand men, to add another victory to the series of his triumphs, and that he might then settle the affairs of Europe as he chose. Knowing that Austria had long hated Prussia, and long regretted the loss of Silesia, he concluded that he had but to offer the annihilation of Prussia as a gratification to her jealousy, and to restore to her the province of Silesia, to induce her to act as he desired. He failed to understand that there is a time when all the world is compelled to be honest and disinterested; that it is, when an intolerable oppression compels it to unite for mutual defence, and that he, Napoleon, had now unfortunately brought that time to pass for our ruin, by making us the voluntary oppressors of Europe. He failed to comprehend that Austria might prefer a lesser amount of territory, with an established system of affairs, to a larger extent under a system which was as fictitious as it was arbitrary.

A serious misfortune, incident to the plan thus entertained by Napoleon with respect to Austria, consisted in the fact that it brought her more prominently forward into the scene of affairs than was at all necessary, gave her a dangerous importance, and furnished her with a pretext for arming, and smoothed the path by which she might pass without dishonour, and almost without embarrassment, from a state of strict alliance with us to a state of open hostility. And this was a fault which Napoleon greatly aggravated by the selection which he made of a person to urge upon the Austrian court the adoption of his ideas. Our ambassador at this court was M. Otto, formerly ambassador in Berlin, a wise and modest man, who was excellently fitted to be our representative at the court of Vienna, had we endeavoured to keep on good terms with it, without permitting it to take too prominent a part in the conduct of European affairs. Napoleon now considering, however, that he was neither sufficiently influential nor clear-sighted, took pains to find a fit successor for him, and selected M. de Narbonne, whose tardy but warm adhesion to the empire we have already related. A patriot of 1789, an old minister of Louis XVI., a grand seigneur, a clever soldier, a man of brilliant and varied talents, and endowed with much tact and grace of manner, M. de Narbonne was marvellously fitted to succeed in an aristocratic and elegant court, knowing how to blend

the character of the man of the world with that of the politician. His fault was that he was too inclined to exceed the limits of his rôle; but for the performance of an active part no better agent could have been selected, and there was good reason to suppose that M. de Metternich would find it difficult to elude his penetration and energy.

Napoleon having selected, then, M. de Narbonne, as his ambassador, was so anxious to send him to his post that he would not await even the arrival of Prince Schwarzenberg, who was on his way to Paris, to explain the views of the Austrian court. He was little anxious, indeed, to know what these views might be, since, whatever they were, he was only desirous that his own should be adopted in their place; and M. de Narbonne could not reach Vienna too soon, since the campaign was on the eve of commencing. Napoleon did not explain to him at first on what conditions he would consent to make peace, sending him away entrusted with only the first part of his secret, which was that it was necessary to his interests that Europe should carry a hundred thousand men to the slopes of Silesia, that she should summon the forces of the coalition to pause in their onward march; that if, as would be most probably the case, they should disregard this summons, she should then take them in flank, whilst he, Napoleon, attacked them in front. He authorised him to propose that when the united arms of France and Austria should have been victorious, the latter power should receive, as its reward, Silesia, a portion of Poland, and Illyria.

Having obtained all the levies which he desired, and taken the diplomatic measures which have been above narrated, he determined to enter at length upon the new campaign. It was now the end of March, 1813. His various military armaments were in a very forward state, with the exception of his cavalry, which had not been reorganized so quickly as he could have desired; and he determined to set out towards the middle of April, impatient to realise the fair hopes which he entertained with respect to the issue of the approaching struggle. He made all his arrangements with a view to his departure at that date. He addressed some reproaches to Prince Eugene for having retrograded too hastily and too far; not that he regretted the steps which the forces of the coalition had been thereby induced to take, but because he regretted the time which was lost to him by the enemy's too rapid progress, calculating that it had compelled him to hasten the commencement of hostilities by at least twenty days, during which he might have much increased the efficiency of his forces. He regretted, especially, the loss of horses, which was a consequence of the abandonment of the

German territories; and also blamed Prince Eugene for having inclined too much towards the right in his anxiety to cover Dresden, which was of little importance, whereby he had left uncovered Hambourg, which it was of the highest importance to shelter from the contagion of the German popular excitement. At the same time he informed him in general terms of the future plan of operations.

He directed him to refrain from occupying himself with the defence of the route from Dresden to Erfurt, Fulde, and Mayence, since it would be of little importance, even if the forces of the coalition penetrated in that direction to some distance. He recommended him on the other hand, to defend to the utmost, that of Magdebourg, Hanover, Osnabruck, and Wesel, which passed by lower Germany. In establishing himself firmly on this line, Prince Eugene would defend the greater part of the course of the Elbe, cover Hambourg, Bremen, Holland, and Westphalia, and that portion of Germany which Napoleon had desired to make French. If the coalition, taking advantage of this arrangement of the French troops, should penetrate by Dresden, and advance as far as the mountains of Thuringia, as far as the celebrated plains of Jena, it would only be necessary for the French forces to execute movements by which Prince Eugene's left should be posted at Wittenberg, the right at Eisenach, the Harz mountains being in the rear, and that when this position had once been taken up by Prince Eugene's forces, Napoleon would advance with one hundred thousand men by Hesse or Thuringia to his support, and to join him on the Elbe; and that then his forces amounting to two hundred and fifty thousand men, Napoleon would cut off the forces of the coalition from Berlin and the sea, drive them back, crush them against the mountains of Bohemia, and, entering Berlin, would release from blockade, the garrisons of Stettin, Custrin, Glogau, Thorn, and Dantzic; and would thus, within the space of a month, from the commencement of the campaign, find himself victorious on the banks of the Vistula.

To these general outlines of the campaign Napoleon added, as was his wont, precise detailed directions. He blamed Prince Eugene for having sent the terrible Marshal Davout to Dresden, where it was necessary to reassure the public mind, instead of having reserved him for Hambourg and Germany, where it was necessary to terrify, and he directed that he should now be transferred to the countries of the lower Elbe, to supply by the fear inspired by his presence all that was wanting in military resources. This marshal had received his second battalions to the number of sixteen, recently reorganised at Erfurt, by the incorporation

of the staffs returning from Russia, with the recruits arriving from France on the banks of the Rhine; Marshal Victor had also received his, which were twelve in number; and Napoleon now directed that he should be left on the upper Elbe, for the purpose of serving as a link between Prince Eugene and the grand army, which was about to debouch from Thuringia, and that Marshal Davout should descend upon Hambourg to retake it. The staffs of the third and fourth battalions of Marshals Davout and Victor were at this moment being recruited on the Rhine, with the men of the old classes. There were still, therefore, thirty-two battalions for Marshal Davout and twenty-four for Marshal Victor, which, added to the second battalions which they had already, would give forty-eight to the one, thirty-six to the other—eighty-four between the two. This then was a second and excellent army, which might within two months be upon the Elbe, and Napoleon devised means of increasing it by the addition of twenty-eight battalions. It has been already said that the staff of the first battalion of these old corps had been retained in the fortresses on the Oder; but it had been found that the staffs of two companies were sufficient to receive the soldiers who returned from Russia. These staffs of the first battalions having become disposable, with the exception of two companies, had been brought back to the Rhine, and having had the two companies which were wanting to them supplied by two others taken from the depôts, were completely reorganized, and were to be filled up with the excellent recruits of the old classes. And thus within a few weeks the Marshals Davout and Victor, already provided with their second battalions, would receive the third, fourth, and first, and be thus placed at the head of ninety thousand infantry. Three hundred pieces of cannon were prepared for them in the fortresses of Westphalia, Holland, and Hanover. The cadres of dragoon and chasseur regiments arriving from Spain would furnish them with a fair body of cavalry, and thus independently of the three hundred thousand men with which he was himself about to open the campaign, there would exist a second army of one hundred and ten thousand men on the lower Elbe. As, however, the insurrection of Lubeck and Hambourg rendered the need of succours urgent, Napoleon despatched immediately, a certain number of those battalions which were ready, sending them under the command of General Vendamme to the Hanseatic departments. The name alone of General Vendamme was calculated to produce a great impression upon the revolted populations, and, moreover, throughout the whole of the second military division, the rule of military commissions had been substituted for the constitutional government.

At Mayence, independently of the guard and the two Rhine corps which had been there organized, and were already distributed between Frankfort, Wurzburg and Fulde, Napoleon planned the construction of a fresh body of troops, with the remainder of the cadres which had been recalled from Spain. A formal order had been sent beyond the Pyrenees, that only the staffs necessary for the existing number of troops should be retained in Spain, and as the surplus staffs successively reached France, Napoleon had directed that they should be filled with the eighty thousand men of the *six old classes* of which he had recently decreed the levy. The staffs drawn from Spain were the best; having been engaged in that species of war which is best calculated to form the experienced officer—namely, a war of surprises; for it is one in which it is almost necessary that each officer should be a general. They were inured to fatigue, and, not having been under Napoleon's immediate command for some time, arrived full of zeal for the honour of being under his personal orders; whilst, on the contrary, the staffs arriving from Russia, although excellent in respect to their military qualities, were worn out, and animated by a resentment which was far from being concealed. It was necessary that these last should have repose, indemnity for what they had lost, and be well recruited before being again employed on active service. With respect to the Spanish cadres, however, there was no need for any particular exertions, and day by day, as they reached Mayence, they entered upon the performance of their duties and served with ardour. Napoleon prepared with these staffs an army of reserve upon the Rhine, as he had formed one on the Elbe of the *old corps*.

Finally, he was resolved to create an army of reserve for Italy, whither General Bertrand had already proceeded for the purpose of forming a corps of forty or fifty thousand men, of the numerous military elements which France had accumulated beyond the Alps since 1796. General Bertrand had accomplished his task and was on his march with forty-five thousand men, having met with no misadventure with the exception that an Italian regiment having fallen in with a detachment of troops of the same nation, who had returned from Russia, after having heard their countrymen's recitals of what they had suffered, had deserted en masse. With the exception of this incident, General Bertrand's army arrived in good order, and animated with the best spirit. It was to be joined by the three thousand troops already assembled at Augsburg, and by the other cadres of Prince Eugene's corps which should return from Russia, and which were now directed to assemble at Verona instead of Augsburg; Napo-

leon considering the latter place too distant from Italy. The cadres sent to Verona would furnish twenty-four battalions, and would be reorganized during the spring and summer. The dépôts of Italy were filled with conscripts of Provence, Languedocque, Savoy, Piedmont, and Corsica, respecting whose discipline, as they had already been to the dépôts from one to two years, there could be little cause for doubt. Of the forty-eight battalions which composed the army of Italy, properly so called, there were seven or eight in Spain, and twenty in Germany. There remained about twenty in Italy, which were already recruited, and these, with the eighty staffs returned from Russia, would present a total of forty-eight battalions; which number might be raised to sixty, by adding to them some French staffs which had been recalled from Spain, and were en route towards Piedmont, where were situated their dépôts. There was here the material for the basis of a second army of Italy. And thus, taking into account the Neapolitan army which Murat was reorganizing with great pains, and with which he consoled himself for the chagrin caused him by Napoleon's severity, eighty thousand men would be available for active service in Italy, should the movements of Austria be hostile.

Napoleon had, therefore, both in Germany and Italy, besides the armies which were to be engaged in actual service, other armies which would serve as a reserve and repair the losses caused by the war. In the cavalry arm, as has been already said, were we alone deficient, General Bourcier in lower Germany had seen his cantonments overturned, and the districts in which he could obtain troop horses, very much restricted by the insurrection of the Hanseatic provinces, whilst the manufacture of harness was very greatly interrupted by the ill-will of the German workmen, and the credits with which he was furnished became reduced to almost nothing in his hands, on account of the difficulty which existed of obtaining money for even the most unexceptionable bills.

Of the thirty thousand saddle or draught horses which he hoped to procure, he had only succeeded in obtaining sufficient to mount twelve thousand troopers, of whom six thousand were already mounted, and ready to take their place with the corps of Generals Latour-Maubourg and Sebastiani. The dépôts of the Rhine would furnish an almost equal number of mounted troopers, who would proceed under the Duke de Plaisance to join the army, and would speedily be followed by a similar contingent. Finally, fresh means of providing cavalry regiments would be furnished by the cavalry staffs arriving from Spain. It was confidently

reckoned that fifty thousand cavalry would be assembled by the middle of the year ; but it was at the same time quite possible that not more than ten thousand would be available at the opening of the campaign. Napoleon, however, allowed himself to be but little disturbed by this circumstance—" We shall fight battles and gain them," he said, " as we fought and gained those of Egypt, with squares of infantry."—And he had himself traced out the plan of education to be pursued with regard to the young infantry, prescribing the formation of the square as the one which would be most frequently required in the field.

Spain had been to him at this period, as we have seen, a nursery of officers and sous-officers of the first quality ; and it was only just, after having exhausted himself for the purpose of supporting this deplorable war, that he should draw from it such aid as this. But at the same time, he was unwilling to enfeeble his armies in the Peninsula to too great an extent, since he had determined, when the time for negotiations should have arrived, to give up Spain, the only sacrifice he was prepared to make for the purpose of disarming England. To have withdrawn from it now, would have been the wiser plan, but it would have exposed him to a campaign with the English in the south of France, and have deprived him of the principal means he possessed on which to base negotiations in the future European congress. It was necessary to defend it, therefore, to the utmost, and as though he were determined to retain it in his grasp.

He approved of the new position taken up by our armies, whilst bitterly blaming the faults which had led them to it. At the same time, he was anxious, should the English make a fresh attempt upon Valladolid and Burgos, that they should be driven back to a considerable distance, and that sufficient occupation should be given them, to prevent their undertaking any maritime expeditions on the coast of France. Marshal Suchet, who had not been enfeebled, appeared to him to be sufficiently strong to defend the Ebro and the coast of the Mediterranean, from Barcelona to Valencia. The armies of Andalusia, of the centre, and of Portugal, united as they had been in the last campaign, appeared to him to be sufficient to defend the Castilles against Lord Wellington. But he considered it of great moment that these armies should be still more closely drawn together, and ordered them to pass the Guadarrama, only retaining the cavalry on the Tagus, and a division of the advanced guard at Madrid, the latter being left for the sake of moral effect, and to establish the court at Valladolid. He wished that the three armies should be united in front of Valladolid, so as to be able, at any

moment, to concentrate and march upon the English. He even directed the preparation of a siege train, for the purpose of leading Lord Wellington to fear that he was about to make an attempt on Cuidad-Rodrigo, and thus detain him in the Peninsula. He also ordered that a portion of the three armies should be employed in destroying, at any price, the guerilla bands which desolated the north of Europe, and which interrupted the communications with France, in Navarre, Guipascoa, Biscaye, and l'Alava. Proposing, in fact, as he did, to make Spain an object of negotiation and exchange, he was anxious to be able to say that he possessed the best half, with a firmness which could not be disputed. To retain the districts which were commonly called the banks of the Ebro, and to restore the remainder to Ferdinand, was the arrangement which he was prepared to compel Joseph to accept and to conclude with Ferdinand, and the English.

With this intention, and for the sake of having some communications, he had entrusted the army of the north to General Clausel, with whose merit, although displayed at such a distance, he had been much struck, and had empowered him to take under his own command, a portion of these armies concentrated in Castille, in order that he might destroy the guerilla bands, before the period when the English usually commenced the campaign. This was an important decision, and was to have, as we shall hereafter see, very serious consequences. But with the exception of this decision, which, if we are to judge of it by its results, was an error, his arrangements with respect to the conduct of the campaign in Spain were most excellent. He had not withdrawn more than thirty thousand men from this country by taking away the staffs, and had left them two hundred thousand troops, which were the best that France at this time possessed.

He had recalled Marshal Soult, who could no longer act with the court at Madrid, and had given Joseph, in addition to Marshal Jourdan as adviser, Generals Reille, d'Erlon, and Gazan, to command under him the three armies of the centre, Andalusia, and Portugal.

And now, being satisfied with respect to the state of affairs in Spain, and satisfied with the progress of his armaments in the direction of Germany, Napoleon, as full of confidence with respect to the result of his vast combinations as he ever was in his life, determined to depart; resolving, however, before doing so, to take some precautions against the recurrence of such an accident as that of the Malet conspiracy.

We have already said, that being anxious to crown the King of Rome this very winter, and to invest Maria Louisa with the regency, he had conversed with the arch-chancellor

Cambacérès, the only man who was, with respect to the domestic policy of his empire, in his entire confidence. After some consideration it had appeared to him that in the existing state of affairs, the coronation of the King of Rome at that time would be somewhat unadvisable; but he still resolved to invest Maria Louisa with the regency, which might be easily done without much ceremony, in order that should a bullet deprive him of life, the country might be able to rally round a government already constituted, and already, even, engaged in the performance of his functions. He was anxious, too, after having made the campaign of 1812 in the character of an emperor, to make that of 1813 in the character of a simple general. He resolved, therefore, to confer the regency on Maria Louisa before his departure; an arrangement which, beside its other advantages, would have that of flattering the pride of his father-in-law, who was sincerely attached to his daughter, although more so to his house.

It will be easily understood that it was not to Maria Louisa, a good and sensible woman, but profoundly ignorant of affairs of state, that Napoleon intended to confide the government of his vast empire, but to a man whose good sense was unequalled, whose experience was consummate, and whose character was somewhat less weak than was generally supposed. The reader will have perceived that we are speaking of the arch-chancellor Cambacérès. Napoleon could have even died without anxiety, if, the war terminated, he could have been certain of leaving the minority of his son and the ignorance of his wife, for ten years under the direction of this man, whose finesse, tact, moderation, and experience, united to form a statesman of the highest character; not indeed, a firm, bold, open-speaking statesman, such as are found in free countries, but a master of that art of managing a people which is so necessary in a country like France, which, even when not free, still requires to be governed with infinite caution. For such a task as this Napoleon feared to select his brothers, distrusting their pretensions and restless temperaments, especially during a minority.

Increasing years, the commencement of a change of fortunes, a long acquaintance with men, the abasement of the human character when exposed to the influence of absolute power, the historical learning in which his youth had so much delighted, and the teachings of which had great influence on his mind in his maturer age, had singularly added to the natural distrustfulness of Napoleon's character. Full of ill-humour against his brothers and his brother-in-law, who annoyed him, and on whom he bestowed much ill-treatment, he was con-

vinced that, should he die, leaving his child under age, they would disturb his minority. He conversed at great length on these subjects of anxiety with the Prince Cambacérès, and displayed a determined resolution to employ even the most offensive precautions with respect to his brothers. By the imperial constitutions the regency could not be held by a woman, but must be conferred on the uncles of the imperial minor; and Napoleon, therefore, now boldly said to Prince Cambacérès that he was unwilling that his brothers should be invested with the regency, and that he intended to confer it on Maria Louisa, in order that he, Cambacérès, might exercise it in reality, in the name of the empress. Cambacérès, whose ambition had always been restrained by his prudence, and who was now, by reason of age and indulgence in some sensual pleasures which were little worthy of the gravity of his years, less ambitious than ever, was terrified at the intentions thus expressed by the emperor, and pleaded with him the cause of his brothers. In the first place, he said, it would be necessary to deprive them of the office in question by a constitutional decree, and history taught but too plainly that the decrees of dead sovereigns, whether declared constitutionally or not, prevailed but little against the passions which were almost invariably let loose at their death. Moreover, he urged, Joseph was of a good disposition, was sincerely attached to Napoleon, had no male infant, and was anxious, probably, to marry one of his daughters to the King of Rome; whilst Jerome was entirely devoted to his brother, besides being to a great extent disqualified by his age for disputing the possession of the regency; Louis had disappeared from the scene; and Murat, except in his military character, was of no importance. "There was no reason, then," said Cambacérès, "why Napoleon should be suspicious of his brothers, and he ought," he declared, "to leave the regency in the hands of Joseph; whose possession of it would be little disputed."—Napoleon remaining unaffected by any of these reasons, the arch-chancellor proceeded to speak of Prince Eugene, who had never given him any cause of discontent, save by a little nonchalance of manner, and who, moreover, had obtained much honour in the late campaign; but at the name of Prince Eugene, Napoleon, who usually displayed the utmost affection with respect to this prince, suddenly appeared to be overwhelmed with disquieting and ominous reflections. "Eugene," he said, "is an excellent man, but he is young! We must take care that we do not inflame with an excessive ambition that heart so little fitted to encounter the passions of the world. . . . Who knows what time may not bring forth?"

As Napoleon remained firm to his idea, it became necessary to consider in what manner it could be least offensively carried out; and no one was more fitted for this task than Prince Cambacérés. For excluding the greater part of the princes of the imperial family from the regency, and even from the council of the regency, there existed a most natural reason in the fact that they were possessed of foreign thrones; for princes who governed countries distant from the empire, might have interests so opposed to those of France, that their exclusion from the government in the case of a minority, could not be considered either a distrustful or an excessive precaution. It was agreed, then, by an article of the projected *senatus-consultum*, that all the princes seated on foreign thrones should be excluded from the regency, unless, which was very improbable, they should abdicate. A second arrangement, which was as natural as the first, was to be that the mother was to rule during the minority of her son. And this measure was one which was not only in accordance with the dictates of nature, but also of good policy, for it could not but be an advantage to confer the imperial power upon a daughter of the Cæsars, who was beloved by her royal father, and had the most sacred claim upon the protection of the chief court of Europe. Napoleon's brothers, then, being excluded without injustice and without offence, and the empress constituted regent in accordance with the best of reasons, it became necessary to compose a council of regency, and to regulate its functions. Napoleon resolved that it should be composed of the princes of the blood, the uncles of the emperor, and the princes, high members of the French government, (always on condition that they should not be reigning over any dominions beyond the limits of the empire) and in the following order;—The arch-chancellor, the arch-chancellor of state, the grand *electeur*, the constable, the arch-treasurer, and the grand admiral; an arrangement which gave the first place and the chief influence to Prince Cambacérés; a place and influence which Napoleon determined to secure to him still further by his secret instructions to the empress. The council was to be consulted on all the great affairs of state, but it was only to have a deliberative voice with respect to them.

These matters having been thus arranged in a projected *senatus-consultum*, Napoleon submitted the proposed plan in the first place to the council of state, before sending it to the senate, explaining it with his own mouth in words which were at once precise and authoritative. Everyone was silent and appeared to listen with approval; but at length a member asked whether it would not be as well to supply an omission in the proposed plan, by conferring the regency on

the mother of the imperial minor, in case she should not be also the empress dowager—a case which would have occurred had Napoleon adopted as his heir a son of his brother Louis and the Queen Hortense, who lived in France, separated from her husband and much loved in society. The enquiry which was now made was evidently intended to serve her interests, and was supported by a young chancellor of state, who enjoyed a large share of the imperial favour, M. the Count Molé. Napoleon, however, repelled the suggestion in a manner so stern and peremptory that it was at once allowed to drop; and on leaving the council, he said to Cambacérès, “Eh! bien! have you seen how the friends of Hortense begin to stir? What would it be if I were dead?” And he sighed at the idea of all that would very probably take place in the event of his death.

The *senatus-consultum* was adopted by the senate in the form in which it was proposed. By his letters patent Napoleon conferred upon the regent the full sovereign authority, with the exception of a prohibition to submit laws to the legislative corps, and *senatus consulta* to the senate, but at the same time he limited the use of this authority by well calculated precautions, and declared that the regent was to perform no act without the signature of Prince Cambacérès. He appointed, moreover, as secretary of the regency, and to perform for it the functions of a minister of state, the wise Duke de Cadore—M. de Champagny.

On the 30th of March he invested the empress with her new dignity. When the formalities of the ceremony were over, he dismissed all who had assisted at it but the ministers, and made the empress take part in a council of state, at which were discussed matters of the highest importance. She appeared attentive, curious, and not wanting in intelligence. Day after day, with infinite pains, her husband strove to initiate her into the conduct of affairs; and at the same time took care to indicate to those who were to advise her, what they should submit to her notice and what conceal from her.

Amongst the exceptions which he made to the authority of the regency, was the nomination of the superior officers of the army; saying, “that the minister of war alone was acquainted with the personnel of the army, and that he could entrust the duty of making these appointments to none but him.”

At the moment of his departure for the army, Napoleon, anxious to make friends for his son and his wife, would have been glad to promote a considerable number of persons to the senatorial dignity, in order to strengthen by the aid of self-interest the shaken devotion of a great number of persons.

But such a measure presented a danger which the arch-chancellor's penetration pointed out to him, and which was, that as there were only thirteen vacancies in the senate, and thirteen available dotations, to nominate more than this number of senators would render necessary either a division of the existing resources of the senate, which would create a feeling of discontent amongst its members, or an increase of the senate's revenues, which the state of the finances could not suffer. Napoleon, therefore, added to the senate but thirteen new members, and failed, as we shall hereafter see, to add very much thereby to its fidelity. At the same time he distributed with great prodigality the decorations of the order of the *Re-union*, and raised the Count Decrès to a dukedom. He selected as his aide-de-camp General Corbineau, who had miraculously found the passage of the Berezina, and the illustrious Druot, who had rendered such illustrious services with the artillery of the guard. Being as anxious also to relieve his wife and child from any sources of embarrassment, as he was to procure friends for them, he recalled Marshal Soult from Spain, and permitted M. Fouché to return to his senatorial position; but as he was very unwilling to leave these two persons idle in Paris (especially the second), he took Marshal Soult with him, proposing to give him some post in his guard, and resolved, as soon as he should have entered the German countries, to confide to M. Fouché the government of the conquered provinces.

The session of the legislative corps was now terminated, after having lasted three or four weeks, and voted the law of finance, as well as the law relative to the sale of the communal property.

Before actually setting out, Napoleon took some further measures relative to the concordat of Fontainebleau, which the pope had failed to execute, whilst preserving complete silence with respect to his ultimate intentions. Returning to the system of finesse, which did not originate with himself, but with his councillors, he was far from declaring that he wished to repudiate the concordat of Fontainebleau and to retract his signature, but he appeared to intimate that in the existing state of affairs, the immediate execution of the treaty was not necessary, and affected to slumber more profoundly than ever in his peaceful retreat. In the meantime, the active personages of the church party visited Fontainebleau with great frequency. All this excessively irritated Napoleon, and he was on the point of destroying by some violent act, the advantage of his reconciliation with the holy father; but wisely restrained himself to making public, as he considered himself by the pope's late conduct perfectly justified in

doing, the concordat which the pope had publicly and freely signed.

He had it, therefore, inserted in the bulletin of laws as a law of state, expecting that this insertion would procure its execution. He then took measures, of which the pope was officially informed, for the institution of the new prelates by the metropolitan, should the pope fail to grant it himself within six months ; and limited the number of visitors to be admitted to Fontainebleau, naming those whom the pope was to be permitted to see. Finally, he ordered, but secretly, the arrest and removal forty leagues from Paris of the Cardinal di Pietro, as having lately distinguished himself by his bad counsels to the pope ; and that those around the pope might be duly warned, he had full intimation given to them of the reason of this fresh severity.

A few days before Napoleon's departure from Mayence, the Prince Schwarzenberg arrived ; being announced as fully informed of the most secret resolutions of the Austrian cabinet. Napoleon had already sent back M. de Bubna to Vienna, after having sedulously striven to impress him with the idea which could scarcely take hold of a German brain at this period, that Austria's wisest course was to endeavour to repair in concert with France her shaken fortunes. He endeavoured to impress the same idea upon Prince Schwarzenberg, who found himself in a position of much embarrassment, since he was most unwilling to displease Napoleon, and yet was resolved to show due regard for the patriotic passion of his country, although he was far from being thoroughly imbued with it himself. M. de Metternich had sent him to question rather than to explain, and whilst directing him to endeavour chiefly to discover on what terms Napoleon would be willing to conclude a peace, had also instructed him to hint that Austria would draw the sword only for the sake of obtaining peace—such a peace as should satisfy the interests of Germany. The prince, however, who had accepted the mission with great reluctance, feared to utter to Napoleon half of what he had been sent to say ; and the latter, in fact, left him neither time nor opportunity to do so, constantly striving, as he did, to persuade him of the wisdom of his projects, treating with a confidence which had a diplomatic purpose, and making every endeavour to convince him that he had in France, Germany, Italy and Spain, eleven or twelve hundred thousand men under arms, and that he was about to crush the Prussian and Russian forces, and drive them beyond the Vistula. He took pains, also, to point out to the prince that it was now the moment for Austria to render the conclusion of peace certain and imme-

diate by declaring in favour of France, and to make it for himself the most advantageous she had ever concluded by accepting Silesia, a million of Polish subjects, and Illyria, all which he, Napoleon, was ready to give her. Prince Schwarzenberg, who, although endowed with a sufficiently firm mind, was influenced by Napoleon's calculations, strove to point out, in reply, that the French Emperor, in the ensuing campaign, would have to fight with troops animated by a violent fanaticism; that the war would not be such an one as could be decided by one or two battles, that it would be well, therefore, that he should enter into negotiations for peace; that Austria was quite ready to aid him in this, but that she could not enter into a contest with Europe for the sake of an arrangement that would in no way satisfy either the wishes or the interests of Germany. Napoleon's ardour, however, was too vehement to be checked by any such cold reasoning as this, and Prince Schwarzenberg seeing very clearly that he was determined to enter upon a decisive war, in which it was very probable that he might be successful, considered that it would be necessary to await the issue of affairs before resolving upon anything. He contented himself, therefore, with uttering a few remarks which neither were nor were calculated to be of any effect, and then kept silence, not daring even to speak to Napoleon on a point respecting which it would have been more consistent with loyalty that he should have given him information. We allude to the Austrian auxiliary corps. As Austria affected to remain faithful to the treaty of alliance of the 14th of March 1812, its corps would naturally remain at Napoleon's disposal, and as its services were especially desirable at this moment, Napoleon said to Prince Schwarzenberg, that he intended to send orders to this corps, to advance with Prince Poniatowski towards upper Silesia, and that he hoped that these orders would be executed; whereupon, Prince Schwarzenberg, who well knew that his government was resolved not to fire a shot in Napoleon's favour, had the weakness to reply that the Austrian corps would obey. After having vainly endeavoured to convert Prince Schwarzenberg to his views, Napoleon addressed to his allies the grand duke of Baden, the Prince Primate, the Duke of Wurzburg, the kings of Wurtemberg, Bavaria, and Saxony, a recommendation to prepare their contingents, and especially, to send him as soon as possible all the disciplined cavalry at their disposal—particularly, insisting upon this latter point in the case of the King of Saxony, who had withdrawn to Ratisbonne with the two thousand four hundred troops already mentioned, and upon whom Napoleon reckoned as an addition

to the corps of Marshal Ney. He made this demand in the form of an absolute order.

At length, all these arrangements concluded, and having received the last embraces of his empress, who was in a state of agitation and despair at the approaching separation, he set out on the 15th April, as ardent and as confident as he had ever been at the commencement of his most successful campaigns! A happy yet fatal confidence, which was destined to be productive of much that was glorious, and yet, by its very excess, to be productive of fresh and irreparable disasters.

BOOK XLVIII.

LUTZEN AND BAUTZEN.

RESULTS of Prince Schwarzenberg's mission—He quits Paris, after having attempted to say to the empress and to M. de Bassano, what he had not ventured to say to Napoleon himself—The course of events at Vienna since the defection of Prussia—The Austrian court maintains more firmly than ever its project of an armed mediation, and desires to impose upon the belligerent powers a peace which should be in all respects favourable to the interests of Germany—Efforts made by this court to procure adherents to its policy—Steps taken by it with respect to the King of Saxony, now withdrawn to Ratisbonne, for the purpose of inducing him to place at its disposal the Saxon troops, and the fortresses on the Elbe, and of obtaining from him the renunciation of the grand duchy of Warsaw—Austria having obtained of King Frederick Augustus permission to dispose of his military forces, takes advantage of it to free itself from the presence of the Polish corps at Cracow—Being unwilling to enter into a contest with the Russians, she enters into a secret arrangement with them by which she agrees to withdraw the Austrian auxiliary corps, together with the troops under Prince Poniatowski to the Austrian territory without a contest—Negotiations of Austria with Bavaria—M. de Narbonne arrives at Vienna—Meets with a cordial reception from the Emperor and M. de Metternich—M. de Metternich endeavours to persuade him that it is necessary to make peace, and intimates that at that price only, can France expect to obtain the real support of Austria—He hints again what should be the outline of the peace—M. de Narbonne having received from Paris his final instructions, submits to the Austrian cabinet the important communications with which he is charged—According to these communications, Austria was to summon Russia, Prussia, and England to lay down their arms, then to offer them the conditions of peace named by Napoleon, and in the next place, should they refuse to accept them, to enter Silesia with a hundred thousand men, to effect its conquest for herself—The manner in which M. de Metternich receives these communications—M. de Narbonne demands of M. de Metternich, whether, should France refuse to accept peace on the conditions proposed by the Austrian court, it would turn its arms against her—M. de Metternich endeavours at first to elude this question, but eventually replies that Austria would declare against whatever power should refuse equitable conditions of peace, but at the same time was strongly disposed in favour of France—

Evidence of the fault that Napoleon had committed in leading Austria to become mediator between the belligerent powers—Information is suddenly received that Prince Schwarzenberg's corps had re-entered Bohemia, instead of preparing to renew hostilities, that the Polish corps was to pass through the Austrian territory without its arms, and that the King of Saxony had withdrawn from Ratisbonne to Prague, for the purpose of definitively throwing himself into the arms of Austria—M. de Narbonne insists that the Austrian corps shall remain at the disposal of France, in accordance with the treaty of alliance, and formally demands to be informed whether this treaty still exists—M. de Metternich refuses to reply to this question—M. de Narbonne awaits, before insisting further, fresh instructions from his court—Napoleon's surprise and irritation, when, arrived at Mayence, he learns the retreat of the Austrian corps, and the projected disarming of the Polish corps—He orders Prince Poniatowski to refrain from resigning his arms for any consideration, and directs M. de Narbonne to compel the Austrian court as quietly as possible to explain its conduct, and at the same time to endeavour to penetrate the secret of the course adopted by the King of Saxony—At the same time he promises to put a speedy end to all these complications, by the immediate commencement of the campaign—His military arrangements at Mayence—Although he had prepared materials for an active army of three hundred thousand men, and a reserve of two hundred thousand, he is able at the commencement of hostilities, to bring into the field no more than a hundred and ninety thousand, or two hundred thousand—His plan of campaign—Position of the coalition forces—Austria, being unwilling to join them before all means of negotiation should have been exhausted, they number no more than a hundred thousand or a hundred and ten thousand combatants actually in line—Composition of their staff—Death of Prince Kutusof on the 28th of April at Bunzlau—March of the allies upon the Elster, and of Napoleon upon the Saale—Skilful manœuvres made by Napoleon for the purpose of joining Prince Eugene—Arrival of Ney at Naumbourg; of Prince Eugene at Mersebourg—Ney encounters the enemy at Weissenfels, and marches upon the Lutzen on the 1st of May—Death of Bessières, duke of Istria—Projects of Napoleon in the presence of the enemy—He proposes to march upon Leipsic, to cross the Elster there, and then to fall back upon the flank of the coalition forces—Position assigned to Marshal Ney near the village of Kaja, for the purpose of covering the army during the movement upon Leipsic—Whilst Napoleon endeavours to turn the forces of the allies, they are planning in a similar manœuvre against him, and prepare to attack him at Kaja—Plan of battle proposed by General Diebitch and adopted by the allied sovereigns—Ney's corps suddenly attacked—Napoleon's marvellous promptitude in changing his plans and falling back upon Lutzen—Memorable battle of Lutzen—Importance and consequences of this battle—Napoleon pursues the coalition forces towards Dresden, and directs Ney upon Berlin—Marches towards the Elbe—Enters Dresden—Passage of the Elbe—In possession of the capital of Saxony, he summons Frederick Augustus to return to it under pain of forfeiture of his kingdom—The course of events at Vienna at the period of the battle of Lutzen—M. de Narbonne having been ordered to compel Austria to come to an explanation with respect to the auxiliary and Polish corps, lays before M. de Metternich a categorical note on the subject—M. de Metternich endeavours to persuade M. de Narbonne to desist from taking this step—M. de Narbonne persisting, the Austrian cabinet replies that the treaty of the 14th of March, 1812, is no longer applicable to the actual

state of affairs—News from the theatre of war arrives at Vienna—Although the allies boast of having obtained a victory, events soon prove that they have been vanquished—Apparent satisfaction of M. de Metternich—Eagerness of the cabinet of Vienna to assume at this moment its office of mediator—It despatches M. de Bubna to Dresden for the purpose of communicating the conditions which it considers itself capable of inducing the belligerent powers to accept, or in support of which at least it would be ready, should they reject them, to ally itself with France—Napoleon, on learning what had been done by M. de Narbonne, regrets that he has driven the Austrian court so hastily to a decision, but on learning the precise conditions of peace laid down by this power is irritated to the last degree—He resolves to enter into direct communication with Russia and England, to annul thus the position assumed by Austria, and to prepare such military measures against her as would reduce her to obey the law, instead of imposing it—In the meantime he orders M. de Narbonne to refrain from any active proceedings, and to adopt an air of the most extreme reserve—Napoleon sends Prince Eugene to Italy to organise the army of Italy there, and prepares new armaments under the impression that he may have to carry on war with the whole of Europe—Reception of the King of Saxony at Dresden—Napoleon prepares to depart from Dresden for the purpose of driving the coalition forces from the Elbe to the Oder, at the same time engaging in another battle—Their plan of stopping at Bautzen and fighting there a decisive battle being well known, Napoleon in place of sending Marshal Ney to Berlin, directs him upon Bautzen—Arrival of M. de Bubna at Dresden at the moment of Napoleon's departure—M. de Bubna well fitted to encounter Napoleon's first burst of irritation and to soften it—His explanation of the conditions of peace proposed by Austria—Modifications with which Napoleon would, perhaps, accept them—Napoleon pretends to be appeased that he may gain time for the completion of his new armaments—He consents to a congress to which even the Spaniards should be summoned to be present, and to an armistice, of which he intends to take advantage to enter into direct communication with Russia—M. de Bubna departs with Napoleon's reply—M. de Bubna has scarcely departed when Napoleon sends M. de Coulaincourt to the Russian headquarters on pretence of negotiating an armistice—Napoleon sets out for Bautzen—Distribution of his corps d'armée, and march of Marshal Ney with sixty thousand men upon the rear of Bautzen—Description of the position of Bautzen—Battle of the 20th of May—Second battle of the 21st, in which the formidable positions of the Russians and Prussians are carried after having been valiantly defended—On the following day, the 22nd, Napoleon drives the coalition forces upon the Oder—Engagement at Reichenbach, and death of Duroc—Arrival on the banks of the Oder, and occupation of Breslau—Distressed state of the allies, and their necessity of concluding an armistice—After having refused to receive M. de Coulaincourt from the fear of inspiring Austria with distrust, they send commissioners to the advanced posts for the purpose of concluding an armistice—These commissioners enter into communication with M. de Coulaincourt—Their pretensions—Refused peremptorily by Napoleon—M. de Bubna having arrived at Vienna during the progress of the late military events, excites a species of joy by giving rise to a hope that Napoleon's objections to the proposed conditions of peace may be overcome, certain modifications of them being consented to, and he returns to the French headquarters—Napoleon finding himself hard pressed by Austria, alleges his military duties as an excuse for not

immediately receiving M. de de Bubna, and sends him to M. de Bassano—Perceiving, however, that he shall be compelled to declare himself within a few days, and that, in case he refused their conditions, he should have the Austrians added to his enemies, he consents to an armistice, which saves the forces of the coalition from total destruction, and signs this fatal armistice, not with the intention of negotiating, but for the purpose of gaining two months' time in which to complete his armaments—The conditions of this armistice, and the conclusion of the first campaign of Saxony, called the spring campaign.

BOOK XLVIII.

AFTER Napoleon's departure, Prince Schwarzenberg had remained confounded by all that he had seen and heard, and very dissatisfied at having been both unable and afraid to utter a single one of the truths to express which he had been sent to the French court. He attempted to be more frank with the empress, to whom he had access, for being a countryman and her father's ambassador, and having been the negotiator of her marriage, he had every claim to her attention. Unfortunately, however, his representations to this princess could not have any very great effect; for Maria Louisa, dazzled by the prestige by which she was surrounded, and fascinated by her husband, who overwhelmed her with affectionate attentions, was ardently anxious for his triumph, but had not any influence over him. Her eyes were still red with the tears she had shed at taking leave of him when she received her father's ambassador, to whose declarations respecting the dangerous aspect of affairs, the state of passionate excitement prevalent throughout Europe against France, the necessity of concluding peace with some nations, and of at least preserving it with others, she listened with chagrin, only replying by repeating the accounts she had heard of the immense forces at Napoleon's command, and demanding that her own position in France should be taken into careful consideration, lest, after having been sent thither as a pledge of peace, she should become a fresh victim to revolutionary violence. The misfortunes of Maria Antoniette had made so deep an impression on Europe, that Maria Louisa often found herself seized with sudden terrors, and considered herself in as much danger as though Austria were again at war with France. She alluded to these fears to Prince Schwarzenberg, but without succeeding in making him pay much attention to them, for he scarcely considered them serious, and he thought, moreover, as a politician and a soldier, and although somewhat bound by the favours he had received from the French court, was in the first place anxious

only on account of the fortunes of his country and himself. But little advantage could result from such interviews as these, and although those which Prince Schwarzenberg had with M. de Bassano, who had still remained some few days at Paris, might have had more effect, they unfortunately had not.

From the time of the marriage of Maria Louisa the Prince of Schwarzenberg had carried his intimacy with M. de Bassano almost to an intrigue; they were, therefore, very familiar with each other, and able to speak together with perfect frankness, and Prince Schwarzenberg endeavoured, accordingly, to place before M. de Bassano what appeared to him to be the true state of affairs; and when the latter, who appeared scarcely to comprehend the truths insisted on by the prince, continued repeatedly to refer to the treaty of alliance, and especially to the marriage, the prince at length lost patience, and exclaimed, "The marriage, the marriage! Policy made it, and policy may unmake it!" At which outburst M. de Bassano began to perceive the true state of affairs, but feigned not to understand its meaning, that he might not have to reply to it; and the interview terminated with fresh and deceitful protestations of fidelity to the alliance. M. de Bassano determined to refrain from repeating what he had heard to the emperor that he might not irritate him against Austria; and this was, doubtless, well intended; but it is thus that servants destroy the masters whom they have not accustomed to the language of truth. If the whole world, if the nature of things would follow the fashion attributed to them, to ignore an evil would be to annihilate it; but, in the actual state of things, to hide adverse facts from those whose fortunes they concern, is but to convert them into disasters.

In Vienna the course of affairs was not more favourable, although much more clear-sightedness and diplomatic skill were brought to bear upon them there by the representatives of France and Austria. Whilst M. de Narbonne had been on his way thither, the position of affairs had become much worse for us, whilst M. de Metternich and the emperor found themselves day after day compelled to plunge into more painful dissimulations. It would, doubtless, have been wiser to have come to an open and immediate explanation with all the belligerent powers; to have said both to the allies and to Napoleon that Austria desired peace, but such a peace as should secure the interests of Germany in the first place, and in the next those of Europe in general, to the equilibrium of which an independent Germany was indispensable; that being able to throw a decided weight into the balance, she was ready

to give it against that side which should refuse to accept completely and immediately that basis of a general peace. But to speak thus before having two hundred thousand men in Bohemia, might have been a hazardous proceeding in the presence of one so impetuous as Napoleon, and of a coalition so intoxicated with unexpected successes as was that of Russia, England, and Prussia. It was prudent, then, to gain time before entering into full explanations.

In the meantime, the Austrian cabinet had neglected nothing which could help her to succeed in the task she had to perform, and in the first place had sought to procure adherents to its mediatorial policy in Germany itself, amongst the princes engaged, as it was itself, to the French alliance. It had commenced, by entering into secret communication with Prussia, and when this power, having suddenly turned from a policy of mediation to one of war, could no longer be of use, it had directed all its efforts towards Saxony and Bavaria, which were most anxious for peace, especially a peace which should be advantageous to Germany, and had succeeded in inducing them to adopt its policy. It had induced the King of Saxony to quit Dresden, as we have already seen, and it was now anxious that he should proceed from Ratisbonne to Prague, that he might be more completely at its disposal, and ready to acquiesce in its views, the chief of which was to obtain from him the resignation of Poland; by procuring which it hoped to render the acceptance of the terms of peace it proposed less difficult on the part of Napoleon, who would then be freed from the embarrassment of abandoning an ally, for whom he had always affected great favour; whilst a territory extending from the Bug to the Wardt would afford the means of reconstituting Prussia. Russia would thus be freed from the grand duchy of Warsaw, which was for it such an accusing and threatening phantom, and something might be given her for the Duke of Oldenberg. Finally, Austria might take for herself, and in the midst of her views for the public welfare this was a matter by no means lost sight of by her, the portion of Galicia lost after the battle of Wagram. Austria was also desirous that Saxony should employ her forces in strict co-operation with her own armies; and of the Saxon forces far the most interesting in the eyes of Austria, was the Polish contingent of Prince Poniatowski, which had fallen back towards Cracow in the track of Prince Schwarzenberg, not only on account of its military importance, but on account, also, of its special position. It was necessary, in fact, to prevent this Polish corps from acting at the approaching opening of hostilities, in accordance with the orders sent by Napoleon, and thus drawing the Russians upon Bohemia.

The means devised by M. de Metternich, by which to escape from the complications in which the Austrian court was involved, consisted in a continuance by a written convention of what had already been done in accordance with a tacit understanding, namely, to retreat before the Russians, feigning to be compelled to do so by superior numbers. A note, therefore, was exchanged between the Austrians and Russians, which, it was declared, should be ever kept secret, and by which it was agreed that the Russian General, the Baron de Sacken, should repudiate the armistice, in accordance with which, the Russians had suspended hostilities with the Austrians at the end of the last campaign, and feign to deploy a considerable force upon their flank; and that the latter, feigning, on their side, to be forced to retreat, should re-pass the upper Vistula, abandon Cracow, re-enter Galicia, and carry with them Poniatowski's Polish corps, compelling it to submit to the pretended necessity of retreating. The Russians were to halt upon arriving at the Austrian frontiers.

As the Austrian cabinet was unwilling that the Polish troops should be left too near the grand duchy of Warsaw, and especially unwilling that they should be left in the midst of Galicia, it was anxious to come to an agreement with the King of Saxony, their grand duke, with respect to their being marched, unarmed, across the Austrian states upon the Elbe, where Napoleon might do with them what he pleased. And to this the poor King of Saxony, who was in a horrible state of anxiety, and unable to decide in whose hands to place himself, consented.

This point having been obtained, it was necessary to obtain of the King of Saxony, the definitive abandonment of the duchy of Warsaw, in order to take from Napoleon what, as we have said, was both an argument and a source of embarrassment, and Austria was desirous that the King of Saxony should receive in exchange for it the fair principality of Erfurt, hitherto kept en dépôt by France, and at one time offered as a recompense to the Duke of Oldenberg. And it was because it wished to have this monarch more completely under its influence, that it now proposed that he should remove from Bavaria to Bohemia, declaring to him the advantages to him of being at Prague, in an inviolable country, and explaining that at so short a distance from Dresden, he could be in constant communication with his subjects, and thus preserve their affection.

The negotiations entered into with Bavaria were as delicate, and even more full of difficulties than those with Saxony, since it was necessary to bring it to consent to a sacrifice which could be of no service to the general cause, but of

great advantage to Austria, being the re-establishment of the frontier of the Inn, which had been re-arranged at the expense of Austria, and to the profit of Bavaria by the treaty of peace of 1809. As for our allies of Baden and Wurtemberg, Austria could only proceed with the utmost caution, for their vicinity to the banks of the Rhine rendered them constantly exposed to Napoleon's vigilant power.

It was whilst Austria was in the very midst of this subtle and secret web of diplomacy, that M. de Narbonne surprised it by coming the bearer of views which were, unfortunately, very different from her own. Instead of bringing a project for the reconstitution of Prussia and securing the independence of Germany, he was the bearer of proposals for the destruction of Prussia, and the substitution of Saxony in its place, whilst Austria was to be paid for its assistance in effecting these changes by the addition of Silesia to its territory, and by being in a state of greater dependence than ever.

The reception of M. de Narbonne, however, by M. de Metternich, was most cordial and flattering. The French minister was received, in fact, by the Austrian one as a friend from whom he had nothing to conceal, and by whose aid he was anxious to save France, Austria, Europe, from a frightful catastrophe. He took great pains to discover whether M. de Narbonne brought at length such concessions on the part of Napoleon, as would prove his desire for peace; but M. de Narbonne still awaited his final instructions from Paris, and until their arrival he had nothing to say, except to intimate that Napoleon was resolved to yield nothing, but that if Austria was willing to become his accomplice, he would pay her well for her services, with territories which should be taken, it mattered not from whom. As, therefore, M. de Narbonne declined to speak, M. de Metternich took their conversations into his own hands, repeating things which would have been sufficiently well understood without the assistance of any words from his mouth, so often, and with such goodwill, that they could not fail to be comprehended. Pointing out to the French minister the excitement of public feeling in Vienna, and its demand that advantage should be taken of the present state of affairs, to free Germany from the yoke of France, he proceeded to say that the Austrian cabinet was, nevertheless, well aware how terribly powerful was Napoleon, and how dangerous it must be rashly to attack him; and that it remembered, moreover, the marriage and the treaty of alliance of 1812. "Still," continued Metternich, "it was necessary to recognise evident truths, and to admit that there was throughout Europe an universal excitement of feeling against France, at least against her chief; that France

herself had need of repose; that a few battles would doubtless be gained by Napoleon, but that victories on the battle-field would not suffice to enable him to resist, for any length of time, the popular movement which had now begun; and that it was necessary, therefore, that he should consent to such a peace as should preserve to him his just glory, but at the same time secure the independence of the nations of Europe.

As M. de Metternich failed to obtain any reply to these general truths, but equally general remarks respecting the extent of our armaments, the certainty that our arms would speedily gain fresh victories, and the consequent necessity of behaving with great caution with respect to us, he again sought to sound the depths of our ambition; repeating the remarks he had already so frequently made, upon the impossibility of maintaining the chimera of the grand duchy of Warsaw, condemned by the campaign of 1812; upon the necessity of strengthening the intermediate powers, and, especially, Prussia, as being the only nation capable of replacing Poland, now for ever destroyed; upon the necessity of narrowing the territorial system of Europe; upon the impossibility of giving any lengthened existence to the confederation of the Rhine; on the impossibility of inducing the belligerent powers to consent to the definitive annexation to the French empire, of Lubeck, Hanover, and Bremen; and upon all those points, in fact, which we have already indicated, and in respect to which the disposition of the Austrian cabinet was already so clearly manifested.—“It will be sufficiently difficult,” added M. de Metternich, “to prevent the allies from raising difficulties with respect to Holland, Spain, and Italy, and even if England gives way to your views with regard to Holland and Italy, it is quite certain that she will not do so with regard to Spain. However, we will leave England on one side, and negotiate without her, if it be necessary to do so; for we should be able, most probably, to induce Russia and Prussia to separate themselves from her, if we submit to them acceptable conditions of peace!”—With respect to what more particularly affected the interests of Austria herself, M. de Metternich intimated that the allies were willing to give anything as the price of the Austrian alliance, but at the same time declared that Austria would be contented with that portion of Galicia which had been taken from her in 1809 for the purpose of increasing the impossible duchy of Warsaw, and the Illyrian provinces, “the restoration of which,” he said, “France has already promised.”

Such was the language of M. de Metternich. The

Emperor Francis, more reserved and more measured in his expressions, contented himself with receiving M. de Narbonne with every personal testimony of consideration, declaring to him his satisfaction at his daughter's happiness in France, his admiration of the genius of his son-in-law, and his anxiety to remain his ally; but at the same time intimating that he could only be so in the cause of peace, since his people would not permit him to be so for any other purpose.

To all these intimations and declarations M. de Narbonne replied as well as he was able, boasting of his master's greatness, and taking advantage of the art which he had learned in the salons, to cover with much ease and grace the impossibility of saying anything of real importance. In the meantime, however, he had discovered what were the real intentions of the Austrian cabinet. He had discovered that she was decidedly unwilling to fire a single shot in favour of France, that she was also unwilling, on the other hand, to pass abruptly, as Prussia had, from a state of alliance to one of war; that she wished to present herself in the character of a mediator between the belligerent powers, and was resolved to throw the weight of her forces against either the one or the other of them for the purpose of enforcing the acceptance of peace.

M. de Narbonne speedily determined that, at the best, neutrality alone could be obtained of the court of Vienna, and that by the exercise of caution, by avoiding explanations, and by making no demands, she might be retained in a state of inactivity sufficiently long to serve our purpose. The best course M. de Narbonne could have adopted, upon making this discovery, would have been, perhaps, to have frankly entered into the views of the Austrian cabinet, and to have declared his adherence to them to Napoleon. But such a bold proceeding would have been ineffectual, and M. de Narbonne did not care to venture upon it, resolving, instead, that it would be better to make every endeavour to paralyse the activity of Austria than to render it more active, and preparing to counsel this course to his own government, when he received the long-expected instructions, which were certainly entirely opposed to the preservation of Austrian neutrality.

These instructions, which were despatched on the 29th of March and arrived on the 9th of April, empowered M. de Narbonne to adopt a decided tone, to declare that Austria must adopt a principal part in the conduct of affairs; that, since she was desirous of peace, she must enable herself to dictate it by preparing powerful forces; that she should then summon the belligerent powers to pause in their movements,

under a threat of throwing a hundred thousand men upon their flank ; and that, finally, if they should not obey her, she should throw a hundred thousand men into Silesia, at once annexing it to her own territory, whilst Napoleon should drive the allied forces beyond the Vistula. . . . M. de Metternich listened to this project with apparent impassibility, and then asked—"Supposing that the belligerent powers do pause at our summons, what bases of peace should we offer them?" and to this question M. de Narbonne could give no reply, for the despatch he had received referred only to the circumstances arising out of the continuance of war, Napoleon being unwilling, in fact, to declare as yet what territorial system in Europe he would consent to. M. de Metternich affected to be willing to await patiently the solution of this point, and to find in what M. de Narbonne had communicated matter for long reflection. He promised to give his answer as soon as the serious nature of the subject would permit.

M. de Metternich himself could not have selected a more satisfactory means of escaping from the embarrassment of the moment than that which was afforded by the last communications from Paris. This embarrassment consisted in the difficulty of declaring to Napoleon that Austria had adopted the rôle of mediator, which was necessarily the abandonment of the rôle of ally, of the difficulty of finding a pretext for armaments of which the extent could no longer be justified, and, finally, of the difficulty of explaining the services which were to be performed by the Austrian auxiliary corps, which, instead of fighting with the Russians, was entering Galicia. And with respect to these three points, Napoleon himself had almost miraculously come to the assistance of M. de Metternich, who was too clever not to avail himself of the path to good fortune thus provided.

After the lapse of two days he announced to M. de Narbonne, with an air of satisfaction which may be easily imagined, that having consulted with his master, he was ready to give explanations with respect to the policy of the Austrian cabinet—declaring his satisfaction at finding his own views on the most important points of the last communications similar to those of Napoleon, he proceeded to say that the Austrian cabinet had perceived, as Napoleon had done, the impossibility that Austria should take a secondary part in the present state of affairs, and had accordingly made such preparations as would speedily place at her disposal a hundred thousand men in Bohemia. "Austria would present herself," he said, "before the belligerent powers as an armed mediator ; should they obey her summons to an armistice, and

to have plenipotentiaries for the negotiation of peace, it would then be necessary to enunciate the conditions of peace, and on this point," continued M. de Metternich, "the fresh communications promised by the French cabinet were impatiently expected. Should the belligerent powers, on the contrary, refuse to entertain any proposition of peace, it would remain for France and Austria to agree respecting the manner in which their forces were to act in concert; and with regard to this point, the insufficiency of the last treaty of alliance, and the necessity of modifying it in conformity with circumstances was evident. That new measures must consequently be taken with respect to the Austrian corps, which was on the frontiers of Poland in a perfectly false position, and that it would be withdrawn to the Austrian territory, together with the Polish corps, in order that it might not be employed in a manner contrary to the views of the two cabinets.

At one single stroke M. de Metternich had freed himself on this occasion from all his embarrassments. From the position of an enslaved ally he had proceeded to that of an armed mediator. But M. de Narbonne was far too clear-sighted not to perceive through the Austrian minister's eagerness to appear to be agreed with the French government on all essential points, that he held, in fact, opinions entirely opposed to them. He attempted, therefore, without either anger or bitterness, but rather with the persiflage of a man of the world, anxious not to be supposed a dupe, to force M. de Metternich to an explanation, and to gain from him some portion of his secret, inquiring of him what were the conditions of peace of which Austria was prepared to compel the acceptance by the belligerent powers—"Those," replied M. de Metternich, "on which we shall have agreed; those respecting which we have vainly pressed you to explain yourselves during the last three months, the communication of which by you we have still to await, and the want of which renders the agreement between us incomplete in a most essential point, namely, that of the conditions which we are to present to the belligerent powers when summoning them to surrender."—"But suppose that these conditions, of which I am not informed," said M. de Narbonne, "should not be such as you desire?"—But here M. de Metternich, who was unwilling to attempt to accomplish too much in one day, and was contented with the ground already gained, and which enabled Austria to proceed from the position of an ally to that of an armed mediator, hastened to interrupt the French minister, saying to him—"I am under no anxiety with respect to these conditions. Your master will be reasonable. Indeed it is impossible that he

should be willing to risk all for such a ridiculous chimera as the grand duchy of Warsaw, for the no less ridiculous protectorate of the confederation of the Rhine, and for those Hanseatic towns which must cease to be of any value to him, as soon as, by the conclusion of a general peace, he renounces the continental blockade!" "But suppose," rejoined M. de Narbonne, who was unwilling to permit his adversary thus to escape him,—“suppose that my master should be of a different opinion, and be resolved to preserve to France all that he has conquered for her; what will happen then?”—“It will happen, it will happen,” replied M. de Metternich, in a tone of embarrassment and impatience, “it will happen that you will be compelled to grant what France herself demands of you, and what she has a right to demand of you, after such long-continued and glorious efforts, namely, peace! A peace accompanied by that just glory which no nation, not even England, wishes to dispute her enjoyment of.” Still persisting in his questions, M. de Narbonne now inquired in plain terms whether, if Napoleon should reject the conditions of peace proposed by her, Austria would turn her arms against him, and M. de Metternich, questioned more closely than he liked, at length exclaimed—“Well! yes! an armed mediator, as his title shows, is an impartial arbitrator, who is provided with the force necessary to enforce respect to that justice of which he is the minister.”—And then, as though he felt that he had said too much, he added,—“of course you will understand that in this case, the inclinations of the arbitrator are all in favour of France.”—“But in certain circumstances you would declare war against us?” again rejoined M. de Narbonne.—“No, no! we shall not do so, for you will certainly be reasonable,” replied M. de Metternich.—And at this point of the conversation M. de Narbonne, endeavouring to give a pleasant tone to a conversation which he feared that he had rendered too serious, said to M. de Metternich;—“Your real object, I imagine, is to gain time, and to afford us the opportunity of gaining some fresh victory. . . . And if the arbitration depend on that, permit me to express a conviction that it will be in our favour.”—“I do certainly,” replied M. de Metternich, “reckon upon your gaining victories, and it is necessary that you should do so for the purpose of bringing your adversaries to reason. But do not deceive yourselves—as soon as you shall have gained a victory, we shall address you in more decided terms than now.”

The consequences of the fault which Napoleon had now committed with respect to Austria were immediate and numerous. Scarcely had Austria assumed the position

of an armed mediator, when she took advantage of this position to advance upon the path which had thus been opened to her. The King of Saxony, still at Ratisbonne, was assailed by advice, threats, and entreaties from every direction. He had declined the offers made to him by Prussia for the purpose of inducing him to join the coalition; but Austria still continued her endeavours to induce him to resign the grand duchy of Warsaw, and now had a fresh argument to adduce in favour of this measure; alleging that France had demanded the mediation of Austria, that Austria had consented to afford it, that Austria, therefore, did nothing which was not in conformity with Napoleon's views, and that the renunciation by Saxony of the grand duchy of Warsaw would relieve him from a serious embarrassment; and render, in fact, the attainment of peace not only easy but certain. Moreover, urged the Austrian cabinet, it would be well to secure a solid possession, such as Saxony, by the sacrifice of a chimera such as Poland, and to renounce a dream which was no longer suited to the times. Overcome by these various reasons, Frederick Augustus, who perceived that a career of ambition was not suited to him, and that in allying himself with a conqueror who had risen from the whirl of revolutions, he had accepted an association as foreign to his genius as to his conscience, subscribed the renunciation which was demanded of him, signing it on the 15th of April, three days after the declaration of armed mediation made by Austria upon our imprudent provocation. At the same time, fearing that if he remained at Ratisbonne, he might again fall under the influence of Napoleon, as the latter proceeded by way of Mayence and Erfurt to place himself at the head of his armies, the Austrian cabinet insisted that Frederick Augustus should remove from Ratisbonne to Prague, from whence, it said, being but a short distance from Dresden, he might govern his kingdom as though he were there, and without incurring any danger either from the allies or the French.

At the very moment when he was being thus urged by the Austrian cabinet, the King of Saxony received the summons sent from Paris to deliver his fine cavalry to Marshal Ney, who required it for the purpose of opening the campaign. This was a demand which, to the unfortunate king, was almost equivalent to a demand of his life, so terrified was he at the idea of the Cossacks; and when M. de Serra, the French minister, insisted upon having a reply to it, Frederick Augustus, in a state of terror and full of regret at having been placed in such a position of embarrassment on account of the ambitious dream of his ancestors, determined suddenly to

depart for Prague. He was accompanied by an enlightened minister, M. de Senft, who had hitherto supported the policy of the French alliance, filling at Dresden a part similar to that played by M. de Metternich in Vienna, M. de Hardenberg in Berlin, and M. de Cetto at Munich. But he was now vanquished, as had been all the partisans of the French alliance, and yielded. At the last moment M. de Serra received a letter for the emperor, in which the worthy King of Saxony told him, that upon the invitation of Austria, with whose perfect understanding with France he was acquainted, he had proceeded to Prague, but was still as faithful as ever to the great monarch who had overwhelmed him with benefits.

When news of this event reached Vienna, the Emperor Francis and his minister Metternich could not conceal their joy, at having in their hands so precious an instrument for effecting their designs, and, believing that reserve was no longer necessary with respect to the auxiliary corps, wrote to Prince Poniatowski that it was necessary to evacuate Cracow, and re-enter the Austrian territories, since hostilities were about to be resumed, and the Austrian government was anxious to avoid drawing the Russians upon Bohemia. He was informed, moreover, that on their march the arms of the Polish, Saxon, and French troops were to be deposited in waggons, to be subsequently restored to them. These directions reached Prince Poniatowski simultaneously with the order sent from Paris to prepare to enter upon active service in the field, and to co-operate with the Austrian corps, which also was to receive Napoleon's instructions. Prince Poniatowski hastened to lay all these communications before M. de Narbonne, that he might explain a mysterious state of things, which was quite beyond his, Prince Poniatowski's, comprehension.

M. de Narbonne, who could not fail any longer to perceive what the designs of Austria really were, hastened to seek another interview with M. de Metternich, to demand of him an account of the recent proceedings of the Austrian cabinet, and found him embarrassed at having to answer the questions which the French minister now put to him, and almost vexed that the results he had desired should have been so speedily attained. Commencing with the King of Saxony, he declared that no one was more surprised at his sudden arrival at Prague than the Emperor Francis. With respect to the withdrawal of the Polish corps to Bohemia and the order given for the removal of its arms, as he was unwilling to avow the secret arrangement signed with the Russians, he excused himself as adroitly as he was able, saying that the Austrian cabinet had simply given a piece of friendly advice on this

matter to Prince Poniatowski, which he was at liberty to accept or refuse; that having hitherto loyally fulfilled the duties of companions in arms towards the Poles, during the retreat they had commenced together, Austria now warned them of the impossibility of supporting them in their present position; that the Russians were approaching in force, and that the Austrian cabinet was unwilling to attract them towards the Austrian territory by entering into fresh conflicts with them, which would be entirely opposed to the mediatorial part which she was about to assume at the instigation of France; that she had resolved, therefore, to withdraw the Austrian corps into Galicia, where she hoped it would not be followed, and had suggested to Prince Poniatowski, that he might withdraw with the Austrian troops in order to avoid being made prisoner, and that if he accepted this offer, the resignation for a time of the arms of his troops was a mere matter of course, since it was not customary for troops to traverse a neutral territory in arms.

Such were M. de Metternich's explanations, to which there could be no difficulty in finding replies: but it would have been better to have left M. de Metternich under the impression that he had succeeded in fulfilling, at once, the two parts of mediator and ally, in order that he might have been constrained, as long as possible, to fulfil the duties of the latter. Unfortunately, however, M. de Narbonne had not been sent for this purpose, and he persisted in embarrassing his antagonist, saying, that although the treaty of alliance between France and Austria was found to be no longer entirely applicable to circumstances, that was no reason for the withdrawal of these thirty thousand troops, which, with the Polish troops, would form a force of forty-five thousand men, perfectly capable, if posted on the left flank of the forces of the allies, to paralyse, at least, fifty thousand of their troops. Again, Napoleon had declared, on setting out to place himself at the head of his armies, that he would speedily give orders to the Austrian corps, and was Austria now prepared, by withdrawing it from his orders, to announce to Europe, to Napoleon himself, that the treaty of the 14th of March, 1812, no longer existed? Was it worthy, moreover, of the Austrian arms, that she should retreat before a few thousand Russians, and after having timidly re-entered her own frontiers, should then conceal her troops, and disarm those of her own allies? And, finally, would these latter, amongst whom were some French troops, consent to be disarmed?

Unable to reply to these observations, M. de Metternich defended himself against them on the ground of prudence. "A few thousand Austrian and Polish troops, more or less,

at Cracow, could not be of any real importance to Napoleon," he said; "and to refuse to allow her to take the course she desired with respect to this matter, simply for the sake of compromising her, would be to place her in a false position, to present herself in the character of an arbitrator, to render the performance by her of the duties of this character impossible, to expose her to a great outburst of popular indignation, should she fire a single shot against the allies, and most probably to cause her to lose that hold on the thread of German politics, which she now held but with a trembling hand. If she refused these thirty thousand troops to France now, it was but that she might place at her service a hundred and fifty thousand, as soon as acceptable conditions of peace should have been agreed on. Moreover, France must be reasonable, and not demand so impossible a thing as that Austria should fight with Germans for Poles. With respect to the point of honour due care had been taken, and the justification of the retreat was the certainty of being confronted by considerable bodies of the enemy. With respect to the disarming of the Polish troops, their sovereign, the King of Saxony, had consented to it; and with respect to the French battalion.—Well! in consideration of Napoleon's glory and that of the French army, the Austrian cabinet would disregard an international principle, and authorise this battalion to remain armed upon a neutral territory; Bohemia, as Napoleon knew, having been declared neutral for the purpose of preventing the Russians from advancing in that direction.

Perceiving, as he could not now fail to do, that neutrality was all that France could expect to obtain of Austria, and even that only at the price of prompt and decisive victories, M. de Narbonne sent information of what had passed between himself and the Austrian minister to M. de Bassano, and demanded fresh instructions how to act in the difficult position in which he found himself placed. In the meantime, a new fact communicated from Munich by our ambassador, M. Mercy d'Argenteau, revealed how great were the exertions which Austria was making to procure adherents to her plan of armed mediation. She had endeavoured to make of Bavaria what she had made of Saxony, an ally of France in a double sense, an ally of this power, that is, if she would accept a peace which secured the interests of Germany, but an enemy if she persisted in refusing it.

Bavaria, eager for repose, and assailed on all sides by the clamours of German patriotism, had listened to, and almost agreed to the proposals of Austria, up to the point at which

the latter had demanded for herself the boundary line of the Inn ; but at the enunciation of this pretension, which could only be satisfied by depriving Bavaria of a portion of territory, for which she could not possibly receive compensation, she determined to remain faithful to the French alliance. These details were communicated to M. de Narbonne at Vienna, and M. de Bassano at Paris, and fully confirmed the impression, which the course she pursued could not fail to leave, that she was endeavouring to form an intermediate party which should enforce the conclusion of such a peace as should be agreeable to Germany, whether it were or were not agreeable to Napoleon.

These various momentous circumstances in the course of European policy, had taken place between the 1st and 20th of April, whilst Napoleon was preparing for his departure from Paris, was proceeding to Mayence, and was giving them his first orders. And of all these circumstances, what most surprised him, was the abrupt departure of the King of Saxony for Prague, at the moment when the French army was ready to set his dominions free. The retreat of the Austrian corps appeared to him more accountable, and he perceived that Austria, whilst refraining from repudiating the alliance, was resolved to ignore its obligations. But the proposed disarming of the Polish troops excited his indignation, and he sent off a courier to Cracow, with a command to Prince Poniatowski to resist this measure at any hazard, and to perish rather than yield to it, adding with a vehemence and grandeur of language which were truly his own,—“ *The emperor cares not for the preservation of men who shall have suffered themselves to be dishonoured.*”

Employing M. de Coulaincourt as his minister of foreign affairs in the absence of M. de Bassano, he wrote to M. de Narbonne to the effect that he began to see too clearly that Austria was playing him false ; that her policy with respect to Saxony was particularly mysterious ; that it was necessary to discover the clue to it, and to find out whether the fortress of Torgau, to which the Saxon infantry had retired, would be faithful or not to France, since it was important to know this at the moment of commencing operations on the Elbe ; to obtain an explanation as to how far France might rely on the services of the Austrian corps, and to persuade her that she ought to renounce the idea of disarming the Polish troops. Napoleon, in short, desired M. de Narbonne to penetrate the mysterious system of diplomacy by which he was surrounded, but in such a manner as should avoid the display of any want of consideration for the father of his empress, whilst he himself

should march to Dresden and cut the Gordian knot which appeared to be so hopelessly intricate at Vienna. At the same time he wrote to M. de Bassano, desiring him to inquire of Prince Schwarzenberg, how it was that there was so great a difference between his promises and the actual state of affairs.

But believing, as he did, that he would speedily arrange everything by the power of his arms, he allowed these subjects to cause him but slight disquietude, and employed himself, as soon as he had arrived at Mayence, with that activity and unequalled intelligence which made him the first administrator in the world.

In spite of the perfect obedience usually paid to his orders, and in spite of the presence at Mayence and indefatigable zeal of the old Duke of Valmy, all the corps were still very deficient both in respect to matériel and officers. But ten or fifteen days' exertions on the spot, would enable Napoleon to repair all deficiencies. By means of his own activity, and by paying ready money for what was required out of the private treasure he carried with him, he provided for all that was wanting. To supply the deficiency of officers, which existed to a great extent, a great number of officers who had been summoned from Spain now began to arrive by the public conveyances, and they had no sooner come, than he employed them in their several duties; and when this means of supplying officers failed, he selected, during reviews made under his personal inspection, individuals capable of filling the vacant grades, and delivered them their commissions without awaiting the formalities of the war office. He had said, that in this campaign he would no longer be the Emperor Napoleon, but General Bonaparte, and he kept his word. He had reduced his own equipage to the strictest limits, and required that all his generals should follow his example.

As soon as a regiment was ready for active service, he sent it to Marshal Ney at Wurzburg, or to Marshal Marmont at Hanau, or the imperial guard at Frankfort. Of all his troops, the guard in particular, demanded and received his greatest care, and its reorganization proceeded with extraordinary celerity. The corps of General Lauriston, exclusively composed of cohorts, had already joined Prince Eugene on the Elbe. Those of Marshals Ney and Marmont, were ready to enter the field. The corps of General Bertrand debouched upon Augsburg, and found its artillery sent there for it by Napoleon, to relieve it from the necessity of dragging it over the Alps, money with which to purchase two thousand draught horses in Bavaria, and three thousand recruits, at first intended for the staffs returning from Russia, but subsequently devoted

to the corps arriving from Italy. Every measure was carried out with such rapidity, even to the discipline of the men, that every day the troops were stopped on their march in order to go through the manœuvres which Napoleon had especially recommended, and which consisted in forming the battalion in square, deploying in line, and then forming into column of attack.

Certainly, this is not the way in which first-rate armies are to be formed; but when, in consequence of a too unbounded policy, it is necessary to execute every measure with rapidity, it is at least fortunate to possess the faculty of doing so in a high degree of perfection.

And we may notice how marvellous was the sympathy between the genius of the French nation and Napoleon's errors, which itself, in fact, partly induced him to commit. This quick, intelligent, and heroic nation, which had never since the earliest periods of our history ceased to be at war with Europe, and which, during the twenty-two years of revolution, from 1792 to 1815, never reposed a day, whilst the nations with which it was successively at war took rest by turns, is the only one in the world, perhaps, whose children are capable of being converted into soldiers within the space of three months. In 1813 the thing was easier than ever; for Napoleon possessed a body of highly trained officers, who had practised the art of war during twenty years of service in the field, who had unbounded confidence in themselves and their leader, and who, whilst bitterly deploring the catastrophe at Moscow, were full of eagerness to repair it. With such elements to work with the accomplishment of prodigies was still possible.

Napoleon had calculated that by leaving about thirty thousand men at Dantzic, and Thorn; thirty thousand at Stettin, Custrin, Glogau, and Spandau; Prince Eugene, reinforced by the corps of General Lauriston, which had been sent to him in March, would be able to assemble eighty thousand combatants on the Elbe. He hoped to debouch himself with one hundred and fifty thousand men from Thuringia, receiving, in passing, fifty thousand expected from Italy, and that being thus at the head of two hundred thousand men in addition to the eighty thousand under Prince Eugene, he would have more than sufficient force to overwhelm the hundred and fifty thousand troops, which the Russians and Prussians expected to have at their disposal at the opening of the campaign. There would also be the three armies of reserve which were being formed in Italy, Mayence, and Westphalia, and which would be ready in June or July.

But, as was usually the case, the number of troops actually

ready for service in the field at the opening of the campaign, fell short of Napoleon's calculations, and numbered only two hundred thousand, instead of two hundred and eighty thousand; but this lesser force was still quite sufficient to drive back upon the Elbe, and the Oder, and even upon the Vistula, the imprudent enemies, who had advanced so far to brave his power. The following were the various positions of our troops at the close of April, at the moment of the commencement of operations.

Prince Eugene, after having left twenty-seven or twenty-eight thousand men at Dantzic, thirty-two or thirty-three thousand in the other fortresses of the Vistula and the Oder, had still almost eighty thousand active troops; but a portion of them were not so perfectly available as to be capable of being marched to join Napoleon, when he should debouch on Saxony. Thus Prince Poniatowski, now thrown towards the frontiers of Bohemia, was separated from Prince Eugene by the whole force of the allies, who had passed the Elbe at several points. Of the Polish troops, there was now available only Dombrowski's division, numbering some two thousand infantry and fifteen hundred cavalry, who were at this period being reorganised at Cassel. Of Reynier's corps since its separation from the Saxons, there remained the French division Durutte, which now numbered four thousand men. The twenty-eight thousand of the division Lagrange and Grenier's corps, were reduced to twenty-four thousand, by continual skirmishes with the Prussians and Russians, and were placed under the superior orders of Marshal Macdonald, and under the direct command of Generals Fressinet, Gerard, and Charpentier. Finally, General Lauriston's corps possessed only thirty-two thousand of the forty thousand troops of which it nominally consisted; but its ranks were filled with well trained soldiers, and it was commanded by officers of division of the greatest merit, such as, for example, General Maison. And this corps it was necessary to still further diminish, by detaching from it the division Puthod, for the purpose of covering the lower Elbe, until Marshals Davout and Victor, should, with their reorganised battalions, have retaken Hambourg and occupied Magdebourg. However, of the reorganised battalions, there were eight, those of Marshal Victor, which had hitherto been at the disposal of Prince Eugene, and which guarded Dessau, a very important point, since it was situated at a short distance from the confluence of the Elbe and Saale, behind which two streams, Prince Eugene and Napoleon were to effect their junction. This prince, had, finally, the cavalry which had been remounted in Hanover, and three thou-

sand men of the imperial guard, which he would very shortly have to restore to the imperial guard. Altogether, he had but sixty-two thousand men with whom to join Napoleon, instead of eighty thousand, which it was calculated would have been at his disposal. These sixty-two thousand, however, were well armed, well disposed, and well commanded; and were spread along the line of the Elbe, from Wittenberg, to Magdebourg, ready, and full of eagerness to join Napoleon.

The two hundred thousand men, whom Napoleon had hoped to have under his immediate command after his junction with General Bertrand, were also replaced by a considerably smaller number. Instead of the sixty thousand troops, which it had been supposed would have been at Marshal Ney's command, he had no more than forty-two thousand, the diminution being due to the absence of the Wurtemberg and Bavarian contingents, and the Saxon cavalry. Of the second corps of the Rhine, which was being organised at Hanau, under Marshal Marmont, eight thousand were wanting of the forty thousand which it had been calculated to consist of; and the third of its division, that of General Teate, had so many men absent from its ranks, that it had to await them before joining the grand army. Finally, the imperial guard, the full number of whose troops should have been over forty thousand, was far from ready, in spite of the activity Napoleon had displayed in its reorganisation; fifteen or sixteen thousand alone being prepared for active service. General Bertrand was the only general who succeeded in bringing up his corps to its nominal strength, having almost forty-five thousand effective troops, well disposed and better disciplined than the other portions of the new army, being composed of veteran troops and conscripts who had already been trained during one or two years.

The actual state, therefore, of the various corps was such, that Napoleon would be able to debouch on Saxony at the head of one hundred and thirty-five thousand men, and three hundred and fifty pieces of cannon, to join Prince Eugene who awaited him on the Elbe with sixty-two thousand men and a hundred pieces of cannon, and to meet the enemy at the head of two hundred thousand troops, whose ranks would speedily be filled up by fifty thousand others, and who would be followed by three armies of reserve, the numbers of which would raise the total of our forces in the field, to four hundred thousand at least.—A marvellous and almost incredible fact, when it is remembered that Napoleon had had only three months in which to realise it.

Napoleon, having at length, completed his preparations, quitted Mayence on the 26th of April, and visiting succes-

sively, Wurzburg and Foulde proceeded to Weimar, whither Marshal Ney had preceded him with his young and valiant divisions. His plan, conceived with his usual rapidity and justness of thought, consisted in permitting the forces of the allies already carried beyond the Elbe, to advance as far as they pleased, even as far as the upper Saale, then to direct his own forces upon Erfurt and Weimar, to defile behind the Saale as behind a curtain, to use his own expression, to join Prince Eugene in the direction of Weissenfels, then to pass that river en masse, and to take the enemy in flank with two hundred thousand men in the direction of Leipsic. Should fortune favour him, he might obtain by the execution of this plan the most important results; for after having vanquished the forces of the allies in a great battle, and taken a considerable number of them, he would be able to drive back the remainder beyond the Elbe and the Oder, free the garrisons of the Oder from blockade, re-enter Berlin a conqueror, put himself in communication with Dantzic, and manifest in a more terrible shape than ever, the lion whom his enemies considered overthrown.

In furtherance of these views, he had sent Marshal Ney to occupy the passages of the Saale before the enemy should have had time to seize them, but directed him only to guard and not to cross the Saale, and had directed General Bertrand, followed at a short distance by Marshal Oudinot, to meet him at Saalfeld. At the same time he ordered Prince Eugene to advance, en masse, in the direction of Dessau, at no great distance from the confluence of the Saale and the Elbe, and to ascend the course of the Saale as far as Weissenfels. He himself followed Marshal Ney and General Bertrand, with the guard and the corps of Marshal Marmont. On the 26th he was at Erfurt, on the 28th at Eckartzberg, near the celebrated battle field of Awerstaedt. He had ordered the collection of immense supplies of provisions at Wurzburg, Erfurt, and Naumbourg, and having overcome, by the power of money, the spirit of German patriotism, which was somewhat less ardent in these districts than elsewhere, had reason to hope that his soldiers would obtain the means of subsistence, without being reduced to commit any excesses for the purpose of obtaining it. The delicate operation which at this moment he purposed to accomplish, consisted in a double movement along the course of the Saale, he descending and Prince Eugene ascending it, the result expected of it being to concentrate in one mass all his available troops in the field. The allies, although posted very near, were neither sufficiently keen-sighted nor alert to divine and frustrate his manoeuvre, as they might have done by a single movement.

The Russian army, which had suffered almost as much as our own during the retreat from Moscow, numbered at this time no more than one hundred thousand men, who were spread over the country from Cracow to Dantzic. About twenty thousand of them, under Generals Sacken and Doctorof, were opposed to the Polish and Austrian troops around Cracow; twenty thousand remained before Thorn and Dantzic; eight or nine thousand, under Tettenborn and Czernicheff, occupied the district of the lower Elbe in the direction of Hambourg and Lubeck; ten thousand had followed Wittgenstein beyond Berlin, and, with General d'York's Prussian corps, watched Magdebourg; twelve thousand, of whom the greater number were cavalry, had, under Wintzingerode, passed the Elbe at Dresden; and thirty thousand, who formed the principal corps, and consisted of soldiers of the guard, the grenadiers, and the remainder of Kutusof's army, remained on the Oder at head-quarters.

The Prussians had reconstituted their army with a promptitude which was a manifest sign of an organisation long and secretly prepared. Their treaties with Napoleon obliged them to have but forty-two thousand men under arms, and of these they had had to send twenty thousand to accompany our armies on the late campaign, and of this number a third had perished. But they had kept up numerous regimental staffs and left *en conge* in the towns and country districts, well trained soldiers, who only awaited the signal to rejoin their ranks. By these means, therefore, and by spontaneous levies of the youth of the country, the Prussian government had been able to assemble an army of one hundred and twenty thousand men, of whom sixty thousand were well disciplined troops, ready for active service, forty thousand troops in course of training, and destined to join the troops in the field, and twenty thousand in the garrison.

At the commencement of operations the allies were able to present on the field of battle, on their right, d'York's Prussian corps and Wittgenstein's Russian corps, which, together, amounted to thirty thousand men; in their centre Wintzingerode's corps of from twelve to fifteen thousand cavalry and light infantry, forming the advanced guard; whilst in a second line were Blucher with twenty-six thousand Prussians and Kutusof with thirty thousand Russians; finally, on their left, but out of reach, were ten or twelve thousand men, under General Sacken; a total force of one hundred and ten or one hundred and twelve thousand men, and a somewhat insignificant foundation for the boldness and presumption so largely displayed by the allies, and for the magnificent promises which they had spread throughout Europe, for the purpose of exciting it against us.

The allies had reckoned upon an addition of strength which they still had to await, and which was that they expected to receive at the hands of Prince Bernadotte. In the interview at Abo, the future King of Sweden had agreed with Alexander, to assist the efforts of the coalition by means of a corps of thirty thousand Swedes, and it was arranged that these, together with a body of fifteen or twenty thousand Russians, should be under his own command. For the purpose of facilitating the formation of this army, the English government had granted a subsidy of twenty-five millions of francs. The reward which Sweden was to receive for waging war with France, was, as we have seen, Norway; and Bernadotte, more anxious to seize the reward than to fulfil his engagements, took care first of all to send troops into Norway, to take possession of the price which had been promised for his defection from our alliance. The result was that the allies were full of distrust with respect to the Prince Royal of Sweden, and they received information from their emissaries that the old Marshal Bernadotte had not yet determined on the course he should pursue, and that he might even now, by the offer of due advantages, be induced to adopt more friendly sentiments towards France.

But although thus deprived of the expected Swedish contingent, and still unsupported by Austria, who had not yet joined them, being anxious first to exhaust all the chances of obtaining the conclusion of a satisfactory peace, the allies had determined not only to meet, but even to advance to meet with such forces as they possessed, the shock of Napoleon's armies. And, indeed, after the boasts in which they had indulged, to repass the Elbe could not but be difficult and even dangerous, for it would be to spread discouragement throughout Germany, and to surrender Austria into Napoleon's hands. They were now posted in a species of *coupe-gorge*, having Prince Eugene on one side of them, the mountains of Bohemia on the other, Napoleon opposite; and thus being exposed to being attacked simultaneously both in front and flank. The cautious Kutusof, who had become a species of oracle since his triumphs, persisted in advising that the Russian army should be content with what it had already gained, and, retaining the grand duchy of Warsaw, should make peace with France, and return to Russia; advice which Alexander, although excessively displeased at having to resign the character of liberator of Germany, did not venture to disregard, and, therefore, whilst Wintzingerode, marching in company with the ardent Blucher had crossed the Elbe at the beginning of April, the Russian army had remained behind, only entering Dresden on the 26th, the

same day on which Napoleon reached Erfurt. But suddenly Kutusof, exhausted by the late campaign, died at Bunzlau, in the midst, as it were, of his triumphs; and from the moment of his death, all prudential considerations being thrown away, the only desire of the allies was to meet us in battle anywhere and anyhow, so that the battle-field was in the plains of Saxony, where their cavalry would give them an advantage over the French, who had but a youthful infantry and no cavalry.

The forces of the coalition continued, therefore, to advance during the 27th, 28th, and 29th of April, between Prince Eugene, who was at the confluence of the Saale and the Elbe, and Napoleon, who was advancing from the Thuringian forest. To have hastened upon Leipsic, Lutzen, Weissenfels, and Naumbourg, for the purpose of cutting the line of the Saale, and preventing the junction of Napoleon and Prince Eugene, would have been the method by which the allies could have escaped from the danger of their position, but the execution of such a manœuvre required the guidance of a general, and since Kutusof's death Alexander had remained the sole military authority, listening to every one's advice without knowing whose to adopt. It was agreed that Wittgenstein should have the command when actually in the presence of the enemy, but in the meantime, the coalition forces advanced under a command which was neither prompt, certain, nor calculated to obtain obedience, pushing on as far as Leipsic, Wittgenstein and d'York marching on the right in the direction of Halle, Wintzingerode commanding the advanced guard at Lutzen, Blucher, and the bulk of the Russian army in the centre, between Rotha and Borna, whilst Miloradovitch was on the left, on the Chemnitz route, which runs along the foot of the mountains of Bohemia, to render this side safe, should Marshal Ney happen to appear there. The allies marched on with the knowledge that he was advancing, but failed to perceive that, instead of proceeding along the mountains of Bohemia on issuing from the Thuringian forest, he might take the opposite direction, and descend the Saale for the purpose of joining the viceroy.

On the 29th, in fact, Marshal Ney did descend the Saale, crossed it a little above Weissenfels, and advanced into the immense plains which extend beyond this river, and in the midst of which is Lutzen,—Lutzen which Gustavus Adolphus had rendered celebrated, and which Napoleon was speedily to render still more so.

Following Napoleon's instructions, Marshal Ney crossed the plain of Weissenfels with the division Souham formed into many squares; the advanced cavalry post having, in the

meantime, afforded him very clear information of the approach of Wintzingerode's numerous squadrons. This German General, who commanded the Russian advanced guard, had under his orders the infantry division of Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg, and eight or nine thousand superb cavalry ; and had that very day, advanced beyond Weissenfels for the purpose of seeking what Ney was perfectly ready to afford him, information of the French.

Our conscripts, although in the presence of the enemy, for the first time advanced with the ardour of youthful and exuberant courage, crossing the undulated ground which lay between them and the enemy, undaunted by his fire, and debouching in many squares on the plain beyond. After some discharges of cannon, Landskoy's division of cavalry advanced at a gallop upon our squares, and the aged and intrepid Souham, the heroic Ney, and the generals of brigade, placed themselves in the several squares for the purpose of encouraging their infantry, as yet unaccustomed to such a position. When successive discharges of musketry had checked the enemy's successive assaults, Ney broke the squares of his infantry, and forming them into column, drove the enemy before him. He congratulated his brave conscripts, who filled the air with shouts, a thousand times repeated, of "Vive l'Empereur ;" and from this moment everything could be expected of them. They followed the Russians into Weissenfels, drove them out of it, and at the close of the day were masters of this important point.

At the same moment, Macdonald, whose troops formed Prince Eugene's tête-de-colonne, had entered Mersebourg and mingled his advanced posts with those of Ney. General Lauriston, who followed him, had found the *Halle* bridges strongly occupied by the Prussian General Kleist, with infantry and artillery, and had not striven to force a position which must fall on the morrow by being turned.

On receiving information of the above recited events, Napoleon was greatly delighted, and wrote to Munich, Stuttgart, Carlsruhe, and Paris, recounting the prowess of his young soldiers. On the following day, the 30th, he quitted Eckartsberg and proceeded to Weissenfels.

His junction with Prince Eugene having been now effected on the lower Saale, he naturally was anxious to make it serve the purpose for which he had effected it, and which was that of enabling him to debouch en masse on the famous plains of Lutzen, march upon Leipsic, cross the Elster there, then execute a *mouvement-de-conversion*, the left in advance, and marching upon the allies, to crush their forces against the Bohemian mountains. His reconnaissances had informed him

that the Russian and Prussian forces were crowding upon his right, that they were consequently between him and the mountains on the upper Elster, which was the stream the French army would find on its north, after it had crossed the Saale. He resolved to advance from Weissenfels upon Lutzen, intending to march from thence upon Leipsic in close column, and then to pass the Elster; but as two hundred thousand men could not well advance at the same time by a single road, he sent Marshal Ney, the guard, and Marshal Marmont, by the grand route from Lutzen to Leipsic, ordering General Bertrand and Marshal Oudinot, to debouch from Naumbourg upon Stössen for the purpose of flanking them on the right, and ordering Prince Eugene to debouch from Mersebourg and advance with all his forces upon Leipsic, by the Mackranstædt route, for the purpose of flanking them on the left. On the following day, the 1st of May, he mounted his horse at an early hour, and accompanied by Marshals Ney, Mortier, Bessières, Soult, Duroc, and M. de Coulaincourt, set out in the hope of enjoying with his own eyes, the spectacle which had so charmed Marshal Ney on the previous evening, that of our young soldiers supporting with undaunted courage the charges of the enemy's cavalry.

At daybreak Marshal Ney's troops advanced upon the vast Lutzen plain, formed in squares, which were accompanied by artillery, and preceded by numerous tirailleurs. Arriving at the brink of a long and deep ravine, called the Rippach ravine, from the name of a village which it traversed, the squares broke for the purpose of passing it, and when it had been crossed, re-formed and continued their advance. The division Souham held the foremost place, marching with an excellent bearing, and had just deployed, when Marshal Bessières, who usually commanded the cavalry of the guard, and should not consequently have been where he now was, advanced a little to the right, for the purpose of being better able to observe the enemy's movements, and suddenly fell dead, struck by a bullet in his breast. It was the second time, alas! that this brave man had been hit on the battlefield by Napoleon's side, the first time being at Wagram, where a bullet had struck him but only caused a contusion. His death on the present occasion, caused, in spite of the general confidence, a painful foreboding in more than one heart. He was a valiant man, of a lively Gascon temperament, but possessed of a fine intellect, and of a courage which frequently led him to express to Napoleon useful truths both impressively and opportunely. Napoleon loved and esteemed him, and felt a sincere pang of sorrow at his loss; but then exclaiming, "Death comes nigh us!" pushed forward to

watch the march of his young soldiers, and experienced in the spectacle a satisfaction equal to that felt by Ney two days before ; beholding his conscripts repelling again and again the repeated charges of the enemy's cavalry, and strewing the ground before them with three or four hundred killed and wounded foemen. The troops halted at Lutzen, and Napoleon went to visit the monument of Gustavus Adolphus, who had been struck down on this plain, as Epaminondas, in the bosom of victory, and gave orders that a monument should also be raised to the memory of the Duke of Istria, killed on the same ground.

On the following day, the 2nd of May, a day ever memorable, and one of the last on which fortune smiled upon our arms, Napoleon rose at three in the morning for the purpose of giving his orders, and dictating a multitude of letters. Leipsic was distant only four leagues, and the reports of spies, more explicit now than they had been during the previous days, declared that the Russians and Prussians, continuing their movement on our right, had marched behind the Elster upon Zwenkau and Pegau, with the desire, apparently, to meet us or find out our position. Napoleon, confirmed by this news in his plan of advancing en masse upon Leipsic and then descending upon the enemy's flank, now ordered Prince Eugene to move Lauriston's corps directly upon Leipsic, to direct Macdonald to the right upon Zwenkau, the point at which would be encountered the enemy's most advanced detachments, and to occupy himself a position between Lauriston and Macdonald, with the division Durutte, Latour-Maubourg's cavalry, and a strong reserve of artillery, for the purpose of affording support to the right or the left as circumstances might render necessary. At the same time, as it was possible that the enemy had ascended the Elster for the purpose of taking his own army in flank, Napoleon retained Ney with his five divisions in the environs of Lutzen, posting him at a group of five villages, of which the principal was named Kaja, and situated a league above Lutzen, on the bank of the Floss-Graben, a canal-d'irrigation which traversed the whole plain between the Saale and the Elster. Remaining at this point with his five divisions, Ney was to form the solid pivot around which we were to effect our *mouvement de conversion* ; and Napoleon ordered Marmont and Oudinot to cross the Rippach for the purpose of taking up a position on Ney's right, that they might be ready to assist him, or be assisted themselves, should they be unexpectedly attacked, and that, should they encounter no enemy, they might subsequently advance together upon the Elster, by Zwenkau and Pegau.

Having informed each *chef-de-corps* with the utmost precision of what he expected him to do, and how to act under any circumstances that might happen, Napoleon employed himself in dictating letters, of which one was to the Duke of Rovigo, pointing out the kind of language which was to be held on the part of the government with respect to military affairs, at the moment when the public mind received with great distrust all official assertions, and concluding with these remarkable words ;—" *Truth and simplicity must be our rules to-day.*"

At ten o'clock he set out from Lutzen followed by a squadron of the guard, and hastened towards Leipsic, which was some four leagues distant. At the same moment, Marshal Macdonald, crossing the Leipsic route from left to right, advanced upon Zwenkau ; whilst on the left, General Lauriston advanced from Mackranstædt upon Leipsic, Prince Eugene being upon the Leipsic route with the division Durutte and Latour-Maubourg's cavalry, and followed by the whole mass of the guard.

Passing along these various columns, which received him with repeated cries of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" Napoleon arrived in front of Leipsic, which the intrepid Maison, in command of the first division of Lauriston's corps, was attacking with his accustomed resolution and skill, General Kleist defending it with the Prussian infantry. A tract of marshy and wooded ground, as is well known, lies in front of Leipsic on the Lutzen side, and being traversed by various arms of the Elster, Leipsic itself can only be reached on this side by crossing the long series of bridges thrown over them, and these were now defended by powerful artillery and a body of Prussian infantry ; *tirailleurs*, moreover, filling the surrounding thickets. But General Maison, directing a vigorous flank fire upon these defences, and then making a battalion ford the first arm of the Elster, for the purpose of taking them in the rear, compelled the Prussians to evacuate the first bridge, and pursued them at the head of his infantry.

Whilst Napoleon watched through his glass in the fair May weather, this scene so similar to so many others which had filled his life, a cannonade suddenly resounded on his right, from the direction of the villages at which he had left Ney's five divisions. He had calculated all the chances of the vast manœuvre which he had planned, and could be neither surprised nor disconcerted. He listened some moments to this cannonade, which continually increased, and then exclaimed, " Whilst we are endeavouring to turn them they are endeavouring to turn us ! It is well ; they will find

us ready for them." He immediately sent Ney, who had hitherto accompanied him, to maintain the position held by his five divisions in the five villages; and then, with the readiness of one prepared for every eventuality, ordered a complete revolution in his order of march; in the first place directing General Lauriston to leave only one of his three divisions in Leipsic, and to échelon the two others in the rear, to ascend the course of the Elster with them as far as Zwenkau itself, and to advance upon the left of Ney. Macdonald, who had been ordered to move upon Zwenkau, he now directed to descend from this place upon Eisdorf, a little village situated on Ney's left, on the edge of the Floss-Graben, where he would be in a position to flank Ney's left, and even to outflank the enemy coming from Zwenkau. Prince Eugene, leaving Lauriston at Leipsic, was to support Macdonald with the remainder of his troops. Such were the arrangements Napoleon now made on Ney's left. On his right Napoleon ordered Marmont to take up a position at Starsiedel, one of the five villages which Ney's corps had been directed to guard. At the same time, he ordered General Bertrand to debouch even on the enemy's rear, linking himself with Marmont, and thus Ney would be flanked on the right and left by corps which would not only afford him support, but also envelope the two flanks of the enemy. Finally, that his centre might not be penetrated, he made the whole of the guard retrace its steps, and moved it by the Lutzen route upon Kaja.

We must now direct our attention to the movements of the allies, and the circumstances which had brought them to encounter our arms at Kaja, instead of where Napoleon had expected to meet them, beyond Leipsic. On receiving information of the two engagements in which General Wintzingerode had encountered our troops with his cavalry, in advance of and in the rear of Weissenfels, on the 29th of April and the 1st of May, the allies had at length comprehended that Napoleon, ceasing to descend the course of the Saale for the purpose of joining the viceroy, was marching from the Saale to the Elster for the purpose of taking them in flank. Having determined to encounter us in battle, they were anxious to meet us on the plain of Lutzen, on account of the advantages it would afford their cavalry over so young an infantry as ours; and Diebitch, Prince Wittgenstein's chief of the staff, proposed to take advantage of Napoleon's flank march to attack him in flank himself, throwing twenty-five thousand men upon him in the direction of Kaja, in the hope of driving his infantry, thus unexpectedly assailed, amongst the marshes which extend from Leipsic to Mersebourg, the point of junction of the Saale and the Elster. This plan was assented to, and

it was agreed that on the night of the 1st of May, the troops of the allies should cross the Elster, those that came from Leipsic and Rotha, at Zwenkau, and those which came from Borna at Pegau; that they should then cross the Floss-Graben, and should then by a *mouvement de conversion* fall upon the five villages situated on the right of the Lutzen, where only a few bivouacs had been observed, and should from thence hurl themselves upon the flank of the French army, the cavalry being ready to charge at a gallop, as soon as the infantry should have taken the villages.

The whole night was employed in these manœuvres, and occupied so long a time that at ten o'clock in the morning the troops were still defiling—rejoiced at seeing the French army on its march upon Leipsic, hoping to surprise it. Alexander and Frederick William, abandoning the command to Wittgenstein, rode through the ranks of their soldiers, receiving their acclamations, and contributing thus to increase a loss of time which had already been too great.

The allies having crossed the Floss-Graben above us for the purpose of advancing to Lutzen, whilst we had crossed it below on our way to Leipsic, rested their right on the Floss-Graben, their left on the Rippach ravine, having in front the five villages, the possession of which was about to be so valiantly disputed. It was agreed that Blucher should attack in the first place the three first villages, which were situated in a hollow, and named respectively Gross-Gorschen, Rahna, and Klein-Gorschen, that Wittgenstein and d'York should support him, that Wintzingerode, posted on the right with all his cavalry, should be ready to pour down upon the French as soon as they should be thrown into disorder, that, finally, the guard and the Russian reserve, infantry and cavalry, ranged on the right along the Floss-Graben, should be ready to advance to the support of the troops which might require it. There was some hope that Miloradovitch would arrive in time to take part in the battle, but without his troops the allies had at their disposal eighty thousand men, well concentrated, and animated with the utmost resolution.

When the troops had had an hour's repose, Blucher's Prussians commenced the attack under the eyes of the two sovereigns, who were posted on a slight eminence at some distance to watch the undaunted courage of their soldiers. Towards noon, Blucher advanced at the head of the division Kleist upon Gross-Gorschen, throwing a violent artillery fire upon four battalions of the division Souham, which, averted by the protracted preparations of the allies, had had time to get under arms, and then attacking them with such extreme vigour with the division Kleist, that they were driven back

into Gross-Gorschen, and from thence into Rahna and Klein-Groschen. On the left, and opposite Starsiedel, another of the five villages, Wintzingerode had, in the meantime, approached the villages with his horse, with the intention of outflanking them, and seizing the occasion for a decisive charge.

In Klein-Gorschen and Rahna, the division Souham, numbering twelve thousand men, and rallied by its old general whose rare courage was accompanied by the experience of twenty years, defended itself with the utmost vigour. Unfortunately, the division Gerard, which was posted on the right, was still in the disorder of the bivouac, and was unable to use its artillery, the horses having been sent to procure forage, and it was possible, therefore, that on this side Souham might be outflanked. But at this moment, Marshal Marmont, having crossed the Rippach, debouched from Starsiedel opposite Wintzingerode, and posted his troops so as to cover the division Gerard, and Wintzingerode dared not attack infantry, whose lines appeared as solid as walls, and which a storm of fire failed to shake.

But now, animated, not only by his natural courage, but also by all the passionate patriotism of a German, Blucher led his second division, that of Zeither, with so much energy upon Klein-Gorschen and Rahna, that he succeeded in overcoming the divisions Souham and Gerard, driving them out towards Kaja on the one side, and Starsiedel on the other, and to these two other villages, Blucher, carried away by his heroic ardour, then advanced, resolved to surmount all obstacles.

But at this moment, Ney arrived from Leipsic, bringing with him those of his divisions which were in the rear of Kaja, and Blucher had now to encounter an enemy capable of giving check to his own. At the aspect of Ney's energetic face and person, our young soldiers recovered confidence, and having been rallied behind the division Brenier, which was at Kaja, advanced to retake the abandoned villages at the point of the bayonet, and driving back the Prussian troops which had advanced beyond them, re-entered Klein-Gorschen on the other, and in these two villages the conflict became a fierce hand to hand encounter, the result of which was that the Prussians were driven back to Gross-Gorschen, their first conquest.

Napoleon now came up, passing through the files of wounded who shouted at his approach "*Vive l'Empereur!*" He saw that Ney maintained his position in the centre, that Eugene with Macdonald marched on the left beyond the Elben-Giraben, for the purpose of outflanking the enemy in

the direction of Eisdorf, and that Marmont, whose troops were formed on the right in numerous squares, maintained his position at Starsiedel. He could not perceive Bertrand, who was at some distance, but he could reckon upon his arrival, and knew that the guard were hastening up with the greatest expedition. He was satisfied, therefore, with the aspect of affairs, and allowed the battle to continue.

Blucher now brought up the royal guard and the reserves; throwing one or two battalions beyond the Floss-Graben for the purpose of preserving Eisdorf against a column of French troops, which he perceived to be advancing against it; and, on the left, hurling the royal horse-guard upon the divisions Bonnet and Compans, which were ranged in square in front of Starsiedel, directing Wintzingerode to support this attack with the whole of the Russian cavalry, whilst he himself advanced with the infantry of the royal guard upon Klein-Gorschen and Rahna. He received a wound in the arm but refused to leave the field; once more the enemy succeeded in gaining possession of Klein-Gorschen and Rahna, from whence, without pausing for a moment, they marched upon Kaja, and for the first time deprived us of its possession, whilst the cavalry directed against the divisions Bonnet and Compans endeavoured, but wholly in vain, to break their squares.

Kaja being taken, our centre was laid entirely open, and had the Russian army been now sent to the support of Blucher, Ney's line would have been pierced before our imperial guard could have had time to close up the breach. Napoleon, in the midst of the fire, rallied the conscripts. "Boys," he said, "I have relied upon you to save the empire, and you fly!" The guard not having as yet arrived, he ordered Count Lobau to place himself at the head of the division Ricard, Ney's fifth division, and retake Kaja; and this officer, marching upon Kaja, attacked the Prussians which occupied it at the bayonet's point, and drove them back towards the hollow in which were situated the villages of Rahna and Klein-Gorschen. At the same time, Souham and Gerard, led on by Ney in person, returned to the charge with their rallied divisions; and from one wing to the other, over a space of two leagues, the combat continued to rage with unabated violence. Macdonald, with his three divisions, after having taken Rapitz from the enemy's advanced troops, approached from Eisdorf and Kitzen, and extended his cannon on our left, beyond the Floss-Graben. Towards the opposite side, Bertrand debouched beyond the position occupied by Marmont and his first division, whilst Morand's was perceived in the distance on our right, approaching in many squares.

Blucher now demanded support and the means of making a great blow at our centre, and the second line of the forces of the allies, that of Wittgenstein and d'York, was ordered to advance to the support of Blucher's almost annihilated troops. Traversing the burning ruins of Klein-Gorschen and Rahna, they passed across the wrecks of the Prussian army, and through a storm of fire advanced upon Kaja, whilst Wintzingerode, with the Prussian horse-guard and a portion of the Russian cavalry, threw themselves upon Marmont's squares, which had taken up a position a little in the rear, that they might rest on Starsiedel. Fruitless assaults! which the squares of Bonnet and Compans received as though they were inflamed citadels, pouring forth floods of fire from their walls. But on the right, the eighteen thousand men of Wittgenstein and d'York, led on with a vigour worthy of the importance of the moment, repulsed Ney's division, and pouring into Kaja, debouched from it and found themselves face to face with Napoleon's guard. Beyond the Floss-Graben the Prince of Wurtemberg disputed Eisdorf with the troops under Macdonald.

It was now Napoleon's turn to endeavour to make a decisive effort, and he ordered the advance of the young guard, directing the sixteen battalions of the division Dumoutier to break their squares, to form into columns of attack, to march upon Kaja and Starsiedel, to break through the enemy's lines at any price, and, in short, to vanquish them, for it was absolutely necessary that they should do so. In the meantime, the old guard, formed into six squares, remained as so many redoubts intended to close the centre of our line. At the same time, Napoleon ordered Druot to take up a position with eighty pieces of cannon, somewhat obliquely on our right in advance of Starsiedel, so as to take in front the cavalry which continued to attack uninterruptedly Marmont's division, and to take in flank Wittgenstein's and d'York's line of infantry.

These orders were executed immediately after they were given. The young guard, advancing in columns of attack, together with such of Ney's troops as were still capable of fighting, retook Kaja and drove back the troops of Wittgenstein, d'York, and Blucher, into the hollow in which were situated the villages of Klein-Gorschen and Rahna, where a storm of fire from Druot's artillery fell upon them and compelled them to beat a retreat. At the same moment two of Macdonald's divisions took Kitzen and Eisdorf from Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg, in spite of the aid sent by Alexander; whilst at the opposite extremity, Bonnet and Compans, led on by Marmont, broke their squares, and ad-

vanced in column upon the enemy's flank, behind which Morand had already extended his cannon.

It was now nearly eight o'clock, the staff of the allies began to be confused, and Frederick William and Alexander deliberated with their generals on the height from which they had witnessed the battle, respecting what should now be done. Blucher, more vehement than ever, was anxious that the Russian guard should once more be hurled against the French centre, urging that Miloradovitch would arrive in the course of the night, and serve as a reserve to cover the retreat of the army should a retreat be necessary. Wittgenstein and Diebitch replied, with good reason, that to persist in continuing the battle would be to incur the risk of being completely surrounded, and that, moreover, the supplies of ammunition were exhausted. These reasons were unanswerable, and a retreat was ordered, but Blucher, indignant, declared that he would prove with his cavalry alone that the day was not yet lost. There remained, in fact, about four or five thousand of the Prussian cavalry, chiefly of the royal guard, yet capable of engaging the enemy, and having rallied them, the old Prussian general led them on in person against the French troops of Marmont's corps, posted on the left of the allies, in advance of Starsiedel. The first regiment, the 37th leger, of recent formation, surprised by the sudden attack, gave way, carrying along with them for the moment Marmont himself, who had hastened up with his staff. But the divisions Bonnet and Compans resisted all Blucher's furious attacks. And now, at length, having driven back this temporary disturbance, our troops could lie down in sleep upon the field of battle, which, covered with ruins and inundated with blood, the forces of the allies had been compelled, after so long a conflict, to abandon to us.

Napoleon slept on the field of battle, and at daybreak on the following day, the 3rd of May, mounted his horse, eager to give directions for the collection of the wounded, to put his troops in order and to pursue the enemy. Had he now possessed the cavalry which had perished in Russia, he might have taken them by thousands, but as it was he could only collect the enemy's wounded, and dismounted cannon, of which trophies he collected a great number. Of the ninety-two thousand men of the army of the allies, about sixty-five thousand had been engaged, and on our side not many more. On each side the loss was very great, the Russians and Prussians having lost about twenty thousand and the French about seventeen or eighteen thousand. The material results of our victory were not so considerable as our arms had been accustomed in former times to obtain, when each

branch of our military service was in a state of perfection, and when we fought against enemies who were not as yet inspired with the courage of despair, but they were, nevertheless, satisfactory, and such as were sufficient cause that Napoleon should thank the generous nation which had thus once more poured out her blood for him, and should follow, if only for her sake, a prudent line of conduct.

How far the blow suffered by the allies was a decisive one, was speedily apparent, for their troops could be perceived in full retreat along the various routes. But decided and indisputable as their defeat had been, they nevertheless indulged in the most arrogant language, Alexander even claiming the result of the battle as a victory for the coalition, whilst the Prussians, overwhelmed, apparently, with the fact of having held their ground at all against Napoleon, spread abroad in all directions the announcement that they had gained a complete triumph, and retreated solely on account of the want of ammunition, and in conformity with a simple military calculation. And, indeed, it was in conformity with a military calculation, but it was that which leads the vanquished to fly before the conqueror. The forces of the allies hurried on, in fact, as quickly as possible to repass the Elster, the Pleiss, the Mulde, and the Elbe, and leave a hundred leagues of country between themselves and the French.

Napoleon having become convinced of the importance of this battle of Lutzen by the rapidity of the enemy's retreat, sent to Munich, Stutgard, and Paris, letters full of just pride, and breathing the admiration of his young soldiers which they so well deserved; and then went to sleep at Pégau, rising at midnight, as was his wont, to give the necessary orders for the march of his troops. It was possible that the forces of the allies might take either of two directions—In the first place, the Prussians might gain by Torgau the Berlin route, for the purpose of covering their capital, whilst the Russians followed the Dresden route for the purpose of re-entering Silesia.—Or, secondly, abandoning Berlin to its fate, and the zeal of the Prince Royal of Sweden, the forces of the allies might continue their march in one mass upon Dresden; and Napoleon, with a military skill of which he alone was capable, formed his own plan of operations in such a manner, that it might meet whichever course was pursued by the enemy. He directed Ney to remain two days at Lutzen for the purpose of tending his wounded, and then to enter Leipzig in triumph, that this city, which had displayed a spirit of hostility against us, might witness our triumph and the terror of our arms. He also arranged that he should be joined by Reynier with about fifteen thousand French and

Saxon troops. the Duke of Belluna with fifteen thousand French, and General Sebastiani with fourteen thousand; which, added to the thirty-five or thirty-six thousand he still possessed of his forty-eight thousand, would form a total of eighty thousand. This addition to his force would be made within a week, and it was he who should have the honour of pursuing Blücher, should the Prussian General take the route to Berlin.

Napoleon reserved to himself the care of following the principal portion of the allied forces with the troops of Oudinot and Bertrand, reinforced by the Bavarian and Wurtemberg divisions, with the troops under Marmont, Macdonald, and Lauriston, and, finally, with the guard—a total force of about one hundred and forty thousand combatants. Having made these arrangements and directed Ney to demand of the city of Leipsic six thousand beds for his wounded, and whatever he might have need of, he set out from Pégau, his troops being divided into three columns, of which the principal composed of the troops under Macdonald, Marmont, and the guard, and led by Prince Eugene in person, was to gain by Borna, the great Dresden road which passes by Waldheim and Wilsdruff; whilst the second, composed of the troops under Bertrand and Oudinot, keeping four or five leagues to the right, was to skirt through Rochlitz, Mittweida, and Freyberg, the base of the mountains of Bohemia. The third, formed of Lauriston's corps alone, was to keep some leagues to the left, and proceed by Wurtzen upon Meissen, one of the *points de passage* of the Elbe, the most useful to occupy, and to form a line between Napoleon and Marshal Ney.

On the morning of the 5th of May, Napoleon set out for Borna for the purpose of placing himself in the track of his principal column, Prince Eugene preceding him. When the latter arrived at Kolditz on the Mulde, he found the Prussian rear-guard posted along the river, the bridges of which were destroyed; he ascended the course of the stream, however, a little to the right, and discovering a ford, established himself on a height which dominated the great Dresden route, and compelled the Prussians to withdraw from the banks of the river under the fire of twenty pieces of cannon. They lost some hundreds of men, and retreated towards Leipsic, passing across the lines of a Russian corps which was in position at Seyfersdorf, beyond Harta, and was that of Miloradovitch, of whom the Prussians bitterly complained, that he had allowed the whole fury of the battle at Lützen to fall upon them alone. After having opened to let the Prussians defile through them, Miloradovitch

re-formed his ranks, and taking advantage of his position, resisted with great firmness the energetic attacks of Prince Eugene, who could only dislodge him by turning him.

During the 6th and 7th our troops continued the pursuit of the enemy without pause, Napoleon wishing to arrive in Dresden by the 8th of May, at the latest. The Prussians had taken the Meissen route, the Russians that of Dresden ; but it was still impossible to conclude that they intended to separate. Napoleon having directed Lauriston's corps upon Meissen, urged him to hasten towards the Elbe, that he might obtain possession, if possible, of the passage of the river, a matter of great importance, since our pontoons were far in the rear ; and that he might, also, overcome all attempts at resistance on the part of Dresden, and render it unnecessary to destroy any of the fair edifices with which its electors had adorned it.

On the 8th our troops stood on the amphitheatre of hills, from the heights of which the fair city of Dresden appears, seated on the two banks of the Elbe and at the foot of the mountains of Bohemia, as Florence upon the two banks of the Arno, at the foot of the Apennines. Descending the slopes of this amphitheatre they beheld the dark columns of the Russian army thronging through the streets of the city, and repassing the Elbe by temporary bridges, which they burned behind them. Our soldiers entered the principal or old town, which is situated on the left bank of the river, and the Russians occupied the new town, situated on the right bank.

Our columns had scarcely entered Dresden, when the municipal authorities hastened to implore our clemency, having good reason, indeed, to be alarmed, since they had raised triumphal arches in honour of the allied sovereigns, and addressed both entreaties and threats to their own sovereign, for the purpose of inducing him to follow the example of the King of Prussia. Napoleon, who had hastened up almost immediately, received the keys of the city on horseback, at the same time sternly declaring to those who presented them, that it was only his personal consideration for Frederick Augustus that induced him to save their city from pillage, and that the least act of treason in future, would be immediately followed by the most terrible chastisements.

Napoleon was anxious to drive the Russians out of the portion of the city on the opposite bank, the new town, for the purpose of avoiding the occurrence of hostilities between the troops posted on the opposite banks, and the consequent danger of destruction to this beautiful capital. It would have been possible to have effected the passage by means of the

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one of his aides-de-camp to Prague with a formal summons to him, under pain of forfeiture of his kingdom, to return to Dresden immediately, with his cavalry, artillery, and court, and to surrender into the hands of General Reynier the fortress of Torgau, together with the ten thousand Saxon troops who occupied it.

With respect to Austria the conduct of affairs had become more difficult, in consequence of what had occurred in Vienna whilst Napoleon was fighting the battles of Lutzen and marching upon Dresden; for M. de Narbonne, receiving a length from Paris, through M. de Bassano, and from Mayence, through M. de Coulaincourt, Napoleon's most formal instructions, declared to M. de Metternich that he would send him a note summoning him to explain himself categorically upon the treaty of alliance of which he refused the literal execution. Upon this M. de Metternich, abandoning subtle arguments, had entreated M. de Narbonne not to insist farther upon placing Austria in a false position, by demanding what she could not grant, namely, the resumption of hostilities with Russia. M. de Narbonne still returning to the charge, M. de Metternich went so far as to say that he was committing a fault in doing so, for he believed he could be certain that Napoleon was unwilling to push matters to a crisis with the Austrian court. In fact, M. de Bubna, returning to Paris much impressed by the attentions of which he had there been the subject, declared that Napoleon was anxious to act in accord with his father-in-law, and that with proper management, a reasonable arrangement of the affairs of Europe might speedily be effected.

M. de Narbonne, however, still adhered to his plan of submitting a formal note to the Austrian court, in which this court should be summoned either to execute the treaty of alliance of the 14th of March, 1812, or declare that it no longer existed. But having some fears with respect to what might be the answer to such a demand, and being anxious to be able to anticipate it, he demanded an interview of the Emperor Francis, and being immediately admitted to his presence, besought him not to cause a state of hostilities between France and Austria, which could not but be productive of the greatest misfortunes. The Emperor received M. de Narbonne with much quiet politeness, and repeated to him all that M. de Metternich had already said, declared that he wished to remain the ally of his son-in-law, but without abandoning the only policy which his people would willingly see him adopt—a material one. He concluded, as had M. de Metternich, by declaring his belief that M. de Narbonne, doubtless for the purpose of relieving himself from personal responsibility

persisted too far in the line he had adopted, and exceeded the intentions of his master.

M. de Narbonne still persisted, however, in demanding a reply to his note, and M. de Metternich, at length compelled to reply, referred to the declaration made on the 12th of April; declaring that as Austria had adopted the position of a mediator upon the instigation of France herself, she could not place herself in a position of hostility with respect to one of the belligerent powers; and that, moreover, as the services of the Austrian auxiliary corps were guaranteed by the treaty of alliance of the 14th of March, 1812, which the 12th of April had declared inapplicable as a means of action in the existing state of affairs, it would be better to defer its active employment.

But at the same time, as M. de Metternich was anxious to avoid a rupture with France, he added, with respect to the Polish troops, that whilst, of course, they were always at liberty to refrain from retreating behind the Austrian frontier, and to encounter the Russian forces alone if they chose, they might also, if they wished to pass through Bohemia for the purpose of entering Saxony, retain their arms on their way, and should find on their line of march both quarters and provisions.

The evil result of these disputations was, that they not only assisted Austria in making those declarations which she was subsequently to employ so disastrously against us, but also led her, in despair of inducing us to adopt a judicious course, to hasten to take that fatal resolution which was recommended to her by all around her. They were now interrupted, however, by the news of the late military events. The report that we had suffered a great defeat was everywhere spread abroad with the most extraordinary assurance. The English ambassador, Lord Cathcart, experienced in military affairs and a witness of the battle, regarded this report, indeed, as a foolish lie, and declared that if the allies could only gain such victories, it would be well to treat for peace on any terms; and M. de Metternich had too keen an intellect to be deceived by such idle boasting.—And in fact, four days after the first arrival of the news, information was received that the *soi-disant* vanquished were at the gates of Dresden, and the *soi-disant* conquerors beyond the Elbe. The greatest confusion was excited by the information of these facts, and the salons of Vienna were filled with exclamations against the military incapacity of the two allied sovereigns; but instead of having gained over the public feeling in our favour by our success, it was now insisted more vehemently than ever, that Austria ought to hasten to the aid of the allied armies, and join the coalition for the purpose of saving Europe from an intolerable yoke.

M. de Metternich assured M. de Narbonne, and not insincerely, that he was by no means astonished at Napoleon's victories, and that he had, in fact, based his pacific calculations on the assumption that these victories would be gained by him. To render the attainment of a peace possible, he said, it was necessary to find a means of blotting out two thirds of the propositions of Russia, England, and Prussia; and these means the battle of Lutzen would afford. But there remained the third part of these propositions, of which it was impossible to deny the reason, justice, and wisdom, and to which it would be necessary to agree; that the time had come for the court of Vienna to adopt its mediatorial office, assumed at the instigation of France with the consent of the other belligerent powers; that it would immediately despatch, therefore, two plenipotentiaries, the one to the French the other to the Russian head-quarters, selecting the Count de Bubna as the former, and M. de Stadion as the latter. At the same time, without pretending to impose them upon Napoleon, M. de Metternich would take the liberty, he said, to indicate the conditions which the Austrian cabinet considered would be acceptable to all the belligerent powers, and he repeated those which have been already laid before the reader, —the suppression of the grand duchy of Warsaw and its restoration to Prussia, with the exception of some portions which would properly return to the share of Russia and Austria; the reconstitution of Prussia by means of this grand duchy, and other territories to be found in Germany; the abandonment of the confederation of the Rhine, and the renunciation of the Hanseatic departments, that is to say, of the towns of Bremen, Hambourg, and Lubeck. All mention of Holland, Italy, and Spain, was to be avoided, for fear of exciting insurmountable difficulties; and the subject, even, of a maritime peace was to be left in abeyance, should it be found impossible to come to an understanding with England on that point. Such, independently of the restoration of the Illyrian provinces, which we had almost promised to Austria, were the conditions now offered to us; conditions which left to us Westphalia, Lombardy, and Naples, as royal vassals: Holland, Belgium, the Rhenish provinces, Piedmont, Tuscany, and the Roman states, as French departments. Such was the France which was offered us, and the offer of which we regarded as an outrage. With respect to Spain, it was certain that its renunciation would be a necessary condition of peace with England; but this sacrifice on our part, M. de Metternich said he had good reason to know would be sufficient, and we have already seen that it would be no insurmountable obstacle to peace on the part of Napoleon.

M. de Narbonne repeatedly declared that Napoleon, victorious, would not accept these conditions, and M. de Metternich as repeatedly rejoined, that Napoleon was not so unreasonable as he was represented, that those conditions, moreover, were inevitable, and that a great struggle would be necessary to induce the allies to accept even them.

In the meantime, the King of Saxony had sorrowfully consented to comply with Napoleon's intimation to him to return to his capital, and prepared to set out from Prague, with his troops and his court, anxiously entreating that secrecy might be observed with respect to the negotiations which had taken place between the cabinets of Dresden and Vienna, and which had simply had reference, in fact, to the adoption of a mediatorial policy.

When Napoleon received information of what had taken place at Vienna, he perceived at length the fault which had been committed, in urging the Austrian cabinet to take so prominent a part in the politics of Europe, and in leading her to assume the part of an armed mediator, whilst unwilling to submit to her arbitration. He perceived, also, the error into which he had fallen, in believing that he would be able to interest this power in the success of his projects by the offer of the spoils of Prussia, and in failing to see that no territorial aggrandisement was equal in her estimation to independence. But, as is the wont of princes, he threw the blame on his representative, M. de Narbonne, who, with the instructions which had been given him, could not have acted otherwise; and in gentle language, for he held M. de Narbonne in sincere regard, blamed him for having pushed matters too far, for having submitted a written note to the Austrian cabinet, whilst the archives of the embassy contained a prohibition against doing so without the authority of a formal order, and with having led M. de Metternich to declare that the treaty of alliance between France and Austria was no longer applicable to circumstances. He now directed him to maintain the most extreme reserve, and to avoid entering into any communications with the Austrian court, that she might perceive that we no longer considered her an ally, whilst still accepting her as a mediator, but not an armed mediator.

In the meantime, Napoleon was bitterly exasperated against Austria and his father-in-law, being irritated at finding that they had completely deceived his calculations, and disgusted at the conditions of peace which they submitted for his acceptance. He had renounced his plans with respect to the grand duchy of Warsaw, having found with how many difficulties its maintenance was surrounded; but after having

just undertaken the campaign of 1812 for the purpose of humiliating Russia, to have to behold Russia aggrandised, and Poland, the re-establishment of which as a kingdom he had undertaken for the purpose of humiliating her, irrevocably destroyed; to have to endure the defection of Prussia and to permit her to receive a reward for that defection; to have to renounce the protectorate of the confederation of the Rhine, and to abandon the Hanseatic towns—were an accumulation of sacrifices which implied no diminution to his real power, but were fraught with severe shocks to his pride. With regard to the real interests of France none of these sacrifices could properly be subjects of regret. With respect to Poland it was puerile to attempt to make of this country a protection for Austria and Prussia, so long as these powers did not themselves care for it; with respect to Prussia it could not be our interest, either in relation to Russia or to Austria, to keep her so shorn of strength as she now was. With respect to the protectorate of the Rhine, it was but an empty title, odious to the Germans, and capable only of bringing upon us their hatred without any counterbalancing advantage; and, finally, with respect to the Hanseatic towns, to persist in retaining them, was simply to extend our military and commercial frontier beyond all reason. Their possession imposed a charge upon France for which she could receive no return, since she could not defend them without extending her territory to the Elbe; and they were commercially indispensable to the trade interests of Germany, whilst useless to ours.

The irritation Napoleon experienced on learning in decided terms the intentions of Austria, was pushed to its utmost limit by a chance circumstance. A courier had been intercepted at Dresden on his way from Vienna, carrying despatches from M. de Stackelberg, who was the Russian representative at the Austrian court, since relations had been re-established between these two powers on the ground of a mediation; and in these despatches addressed by M. de Stackelberg to M. de Nesselrode, were found many singular details, whilst they showed clearly that M. de Metternich, placed in a difficult position which condemned him to a course of extreme dissimulation, was prodigal of testimonies of sympathy with each of the belligerent powers, and even more so to the Russians and Prussians than to the French. And that this should be the case might have been well understood by us without the perusal of intercepted despatches, and was no reason why we should not consider M. de Metternich to be sincere, in declaring that on certain conditions Austria would be on our side. We should have

understood that M. de Metternich, being a German, could not and ought not to be entirely favourable to our policy, and should have endeavoured to obtain of his prudence just so much as was possible, and no more. But Napoleon, inspired by pride, victory, and despotism, was as irritated by the revelations contained in the intercepted despatches, as though his keen intellect, which was full of light when undisturbed by passion, had not been able to foresee them.

Napoleon now suddenly returned to the policy which had been proposed in the council held in the Tuileries in the preceding January, and earnestly supported by MM. de Coullaincourt, Talleyrand, and Cambacérès, and which consisted in ignoring the mediation of Austria, and endeavouring to enter into direct negotiations with Russia. But judicious as the adoption of this policy would be, it was attended by a serious practical inconvenience, in the shape of the difficulty of entering into communication with the Russian Emperor. This difficulty had been great in January, and had become much increased by the late military events, and the hopes which the Germans cradled in Alexander's breast that he was to be the liberator of Europe, and the first of reigning monarchs. Napoleon, however, expected that the battle of Lutzen and another victory, which he felt certain he should obtain, would dissipate the extravagant ideas in which Alexander had permitted himself to indulge, and would render direct communication with him a matter of no difficulty. He resolved, therefore to carry on this campaign with the utmost vigour, to strike, as soon as possible some decisive blow, and to take advantage of it to secure peace, but by means of direct negotiations with Russia or even England, rather than with the Germanic powers. By yielding Poland wholly or partly to Russia, and Spain wholly or partly to the Bourbons, it appeared to him that peace might be arranged, without submitting him to the yoke of Prussia, which, according to him, had openly betrayed him, or of Austria, who had betrayed him secretly. Should the progress of the war not bring an immediate decisive result and a negotiation, he wished to prolong the existing situation until the completion of the second series of his armaments should be completed, when he would have at his disposal a total force of some five hundred thousand combatants, when he would be relieved from the necessity of dissembling any longer with Austria, and established on the Elbe as formerly on the Adige, at Dresden as formerly at Verona, at the foot of the mountains of Bohemia as formerly at the foot of the Alps, he would be able to carry on, not only against a single power, but against the whole of Europe, a new campaign of Italy,

in which, by the aid of a riper experience, he would be able to repeat at a riper age the prodigies of his youth, to be concluded then, as formerly, by brilliant triumphs, which would enable him, at length to enjoy repose by granting it to the world.

Having thus resolved, Napoleon gave up his whole thoughts as usual, to practical arrangements, for, in himself a miracle of contrasts, he was as chimerical in his projects as he was precise and correct in the means he took to realize them. In the first place, he sent a series of despatches to M. de Narbonne, directing him to behave with the utmost reserve towards the Austrian cabinet, at the same time letting it see that France no longer relied on its aid, and recognised the truth of the maxim which it was so fond of repeating, that the treaty of the 14th of March, 1812, was no longer applicable to circumstances.—Directing him to attempt no denial of the vast armaments which were being so rapidly made in Italy, Bavaria, and France; and to intimate to the Austrian cabinet that its mediation was by no means necessary to France as a means of communication with the other powers, since the quarrel between the Emperor Napoleon and the Emperor Alexander was political and not personal, and the two sovereigns had never ceased to have a mutual feeling of friendship, which would be revived on the first amicable demonstration on the part of Napoleon. “*A direct mission to the Russian head-quarters,*” said Napoleon, “*would divide the world in two.*!” an exclamation which signified that the despatch of M. de Coulaincourt, whose old friendship with the Emperor Alexander was well known to the Russian Emperor, would entirely change the aspect of affairs, combining the forces of France and Russia in one camp, and those of the rest of the world in the other. But this hint was not founded on fact, since the pride of the Emperor Alexander had been so deeply wounded, and was most imprudent, since it would naturally lead Austria to throw herself immediately into the arms of Russia, and thus deprive Napoleon of the two months which he required for the purpose of converting into five hundred thousand men the three hundred thousand which were at this time at his disposal. Fortunately, M. de Narbonne was too politic to commit such a fault as that of uttering so dangerous and useless a boast.

Napoleon, after having given M. de Narbonne a full intimation of his views through M. de Coulaincourt, who replaced at Dresden M. de Bassano, still detained in Paris, had Prince Eugene summoned to his presence, expressed to him his satisfaction of his conduct in the late campaign, and announced to him that he had determined to bestow upon his daughter the

duchy of Galicia as a *dotation*, and as a reward for the prince's services. He then told him that it was necessary that he should set out immediately for Milan, where he would meet with his family, from whom he had now been separated more than a year, for the purpose of fulfilling an important mission. In the first place, Napoleon told him he would have to take the command with respect to military matters, not only of the kingdom of Lombardy, but also of Piedmont and Tuscany, and to employ the whole summer in organising a serviceable Italian army. The necessary elements existed in the places themselves. The remaining troops of the 4th corps, with which Prince Eugene had made the Russian campaign, were re-entering Italy and would furnish twenty-four battalions. The Italian army would furnish at least as many. The Piedmont regiments, which had recovered the battalions which had been sent into Spain, would possibly render it possible to raise the army of upper Italy to the strength of eighty battalions. There was an abundance of artillery in this country, and there would be no difficulty in having one hundred and fifty pieces of cannon ready by the month of July. The cavalry which should have been ready for General Bertrand, but was not, would be ready for Prince Eugene. It would be easy, therefore, to have an army there of eighty thousand men within two or three months.

In the meantime, Murat, whose pride had been much hurt by the words which Napoleon had had inserted in the *Moniteur* with reference to him after his departure from the army, who feared that he had irretrievably incurred Napoleon's displeasure, and that he and his kingdom might at any moment be sacrificed to some scheme of compensation, some arrangement entered into for the conclusion of peace, found himself in the same position as that of the Kings of Bavaria and Saxony, and all those allies, in fact, who were too honest to betray us, but not too honest to speculate on doing so. The anxieties in which he found himself involved, sometimes threw him into a state of agitation which resembled delirium. His health suffered severely, and he fell into a feeble desponding state, in which he lost both his beauty and his courage. His subjects, whom he had known how to please, were filled with compassion for him, and endeavoured to console him by overwhelming him with acclamations wherever he appeared amongst them. Sometimes he determined to throw himself at Napoleon's feet, and offer to command what remained of his cavalry; sometimes to throw himself into the arms of Austria, and he despatched to Vienna, a Prince Cariati, whose conduct became so great a scandal there, that M. de Narbonne was compelled to acquaint Napoleon with it.

The result of this state of things was to excite Napoleon's compassion, but at the same time, to make him resolved to summon Murat to the army, and to direct him to send twenty thousand of the forty thousand well organised men at his disposal, to Prince Eugene.

We have already seen that he had made arrangements for the formation of an army at Mayence, with the *cadres* returned from Spain. He could calculate upon having sixty *cadres de bataillon* at Mayence, which would day by day be filled up with conscripts from the old classes; and he hoped to be able to add to them the *cadres* of sixty battalions of cavalry, recruited from the cavalry assembled at the dépôts, and mounted with horses obtained from France. In Westphalia the reorganisation of the corps of Marshal Davout and the Duke of Belluna, would furnish one hundred and twelve battalions, or ninety thousand men. When the battalions should have been fully formed, he resolved to recompose of them the twenty-eight old regiments; giving sixteen to Marshal Davout, and twelve to Marshal Victor, and creating an army of one hundred and twenty thousand men, with a numerous artillery drawn from Holland and the Hanseatic provinces, and with the remainder of the cavalry remounted by General Bourcier. Should Denmark at this moment, as there was reason to hope, return to our alliance, a contingent of twelve or fifteen thousand excellent soldiers might be expected from this quarter, and the army of the lower Elbe would thus be raised to at least one hundred and thirty thousand men. There were three armies, therefore, which Napoleon prepared independently of the one under his own immediate command, and the organisation of which became every day more complete, especially since he had been in Dresden.

He addressed the most precise instructions to Marshal Davout, respecting the troops whose reorganisation was to be entrusted to his care, and ordered him to enter Hambourg as soon as possible, taking advantage of the projected movement upon Berlin, for the purpose of putting into force the most rigorous justice. He was exasperated against the Hanseatic towns which had expelled his officers of customs, and his police, which had received the Cossacks with every testimony of delight, and which seemed to be the object of all the diplomatic and military efforts of the allies. He was resolved to bring these towns once more under his authority by means of force and terror, and if it were necessary to give them up to Germany, to resign them only in a state of ruin. He ordered Marshal Davout to shoot those members of the senate who had resumed their functions, the persons who had taken a prominent part in exciting the insurrection, and

some of the officers of the Hanseatic legion which had been raised to fight against us; at the same time he directed that five hundred of the principal merchants, suspected of being enemies of France, should be seized and deprived of their property, and that the colonial produce and English merchandise, which, since the insurrection of Hambourg, had entered the country through the Elbe in abundance, should be everywhere confiscated. He would thus obtain the means, he said, of satisfying the expenses of the war, of which the merchants of those parts were partly the cause. But whilst giving these orders, Napoleon secretly reckoned on the wisdom of the marshal to whom the execution of them was entrusted, and who, rigorous as he was, knew how to delay actual proceedings until his master's anger should have evaporated in terrible words. The practical result of the above orders, of which the chief part remained unexecuted, was a series of heavy contributions on which the army lived for more than six months, from Hambourg up to Dresden.

Napoleon, passing on horseback all the time which he did not employ in his cabinet, traversed the banks of the Elbe, reconnoitring Kœnigstein and Pirna as well as all the country above and below Dresden, and ordered the repair in timber-work of the stone bridge in Dresden itself, and the construction of a new one of rafts at Priesnitz where the army had effected a passage by main force. He had also vast hospitals and depôts of provisions established on the left bank of the river. In these and similar works, in reorganising and concentrating his cavalry, and raising the forces actually in the field to the complete number of three hundred thousand, he employed the time during which he awaited at Dresden the arrival of the King of Saxony, who arrived on the 12th of May, surrounded by his family and the cavalry which had been so often demanded of him in vain.

Napoleon, who had resolved to play a grand sort of comedy, went forth from the gates of the city at the head of his guard to receive the Saxon monarch, to whom he was happy, he said, to restore his states, reconquered for him by the arms of France. As soon as he had come nigh the old king, he descended from his horse and embraced him, receiving him in every way in so gracious a manner as to excite deep feelings of emotion in his heart, and almost to appease the minds of his subjects, who were much moved by the spectacle of the reconciliation of the two monarchs, the manner in which the Russians had conducted themselves in Saxony having also very much diminished the hatred with which its inhabitants regarded the French.

After these, and many other demonstrations of good-will,

Napoleon and the old monarch entered into mutual explanations, in the course of which, it has been said that the latter made the avowals of which he has since been accused, as a justification of the spoliation of a portion of his estates. But there is full proof in existing documents, that this accusation is unfounded; it is probable, indeed, that the views of the Austrian cabinet might become apparent in the course of his recitals, for they were very manifest and by no means of a culpable nature, although Napoleon took them at the moment in ill part; but it was quite certain that the revelations which completely changed Napoleon's disposition towards Austria, had reached him before the 12th of May, the day of the King of Saxony's return to Dresden, either through M. de Narbonne or the intercepted despatches.

The first advantage which Napoleon obtained from the presence of the King of Saxony in Dresden was, that he was able to employ in his own service the superb Saxon cavalry, which numbered with the addition of some recruits, about three thousand men, and which he immediately entrusted to the brave Latour-Maubourg. The Saxon infantry shut up in Torgau had been exposed to a dangerous trial, their commander, General Thielmann, one of the most ardent and sincere of the German patriots, who had visited the Emperor Alexander at Dresden, and manifested the greatest devotion to the cause of the allies, having, in a state of despair at seeing his king fallen again into the hands of the French, and in a state of terror for his own personal safety, attempted to shake the fidelity of his troops, and persuade them to pass over to the Russians, on the ground that the king was not free, and only gave such orders as he was forced to give. His attempt, however, was unsuccessful, and he fled alone to Alexander's camp, abandoning his infantry, which passed without difficulty under the command of General Reynier, whose talents and character it held in high esteem.

In the meantime, Marshal Ney, in conformity with the instructions which he had received, had traversed Leipsic, and proceeded to Torgau, where he received the Saxon troops into his corps. A little to the left at Wittenberg, he had the Duke of Belluna with his reorganised battalions, and on the right, General Lauriston established with his corps at Meissen. General Sebastiani, who was to bring the cavalry remounted in Hanover, and the division Putthod (that one of Lauriston's divisions which remained in the rear), had not yet arrived; but yet, with the troops of Reynier, Victor, and Lauriston, Marshal Ney had a sufficient force with which to march upon Berlin, and he awaited the order to do so with impatience.

Before giving this order Napoleon wished to obtain precise information respecting the designs of the allies. He had already carried forward Prince Eugene's corps, which since this prince's departure had passed under the command of Marshal Macdonald, and had directed it upon Bischoffswerda, which it had entered, fighting with a rear-guard of the enemy and through the midst of flames. From Bischoffswerda Marshal Macdonald had marched upon Bautzen, where the Russian and Prussian forces had shown signs of having resolved upon encountering us in a second battle, and, indeed, to retreat any farther was to abandon three fourths of the Prussian monarchy, and especially Berlin, which they had not been able to defend directly by sending thither a detached corps, but which a strong position preserved in Lusatia protected up to a certain point. It was also to bid adieu to the German patriots whom they had summoned to meet them on all the battle-fields of Saxony, and to Austria, whom they retained on their side but by means of promises, boastings, and exaggerations, and especially, by the species of physical alliance resulting from near neighbourhood. It was necessary, therefore, to encounter the enemy at any hazard, rather than permit the enemy to drive them from the Bohemian mountains, at the foot of which they had paused after having quitted Dresden, and to take advantage, also, as a means of defence, of one of those numerous streams which descend from the Riesen-Gebirge across Lusatia, and traverse the space between the Elbe and the Oder. At Bautzen, in particular, there was a strong position on the Sprée, which offered two battle-fields, the one in advance of the Sprée, the other behind it—a position rendered famous by the great Frederick during the "Seven years' war." And on this position, partly on account of its renown, partly on account of the advantages which it offered, the allies now resolved to have a desperate struggle with Napoleon's forces. Of the ninety-two thousand troops of the coalition assembled on the plains of Lutzen on the 2nd of May, twenty thousand had been lost either in engagements or on the march, but their place had been filled up by thirty thousand others, supplied by the reserves which Prussia had provided in Silesia; and Barclay de Tolly's Prussian corps of fifteen thousand men, which blockaded the fortresses of the Vistula. The allies, posted, therefore, in advance of and behind Bautzen, along the Sprée, under the protection of vast abattis and numerous redoubts, about a hundred thousand Prussians and Russians, with whom they determined to resolve under the eyes of Austria, at the very foot of her mountains, the great European question. At the same time the Prussian Generals Bulow and Borstell were

directed to cover Berlin and Brandebourg as well as they might be able, whilst Czernicheff's and Tettenborn's *couteurs* were to maintain themselves on the lower Elbe at the expense of the Germans, as they could.

Napoleon having spent seven days in Dresden, employed in reinstating the King of Saxony in his states, in forming a body of cavalry, and placing his troops in line, now set out once more to dissipate the empty dreams with which the allies had permitted themselves to become intoxicated. Marshal Macdonald was already within sight of Bautzen, supported on the right and left by Marshal Oudinot and Marshal Marmont respectively, whilst still more to the left was General Bertrand; and Marshal Ney and General Lauriston were in advance of the Elbe, in a position from which they could advance either on the right towards the grand army, or on the left towards Berlin. On the 15th of May, in consequence of the receipt of certain information, Napoleon directed them to march without delay upon Hozerswerda, so as to debouch on the flank and rear of the Bautzen position, which the allies would find it difficult to maintain, when sixty thousand men proceeded to turn it. He ordered General Reynier to follow Ney and Lauriston, and left Marshal Victor in advance of Wittenberg, as a permanent menace against Berlin.

At the moment when Napoleon was about to set out for Dresden, on the evening of the 16th of May, M. de Bubna arrived from Vienna, and immediately obtained audience of the Emperor, who, although having a great personal regard for M. de Bubna himself, received him in a manner which was almost rude, being unable wholly to restrain the feelings of irritation excited in his mind, by the efforts of Austria to make his will submit to hers, and by what he considered the proved duplicities of M. de Metternich. M. de Bubna, however, being fortunately a man of great clearness of mind, ignored all Napoleon's manifestations of anger, and submitted to him, in the first place a letter written to his son-in-law by the Emperor Francis, in which, in terms both affectionate and sincere, he pointed out the gravity of the existing state of affairs; pointed out to him the boundaries which separated the duties of the father from those of the sovereign, and earnestly entreated him for his own advantage and that of the world, to listen to the overtures which would be made by M. de Bubna.

Napoleon's feelings of irritation were evidently softened by this letter, although it was far from being very effectual in inducing a change in his resolutions. He listened calmly and attentively to the propositions which M. de Bubna had to make to him, feigning that he now heard them enunciated for

the first time ; but tranquilly as he listened to their exposition, he gradually permitted to appear the real cause of his rejection of them—this cause being pride ; a pride which could not endure to abandon the titles which it had assumed with so much ceremony, or to resign the territories which it had so solemnly annexed to the empire. The grand duchy of Warsaw was wholly lost, having perished in the Moscow catastrophe ; there was no room for discussion on this subject, and Napoleon contented himself with declaring that he attempted to restore Poland, not for the sake of France but for the sake of Europe. On another subject of still greater importance, the kingdom of Spain, he avoided making any decided explanations, appearing, however, to have resolved to make some sacrifices on this point, and declaring himself ready, for the purpose of inducing England to negotiate, to admit the Spanish insurgents to a share in the conferences. But on all those points in respect to which Austria was especially anxious that he should consent to adopt her views, he displayed a far less compliant disposition. To permit the reconstitution of Prussia as a reward for her having renounced her alliance, to resign the Hanseatic towns and the title of protector of the confederation of the Rhine, appeared to him to be terrible humiliations. But although fully resolved not to submit to the conditions Austria attempted to impose upon him, he considered that the assembly of a congress for the discussion of the terms of peace would be of much advantage to him, in the first place as a means of showing to France and to Europe his pacific tendencies, in the second place as a means of gaining two or three months' time, which he yet required for the completion of his armaments, and thirdly as a means of renewing direct relations with Russia and England, and thus coming to an understanding with these kingdoms without the intervention, and even to the detriment of the German powers.

In a second interview, therefore, which he granted to M. de Bubna on the 17th of May, he declared his willingness to consent to the assembly of a congress for the purpose of negotiating a peace, and to an armistice, and to admit to this congress the representatives of the Spanish insurgents, this having been always made by England the essential preliminary condition of any negotiation. M. de Bubna, astonished and delighted at having obtained these concessions, immediately sent a letter, revised by Napoleon's own hand, to M. de Stadion, who had been sent to the Russian head-quarters, to do what M. de Bubna was doing at the French head-quarters ; which set forth that Napoleon, by no means rendered arrogant by his recent victory, was eager to

put an end to the evils endured by the world, and consented to the assembly of a congress to negotiate a peace, and also ever being ready that the effusion of blood might be stopped as soon as possible, to send commissioners to the advanced posts for the purpose of negotiating a suspension of arms. When M. de Bubna had despatched his letter, he demanded permission to return to Vienna, that he might delight the Emperor Francis and M. de Metternich, by the announcement of the excellent disposition in which he had found Napoleon, and might also discuss with them, certain modifications of the proposed conditions. Napoleon strongly approved of M. de Bubna's return to Vienna, and entrusted him with a letter for his father-in-law, in which, in the most affectionate and filial terms, he declared that he was anxious for peace, but that, having become the son-in-law of the Emperor Francis, he placed his honour in his hands—his honour, which he esteemed more than power, more than life; and that he was resolved to perish, sword in hand, rather than submit to humiliating conditions. With this letter he sent away M. de Bubna, after having lavished upon him marks of his favour.

As soon as M. de Bubna had set out, Napoleon made preparations for his own departure, but before quitting Dresden, he was anxious to obtain from the negotiations to which he had consented, the principal result he hoped to draw from them, which consisted in entering into direct communication with Alexander, that he might escape from the interference of Austria. Under pretext of the armistice, therefore, he sent M. de Coulaingcourt to the Russian advanced posts, in which he said, that in consequence of what had been agreed on by M. de Bubna, he, the Emperor Napoleon, had hastened to send a commissioner to the advanced posts of the troops of the allies, for the purpose of negotiating an armistice, which appeared to him to be an urgent necessity, since the opposed armies were in such close proximity, and that he had chosen for this purpose the person he supposed would be most agreeable to the Emperor Alexander.

Having completed all his arrangements, Napoleon set out from Dresden on the 18th of May, proceeding in the direction of Bautzen, which he reached at an early hour on the following day. His guard had already arrived, and his troops awaited him with impatience, in the expectation that he would lead them to a fresh triumph. He immediately proceeded to reconnoitre the position on which we were about to encounter the allied forces of Europe, for the purpose of restoring the prestige of our arms.

The position rested on the highest mountains of Bohemia,

the Riesen-Gebirge, neutral ground, against which either of the opposed armies could safely rest, since neither of them would hazard the chance of offending Austria by violating her territory. On our right arose these mountains, covered with dark fir trees; the Sprée, flowing from their side in a deep channel, and passing around the little town of Bautzen under a stone bridge, which was strongly barricaded. Directly in front appeared the town of Bautzen itself, surrounded by an old embattled wall, flanked with towers and armed with cannon, and looking from thence to the left appeared again the stream of the Sprée, which, having flowed through the midst of a range of wooded hills, far inferior in elevation to the mountains on the right, suddenly spread out in an open bed in the midst of verdant plains.

Such was the first line of the Sprée, and one not easy to carry. On the right, on the mountains and their slopes, were perceived wooden abattis, and behind them many cannon, bayonets, and Russian uniforms. In the centre, above and below Bautzen, were also to be seen a great number of Russian troops, and on the left, on the wooded hills, across which the Sprée opened a way of escape into the plain, were to be seen masses of infantry and cavalry, some deployed in line, others posted behind the field-works, and all denoting by their equipment that they belonged to the Prussian army.

Napoleon resolved to force on the following day, the 20th of May, this line of the Sprée, and determined to send Marshal Oudinot to pass the Sprée on the right towards the mountains, to endeavour to drive back the enemy upon their second position; whilst in the centre, Marshal Macdonald should seize the stone bridge which crossed the Sprée opposite Bautzen, and take this town by assault; whilst a little below the centre, Marshal Marmont should cross the Sprée upon pontoons, between Bautzen and the village of Nimschütz, and should establish himself in a good position beyond it; and whilst, finally, General Bertrand on the left, effecting his passage at Nieder-Gurck, vis-a-vis with the last hills which the Sprée washed before expanding its stream amongst the open plains, should endeavour to gain possession of the hills, or at least establish himself in their neighbourhood. In the meantime, Marshal Ney, completing his movement upon Hozerswerda with a mass of about sixty thousand men, would arrive on the lower Sprée at Klix, about four miles below Bautzen, and would be able on the following day, by forcing the passage of the river at Klix, to attack in flank the enemy's second position, which Napoleon would attack in front.

In the meantime, the allies attributing to Napoleon errors such as he was not in the habit of committing, had supposed that Marshal Ney had advanced with his corps alone, this corps consisting, in their estimation, of no more than about twenty-five thousand men after the battle of Lutzen, and they had, accordingly, detached Barclay de Tolly and General d'York, at the head of about twenty-three thousand men, to meet and engage this corps of our army; hoping, at least, to be able to injure it sufficiently to prevent its being of any active service on the decisive day of battle. Generals Barclay de Tolly and d'York advanced, therefore, from Klix upon Hozerswerda, the one keeping to the left the other to the right.

At this moment, the Italian division Pezri, the second of Bertrand's corps, had been detached in the direction of Hozerswerda to form a link with Ney; but General Pezri, failing, unfortunately, to execute this delicate operation with sufficient precaution, was suddenly surrounded with his seven or eight thousand Italians in the neighbourhood of Kœingswarta, by Barclay de Tolly and fifteen thousand Russians, and would have been completely overwhelmed, had not General Kellermann (the son of the old Duke of Valmy), come up by the Hozerswerda route with Ney's cavalry, and released him from his position by furious charges on the enemy's lines. As it was he lost about two thousand men and three pieces of cannon.

At the same instant the Prussian General d'York, occupying a position on the right of Barclay de Tolly, seeking Ney's corps, fell in with Lauriston, who was advancing at the head of twenty thousand men, in the environs of the village of Weissig, and after maintaining a desperate conflict was compelled to fall back upon the Sprée, with a loss of more than two thousand men.

On the following day, the 20th of May, Napoleon having calculated the amount of time likely to be employed in forcing the enemy's first line, and being desirous that the night should intervene between the operation of forcing the first line and the second, employed the morning in preparing the *ponts de cheralet* and the boats necessary for effecting the passage of the Sprée.

At noon, from a position in front of Bautzen, Napoleon gave the signal, and the action commenced by a general discharge of musketry from our tirailleurs who were posted along the Sprée. Marshal Oudinot, in conformity with the orders he had received, advanced towards the village of Sinkwitz with the division Pactod, and crossing the Sprée found himself in front of the Russian troops, which formed

the left wing of the coalition forces, and composed of the old corps of Miloradovitch, Wittgenstein's corps, and that of Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg. General Pactod's brigades were immediately charged by numerous columns of the enemy's infantry, but remained firm until Oudinot's second division (Lorencez), came up upon their right, when the enemy left them in possession of the ground. Uniting with these two divisions the Bavarian division, Marshal Oudinot advanced to the foot of the mountains on our right, in the direction of the principal one, named Tronberg, and attempted to climb it under the enemy's fire—the left at Jessnitz, the right in the direction of Klein-Kunitz.

Whilst these events were taking place on our right, Marshal Macdonald, in the centre, took the stone bridge which crossed the Sprée in front of Bautzen, and enveloped the town itself with two of his three divisions, whilst his third, that of General Gerard, kept at a distance the troops of Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg, who showed a disposition to advance to the aid of Bautzen.

A little below Bautzen, vis-a-vis with Nimschütz, Marshal Marmont had also crossed the Sprée with his three divisions, and advanced to the ground assigned to him between the centre and left of the general position, carrying with little difficulty a village named Burk, which was situated there, and was defended by the Prussian general Kleist. Beyond this ground commenced the second position of the allies; its first defence being a deep stream, bordered with trees, on the edge of which stood three villages, that of Nadelwitz on the right, that of Nieder-Kayne in the centre, and that of Basankwits on the left. Upon these villages General Kleist fell back, summoning General d'York to his aid; and then sallying forth from Basankwits, attacked Marmont's troops at the bayonet's point, whilst Blucher, who was posted on his left on some wooded hills with twenty thousand men, simultaneously charged them with his cavalry. Whilst his infantry were firmly sustaining these various assaults, Marshal Marmont, anxious to relieve himself from the danger of attack from the town of Bautzen, which was still in the hands of the enemy, detached the division Compans on his right; and this division, finding a portion of the walls of Bautzen accessible, scaled them, and facilitated the entrance of the troops of Marshal Macdonald. In the meantime, General Bertrand had crossed the Sprée at Nieder-Gurck at the foot of the hills occupied by Blucher, and had there been compelled to pause, finding himself before a strong position defended by the flower of the Prussian army. It was now six o'clock in the evening, and the whole of the enemy's first line had

allen into our hands, without our having suffered any very great loss. It is true that if the enemy had not reckoned on his second line, he would have disputed his first with greater vigour; but, nevertheless, he had valiantly defended it, and we had gloriously overcome his resistance.

Napoleon entered Bautzen at eight o'clock in the evening, reassured the trembling inhabitants, and then encamped beyond it, in the midst of the squares of his guard, making all the necessary arrangements for the attack on the following day, the 21st.

The principal lineament of the enemy's second position, which now remained to be taken, was a stream named the Blöser-Wasser, from the name of one of the villages which it traversed, which, flowing from the sombre mountains on the right, traversed the plateau on which stood Bautzen, and after having washed the walls of this town, flowed among the willows and poplars downwards from Nadelwitz, Nieder-Kayne, and Bazankwitz, the villages opposite which Marshal Marmont had taken up his position on the previous evening, then arrived at our left, at the top of the village of Kreckwitz, turned behind the wooded hills on which Blücher had taken up his position, retrograded behind them as far as Klein-Bautzen, passed thus behind those hills, whilst the Sprée flowed in front of them, quitted them at a village named Preititz, and flowed on to join the Sprée across the extended plains already mentioned.

The Russian left had fallen back upon one of the mountains from which flowed the Blöser-Wasser, and was prepared to defend it to the utmost against our right, which was established upon Tronberg. Their centre was behind the Blöser-Wasser, at Baschütz, on elevated ground, opposite Nadelwitz and Nieder-Kayne, and under the protection of numerous redoubts and a powerful artillery. Towards their right, and consequently towards our left, the allies, instead of establishing themselves behind the Blöser-Wasser had posted themselves in advance of it, and their line, therefore, at this extremity, resembled a species of advanced promontory. Blücher occupied this portion of the line of the allies with twenty thousand men; the remnant of Kleist's and d'York's troops being on his left at Kreckwitz, whilst on the other side of the hills, the Prussian cavalry and a portion of the Russian cavalry covered his rear. Finally, on slightly elevated ground on the verdant plain beyond those hills, and on which the Sprée and the Blöser-Wasser joined their streams Barclay de Tolly was posted with his fifteen thousand men.

The strength of the position thus occupied by the allied forces was so great, that an attempt to carry it by an attack

simply in front must very probably have failed; but Ney, who had arrived in the course of the evening at Klix with sixty thousand men, would there pass the Sprée, traverse the extended plains on our extreme left (the extreme right of the allies), defile behind the hills occupied by Blucher, and then move his troops in the direction of the steeple of Hochkirch, which appeared at the very end of the battle-field covered with glittering copper. As soon as he had executed these movements, Bertrand in front and Marmont in flank were to attack Blucher, then cross the Blöser-Wasser and assault the redoubts in the centre, defended by the Russian guard.

Such were Napoleon's arrangements for the following day, the 21st. He bivouacked for the night in the midst of the squares of his guard on the Bautzen plateau, at a point from whence he could perceive all the enemy's positions; and exactly opposite to him at the post-house of Neu-Burschwitz, the sovereign allies were engaged in anxious deliberations throughout the night. They had received Napoleon's letter relative to an armistice and M. de Coulaincourt's mission, and had immediately resolved to brave the chances of a second battle, politely referring M. de Coulaincourt to M. de Stadion, as the representative of the mediatorial power, and deferring the answer relative to the armistice until after the impending battle. This matter having been thus settled, the allied sovereigns employed themselves in discussing the chances of victory or defeat on the following day, and the question which was most anxiously discussed, was relative to the position of Barclay de Tolly—could he resist Ney, who appeared to be advancing towards him? M. de Muffling, a distinguished officer of the staff, who had carefully reconnoitred the ground, insisted on the danger which threatened this portion of their line, but Alexander and all the other members of the staff were reassured on this point, on learning from Wittgenstein that Barclay de Tolly had at his command fifteen thousand men.

Shortly after daybreak on the 21st of May, a terrible cannonade filled with its roar the vast extent of the field of battle. Marshal Oudinot on our right disputed with Miloradovitch's Russians the heights of Tronberg, which he had seized on the previous evening. In the centre, Macdonald and Marmont, having between them the squares of the guard, and behind them Latour-Maubourg's cavalry, awaited orders from Napoleon, who himself awaited the success of the manœuvre entrusted to Marshal Ney. General Bertrand on the left, completing the passage of the Sprée, which he had commenced on the previous evening, climbed with his three divisions the right bank of the river, under

cover of artillery posted on the left bank. But it was at a point two leagues lower down, at Klix, that the decisive event of the day took place, Marshal Ney having there crossed the Sprée, and then succeeded after a desperate contest, in compelling Barclay de Tolly to fall back from the position he occupied upon Gleine, when he took up his position on the slope of the heights which filled the bottom of the field of battle.

Ney now ascended a little to the right for the purpose of taking in reverse the hills, where he had perceived the mass of the Prussian troops, and found himself in front of the village of Preititz, which was situated on the Blesser-Wasser, at the point at which this stream, after having turned behind the position occupied by Blucher, resumed a direct course for the purpose of debouching on the plain. He had this village taken possession of by the division Souham, and then began to entertain some doubts with respect to his future movements, heavy masses of the enemy's cavalry, to which he could oppose but a small body of light cavalry, being in front, whilst Barclay de Tolly was in an advantageous position on his left, Blucher on the hills on his right, and Napoleon separated from him by a distance of three leagues and wooded hills.

In the meantime, Barclay de Tolly having sent earnest demands for succour, Blucher had ordered some of Kleist's battalions and two of the royal guard to proceed from his rear to retake Preititz; and this command, by following unexpectedly upon the division Souham, these battalions succeeded in executing. Ney, however, immediately returned to the charge with his second division and retook the village. He might then, by advancing to occupy the Wurschen and Hochkirch routes, which were the means of retreat for the right wing of the forces of the allies, have taken twenty-five thousand Prussians, and two hundred pieces of cannon. He was earnestly advised to adopt this course by General Jomini, the chief of his staff, but he wished to await until the roar of artillery, which at present was only heard on his right, should be more general and nearer, and until he should be less isolated on the vast and complicated field of battle, with the nature of which he was himself entirely unacquainted.

He had, however, already done sufficient to render the enemy's position untenable, and scarcely had his cannon sounded on Blucher's rear, when Napoleon hastened to give the signal for the commencement of a general cannonade, and Marmont, who had at his disposal besides his own artillery, all that of the guard also, opened a terrible fire on the enemy's redoubts in front of him, as well as an oblique fire upon

Kreckwitz and Blucher's flank. After this cannonade had lasted a short time Bertrand advanced to attack Blucher's line, when he saw the Prussian cavalry pouring down upon him at a gallop. The division Morand, however, received them in square without being shaken, repelled them with a fire of musketry, and then advanced in columns of attack upon Blucher's lines. In the meantime, the Wurtemberg division had advanced upon and seized Kreckwitz, which was on the flank of the wooded hills. Blucher finding his front threatened, moved forward his second division, that of Zeithen, for the purpose of opposing Bertrand's corps. This division found Morand firmly established in the position he occupied, and was unable to drive him back, but it gained ground on the Wurtemberg division, and outflanking Kreckwitz, made prisoners of the battalion which had taken possession of it. Marmont, however, redoubling his fire upon this village, whilst Morand also moved up to the attack the division Zeithen, was compelled to fall back upon the hills which served as Blucher's support. To have been enabled to hold his position, Blucher should now have been able to draw to his aid the whole of the Prussian royal guard, Kleist's corps, and a portion of the Russian forces, but to all his demands for this aid, it was replied that these troops were employed in disputing the possession of Preitz on his rear, and that so far from persisting in defending his position, he should make a speedy retreat if he wished to avoid being taken prisoner, together with his corps d'armée, by Marshal Ney. And at length, uttering a thousand invectives against the arrangements made by the Russian staff, he retreated through the lines of cavalry behind him.

Whilst Bertrand followed Blucher in his retreat, Marmont with his corps, Mortier with the young guard, perceiving the enemy's retrograde movement, descended to the bank of the Blöser-Wasser, and traversed the plain which extended to the foot of the Baschütz redoubts; which redoubts the young guard scaled without much loss, the retrograde movement which had been enforced on the allies' right, having been communicated to other portions of their line. This general movement took place at the right moment for the relief of Oudinot, who, on our right, on Tronberg, assailed by all the forces of Miloradovitch, had been compelled to fall back and take up a position in the rear, where he had been supported by the intrepid Gerard, commanding Macdonald's right. As soon as the rumour that we were victorious reached him, Oudinot resumed the offensive against the Russians, who now retreated, and pursued them with vigour. And now over an extent of three leagues we pur-

sued the forces of the allies, being prevented from taking any prisoners and cannon, save a considerable number of wounded and dismounted pieces, by the nature of the ground, which was unsuitable for the movements of cavalry, and also, by our deficiency in this arm. But as it was, the victory was a most brilliant one, depriving the enemy of a formidable position, defended by almost a hundred thousand men, and dissipating the idea with which they had flattered themselves, that they should be able to close against us the road of the Oder. They could not any longer, moreover, without the intervention of an immediate armistice, remain connected with the Austrian territory, and, through its territory, with its policy.

With respect to the loss suffered on each side in this battle, it is very certain, whatever may be said by German writers, that ours was less than that of the allies. The latter have admitted a loss on the two days of about fifteen thousand men in killed and wounded, and whilst this number is far below the actual one, the loss on our side could not amount to more than thirteen thousand in killed and wounded, although we had been the assailants, and our task had been by far the more laborious. But we had to regret a species of loss which the allies had not suffered, and this was under the head of deserters; two or three thousand men of the Italian division Pezri, and the three German divisions which served in the corps of Oudinot, Ney, and Bertrand, having taken advantage of their neighbourhood to the mountains of Bohemia, to escape amongst them from a service to which all their feelings were opposed.

But our victory may be fairly estimated by its consequences if not by its trophies. On the following day, the 22nd of May, Napoleon resolved to march in person in pursuit of the vanquished sovereigns, leaving Marshal Oudinot's corps, which had suffered the most severely on the 20th and 21st, and had need of three or four days to rally, to advance upon Berlin. He added to it eight battalions which were in garrison at Magdebourg, and which would be replaced there by the division Teste, and a thousand horse, which raised this corps to twenty-three or twenty-four thousand, a sufficient force to vanquish General Bulow, whom the allies had entrusted with the charge of covering Berlin.

On the morning of the 22nd of May Napoleon advanced, preceded by Generals Reynier, and Lauriston, and Marshal Ney, followed by Marmont, Bertrand, and Macdonald, and surrounded by his guard. The allies retreated by the Bautzen route to Gorlitz. On arriving near Reichenbach, the enemy's infantry were perceived effecting their retreat across

a line of heights beyond a tolerably open plain, on which their cavalry remained to cover it. Napoleon, however, threw Latour-Maubourg's twelve thousand cavalry upon them and they were compelled to give way with loss; but not before Napoleon had perceived that his own cavalry, although mingled with veterans of this arm who had returned from the Russian campaign, had been organised too short a time to effect as much as his cavalry had been wont. He saw, also, that the enemy now retreating before him, animated as they were by the most energetic sentiments, were more difficult to cut off in a retreat than were those demoralised troops, which, engaged in a war in which they felt no passionate interest, he had pursued after the battles of Austerlitz and Jena. After the cavalry engagement which had thus taken place in the plain, General Reynier with the Saxon infantry occupied the Reichenbach heights, and Napoleon, considering that sufficient had been now effected for this day, gave orders that his tent should be pitched on the ground the troops then occupied. As he was alighting from his horse there arose a cry, "Kirgener is dead!" On hearing these words Napoleon exclaimed "Fortune nous en veut bien aujourd'hui!" But to the first cry immediately succeeded a second, "Duroc is dead!" "Impossible!" said Napoleon, "I have just been speaking to him." It was, however, not only possible, but the actual fact. A bullet, which had struck a tree close to Napoleon, had, in its rebound, slain successively General Kirgener, an excellent engineer officer, and then Duroc himself, the grand marshal of the palace. Duroc, a few minutes before his death, overcome by a singular feeling of sadness, had said to M. de Coulaincourt, "My friend, do you observe the Emperor? After a series of misfortunes he is now victorious, and should profit by the teachings of misfortune But see! he is still the same, still as insatiable as ever for war The end of all this cannot possibly be a happy one." He had received a cruel wound in his entrails, and there could be no hope that he could survive it. Napoleon hastened to him, took him by the hand, called him his friend, and spoke to him of a future life, where at length they might find rest; uttering these words with a feeling of remorse which he did not acknowledge, but which thrilled the inmost recesses of his heart. Duroc thanked him with emotion for these testimonies of regard, confided to his care his only daughter, and expressed a hope that his master might live to vanquish the enemies of France, and then to enjoy repose in the midst of that peace of which the world had so much need. "As for myself," he continued, "I have lived as an honourable man should live; I die as a

soldier should die. I have nothing to reproach myself with. Let me again recommend my daughter to your care." And then, as Napoleon remained beside him, holding his hands, and seeming overwhelmed with serious reflections, he added, "Go, sire go; this spectacle is too painful for you." And Napoleon left him, saying, "Adieu, my friend. We shall meet again, and perhaps soon!"

It has been asserted that these words uttered by Duroc, "*I have nothing to reproach myself with*," were an allusion to some unjust reproaches made against him by Napoleon, who in his moments of excitement did not spare even the men whom he esteemed the most. But he rendered full justice to his grand marshal, who was the second sincere and truly devoted friend whom he had lost during the space of twenty days. Napoleon, was, indeed, profoundly moved by his loss. Leaving the cottage in which the dying Duroc had been placed, he went to sit down upon some fascines near the advanced posts; and there remained, overpowered with grief, his hands lying listlessly on his knees, his eyes wet with tears, deaf to the fire of the tirailleurs, unconscious of the caresses of a dog belonging to one of the regiments of the guard, which frequently ran beside his horse, and now stood before him licking his hands. Such, and so changeable is human nature! So contradictory in its various aspects; so incapable of being judged by any but God alone! For this man who was now so afflicted by the wounded state of one human being, had within the preceding month been the cause of wounds and death to more than eighty thousand, and within the preceding eighteen years to more than two millions, and was still to be the cause of destruction to some hundreds of thousands.

On the following day we entered Gorlitz and crossed the Queiss. On the 24th we crossed the Queiss, and on the following day the Bober. The forces of the allies were divided into two columns, the one on our right composed of the troops of Miloradovitch and the Russian guard, the other on our left composed of the Prussians and Barclay de Tolly—a distribution similar to that which their troops had presented at the battle of Bautzen. Each of these columns was followed by our troops. One column formed of Bertrand's and Marmont's corps, marched upon the right, by Gorlitz, Lauban, Goldberg, and Schweidnitz, proceeding along the foot of the mountains. Another, comprising the corps of Reynier, Lauriston, Ney, the guard, and the imperial staff, advanced in the centre by Gorlitz, Bunzlau, Haynau, Liegnitz, and Breslau; whilst upon our left the Duke of Belluna, preceded by the cavalry of General Sebastiani, proceeded towards the Oder, to release Glogau from blockade.

At Haynau the division Maison suffered an unfortunate and even fatal surprise; the forces of the allies perceiving themselves to be vigorously pursued, and desiring to check the rapidity of our advance, devised a snare which cost us considerable loss, and which was contrived with much art. On one side of the plain of Haynau, which was well suited for the movements of cavalry, they concealed five or six troops of heavy cavalry, and when Maison's division, which Ney had urged on with some eagerness, being stimulated by Napoleon's complaints that he made no prisoners, had entered upon the plain, a cloud of troopers charged our infantry before they had time to form in square, and drove them to flight in spite of all the efforts of Marshal Ney and General Maison; taking three or four pieces of cannon, and causing a loss to us of about a thousand men in killed and wounded.

On the following day, however, General Sebastiani, who marched at the head of the corps of the Duke of Belluna towards Glogau, avenged in the environs of Sprottau the check thus suffered by General Maison, taking an immense park of artillery and five hundred prisoners. Such are the alternating chances of war! On the 27th our troops arrived at Katzbach and Liegnitz, and our left corps having reached the Oder, released Glogau from blockade, to the great joy of the garrison which had been invested during five months.

There may be some feeling of wonder that after the letter of General de Bubna to M. de Stadion, and after that of M. de Coulaincourt to M. de Nesselrode, the one announcing the project of an armistice, and the other offering the means of immediately commencing negotiations, the subject of an armistice should appear to have been forgotten. But, as we have already said, the Russians had been unwilling to admit M. de Coulaincourt, that no umbrage might be given to the allies they already had, the Prussians, or to the allies they hoped to have, the Russians; and they had replied, therefore, that the mediation of Austria having been accepted, M. de Coulaincourt should address himself to M. de Stadion, its representative. This answer, signed by M. de Nesselrode, was enclosed in a letter from M. de Stadion to Prince Berthier, in which the Austrian minister said, that after the communication which he had received he was quite ready to receive M. de Coulaincourt, and in concert with the Prussian and Russian commissioners, to enter at once upon the negotiation of an armistice.

This double answer, deferred to the day after the battle, was despatched on the 22nd of May; and Napoleon considering it unnecessary to act with any great alacrity, with respect to persons who gave so cold a reception to his over-

tures, had simply replied that when the commissioners presented themselves at the advanced posts, they would be received. He had then continued his march, and had, as we have seen above, arrived at Liegnitz, one or two marches distant from Breslau.

In the meantime, a state of great confusion prevailed amongst the forces of the allies; lost battles and rapid retreats telling severely upon the young soldiers of whom they were principally composed. And of the two armies, the Russian was much more shaken than the Prussian; the war, which had at first been one of patriotism for the former, had become simply a political war since it had crossed Poland, and it now supported, therefore, the attendant sufferings with impatience. Barclay de Tolly, from whom Alexander had found it impossible to withhold any longer the command in chief, being as he was, the only man capable of exercising it, although very unpopular with the troops, had found it impossible to restore order to the ranks of the army, and declared that it would fall into a state of complete dissolution unless it were carried into Poland, for the purpose of having two months' reorganisation behind the Vistula. So anxious, indeed, was he to act in accordance with this opinion, that Alexander's formal orders had been necessary to make him abandon the Breslau route, which led directly to Poland, for that of Schweidnitz, on which the allies hoped to be able to halt on the famous field of Bunzelwitz, so long occupied by Frederick the Great, and which had the advantage, always so strongly insisted upon by the diplomatists of the coalition, of being in the neighbourhood of Austria. On inspecting this position, however, the fortress of Schweidnitz, which was its support, and which had been destroyed by the French in 1807, was found to be still in a state of ruin, and Barclay de Tolly declared with good reason, that the allied armies could not maintain their ground in such a position more than a few hours, and was confirmed more strongly than ever in his idea of the advisability of leaving the Prussians in Silesia, and marching his own army into Poland, to return upon the Oder after two months' reorganisation.

The allies at length began to perceive that a suspension of hostilities was the only means by which they could escape from the difficulties of their situation. But unfortunately for the allies the Prussian patriots were opposed to it. General Gneisenau, a member of the *Tugend-bund*, a man of warm feelings and keen intellect, but rash and thoughtless, filled with patriotic passion, the successor of General Scharnhurst in the function of chief of Blücher's staff, held the most violent language against an armistice, and was well calculated to have a dangerous influence over minds so excitable as those of the

Prussian officers. However, the necessity of suspending hostilities was an imperious one, and it was agreed to send commissioners to the French head-quarters in order to negotiate it. At the same time, it was hinted, as a means of soothing those who were excessively opposed to this measure, that hostilities were but to be suspended for a short time, and that when resumed they would only cease with the destruction of the common enemy. Whilst the commissioners proceeded to the French head-quarters M. de Nesselrode was also sent to Vienna, to point out the dangers which surrounded the forces of the allies, and to intimate that unless Austria immediately took measures in their favour, they should probably be compelled to retreat upon Poland, which would involve the dissolution of the coalition, and the loss to Austria of the only means of saving Europe and herself. He was also armed with the threat of the probability, if Austria still hesitated, of a direct arrangement between France and Russia.

M. de Nesselrode, therefore, set out for the Austrian capital, whilst General Kleist, on the part of the Prussians, and General Count de Schouvaloff on the part of the Russians, proceeded to the French advanced posts, which they reached at ten o'clock on the morning of the 29th of May, being received by Prince Berthier who immediately referred them to the Emperor.

It was to Napoleon's advantage to engage the enemy's forces yet once more, for the purpose of driving them back in disorder upon the Vistula, far from Austria, who would certainly in that case decline to become their ally; but feeling himself in some degree bound to the principle of an armistice by the answers he had already made, feeling, also, that his refusal would be a too determined declaration against peace, and above all, flattering himself that it would afford him time to carry his second series of armaments to such a state of completeness, that he would be able to become himself master of the conditions of peace, he sent M. de Coulaincourt to Gebersdorf on the 30th of May, to negotiate an armistice on the bases already mentioned.

M. de Coulaincourt found the Prussian and Russian commissioners very animated, and much too haughty for their situation, although very polite to the former ambassador of France to Russia. They showed themselves almost resolved not to yield on three points—being unwilling to abandon Breslau during the armistice, this having become a second capital to the Prussians; unwilling to resign to us the occupation of Hambourg, on the ground that this would be to establish before-hand, a prejudice in favour of the defini-

tive annexation of the Hanseatic towns to France; and finally, unwilling to allow the armistice to continue beyond a month. When the discussion on these three points had lasted ten hours without any result, M. de Coulaincourt referred them to the Emperor, who was at Neumarkt, at the gates of Breslau.

Napoleon was excessively irritated at the tone and demands of the allies; and replied that the armistice was not necessary to him, whilst it was so to the allies, that he only consented to it for the purpose of restoring to Europe hopes of the peace of which she had so much need. He was resolved not to resign Hambourg, and that as for Breslau, if he yielded it, it was only out of complaisance, since it was already in his power. However, he avoided declaring himself decidedly on this point, letting it be seen that Breslau would be the equivalent of Hambourg. With respect to the duration of the armistice, however, he was imperative, saying, that if a congress were really to be held, it must be allowed sufficient time to arrive at a result.

The commissioners now resumed the discussion of the various disputed points; those of the allies maintaining their pretensions, without, however, showing signs of having determined not to yield, for the conclusion of an armistice was absolutely necessary to their interests. In the meantime, Napoleon received information which rendered him on his side disposed to be somewhat more accommodating. M. de Bassano, recently arrived at Dresden from Paris, had proceeded to Liegnitz to resume his diplomatic functions at headquarters, and had scarcely reached this place when he had been joined by M. de Bubna, returning from Vienna, with detailed explanations on all the points which Napoleon had discussed with him at Dresden, on the 17th and 18th of May last.

On returning to Vienna from his interview with Napoleon, M. de Bubna had declared that he had found the French Emperor more amiably disposed than he had ever before known him to be, set forth his consent to the presence of representatives of the Spanish insurgents in a congress as an unhopèd-for concession, and made no mention of his expressions of anger against M. de Metternich, except to M. de Narbonne. This prudent report had been regarded as very satisfactory by the Emperor Francis and M. de Metternich, who were anxious to avoid being drawn into a war. They were, however, very content with Napoleon's letters, and accorded a certain amount of consideration to the repugnance he had manifested with respect to some of the proposed conditions; resolving to consent to such modifications of those

which referred to the confederation of the Rhine and the Hanseatic towns, as might save from injury, what Napoleon called his honour. The modifications they devised were, that the Hanseatic provinces should not be restored for the purpose of reconstituting the free towns of Lubeck, Bremen, and Hambourg, until the conclusion of peace with England, and that the question respecting the confederation of the Rhine, should also be referred to the period of the arrangement of a general peace—of a peace which should comprise all the powers of the earth, even America.

M. de Bubna had then been sent to the French headquarters with these two modifications, which were, in fact, very important, and the Emperor Francis had addressed another letter to Napoleon, in which, in answer to the prayer of the latter that he would have regard for the preservation of his honour, he said, "On that day on which I gave you my daughter, your honour became mine. Have confidence in me and I will demand nothing of you which shall tarnish your glory." To all these testimonies of friendship M. de Bubna had added a formal declaration that Austria was as yet, entirely free from engagements to other states, and that if Napoleon would accept the conditions of peace thus modified, she was ready to bind herself to him by a renewal, with the addition of fresh articles, of the treaty of the 14th of March, 1812. Such were the declarations sent by the hands of M. de Bubna by the Austrian court, and made with sincerity, for it had not yet heard any mention of direct negotiations between France and Russia; and she had, therefore, neither cause for discontent, nor any particular reason to adopt hasty measures. M. de Bubna, journeying with great rapidity, had reached Liegnitz on the 30th of May, and set forth to M. de Bassano the propositions of which he was the bearer, in spite of the coldness of the latter, with the warmth of a man who desired to succeed, in the first place for the sake of his country, but also for his personal glory. M. de Bassano immediately sent an account in writing of this conference to Napoleon, without saying a single word, either in support of or in opposition to the proposals, the rejection of which was to prove the greatest misfortune which had ever happened to France.

Unhappily, Napoleon was irritated instead of being gratified by the opportunity now offered him of terminating his long struggle with Europe, and remaining in possession of a magnificent empire. He saw in these proposals signs of a determination on the part of Austria, to commence its intervention without further delay, and believed, that if he did not now immediately accept conditions to which he was unwilling to

consent, however they might be modified, she would at once advance against him, a declared enemy ; to gain, therefore, the two months' time which he required for the completion of the arrangements which would enable him to meet her, he wrote to M. de Bassano ;—" Gain time, avoid entering into explanations with M. de Bubna, carry him with you to Dresden, and put off as long as possible the moment when it may be absolutely necessary to accept or refuse the Austrian propositions. I am about to conclude an armistice, and shall thus gain the time which I require. If, however, they should refuse an armistice except on terms which do not suit me, I will furnish you with themes, by discussing which you may prolong your conferences with M. de Bubna, and procure me the delay which is necessary, in order to enable me to drive back the forces of the coalition far from the Austrian territory."

At this moment, unhappily for himself and us, Napoleon received news that Marshal Davout was at the gates of Hambourg, and would certainly have entered it by the 1st of June. It was now the 3rd ; he imagined, therefore, he would be able to solve the difficulty with respect to this city, by making the terms of the armistice declare relative to the Hanseatic provinces, that that condition of things should be accepted by both sides with respect to them, which should have been arranged by the chances of war at midnight on the 8th of June. With regard to Breslau he consented that a tract of neutral ground of ten leagues, which should comprise Breslau, should be left between the two armies ; with respect to the duration of the armistice, he proposed that it should last until the 20th of July, with six days' interval between its renunciation and the renewal of hostilities, which would carry it to the 26th of July, and make it last nearly two months. He forwarded these conditions to M. de Coulaincourt, directing him to break off negotiations at once if they should not be accepted.

M. de Coulaincourt having presented them on the 4th of June, the commissioners who were ordered to persist only in refusing to allow Breslau to remain in Napoleon's hands, accepted them, and this disastrous armistice, which proved to be one of the greatest misfortunes of Napoleon's life, was signed on the 4th of June. It was agreed that the Katzbach should be adopted as the line of demarcation between the two armies, in order that Breslau might be left as neutral ground ; that after the Katzbach the neutral line should be continued along the Oder, by which means lower Silesia was secured to the French ; that after the Oder it should be continued along the ancient frontier which had always separ-

ated Saxony from Prussia ; and, finally, along the line of the Elbe from Wittenberg to the sea, with the exception of that portion which should be *advenu des* Hanseatic towns. It was stipulated, moreover, that the blockaded garrisons of the Vistula and the Oder, should be successively provisioned, payment being made for what they might require. Almost simultaneously with the signing of the armistice, information was received that Hambourg and the Hanseatic towns had been retaken by Marshal Davout, and had thus become secured to us during the continuance of the armistice.

Such was this deplorable armistice, to which Napoleon would assuredly have rightly consented had peace been his object, but which he ought most certainly to have rejected if he had determined upon war ; since in this latter case, he should have completed at once the destruction of the allies. But Napoleon, on the contrary, accepted it just because his policy was war, and because he desired to gain two months' time in which to complete his armaments, and be in a position to refuse the conditions of peace which Austria proposed to him. And the error was but one of that fatal series of foolishly ambitious resolutions which were to bring his reign to a premature conclusion. It caused, however, except amongst the Prussians, a false and universal joy throughout the whole of Europe, because it appeared to be a sign of peace. Napoleon on sending his army into cantonments, ordered the erection of a monument on the summit of the Alps, to be inscribed with these words ; "NAPOLEON, TO THE FRENCH PEOPLE, IN MEMORY OF ITS NOBLE EFFORTS AGAINST THE COALITION OF 1813." And the idea was one commensurate with the greatness of his genius ; but far more advantageous both to himself and the French people would it have been, had he sent to Paris a treaty of peace, stipulating the abandonment of the confederation of the Rhine, of Hambourg, of Illyria, and of Spain, with these words ; "THE SACRIFICES MADE BY NAPOLEON FOR THE SAKE OF THE PEOPLE OF FRANCE."—The adoption of this course, would have left Napoleon not less poetically, but more really great, and would have left to his noble people the fruit of that blood, its best, which during the last twenty years had not ceased to flow.

END OF VOLUME XV.

LONDON :

M. S. Myers, 12, Great Newport Street.

HISTORY
OF THE
CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE
OF
FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON.

FORMING A SEQUEL TO
"THE HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION."

BY
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VOL. XVI.

LONDON:
WILLIS AND SOTHERAN, 136, STRAND.
1858.

LONDON :
GODFREY AND DELANY, 3, SAVOY STREET, STRAND

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Castile with ten thousand Anglo-Portuguese and twenty thousand Spaniards—Plans of the French Generals — Possibility of holding in check, by means of a good system of operations, the English forces, and of even driving them back into Portugal—Fresh conflicts between the government in Paris and that in Madrid, and the disastrous instructions which are their result—By these instructions, and Joseph's dilatoriness in evacuating Madrid, is caused a fresh dispersion of the French troops — Resumption of operations in May, 1813—Four divisions of the army of Portugal having been sent to General Clausel in the north of the Peninsula, Joseph has only fifty-two thousand troops to oppose to Lord Wellington—Retreat upon Valladolid and Burgos—The failure of provisions hastens our retrograde march—Two opinions prevail in the army; the one to the effect that it would be better to fall back upon Navarre, in order to be more certain of being able to rejoin General Clausel; the other, that the army should remain upon the great Bayonne route, in order to cover the French frontier—The reiterated orders received from Paris incline Joseph and Jourdan to follow the latter opinion—Numerous advices sent to General Clausel to procure his junction with the grand army between Burgos and Vittoria—Retreat upon Miranda del Ebro and Vittoria—Hope of being joined there by General Clausel — Unfortunate inaction of Joseph and Jourdan during the days of the 19th and 20th of June — Disastrous battle of Vittoria on the 21st of June, and complete ruin of the affairs of France in Spain—To whose fault the occurrence of these misfortunes should be attributed—Napoleon, excessively irritated against his brother Joseph, gives orders for his arrest should he visit Paris—Marshal Soult despatched to Bayonne to rally the army and resume the offensive—Return of Napoleon to Dresden, after an excursion of some days' duration to Torgau, Wittenberg, Magdebourg, and Leipzig—Results of the negotiations of Prague—M.M. de Humboldt and d'Anstett nominated to be the representatives of Prussia and Russia in the congress of Prague—These negotiators arriving at Prague on the 11th of July, complain bitterly at not being met by the French plenipotentiaries on the appointed day — Chagrin and complaints of M. de Metternich — Napoleon, returning to Dresden on the 15th, at length, after having delayed the selection of the French plenipotentiaries under various pretexts, nominates M.M. de Narbonne and Coulaingcourt—A false interpretation given to the convention which prolongs the armistice, furnishes him with a fresh pretext for deferring the departure of M. de Coulaingcourt—He hopes by thus gaining time to delay the resumption of hostilities until the 17th—The difficulty raised with respect to the armistice having been overcome, Napoleon sends M. de Coulaingcourt, furnished with instructions which raise almost insoluble questions of form—In the meantime, he leaves Dresden on the 25th of July for the purpose of meeting the Empress at Mayence—Financial affairs and policy of the empire during the Saxon campaign — Affairs of the seminaries of Tournay and Gand, and of the jury of Antwerp—Return of Napoleon to Dresden on the 4th of August, after having passed in review the new corps which have arrived in Saxony—Fruitless difficulties with respect to matters of form, by which even the constitution of the congress of Prague is prevented — M. de Metternich declares for the last time, that if at midnight on the 10th of August the bases of a peace have not been agreed upon, the armistice will be renounced, and Austria will join the coalition—Napoleon's real sentiments at this decisive moment—Being no longer able to hope to prevent the renewal of hostilities on the part of Russia and Prussia on the 17th of August, he is anxious, by opening a serious negotiation with Austria, to delay the

adoption by her of active measures—He commences, accordingly, a secret negotiation with Austria, which he proposes should be conducted by M. de Coulaingcourt, without the knowledge of M. de Narbonne — Overtures made by M. de Coulaingcourt to M. de Metternich four days after the expiration of the armistice—Surprise of M. de Metternich — His answer within forty-eight hours, and authentic declaration of the intentions of Austria given in the name of the Emperor—Terms unexpectedly advantageous offered to Napoleon—Noble efforts of M. de Coulaingcourt to induce Napoleon to accept the peace now offered to him — Counter proposition sent by Napoleon on the 10th, and considered by Austria to be unacceptable — The 10th of August having passed without the adoption of the proposed bases of negotiations, Austria declares the congress of Prague dissolved before it has been opened, and proclaims her adhesion to the coalition—Napoleon, experiencing a moment's regret, desires M. de Coulaingcourt to prolong his residence at Prague, but uselessly—The Emperor of Russia having gone before the King of Prussia into Bohemia, and conferred with the Emperor of Austria, declares in the name of the allies the last propositions made by Napoleon to be unacceptable—Return and noble distress of M. de Coulaingcourt — Departure of Napoleon from Dresden on the 16th of August — His feelings of confidence and plans—He adopts the course of the Elbe for his line of defence, and proposes to manœuvre around Dresden, so as to vanquish in succession all the masses of hostile troops which might attack him in front, flank, or rear—Projects of the coalition and immense forces brought into the field in the cause of this gigantic war — The army of Silesia, commanded by Blücher, being the first in motion, Napoleon marches towards it to drive it back upon Katzbach — Combats of the 20th, 21st, and 22nd of August, in consequence of which Blücher is compelled to fall back behind the Katzbach — Napoleon receives information on the evening of the 22nd, of the appearance of the grand army of the allies in the rear of Dresden — His precipitate return towards Dresden — He halts at Stolpen and forms the project of debouching by Königsstein, for the purpose of taking the army of the allies in the rear, and driving it into the Elbe—The terror of the inhabitants of Dresden and the hesitation of Marshal Saint Cyr, are the means on this occasion of diverting Napoleon from the best of his military plans—His return to Dresden on the 26th and useless attack upon this town by the forces of the allies—Celebrated battle of Dresden fought on the 27th of August — Complete defeat of the army of the coalition and death of Moreau—Position of General Vandamme at Peterswalde on the rear of the allies — A new and vast plan of operations in the direction of Berlin diverts Napoleon from the prosecution of the manœuvres around Dresden — Disaster sustained by General Vandamme at Kulm brought about by the most singular concurrence of circumstances—Consequences of this disaster — Restoration of confidence to the allies, and aggravation of the evils of Napoleon's position; the results of his last victories being annulled—His situation on the 30th of August, 1813.



HISTORY
OF
THE CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE
OF
FRANCE
UNDER
NAPOLEON.

BOOK XLIX.

DRESDEN AND VITTORIA.

IN signing the armistice of Preisnitz, Napoleon's only intention was to gain two months' time, in which to complete his armaments, and to raise them to a strength sufficient to meet the new enemies he was about to create; but he had never for a moment entertained the idea of peace, being utterly unwilling to conclude it on the conditions dictated by Austria; which conditions, so frequently propounded during the last four months, sometimes by simple insinuations, but, also, by the recent and formal declarations of M. de Bubna, were, as we have seen, as follow;—The dissolution of the grand duchy of Warsaw; the reconstruction of Prussia, by means of the addition to it of a considerable portion of this grand duchy, and some portions of the Hanseatic provinces; the restoration to Germany of the free towns of Lubeck, Bremen, and Hambourg; the abolition of the confederation of the

Rhine; the restoration to Austria of Illyria and the portions of Poland which had formerly belonged to her. Although a continental peace on these terms, the sure precursor of a maritime peace, would leave to France, independently of Belgium and the Rhenish provinces, Holland, Piedmont, Tuscany, the Roman States, to exist as French departments; with Westphalia, Lombardy, and Naples, as royal vassals; Napoleon absolutely rejected it, not on account of the loss of territory which it would involve, and which would be very small, but because it would cast a cloud upon his glory. He unhesitatingly preferred, to its acceptance, therefore, war with the whole of Europe — a resolution which was, doubtless, remarkably bold with respect to his own fortunes, very cruel with respect to the many victims which it sacrificed on fields of battle, and a species of outrage against France, exposed to so many dangers simply on account of the pride of her ruler; but it was a resolution which he had now taken, and from which it was unlikely he would be turned. It would have been well had he had around him better counsellors, or, at least, counsellors possessed of more influence over him, and capable of inducing him to renounce the fatal resolutions he had adopted. In the meantime, although thoroughly resolved upon the course he intended to pursue, as is sufficiently evident from his orders, his diplomatic communications, and some confidential avowals made to the most intimate of his courtiers, he was, nevertheless, unwilling that it should be known, either to the powers with whom he had to negotiate, or to the general body of the agents of his government, of whose active zeal he had great need. In fact, the knowledge on the part of Austria of Napoleon's real intentions, could not but definitively array that power against us, increase her activity, already very great, in the completion of her armaments, spread a feeling of despair amongst our allies, who were even now dissatisfied at their alliance with us, and render impossible that prolongation of the armistice, which Napoleon considered so essential to his plans, and which he did not despair of obtaining by protracting the negotiations. His resolution not to accept or even acknowledge the men who composed his government, would have speedily become public, have increased the aversion so widely inspired by his policy, have extended this aversion to his person and his dynasty, have rendered the levy of troops a more difficult task, and both irritated and discouraged the army, which, seeing no limit to the effusion of its blood, would have indulged in still bolder and bitterer language. It seemed, in truth, as though the opposition, repressed on all sides, had found refuge in the camps, and that our soldiers

of all ranks had chosen as the price of the sacrifices demanded of them, the exercise of the inalienable liberty of the Frenchman's spirit. After having hurled themselves in the morning into the midst of dangers, they passed the evening in deploring in their bivouacs the fatal obstinacy which caused so much blood to flow, in support of a policy which began to be incomprehensible. They had admitted that the French arms had need, after Moscow and the Berezina, of some glorious vengeance; but when, after Lutzen and Bautzen, the prestige of our arms had been restored, they would have been shocked, and their zeal have been chilled, had they learned that Napoleon, having it in his power to retain possession of Belgium, the Rhenish Provinces, Holland, Piedmont, and Tuscany, could not be contented, but wished to bring destruction upon tens of thousands of men for the purpose of enabling him to retain Lubeck, Hambourg, and Bremen, and to keep that empty title of Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine.—On account of all these reasons, then, Napoleon confessed to no one, except, perhaps, to M. de Bassano, his real intentions. Saying only to each just what it was necessary each should know, for the purpose of being able to accomplish his particular task, and reserving for himself alone the complete scheme of his fatal designs.

We have already narrated that M. de Bubna had repaired to the French head-quarters with the Austrian conditions, and that these conditions had been considerably modified, since, by deferring to the period of the conclusion of a maritime peace the sacrifice of the Hanseatic towns and the confederation of the Rhine, the only objection which could reasonably be raised against them had been removed. And Napoleon perceiving himself, therefore, to be now pressed closely, and fearing to have to declare himself immediately—the consequences of which would be to bring down upon him the weight of the Austrian arms before he should be sufficiently prepared—had signed the disadvantageous armistice of Pleiswitz, not for the purpose of gaining time in which to treat, but time for the completion of his armaments. He wrote secretly to Prince Eugene and the minister of war that he had signed this armistice, the danger of which he partly perceived, for the purpose of obtaining the necessary time for the completion of the armaments which he was preparing against Austria, upon whom he intended to impose the law, rather than receive it from her. He recommended them to neglect nothing which could tend to render the army of Italy (intended to threaten Austria by Carinthia), and the army of Mayence (intended to threaten her by Bavaria), ready to take the field by the end of July; but he

refrained from explaining to either the one or the other of these persons, what was this law laid down by Austria to which he was unwilling to submit, leaving them to believe that the demands of this power were excessive, and tended to nothing less than the ruin of the power of France, and the annihilation of her glory. He wrote to Prince Cambacérès, to whom on his departure he had entrusted the exercise of his authority, that the armistice which had been signed would, doubtless, lead to peace, *but that this was no reason for any relaxation in the preparations for war, being, on the contrary, a reason for redoubling them, since we could only hope to obtain a secure and honourable peace, by convincing our enemies that we were at all points well prepared.*—But to Prince Cambacérès, as to the others, he feared to explain what he understood by the term *a sure and honourable peace*; and he refrained, therefore, from avowing to him that he did not understand by it such a peace as, independently of the Rhine and the Alps, should resign to France, either directly or indirectly, Holland, Westphalia, Piedmont, Lombardy, Tuscany, the Roman states, and Naples.

Only to M. de Bassano, whom he could not deceive, since this minister conducted, on the part of France, all the communications with the European powers, and because he had no reason to fear any objections in this quarter, he declared his real intentions, entrusting to him, also, the task of receiving M. de Bubna, whom, he told him, he was anxious to avoid seeing, that he might not be compelled to explain himself with respect to the Austrian conditions. He further directed M. de Bassano to carry this envoy to Dresden, whither the French head-quarters were about to return, and to retain him there until his return, by which means would be gained ten days, and the assembly of the plenipotentiaries delayed until the middle of June, when, by raising difficulties with respect to the forms of procedure to be adopted, it would be possible to defer any decision upon the matters actually in dispute until the month of July. And then, by showing at the last moment a disposition to treat, and thus increasing the little time which would still remain, it would be possible, he considered, to protract yet a month longer the duration of the armistice; by which means three months in all would be procured for the completion of the French armaments—three months of which the allied powers would, doubtless, take advantage for a similar purpose, but not to such good effect as France, since their administrative functions were carried on neither with so much activity nor skill as hers.

Having determined upon this plan, Napoleon made M. de Bassano set out for Dresden, directing him to announce

his own speedy arrival at that capital, and to seek out for him a fit and convenient dwelling in the suburbs, where he might be able to work free from interruption, breathing a pure air, and be near the *camps of instruction* established on the bank of the Elbe. He ordered to be conveyed thither a portion of his household, together with the *Comédie Française*, in order that he might display there a species of pacific splendour, which should breathe around him an air of tranquil confidence and inclination for repose — an inclination which had never been so alien to his heart as at this time. *It is as well*, he wrote to Prince Cambacérès, *that people should think that we are amusing ourselves here.*

According to his custom, Napoleon did not leave his troops until he had made due provision for their support, health, and instruction, during the suspension of arms. He had reserved, by the conditions of the armistice, lower Silesia, a country rich in every species of material, as well for the clothing as the provisioning of troops, and he had distributed his *corps d'armée* there, from the mountains of Bohemia to the Oder, in the following manner. He posted Reynier at Gorkitz with the 7th corps, Macdonald at Lowenberg with the 11th, Lauriston at Goldberg with the 5th, Ney at Liegnitz with the 3rd, Marmont at Buntzlau with the 6th, Bertrand at Sprottau with the 4th, Mortier in the environs of Glogau with the infantry of the young guard, Victor at Crossen with the 2nd, Latour-Maubourg and Sebastiani on the Oder with the cavalry reserves; whilst Marshal Oudinot, with the corps intended to march upon Berlin, was cantoned on the boundaries of Saxony and Brandenburg, which formed, from the Oder to the Elbe, the line of demarcation stipulated for by the armistice. These various corps were to take up their quarters in the villages or in barracks, passing their time in the practice of military manœuvres and the enjoyment of repose. They were to be supported by means of requisitions levied upon the surrounding districts; the supplies thus obtained being so managed as to afford subsistence for the troops during three months at least, and a supply of provisions available at the period of the renewal of hostilities. Napoleon ordered, moreover, that levies of cloths and other woven fabrics should be made in that portion of Silesia which remained to him, and which produced them in abundance, for the purpose of renewing the already well-worn garments of his soldiers. As Silesia was, in all cases, to return into the possession of Prussia, since Austria would not have it, he had no need to bestow any greater care upon the management of its resources, than just such as would make them last as long as his need of them.

Glogau alone, of all his fortresses on the Oder and the Vistula, having had the advantage of being free from blockade, he renewed its garrison and supplies of provisions, and gave directions for the completion of its means of defence. He sent officers to Custrin, Stettin, and Dantzic, to inform the garrisons of these places of the late triumphs of our arms, to convey to them rewards, and to take care that the provisions consumed each day, were immediately replaced by equal quantities, in conformity with the express conditions of the armistice. It had been agreed by one of the stipulations of the armistice, that the important fortress of Hambourg should go with the tide of war, and should remain in the hands of those who might occupy it on the evening of the 8th of June. It had fallen again into our possession on the 29th of May, by means of the arrival of General Vandamme at the head of two divisions, and would have done so at an earlier period, but for the singular, and, for a moment, inexplicable conduct of Denmark on this occasion. Up to this time Denmark had been faithful to us, and justly so, since it was for the purpose of preserving to her the possession of Norway that we were at war with Sweden. Immediately after the Moscow catastrophe, it had been urgently entreated by Russia and England to abandon Norway to Sweden; an indemnity at the expense of France being promised her should she yield, and the annihilation of her monarchy being threatened should she refuse. To these entreaties and menaces of Russia and England had been added gentler solicitations on the part of Austria, this power inviting Denmark to become her ally, and promising that the possession of Norway should be secured to her, if she would adhere to the Austrian mediatorial policy. In the midst of this conflict of suggestions of all kinds, Denmark, fearing that France would be no longer able to afford her support, had loyally demanded of Napoleon that he should authorise her to treat on her own account, in order to escape the perils with which she was threatened. To this request, Napoleon, touched by her candour, had generously consented; even dismissing the Danish sailors who served on board our vessels, that her position might be still more thoroughly neutral. The hope entertained by Denmark had been, that by making peace with England through the mediation of Russia, and then remaining neutral with all the world, she might render her possession of Norway secure; but it had been speedily intimated to her that she must not only immediately declare war against us—a proceeding which could not but be a severe blow to her feelings of loyalty—but must, moreover, renounce the possession of Norway, receiving in exchange, eventually, an indemnity of such a nature, as

would compel her to add spoliation of our territories to defection from our alliance. Disgusted by these demands, Denmark had definitively returned to us, and one of her divisions, which had occupied a position at the gates of Hambourg, in an equivocal and almost threatening attitude, had ultimately declared itself on our side. Vandamme had then driven out Tettenborn's mixed force, composed of Cossacks, Prussians, men of Mecklenbourg, and soldiers of the Hanseatic towns, and had set up once more the French eagles along the whole course of the lower Elbe. Napoleon had immediately sent orders to Marshal Davout to establish himself strongly in Hambourg, Bremen, and Lubeck, reiterating his injunctions to punish the revolt of these towns with the utmost severity, and to draw from them the resources necessary for the support of his army, and directing him to create upon the lower Elbe a vast military establishment, which should complete the defences of this extensive stream, upon which we now had possession of Kœnigstein, Dresden, Torgau, Wittenberg, Magdebourg, and Hambourg; and which important line, the object of such animated dispute in the course of the negotiation of the armistice, was, therefore, secured to us, independently of that of the Oder, of which we possessed the most essential portion — that which was opposite Dresden. Some hostile troops, had, it is true, passed the line of the Elbe, and overrun at this time, Westphalia, Hesse, and Saxony, spreading everywhere that terror of the Cossacks, which had become almost a superstition; but Napoleon had formed in his rear a corps of infantry and cavalry, whose duty it was to pursue these marauders to the utmost, and to sabre without mercy all those whom it should find on this side of the Elbe. The Duke of Padua, to whom it was intended to entrust the command of the 3rd corps of cavalry, when the two first, those of Latour-Maubourg and Sebastiani should be completed, was now at Leipsic with the nucleus of his corps, which numbered about three thousand troopers, with a few pieces of artillery. Napoleon added to it the Polish division Dombrowski, the division Teste (Marmont's 4th), left in the rear for the completion of its organisation, a second Wurtemberg division, which had recently arrived, and some garrison battalions from Magdebourg; the whole forming a mass of troops numbering some eight thousand horse, and twelve thousand infantry. To this force he prescribed the performance of the functions of a police, throughout the country between the Elbe and the Rhine, that it might be restored to a state of order, and freed from the marauders; and gave orders that if any of these should be taken after

the 8th of June, the extreme limit assigned to hostilities, they should be treated as simple bandits, being, at least, made prisoners for the purpose of seizing their horses, which were excellent.

Having thus taken preliminary measures for the observance of the armistice, and the welfare of his troops during its continuance, Napoleon proceeded towards Dresden, where he intended to remain during the progress of the impending negotiations, and retrograded towards the Elbe with the cavalry and infantry of the old guard, making his own journey accord with that of the troops, by which means he did not reach Dresden until the 10th, which was fully in accordance with his design of delaying at long as possible his meeting with M. de Bubna. The King of Saxony met him upon his approach, and the inhabitants of Dresden itself, seeing with pleasure the war removed from their own thresholds, and their king treated with honour, gave him a reception such as could scarcely have been expected on the part of a German population.

Napoleon alighted at the Marcolini palace, which had been selected by M. de Bassano for his residence, and which, surrounded by a large and handsome garden, was situated in the Friedrichstadt faubourg, near the Oisterwise plain, where the numerous troops would be able to manœuvre on the bank of the Elbe. Napoleon found here his household already installed and ready to receive him; and here, without being at the charge of the Saxon court, or interrupted by it, he had all that he desired — a suitable establishment, fresh air, a rural aspect, and a field proper for the manœuvres of troops. He determined to have here a morning levee as at the Tuileries, to review and manœuvre his troops in the middle of the day, and to devote the evenings to dinners and receptions, and the chefs-d'œuvre of Corneille, Racine, and Molière, as represented by the French comedians. On the very day, even, succeeding that of his arrival at Dresden, his mode of life fell, with military precision, into that course of life upon which he had resolved. But in the meantime, M. de Bubna, who had been now a whole fortnight at Dresden, awaited an interview with him in vain, and at length reminded him of his presence by a formal note, couched in terms which rendered a prompt and explicit reply absolutely necessary.

To understand this note and its importance, we must be informed of the last series of events which had taken place in Austria, where, as elsewhere, events succeeded each other with prodigious rapidity, under the influence of the violent impulse given by Napoleon to the whole course of European

affairs. In employing M. de Coulaincourt in the negotiation of the armistice, for the purpose of procuring some opportunity for coming to a direct arrangement with Russia, Napoleon had furnished this power with a dangerous weapon, of which it was subsequently to make the most disastrous use. Had the Emperor Alexander, less hurt than he actually was by Napoleon's contemptuous treatment of him, and less fascinated by his new rôle of *king of kings*, been able to entertain Prince Kutusof's opinion that Russia should conclude the war with France by signing a separate peace, the sending of M. de Coulaincourt to him would have been a very happy measure, since he had been long his confidant and almost his friend. But as, intoxicated by the adulation lavished upon him by the Germans, Alexander had become, in spite of his natural gentleness, an implacable enemy, whom it was dangerous even to attempt to address, the sending to him of M. de Coulaincourt, so far from touching him, but furnished him with a means of putting an end to Austria's protracted hesitations. It was, in fact, to afford to Alexander an opportunity of saying to this power, "You must now decide upon the course you intend to pursue, for if, instead of aiding us, you leave us to struggle alone, as at Lutzen and Bautzen, we shall be forced to treat with our common enemy, to accept the advances he has made to us, to conclude with him a peace solely advantageous to Russia, and definitively leave you to the effects of his resentment; for if you have done nothing to help us, you have, nevertheless, done what is quite sufficient to inspire him with the greatest distrust of you;" language, of which the employment at the court of Vienna would be very apropos, on the morrow of the battle of Bautzen, when a fresh retrograde movement would remove the coalition forces from the Austrian frontier, and deprive them of all contact with her. It was now or never, therefore, the time for Austria to unite herself with the allies, for one step more, and the hands now outstretched towards each other, would be unable to clasp.

Such were the arguments which it had been resolved to use with the Emperor Francis and M. de Metternich; and whilst MM. Kleist and de Schouvaloff negotiated at Presnitz the armistice of the 4th of June, the selection made by France of M. de Coulaincourt for this negotiation had been pointed out to M. de Stadion, a lie being even added to the truth, mention being made of certain insinuations, which it was falsely pretended this personage had permitted himself to make, to the effect that Napoleon was inclined to come to a direct understanding with Russia at the expense of Austria. Everything that could possibly be surmised from the mere

circumstance of M. de Coulaingcourt's mission, was set forth by Russia as being an accomplished fact, and M. de Stadion was urged to declare to his government, that that which was refused to-day, would of necessity have to be accepted within a few days, under the pressure of circumstances and Napoleon's victories. M. de Stadion, who was hostile to France, and was much startled at the presence of M. de Coulaingcourt, hastened to explain to his court, in exaggerated terms, the imminent danger of a direct arrangement between France and Russia. Distrusting, even, the effect of written words, the allies sent to Vienna, as has been already related, M. de Nesselrode, a minister who during forty years has never failed to urge upon his masters a policy which, profound by reason of its element of patience, was by no means always such as accorded with their irritable temperaments. At the period of which we treat he was still a young man, of a straight-forward and modest temperament, less dogmatic than M. de Metternich, and also less enterprising, but equally skilled in finesse, and precisely fitted to gain the confidence of an enlightened Prince like Alexander, over whom he had already gained a considerable degree of influence. The Czar, although he had left M. de Romanzoff in possession of the empty title of chancellor, in remembrance of the additions which had been made to the Russian empire of Finland and Bessarabia during his ministry, had summoned M. de Nesselrode to head-quarters, and consulted him with respect to the conduct of affairs. On the 1st of June he sent him to Vienna, with directions to make use of entreaties, prayers, and even threats, if necessary — unveiling the Medusa's head, or, in other words, pointing at the probability of an interview between Napoleon and Alexander; of the renewal on the Oder of the conference of the Niemen, and the renewal at Breslau of the alliance of Tilsit.

These proceedings were more than sufficient to produce a decided effect upon such far-seeing politicians as the Emperor Francis and M. de Metternich. Austria, in fact, replaced by fortune in that position of importance from which she had been hurled twenty years since by the sword of Napoleon, was threatened, nevertheless, by a serious danger. Overwhelmed on all sides with caresses, she was besieged from every quarter with the most magnificent offers. Alexander proffered for her acceptance not only Illyria and a portion of Poland, but also Italy, the Tyrol, the imperial crown of Germany, which Napoleon had torn from her brow, and more than all, independence. France, on her side, also offered her Illyria and a portion of Poland, but instead of Italy, the Tyrol, and the imperial crown, offered her Silesia,

a possession which she had much prized in a previous age; and refrained from offering her that independence upon which she set a higher value than upon aught else. She had, therefore, but to exercise her choice between these various offers; but if, from a desire to play too long the rôle of an universally-courted power she should fail to decide at the right moment, it might very possibly happen that after having been flattered and caressed by all, she would end by being as universally outraged by all, and crushed under their common resentment; for the result of a reconciliation between Napoleon and Alexander would be a peace exclusively Russian; such a peace as would leave Austria without any portion of Poland, Illyria, or Italy; as would ignore her desire for the reconstitution of Germany, except so far as this might be accomplished, by the bestowal of certain recompenses for her services upon Prussia; and, so far from restoring to her her independence, would throw her back into the power of Napoleon, become a severer master than ever. For the accomplishment of all this a moment would suffice, for in the existing conjunction of circumstances, affairs were decided in the flashing of a sword—a sword of such a species, as in forty-eight hours was capable of changing the fortunes of the world.

Fully conscious of these truths, M. de Metternich had already taken care to conduct his master to Prague, that he might be near the scene of conflict and negotiation, be able, from Bohemia, as from an elevated and neighbouring post of observation, to watch the rapid torrent of affairs, and be ready to plunge into its midst at the right moment. The news that M. de Coulaingcourt had been chosen for the negotiation of the armistice had had an effect upon him which had not escaped the keen eyes of M. de Narbonne. The letters of M. Stadion had rendered any doubt upon the actual position of affairs impossible, and within four-and-twenty hours the emperor and his minister had resolved to set out from Vienna for Prague, a great source of astonishment for the public, which was surprised, not at the adoption of such a course, but at the promptitude with which it had been taken. In the existing state of the relations between Austria and France, the former power was under some degree of obligation to explain her movements to the latter, and M. de Metternich had hastened, therefore, to say to M. de Narbonne, that as negotiations were about to commence through the intervention of the Austrian government, it was necessary that it should be near the parties who had submitted to its arbitration, and that by its presence at Prague, six days, at least, would be gained upon each communication. This reason was a sufficient justification for the journey to Prague, but

not for the departure within twenty-four hours. Secret information, and the evident constraint of M. de Metternich's manner, revealed the whole truth to the French legation. M. de Narbonne had learned, by means of information on which every reliance could be placed, that the court of Vienna would hasten its departure on account of the fear entertained by it of the conclusion of a direct arrangement between France and Russia, and in this information had found an explanation of the new sentiments which he had discovered, he thought, to be entertained by M. de Metternich. M. de Narbonne, in fact, had found the manner of the Austrian minister manifestly colder, which was very natural, for if M. de Metternich had escaped from our alliance as a serpent escapes, by means of writhing alternately in opposite directions, from the clutch of a muscular hand, he, nevertheless, had not entirely deserted our cause, and in the very sage intention of putting an end to all existing difficulties, without recourse to arms, he had defended with the allies, with some difficulty, the adoption of a moderate peace, and he was now convinced that we had been endeavouring to negotiate a peace adverse to Austria, whilst Austria had been striving to obtain one advantageous for us.

M. de Narbonne, however, had scarcely had time to discuss the state of affairs with M. de Metternich, who, having set out in all haste, was, from the 3rd of June, with the Emperor Francis at Gitschin, a residence situated twenty leagues from Prague, and where, on his arrival he had found M. de Nesselrode, who, on learning the departure of the court from Vienna, had retraced his steps for the purpose of meeting it. The conversation which took place between these two statesmen, at that time of such high importance, may be readily imagined. M. de Nesselrode had, in the name of the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia, entreated M. de Metternich to put an end to the too protracted hesitations of his court, and to take care that the allies should not be still further vanquished in the field, since another defeat would compel them to submit to Napoleon, to come to terms with him at the expense of Austria, and to subject Europe to a hopeless state of dependence. M. de Nesselrode had endeavoured, above all things, to point out to M. de Metternich that Napoleon was acting treacherously towards the Austrians, since, whilst they were endeavouring to obtain for him a peace founded upon a moderate basis, he was entertaining the idea of sacrificing their interests by the conclusion of a peace, which should be entirely to their injury. He had then proceeded to urge, with the utmost earnestness, the Austrian minister to follow the example of Prussia, and to

unite his country by a formal treaty with the allied sovereigns. But M. de Metternich, whose merit it had always been to maintain, whilst his spirit was far from being a passionless one, a policy which no passion was allowed to sway, continued to adhere with even increasing firmness to the plan he had adopted of exhausting every attempt at arbitration, before passing from the mediatorial attitude to one of hostility; and this course, whilst it was well fitted to preserve from any slur the honour of the Emperor Francis, as well in his imperial as in his paternal character, had the advantage, moreover, of procuring for Austria the time of which she had need for the purpose of arming, and, above all, of preserving the possibility of a peaceable arrangement.

M. de Metternich's profound political foresight, rendered him anxious to avoid not only the danger of seeing the contending parties, weary of his protracted hesitations, settle their disputes at the expense of Austria, but also the danger of defeat before the arms of France, a possibility which he still greatly dreaded, in spite of the events of the preceding year; and for these reasons, therefore, he was desirous of holding Prussia and Russia with one hand in such a manner that they might not escape him, whilst with the other, drawing Napoleon to the acceptance of a peace such as the other European powers would accept. Entertaining this plan, therefore, he had said to M. de Nesselrode that he had undertaken the post of arbitrator, that he would frankly fulfil the duties of this position during the two following months, and that it was absolutely necessary that Austria, with respect to France, should assume the rôle of a mediator before passing to that of an enemy, but that if reasonable conditions of peace should be absolutely rejected by the latter country, he would then advise his master, the armistice being concluded, to join the allied powers in making one supreme and last effort to rescue Europe from subjection to Napoleon.

In reply to the expression of these views, it was absolutely promised on the part of Russia, that it would not permit itself to be seduced by the temptation of a direct arrangement between herself and France; Austria at the same time promising to declare war at the time above stated, should France reject the bases of peace proposed by her. In the meantime M. de Metternich, taking advantage of the vicinity of Prague, summoned thither M. de Bubna, for the purpose of explaining to him the position of affairs, and whilst positively declaring to him that Austria was not as yet in any way committed to the allies, authorised him to declare this truth, adducing in support of it the honour of the Austrian Emperor himself, but also authorised him to intimate

in the most decided manner that Austria would certainly join them, if the period of the armistice were not employed in the negotiation of a moderate peace. He was at the same time directed to announce to the French cabinet that the mediation of Austria had been formally accepted by Prussia and Russia, and that the former power, being now, therefore, the reorganised arbitrator, had to demand of each of the belligerents the conditions on which they would severally accept peace, and especially of France, who was now, accordingly, requested to explain herself on this head. Whilst making this demand, M. de Bubna was to take the opportunity of expressing M. de Metternich's desire to pay a brief visit to Dresden, for the purpose of solving all difficulties at once, in a cordial interview with Napoleon.

Such were the matters, and matters of high importance they were, which M. de Bubna on his return to Dresden was anxious to communicate to Napoleon, and of which he communicated but one portion to M. de Bassano, well knowing the inutility of entering into any explanations with this minister, who adopted the ideas of his master, instead of inspiring his master with his own. Napoleon having arrived on the 10th of June, M. de Bubna sent in a note on the 11th, to the effect that Russia and Prussia had formally accepted the arbitration of Austria, that she was now demanding of them the conditions which they proposed as the bases of a peace, and that she awaited the enunciation on the part of France of hers; the object of this note being, not to obtain the immediate enunciation of the terms on which Napoleon would make peace, but to give rise to those preliminary discussions and confidential intimations, which would necessarily precede any official and definitive declaration.

If Napoleon had been willing to accept peace on those terms alone on which it was obtainable, and which he well knew, he would now have lost no time, since there remained but forty days, at the most, in which it could be negotiated. It was now, in fact, the 10th of June, and the armistice would expire on the 10th of July. With his accustomed ardour he would have invited M. de Metternich to Dresden, endeavoured to induce him to make some modifications in the Austrian propositions, and sent him again and again to the head-quarters of the allies, for the purpose of solving the difficulties, arising from matters of detail, which are necessarily attendant upon the negotiation of any treaty, and which would naturally be more than usually numerous, upon the negotiation of a treaty which was to have reference to the interests of the whole world. But the evident proof (independent of the irrefutable proofs to be found in his correspondence), that

he was not unwilling to accept such a peace, is to be found in the fact, that he now wasted, and continued to waste, the time during which its negotiation would have been possible. His plan was, as has already been explained, to defer the period of explanation by multiplying the difficulties respecting matters of form, to show a sudden disposition, at the moment when the armistice should be about to expire, to give way upon these points, to obtain by this sign of a desire for peace, a prolongation of the suspension of arms, to obtain thus a period of leisure up to the 1st of September for the completion of his armaments, to break off the negotiations at that time on some plea well calculated to deceive the public, to fall suddenly with the whole weight of his arms upon the forces of the coalition, to crush them utterly, and to re-establish upon a firmer basis than ever his disputed domination—a pardonable calculation, and one for which the history of conquering princes might afford too much support, had it been founded on realities! Such being his views, he did not consider it yet the right time to receive M. de Bubna, and to accept by a decided yes or no, conditions which were few in number, and the meaning of which could admit of but little doubt. He resolved, therefore, to let three or four days elapse before receiving M. de Bubna, or replying to his note; a delay which would have been very natural had no precise limit been fixed to the continuance of the negotiations, and if, as at the treaty of Westphalia, they could have been allowed to extend over months and even years. But to lose four or five days out of forty on account of a mere matter of form, any hesitation respecting which was to presuppose discussion respecting a thousand others, was only a too manifest means of expressing his, Napoleon's, real wishes, or of pointing out, rather, what his wishes were utterly opposed to.

As Napoleon, however, arrived at Dresden much fatigued, doubtless, and overwhelmed with all kinds of cares, his not granting an audience to M. de Bubna on the first day of his arrival might be readily understood, had it not been the fact, as it was, that when Napoleon was really pressed, day and night, fatigue and repose, were matters of which he was equally regardless. His not being hurried with respect to the conclusion of the peace at this moment, was equivalent, in short, to his not desiring it. M. de Bassano received M. de Bubna's despatch, affected to regard it of extreme importance, and said that an answer would be given to it within three or four days, when Napoleon would grant a personal interview to M. de Bubna, and explain himself with respect to the matters which it contained.

During this interval the answer was prepared and drawn up; and was of a nature more fitted, even, than the voluntary loss of time, to manifest the real designs of the French government. In the first place, it was objected to M. de Bubna that he possessed no official character, which could authorise him to submit a note to the French court; and, in fact, this minister, whom Napoleon had officially received, and who had been sent to him as being more agreeable to him than any other, and as being more *spirituel* than the Prince of Schwarzenberg, whose character was rather the reverse, had never been formally accredited, either as plenipotentiary or ambassador, and he had no qualification, therefore, for the transmission of a diplomatic note; but to make a difficulty with respect to this matter was an absurdity, since the French court had already exchanged with this personage the most important communications. A preliminary reply to M. de Bubna was drawn up, in which it was maintained that it was necessary that the note presented by him should be signed by M. de Metternich, before it could be placed in the French archives, since he himself possessed no diplomatic character which could give it authenticity.

After this difficulty with respect to form, difficulties were raised with respect to the substance of the note itself. The first of these related to the mediation. France had, doubtless, it was said, appeared disposed to accept the arbitration of Austria, and had even promised to accept it, but so important a resolution could not, of course, be deduced or supposed from what might take place in the course of an ordinary interview, and could only be formally agreed to at an official meeting, at which the object, form, method of procedure, and duration of this mediation should be duly determined. And how, again it was further asked, could this arbitration be made conformable to the treaty of alliance between France and Austria, if the latter power were to assume the position of an armed mediator ready to declare war against the disputants, either on the one side or the other? And, finally, what was to be the form of the mediation? A question of form, respecting which the honour of France would not permit her to be silent; for the arbitrator assuming his office with a certain rude haste, had already declared a method of carrying on the negotiations which could not be agreeable to the French court; a method which consisted in permitting the negotiators to discuss the various matters in hand only through the intervention of the arbitrator. Such a method, it was urged, was quite inadmissible on the part of France, since she could not permit anyone to assume the right of taking out of her own hands, the privilege of treat-

ing with respect to her own affairs, and as to submit to such a course would be to subject herself to the terms of a peace concerted amongst foreign powers — a degradation to which France, so long victorious, and able to dictate conditions to Europe, was not yet reduced, especially at a time when victory had just returned to her arms. She was willing, for the purpose of contributing to that peace of which all the world had such great need, to refrain from stating conditions; but she would never, although the whole of Europe should combine against her, submit to have them dictated to her.

These quibbles were made the subject of many notes, and of a long interview also, between Napoleon and M. de Bubna. This interview took place on the 14th of June, and the notes were signed and despatched on the 15th. M. de Bassano accompanied them by a private letter for M. de Metternich, the tone of which was opposed to the end in view, for Napoleon wished to gain time, and the indulgence in frank language was not the means by which this object could be attained. In this letter the loss of time, which had already taken place, was attributed to M. de Metternich, and complaint was made that the armistice having been signed on the 4th of June, so little progress had been made now that it was the 15th; a complaint which was somewhat maladroit, as M. de Bubna had been, since the latter days of May, at the French head-quarters, demanding an interview in vain, and since Austria had shown herself unceasingly impatient, both to receive and to give explanations on all points. Finally, with respect to the desire expressed by M. de Metternich to pay a visit to Dresden, M. de Bassano, not even eluding it, replied, in a manner which was scarcely polite, that the questions under discussion were, as yet, in too indeterminate a shape to receive from an interview between M. de Metternich and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, or Napoleon himself, all that light which, at a somewhat later period, it might well be expected to shed upon them.

Such were the replies with which M. de Bubna had to be contented, and which were sent to M. de Metternich at Prague. As the distance to this city could not be traversed under a day, and as three or four days might be employed by M. de Metternich and his master in determining upon their next step, Napoleon could hope that the 20th of June would have arrived before he should be compelled to make any further communications. As, moreover, it would be fairly allowable to the French diplomatists to spend on their side, three or four days in determining upon the text of the agreement by which they should accept the Austrian arbitra-

tion, and as some additional days would necessarily be employed in assembling the plenipotentiaries, the 1st of July would have arrived before the negotiations had begun; and then it would be only necessary to display a conciliatory disposition for a short period, as for example, from the 1st to the 10th of July, to be successful in a demand that the conclusion of the armistice should be deferred from the 20th of July to the 20th of August, which, with six days for the declaration of hostilities, would defer the recommencement of them until the 26th of August, or almost as long as Napoleon desired.

But whilst he was thus anxious to waste time in negotiations, he was equally anxious to employ it to the greatest advantage in the accomplishment of his vast military designs. His first project, when he had reckoned on the alliance or neutrality of Austria, had been to advance as far as the Oder and the Vistula, for the purpose of driving back the Russians vanquished and separated from the Prussians upon the Niemen. But the supposition of a war with Austria compelled an alteration in his plans, since, in that case, by advancing only to the Oder he would leave the Austrian armies upon his flanks and rear. He had, therefore, to choose his future line of defence between the Elbe and the Rhine, or the Maine, at the most. He preferred the Elbe, for profound strategical reasons, which are generally little known or appreciated. Let us observe, in the first place, that to have advanced upon the Rhine or the Maine would have been much the same thing, since the little stream of the Maine, flowing in a serpentine course across the mountainous country of Franconia, and falling, after a very short course, into the Rhine at Mayence, would serve very well as a defence to the approaches of the Rhine in a campaign fought with armies of sixty or eighty thousand men, but would not serve for this purpose in one fought with masses of five or six hundred troops, since it would, in this case, be outflanked either on the right or the left within a fortnight. The chance lay, therefore, between the Rhine and the Elbe; and to raise the question as to which should be selected was almost to answer it. To fall back upon the Rhine was to make a sacrifice of territory, far more humiliating than any sacrifice which had been demanded as a condition of peace. It was to abandon not only the alliance of Saxony, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Baden, &c., but the Hanseatic towns, the possession of which we had so vehemently disputed, Westphalia, and a portion of Holland. And how would it be possible to demand for France the protectorate of the confederation of the Rhine, when declaring, by a retrograde movement, that

France was unable to defend it? And how assert a right to the possession of the Hanseatic towns, Westphalia, and Holland, whilst acknowledging an inability to occupy them? The acceptance of the conditions of peace proposed by Austria, would, indeed, have been far preferable to the choice of this ground as a battle-field, for in the former case, whilst renouncing the confederation of the Rhine and the Hanseatic towns, France would have, at least, retained indisputable possession of Westphalia and Holland; Napoleon's sovereignty, and, which was of far more importance, the territorial grandeur of the French empire, being at the same time definitively rendered secure. Independently of these reasons, which were, in a political point of view, decisive, there was another which could not but be, both morally and politically, regarded as of great weight, and this was, that to fall back upon the Rhine was to carry the theatre of the war to France itself, since, although, of course, as long as the enemy had not crossed the Rhine, the war might be considered to be carried on out of France, it would, nevertheless, be so close, that the sufferings resulting to the frontier provinces would be almost the same as though it were waged within it. Moreover, by obtaining victories on the upper Rhine, between Strasbourg and Mayence for example, Napoleon could not be certain that one of his lieutenants might not suffer his position to be forced below him, the result of which would be that the war would, henceforth, be waged upon French ground, and the position of its emperor be changed from that of a conqueror endeavouring to bring the world under his subjection, to that of a monarch compelled to fight in defence of his own kingdom. Those, therefore, who blame him for having chosen the line of the Elbe, should rather reproach him for not having accepted the peace which was offered him, since the acceptance of this peace would have involved far fewer sacrifices of all kinds, than would have been incurred by an immediate retreat upon the Rhine. The deplorable plea of continuing the war for the sake of the Hanseatic towns, and the confederation of the Rhine, having been once adopted by him, it was evident that the only course open to him was the occupation and defence of the line of the Elbe.

This was a point on which Napoleon's lofty military genius could not be deceived, and after brooding, as an eagle, over the map of Europe, he had swooped down upon Dresden as upon a rock, from whence he might hold at bay the whole number of his enemies. The narrative of the events which subsequently took place will show us, that if he was forced from this position it was not on account of any weakness in

the position itself, but on account of the extraordinary extension of his combinations, the exhaustion of his army, and the patriotic fury aroused against him throughout the whole of Europe. Six years sooner, at the head of the army of Friedland, he might have maintained his ground there against the world.

The line of the Elbe, although presenting in its upper portion a line of defence less formidable than that of the Rhine, had the advantage, on the other hand, of being less long and less accidentée, of offering interior facilities for the transmission of succours from one point to the other, and of being, from the mountains of Bohemia to the sea, furnished with solid points of support, such as Kœnigstein, Dresden, Torgau, Wittenberg, and Hambourg. To render these points serviceable, some of them required to be strengthened by military works, and it was for this reason, that Napoleon, whose military calculations were always more profound than his diplomatic schemes, was so anxious to prolong the armistice—and thus repair the fault of having signed it. The important question was, whether the line of the Elbe resting on its extreme right, on the mountains of Bohemia, and Bohemia affording to Austria the means of debouching on the rear of this position, it would be possible to defend it against an attempt of the enemy to turn it? And the answer to this question was a matter of grave doubt to many enlightened minds. Napoleon, however, treated with disdain any observation intimating that his position of Dresden, might be turned by a descent of the Austrians upon Freyberg or upon Chemnitz, replying with good reason that the best gift he could ask of Heaven, would be that the principal mass of his enemies should, whilst he was posted on the Elbe, debouch behind this stream, that he might fall upon and completely envelope it between the Elbe and the forest of Thuringia. The disaster suffered by the allies at Dresden speedily proved the justness of his previsions; and if his line were subsequently forced upon the Elbe, it was not by Bohemia, but by the lower Elbe, which his lieutenants did not know how to defend, and which many accidents had much enfeebled. His plan, then, was to establish himself on the various points of the Elbe so strongly, as to be able, if necessary, to withdraw from this line during several days without fear, should it, on the one hand, be advisable to advance to meet the mass of hostile troops moving down upon him in front, or, on the other, to fall back rapidly upon that which might have debouched by Bohemia upon his rear; to repeat, in short, with five hundred thousand men against seven hundred thousand, the achievements he had accom-

plished in his youth with fifty thousand Frenchmen against eighty thousand Austrians. But the glory of realising upon so vast a scale the prodigies of his youth, was to be withheld from him, as a punishment for having been wasteful as well of human lives as of worldly advantages—of the bodies of his subjects as well as of their affections.

To obtain of the line of the Elbe all its advantages, it was necessary to employ the period of the armistice in fortifying the principal points, and to proceed with the utmost expedition in this work, whether we should succeed or not in prolonging the suspension of arms. The first of these points was that of Kœnigstein, at the spot where the Elbe flows from the mountains of Bohemia and enters Saxony. Two rocks, the Kœnigstein and the Lilienstein, posted as two advanced sentinels, the one on the left the other on the right of the stream, guard and narrow the channel of the Elbe on its entrance into the German plains. On the Kœnigstein rock, which was situated on our side, that is, on the left bank of the river, stood the fortress of the same name, commanding the celebrated camp of Pirna, rendered illustrious by the wars of Frederick the Great. Its military works required no addition, but as its garrison was composed of Saxon troops, Napoleon gradually replaced them by Frenchmen. He also ordered that there should be collected within this citadel ten thousand quintaux of flour, and that ovens should be constructed there, that it might contain, for reasons which will hereafter be seen, the means of providing food for a hundred thousand men during nine or ten days. On the rock situated on the opposite bank of the river, that of Lilienstein, there existed scarcely any military resources, and Napoleon accordingly commanded the rapid prosecution of works which would afford secure shelter for two thousand men, and entrusted their due execution to the care of General Roguet, a distinguished general of his guard. He then collected a number of boats sufficient for the construction there of a spacious and solid bridge, capable of affording a passage for a considerable army; and which, fortified as it would be, by the Lilienstein and Kœnigstein forts, would be protected from every attack. Napoleon's profound military foresight had led him to calculate that if a hostile army, realising the prognostications of more than one alarmist, should debouch from Bohemia on his rear, for the purpose of attacking Dresden, whilst he should be, it might be, at Bautzen, he would by means of this bridge be able to cross the Elbe at Kœnigstein and take the imprudent hostile army in reverse.

After the fortresses of Kœnigstein and Lilienstein came that of Dresden, which was to be the central point of the

impending operations, and to become what Verona had been in the wars of Italy. During his last Austrian campaign, being unwilling to expose Dresden to the fate of becoming the point against which should be directed the enemy's operations, and desiring to spare his gentle ally, the King of Saxony, the trial of a siege, Napoleon had advised the Saxon government to demolish the fortifications of Dresden, and replace them by those of Torgau; whereupon, by a species of negligence which was too common, the military works of Dresden had been destroyed, before those of Torgau had been more than just commenced. This was a circumstance much to be regretted, but Napoleon took measures for obviating its disadvantage, by works which, although hastily constructed, would serve for the purpose he had in view; giving directions for the repair of such portions of the fortifications of Dresden as still remained, and having the suburbs of this city surrounded by palisades and well-armed redoubts. On the right bank of the river, however, at Neustadt (new town), he ordered the construction of a series of works of a more formidable nature, and such as would form a vast tête-de-mort almost completely fortified. Two bridges, of wood-work, built the one above and the other below the stone bridge, were to serve, in addition to the latter, as the means of communication between the opposite banks of the stream. Duly executed, these various works would enable thirty thousand men to defend themselves in Dresden during a fortnight against two hundred thousand enemies, if under the command of a general of great military genius. To these means of defence Napoleon added immense magazines, the method of supplying which we shall presently see, and hospitals sufficiently extensive for the wants of the largest army.

After Dresden Napoleon devoted his attention to Torgau and Wittenberg. His principle, with respect to fortifications, was that they may always be erected where an abundant supply of wood is available, and that earthworks, provided with wooden palisades, are capable of furnishing the means of a most prolonged resistance. It was in this way that Napoleon determined to supply the deficiencies in the fortifications at Torgau and Wittenberg, and he gave the necessary orders for the completion of these works in the course of six or seven weeks. Thousands of well-paid Saxon peasants worked day and night at Königsstein, Dresden, Torgau, and Wittenberg; at these latter places, as at the two former, the establishment of magazines and hospitals proceeding simultaneously with the construction of defensive works. At Magdebourg, which was one of the strongest fortresses of Europe, there was no need of any addition to the solid defences; it was only

necessary, therefore, to complete its armament and furnish it with a garrison; and Napoleon determined to devote to it a corps d'armée, which, without being entirely immobilisé, should serve both as a garrison and as a flying corps, to form a link between our two principal bodies of troops in the field, that of the upper and that of the lower Elbe. He resolved also to transport to Magdebourg, almost the whole of his wounded and the cavalry dépôt of General Bourcier, for at this fortress they would not only be sheltered from attack, and in a position where they would not clog the movements of our active troops, but would also find there extensive hospital buildings and open spaces for the construction of barracks; situated, as it was, moreover, at an almost equal distance between Hambourg and Dresden, it would form a most valuable dépôt between the two extreme points of our line of battle. Napoleon appointed to be its governor his aide-de-camp, General Lemarois, an intelligent and energetic officer, and gave directions to *convert the whole of Magdebourg into hospitals and barracks*. He calculated that by sending to Magdebourg all the sick and wounded who were in his way at Dresden, and the cavalry dépôts of General Bourcier, now in Hanover, there would always be there sufficient convalescents and dismounted troopers to supply a garrison corps of seven or eight thousand men, whilst the *corps mobile* of twenty thousand men, which he intended to establish at Magdebourg, for the purpose of forming a link between the armies of the upper and lower Elbe, would add to this number five or six thousand more, and thus raise the whole strength of the garrison to about fifteen thousand men; the remainder of the column mobile being at liberty to manœuvre around the fortress to a considerable distance, without compromising its safety.

From Magdebourg to Hambourg the course of the Elbe was entirely undefended, no single point between these two cities being fortified. This subject had occupied Napoleon's attention from the day of the signature of the armistice, and after having entertained many projects with respect to it, he had at length sent General Haxo, to discover by personal inspection what would be the best method of supplying the deficiency. After patient consideration he had determined to construct at Werben, a place situated nearer Magdebourg than Hambourg, at the top of the angle formed by the course of the Elbe as it turns from a northerly to a westerly direction, and its nearest point to Berlin, a species of citadel formed of earthworks and palisades, and furnished with barracks and magazines, in which three thousand men might be able to hold their ground for a considerable time.

The last and most important object of his solicitude was Hambourg; and this great commercial city, which was one of the chief reasons on account of which he had rejected a peace of which there was so much need, he had not only to defend by force of argument against hostile diplomatists, but also by force of arms against hostile armies. Want of time, however, unfortunately, in this case, as in others, prevented the construction of any other than temporary works. Ten years and forty millions of money would have been required to make Hambourg a fortress, as capable of resisting an enemy as Dantzic, Magdebourg, or Metz. In such time and with such resources as were at his disposal, however, Napoleon formed of Hambourg a vast military establishment, which was partly a fortress and partly an entrenched camp, and which offered the means to a resolute man, such as Marshal Davout speedily proved himself, of opposing to an enemy a protracted resistance.

There remained below Hambourg at the very mouth of the Elbe, the fort of Gluckstadt, the defence of which was confided to the Danes, whom unworthy treatment had driven to the necessity of sharing our fortunes.

Thus from the mountains of Bohemia to the northern ocean, the line of the Elbe would be studded with a series of fortified posts, of strength proportionate to the importance of their several positions, and provided with bridges which would be in our exclusive possession, and would enable us to move our forces from one bank to the other with the utmost facility. Napoleon's maxim that the course of a river should only be defended on the offensive, so to speak, that is, by securing all the points at which it may be passed, and keeping means of effecting its passage always available — this maxim, we say, was now in the case of the Elbe to receive its most distinguished illustration.

It still remained, however, to provide for the expenses of the works which, if they were to be executed with the necessary rapidity, would require ready money; whilst, moreover, immense depôts of provisions had to be added to the military establishments already enumerated, for the purpose of supplying the vast bodies of men who were about to be manœuvred along this line of the Elbe. And with respect to these matters, Napoleon showed as much ingenuity as determination to make the heavy charges of the war, fall on the populations of the countries in which it would be waged.

We have seen that he had ordered Marshal Davout to exact a cruel retribution for their revolt from the inhabitants of Hambourg, Lubeck, and Bremen, directing him to shoot immediately the old senators, the officers or soldiers of the

Hanseatic legion, and the persons who had acted as the officials of the insurrectional movement, and then to draw up a list of five hundred of the principal merchants for the purpose of seizing their possessions. He had relied, when giving these orders, upon the inexorable rigour of Marshal Davout, but, also, we may add, for the honour of both of them, upon this marshal's good sense and probity. But the fact was that when the latter had reached Hambourg he found no delinquents to shoot, the frontier of Denmark, which was at the very gate of the city, having served as the means of escape to almost the whole of them. Some much-to-be-regretted executions had, indeed, taken place before his arrival, but that was during the first movement of the insurrection, in the month of February, and as a punishment for the disgraceful treatment to which had been subjected the French officials.

As the marshal was fortunate enough to have to put no person to death, it only remained for him to draw up a list of persons who were not to lose their lives but their goods; and this project appeared to him to be as ill-advised as the other. The Hambourg citizens, who were, or were supposed to be culpable, were collected, en masse, in the little town of Altona, really a suburb of Hambourg itself, and Marshal Davout represented to Napoleon that the most advantageous course would be to promise pardon to such of them as should return to their own dwellings within a certain time, punishing them only by the imposition of a heavy fine, which they would at first declare themselves incapable of paying, but which they would, certainly, eventually pay, and which would be a species of punishment they would feel very acutely, whilst at the same time, it would procure for the use of our troops a large supply of money. Large resources instead of bloodshed was the résumé of the policy which he advised the emperor to adopt.

Napoleon, who was fond of having large resources at his command, and who had no taste for bloodshed, accepted the marshal's proposal, and wrote to him—"If you had had a few persons shot on the morrow of your arrival, it would have been as well; it is now too late; and pecuniary punishments will be the best." It is thus that despotism and war teach men to speak, even those who have no cruelty in their hearts. It was determined, then, that every Hambourg citizen who should return within a fortnight should be pardoned, that the others should suffer sequestration of their property, and that the city of Hambourg itself should pay, in money or goods, a contribution of fifty millions. A small portion of this contribution was, however, to be levied on

Lubeck, Bremen, and the districts of the 32nd military division. Ten millions were to be paid in money and twenty millions in bills; whilst the remainder was to be set off against such requisitions of matériel and provisions as the French commissariat might demand of Hambourg, Lubeck, and Bremen. The value of the houses which might be demolished for the purpose of constructing the Hambourg defences, was also to be taken into account, as in part payment of these fifty millions. The Hambourg citizens complained bitterly at the fine thus imposed upon them, and were anxious to present a petition to Napoleon on the subject, but he refused to receive them, and as the marshal, who a few days before had defended them from the rigour of the sentence, was now perfectly inflexible, they were compelled to pay down that portion of the fine which was to be paid immediately, and the payment of which was of most importance to the necessities of the army. About ten millions of money were sent to Dresden, and great quantities of grain, cattle, and spirits, were embarked on the Elbe for the purpose of being carried up its stream.

As soon as Napoleon found himself in possession of these resources, he made arrangements for their disposal in such a manner, as might render them available on all the points of the Elbe, and especially at Dresden, for the support of the numerous troops which he was about to concentrate upon it. He was desirous of having at Dresden, the chief central point of his operations, sufficient provisions for the supply of three hundred thousand men during two months, and especially a large reserve of biscuit, which, carried by the troops themselves, would render it possible for them to execute manœuvres occupying seven or eight days without being checked by considerations with regard to provisions. For the attainment of this object it would be necessary to have a hundred thousand quintaux of grain or flour at Dresden, and eight or ten thousand at Kœnigstein. There were already at Magdebourg about seventy thousand, which had been collected there during the winter, to serve either as provisions in case of siege, or for the support of troops on their march; and Napoleon now ordered that these seventy thousand quintaux should be transported by the Elbe to Dresden, and replaced immediately by an equal quantity drawn from Hambourg. An arrangement which shortened, by one half, the space over which these immense quantities of provisions had to be conveyed. As it had been perceived that rations of rice were a very effective means of cure for the dysentery to which the young soldiers were liable, when overcome by fatigue and the heat of the weather; possession was taken of all the rice

to be found at Hambourg, Bremen, and Lubeck; the same places being also made to contribute supplies of spirits, salted meat, cattle, horses, leather, and woven fabrics.

But whilst Napoleon was thus rendering the line of the Elbe both a powerful line of defence and an inexhaustible depôt of provisions, he did not confine his attention to this line alone. He was anxious to have beyond Dresden, at Liegnitz, and on the nearer side of Dresden, at Erfurt, magazines as well-furnished as those on the Elbe; and taking advantage of the richness of lower Silesia, in which was encamped the army which had fought at Bautzen, and the resources of which he cared little to husband, he ordered that the period of the armistice should be employed in this district, in the collection of twenty days' provisions for each corps. With respect to the districts behind Dresden, as at Erfurt, Weimar, Leipsic, Nuremberg, and Wurzburg, these being Saxon or Franconian, and, consequently, friendly countries, he could not make use of any of their resources but by means of purchase; but here also he ordered the formation of vast stores of provisions, which were to be duly bought. With respect to the city of Leipsic, on the other hand, this city having displayed open hostility towards him, he showed less moderation, compelling it to afford contributions of woven fabrics, grain, and spirits, goods with which its magazines were abundantly supplied, taking possession of its public buildings for the purpose of converting them into hospitals, and adding to all this, a threat that at the first sign of revolt he would burn the city to the ground. The cities of Erfurt, Naumburg, Weimar, and Wurzburg, were equally filled with hospitals. Erfurt, of which he had retained possession since 1809, and Wurzburg, which was the capital of the grand duchy of Wurzburg—places which were capable of offering a certain amount of resistance to an attacking enemy, were armed, that there might be a series of fortified points along the Mayence route, should events, which were not then anticipated, render a retreat necessary; for as we have already remarked, Napoleon, whilst unwilling to admit the possibility of a defeat as an element in his political calculations, never failed to provide for it in his schemes of military tactics. But whilst Napoleon was devising these means for rendering his line of battle, at the renewal of operations, both well-defended and well-provisioned, he did not neglect to render the number of his troops proportionate to the probable extent of the war in which they were to be engaged, for his vast intellect was equal to the simultaneous consideration of every subject.

We have already seen, that whilst flattering himself with

the idea that Austria would probably accede to his plans, he had, nevertheless, taken his measures in accordance with the contrary hypothesis, and had prepared in Westphalia, on the Rhine, and in Italy, three armies of reserve; and he resolved, during the three months through which he hoped to extend the armistice, to complete their formation.

In Westphalia, were, as we have already said, the reorganised regiments of the grand army of Russia, which were intended to form two large corps under Marshals Victor and Davout. The other regiments of the grand army had been sent to Italy. As the battalions of each regiment could not be all reorganised simultaneously, the second battalions had been first reconstituted, then the 4th, and, finally, the 1st, according to the period of the return of the staffs; and the divisions had been successively composed of 2nd, 4th, and 1st battalions, so that each regiment was divided into three divisions. Napoleon, anxious to put an end to so vicious an arrangement, desired to unite the three battalions already organised, and to form the divisions by regiments instead of battalions; an arrangement to the execution of which there was no cause for delay but the absence of the 3rd battalions, which, however, would be speedily available, when all the regiments would amount to four battalions. Marshal Davout formed of the regiments placed under his command, four excellent divisions, and Marshal Victor three, and whilst their organisation was being completed, Napoleon determined the several positions they were to occupy, and duties they were to perform. That of Marshal Victor, which had hitherto remained in the rear, he marched upon the frontier line, determined by the terms of the armistice, and cantoned it along the Oder in the environs of Crossen; but with respect to that of Marshal Davout, considering that when reinforced by the Danes, it would be more than sufficiently strong for the Hanseatic departments and the lower Elbe, he determined to divide it into two parts, leaving two of its divisions under Marshal Davout, and posting two under General Vandamme at Wittenberg, from whence he might bring them under his own immediate command, if necessary, or march them upon the lower Elbe should Marshal Davout require them.

The other corps destined to reinforce the mass of the active troops were being reorganised at Mayence, and the reorganisation of four divisions which Napoleon intended to place under the command of Marshal Saint Cyr, had already made considerable progress. There were, consequently, three corps d'armée, Marshal Victor's, General Vandamme's, and Marshal Saint Cyr's, comprising about

eighty thousand infantry, with which Napoleon intended to swell the mass of his troops in Saxony, ready to meet the forces of Austria, should they appear on the theatre of war. Besides the four divisions already almost organised at Mayence, Napoleon had assembled the elements of two others, which were to be organised under the care of Marshal Augereau, and be joined by the two Bavarian divisions. The Bavarian court, which had for a moment inclined, as had also Saxony, towards the mediatorial policy of Austria, had immediately renounced it when required to make on the banks of the Inn, sacrifices for which it was to receive no compensation. It had hastened to renew its armaments, and it could be relied on to furnish two serviceable divisions—serviceable, however, only in case victory should come to keep in check the excitement of the popular mind, and encourage the monarch to preserve his fidelity towards us. These four divisions, two French and two Bavarian, were to threaten Austria in the direction of the *haut Palatinat*.

Finally, Napoleon had watched with his accustomed attention the execution of the orders given to Prince Eugene; by means of which he hoped to effect the reorganisation in Italy of an army of sixty thousand men, to whom he desired to add twenty thousand Neapolitans. Murat, always oscillating between the most opposite opinions, deeply hurt by the manner in which he had been treated by Napoleon, anxious to save his crown at any price, but unable to determine whether an alliance with France or with Austria would most conduce to the attainment of this object, had hitherto delayed to send his contingent; but Napoleon had scarcely entered Dresden, when he had summoned him to decide upon the course he intended to pursue, at the same time directing M. Durand de Mareuil, the French minister at Naples, to withdraw, should the Neapolitan corps not receive immediate orders to march. There remained in the dépôts what would suffice to furnish six or seven thousand light cavalry to the future army of Italy; and the arsenals and dépôts of this country still contained the elements of an excellent artillery. Napoleon flattered himself, therefore, that by the 1st of August he would have an army of eighty thousand men, accompanied by two hundred pieces of cannon, threatening an invasion of Austria by Illyria.

The three corps of Victor, of Vandamme, and of Saint Cyr (without taking into account that of Augereau, which was not intended to act upon the Elbe), appeared to him to be in themselves almost a sufficient protection against the appearance of Austria on the theatre of the impending struggle. But Poniatowski's corps, after many vicissitudes, brought across

Colours and Standards to Marshal on the line on which was concentrated the Silesian corps was an additional resource, of which the real importance was less due to the number than to the quality of the troops in which it was composed. Of all the troops which were driven more wretched, more devoted to France, and their country, there remained but the remnants and the desire to avenge it: and Napoleon was resolved to give them a new country by making them the victors of France, and taking them into her service. In the meantime, whilst awaiting their definitive incorporation with the French army, he placed them under the direct administration of M. de Bassano, directing this minister to satisfy their wants of pay, to provide them with clothing, arms, and all in short that they might require. Independent of Jourdanville's corps, or the various detachments of their countrymen distributed amongst the fortifications, they numbered about twelve thousand infantry, and three thousand cavalry, and were a fresh addition to the forces which had fought at Lutzen and Bautzen.

Finally, amongst the resources created for the purposes of the autumn campaign, and for the eventuality of a war with Austria, must be reckoned the development now given to the imperial guard, which had been composed at the commencement of the campaign of but two divisions, the one the old, and the other the young guard; but which was increased at the moment of the signature of the armistice by a 3rd division, whilst a 4th and a 5th were about to join it. It would thus, with twelve thousand cavalry and one hundred pieces of cannon, form a corps numbering almost fifty thousand men, of whom thirty thousand would be young infantry, whom Napoleon intended to expose much more freely than the old guard, making use of them in all the great battles, of which there were to be, unfortunately, both many and sanguinary ones.

It remained to provide for the reorganisation of the cavalry, of which there had been a great want at the commencement of the campaign, and which had been one of Napoleon's reasons for signing the armistice. The two corps of Latour Maubourg and Sebastiani did not number at the beginning of June more than eight thousand horsemen. Four thousand might be drawn from the dépôts of General Bourcier, and about twenty eight thousand from France; and by this means the cavalry arm of the army in Germany would be raised to the number of forty thousand, without taking into account the cavalry of the imperial guard and the allies, the Saxons, Wurtembergians, and Bavarians. Of the twenty-eight thousand expected from France, however, some would arrive

on foot, and would have to be provided with horses; and with respect to the supply of horses required for his cavalry, Napoleon had an article inserted in the treaty of alliance by which Denmark became definitively attached to France; by which article France engaged on her part to keep a body of twenty thousand troops always at Hambourg, for the purpose of being ready to hasten when it might be necessary to the defence of the Danish provinces, whilst Denmark on her side undertook to furnish the French army with ten thousand infantry and two thousand horse, all of whom were to be paid by the French treasury, and to procure for it ten thousand horses, receiving, immediately, their value in ready money. Napoleon had reason to suppose, therefore, that by these means he would be able, within two or three months, to form a body of cavalry which, including the ten or twelve thousand troopers of the guard and the eight or ten thousand of the allies, would number sixty thousand. Of the light cavalry, or cavalry of the line, Napoleon annexed about two thousand to each corps of the army, to serve the purpose of a corps of observation, and formed the remainder, as was his custom, into several reserve corps, intended to fight in line. Of these corps, Generals Latour-Maubourg and Sebastiani were already in command of two, which had made the spring campaign. The 3rd, which was now employed in pursuing the Cossacks, was under the command of the Duke of Padua, and at the head of the 4th was the Count de Valmy, the son of the old Duke de Valmy.

To these four corps Napoleon was anxious to add a 5th, to be formed of the regiments recalled from Spain. As the principal occupation of the cavalry in Spain—that of connecting together the several bodies of French troops—had become much less necessary since he had ordered the evacuation of Madrid, and the concentration of all the French forces in the north of the Peninsula, he had now recalled from thence the cadres of ten regiments of dragoons, four of chasseurs, and two of hussars, directing that they should be immediately conveyed to Mayence, where they were to be filled up with men of the last conscriptions, now already tolerably well disciplined. Napoleon hoped by this means to obtain about four or five thousand more cavalry, and thus to raise the strength of this arm of his forces to a total of sixty-five thousand men. Nor did he, whilst thus making these exertions to complete the organisation of his infantry and cavalry, neglect to bestow equal care upon the artillery, of which he hoped to be able to carry a thousand pieces actually into the field.

Established, by means of the measures above narrated, on

the line of the Elbe, Napoleon flattered himself that he would have at his disposal, without taking into account the troops in garrison, four hundred thousand soldiers, besides twenty thousand in Bavaria and eighty thousand in Italy, which would raise his total force to five hundred thousand active troops, and seven hundred thousand, if we include those not actually in the field—an enormous force, which was quite sufficient in his powerful hand for the subjection of the coalition, even if strengthened by the addition of Austria, and for the development of which he had consented to an armistice, which afforded to the allies time to escape his pursuit, and also, unfortunately, time to augment considerably their forces.

The answer sent to M. de Metternich on the 15th of June had been interpreted rightly, the clever Austrian diplomatist understanding perfectly well that when, of forty days which remained for the negotiation of a general peace, five had been lost in replying to the note constitutive of the mediation, independently of those which would be lost in settling mere questions of form, it might fairly be concluded that there was no very earnest desire to arrive at a pacific conclusion of the existing complications. Nevertheless, as it was possible that Napoleon might be merely unwilling to declare his real intentions until the last moment, or might really be sincere with respect to some of the difficulties which he had raised, M. de Metternich did not yet resign the hope that peace might still be obtained, either on the basis of the conditions proposed by Austria, or on others which should be moulded upon them. In either case he considered that he ought to await Napoleon's movements, whilst, at the same time, employing some method by which they might be stimulated. The two monarchs of Prussia and Russia were eager for an interview with the Emperor Francis, hoping that it might be the means of enabling them to engage him to what they called the cause of Europe; but the latter, considering himself bound, as well in his paternal as in his mediatorial character, to maintain extreme reserve with respect to two sovereigns who had become the implacable enemies of France, was unwilling to enter into any personal communication with them so long as circumstances should leave him at liberty to refrain from declaring war against this country. The same reasons did not apply, however, to the case of M. de Metternich, and he had, accordingly, proceeded to Oppontschna for the purpose of conferring with the two allied sovereigns; intending to make use of this opportunity to persuade them to adopt his own views. He set out on this journey with all publicity, being certain, as the event proved, that Napoleon, as soon as

he should hear that the Austrian minister was engaged in personal conference with the two allied sovereigns, would experience a strong feeling of jealousy, and, so far from objecting to his paying a visit to Dresden, would rather earnestly press him to do so.

Whilst M. de Metternich was on his journey, Prussia and Russia were entering into a *subsidy treaty* with England. By this treaty, concluded on the 15th of June and signed by Lord Cathcart, M. de Nesselrode, and M. de Hardenberg, England undertook to furnish, immediately, to Russia and Prussia, two millions sterling, and to liquidate the moiety of an emission of paper money, known by the name of *papier federative*, and intended to have currency through all the allied states. As this paper money would amount to five millions sterling, the total sum furnished by England to the two powers would amount to four and a half millions sterling (one hundred and twelve millions five hundred thousand francs), these powers engaging in return to maintain constantly in the field, in Russia one hundred and sixty thousand, in Prussia eighty thousand, active troops, to carry on a vigorous war against the common enemy of Europe, and to refrain from entering into any treaty with him without having first concerted with England. The Russian and Prussian sovereigns having informed Lord Cathcart that they were summoned by Austria to accept her mediation, and that they were disposed to do so, provided it would not be an infraction of the *subsidy treaty*, Lord Cathcart replied that he did not consider that their acceptance of the mediation of Austria would be any infringement of this treaty, and added his opinion that it was necessary to comply with the views of Austria, since it was very probable that the conditions of peace proposed by her would be rejected by Napoleon, and she would thus be led into declaring war against him, by the very act of mediation by which she had endeavoured to bring about a general peace.

On his arrival at Oppontschna M. de Metternich was overwhelmed by caresses and solicitations on the part of the allied sovereigns and their ministers; who declared to him that their forces were immense, that if Austria should join them they would be irresistible, that Napoleon would be vanquished and Europe saved. Peace with Napoleon, they added, was impossible, for he was evidently unwilling to make it, and even if he did, it would only be with the intention of taking the field again as soon as he should have recruited his strength. These points of view, however, were not, and could not be those from which Austria regarded the existing state of affairs. She was neither, as Russia, intoxicated with

the idea of being the liberator of Europe, nor reduced, as Prussia, to the alternative of victory or destruction, nor driven, as was the case with England, to the shelter of all the consequences of a disastrous war. Her political and domestic relations with France, moreover, were strong motives for not entering into a state of hostility with this country without the most urgent motives for so doing. She was anxious to re-establish the independence of Europe without having recourse to a war, which she regarded as full of perils, even if waged against Napoleon when enfeebled, and was of opinion that it was necessary to seize any opportunity of concluding an advantageous and secure peace, and to avoid the risk of losing all by endeavouring to gain too much at a single stroke. If, for example, Napoleon should be willing to renounce his Polish dream (as was styled his grand duchy of Warsaw), if he should consent to re-establish Prussia in her former condition, to restore independence to Germany, by the abolition of the confederation of the Rhine, and to restore her commerce, by resigning the Hanseatic towns, it would be better to accept a peace based on these conditions than to encounter the risks of a formidable war. Should England be disinclined to adopt this view it would be necessary to force her to do so, by intimating that she would, otherwise, be left to carry on the war alone. Such were the opinions of Austria; opinions which Prussia and Russia, under the influence of the passions of the moment, were far from sharing; desiring, as they did, that far harder terms should be exacted from France. She should be deprived of Westphalia and Holland, they said, and a portion of Italy, at least, should be taken from her and bestowed upon Austria. M. de Metternich rejoined, that whilst considering these views perfectly reasonable, Austria would confine herself to demanding the abandonment of the duchy of Warsaw, the reconstitution of Prussia, the abolition of the confederation of the Rhine, and the restoration of the Hanseatic towns, and would only declare war in case these conditions were rejected.

The result of the conferences between the Austrian minister and the allied sovereigns was, that the latter accepted the Austrian mediation, agreeing to enter into negotiations with Napoleon, through the Austrian minister; that it was arranged that Austria should submit to the French court the conditions she proposed as the basis of peace, that she should only declare war in case they were rejected, that until then she should remain neutral, and that—with respect to England—she should be informed of the existing position of affairs, but that the question of peace between her and

France should be adjourned for the purpose of simplifying the negotiation of a continental peace, which would necessarily and immediately be followed by a maritime one.

These bases of negotiation having been agreed upon, M. de Metternich returned to Gitschin, to his master, and found on his arrival there that his anticipations had been completely verified. Napoleon, in fact, full of anxiety with respect to what was taking place in Bohemia, knowing that continual communications were taking place between Gitschin, where his father-in-law was residing, and the head-quarters of the allied sovereigns, and knowing also that there was every probability of personal interviews taking place between them and M. de Metternich at Oppontschna, began to consider that it was not altogether necessary, in his anxiety to procure delay, to afford the opportunity for the formation of a formidable coalition, which, by interfering at the right moment, he might be able to prevent. By means of a personal interview with M. de Metternich, he flattered himself that he should be able to discover what were the designs of the coalition, which would be an advantage of no slight importance, and, more especially, to contrive a fresh prolongation of the armistice. He had an intimation, therefore, given to M. de Bubna through M. de Bassano, that he would willingly receive M. de Metternich at Dresden, and that he even considered his presence necessary for the complete comprehension of the questions which now had to be solved. M. de Bubna immediately transmitted this intimation to Gitschin, and M. de Metternich found it there on his return from his interview with Alexander and Frederick William. As this was precisely what both he and the Emperor Francis desired, M. de Metternich determined to accept the invitation without delay, and immediately set out for Dresden, bearing with him a letter written by the Emperor Francis to his son-in-law, in which he declared that he had authorised his minister of foreign affairs to sign all articles relating to the negotiation of the treaty of alliance, and the acceptance by France of the Austrian mediation; at the same time reiterating his entreaties, that Napoleon would adopt a peaceful policy, and thus crown himself with the best species of glory, and the only kind which he had not yet grasped.

M. de Metternich arrived at Dresden on the 25th of June, and on the following day, the 26th, had a first interview with M. de Bassano, since it was with this minister that he was ostensibly to treat. Two days were spent by the two ministers in discussing empty quibbles respecting the treaty of alliance—which was to continue unbroken but was to be temporarily suspended, so that the rôle of mediation might be

rendered consistent with that of ally ;—respecting the form in which the arbitration was to be conducted; respecting the claim set up by the arbitrating power to be the sole channel through which the arbitration was to be conducted. As, however, M. de Metternich had not visited Dresden for the purpose merely of having interviews with a minister who had no real influence, and as he had, moreover, to deliver a letter from the Emperor Francis to the Emperor Napoleon, it was necessary that he should see the latter, and that without any further delay ; and Napoleon was on his side equally ready for an interview, although the presence of M. de Metternich raised the heat of his wrath against Austria to a raging fever. The interview was appointed to take place on the afternoon of the 28th of June.

As M. de Metternich traversed the ante-chambers of the Marcolini palace, he found them filled with foreign ministers and officers of all ranks ; amongst them being Prince Berthier, who was extremely anxious for peace, and who, afraid to express his real feelings to Napoleon, was too prone to make them known to just those persons from whom it might have been wiser to conceal them. On the appearance of M. de Metternich, a species of anxiety was visible on the countenances of all those present ; and Prince Berthier, whilst conducting him to the emperor's apartment, said to him—" Well ! Is it peace ? Pray be reasonable, and put an end to this war, for assuredly both you and we have equal need of repose !" —By these words M. de Metternich could judge that his spies had reported truly, when they said that throughout France peace was earnestly desired, and was longed for even in the ranks of the French army. When M. de Metternich entered Napoleon's cabinet, he found him standing, his sword by his side, his hat under his arm, and wearing an air which was formally polite and seemed to be that of a man who was restraining his passion for a moment, but would be unable to do so much longer.—" You have come at last, then, M. de Metternich," he said, as the Austrian minister entered, " you have come at last, but it is somewhat late, is it not ?"—And then, adopting at once the tone agreed on in the French cabinet, he endeavoured, by being the first to describe the existing posture of affairs, to attribute to Austria the causes of the delay which had already taken place ; at the same time complaining bitterly of the manner in which the Austrian court had behaved towards him, considering the relations which existed between them, and enlarging at great length upon the little dependence which it was possible to place upon Austrian good faith.—" I have thrice," he said, " restored his throne to the Emperor

Francis, and have even committed the error of marrying his daughter, in the hope, which has proved to have been but too vain, of rendering him my sincere ally. Last year, relying upon his good faith, I concluded a treaty of alliance with him, by which I guaranteed to him the possession of his states, and he guaranteed to me the possession of mine. Had he expressed any unwillingness to enter into this agreement, I should not have insisted upon his doing so, and I should have refrained from engaging in the Russian war. But now, after having signed this treaty, because a single campaign has been rendered disastrous to me by the unpropitious state of the elements, he begins to withdraw from the course he appeared to have warmly adopted, and interferes between me and my enemies, not, as he would have it supposed, for the purpose of negotiating a peace, but in reality, to check me in a career of victory, and to rescue from my grasp the enemies I am about to destroy. . . . —If you are anxious to renounce my alliance," he continued, throwing more and more animation into his voice and manner, "if it is injurious to you, leading you against your will into a state of hostility with the rest of Europe, why not have said so at once? I should not have insisted upon your adopting a course to which you were opposed; your neutrality would have sufficed me, and at this moment the coalition would have been already dissolved. But the fact is, that under the pretence of bringing about peace by adopting the rôle of arbitrator, you have taken up arms; and now that your armaments are completed, or nearly so, you assume the right of dictating to me conditions which are those of my enemies themselves; and behave, in short, in the manner of persons quite ready to declare themselves my enemies. Be frank. Do you wish to wage war with me? . . . If it be so, men are, indeed, incorrigible, and incapable of deriving any advantage from experience! . . . The Russians and Prussians, in spite of many bitter lessons, have dared, emboldened by the events of last winter, to come forth to encounter my arms, and I have vanquished them, thoroughly vanquished them, although they have told you the contrary. And now you, also, wish to have your turn? Well! be it so, you shall have your wish. . . . I will meet you in Vienna, in October——"

The strange and contemptuous manner in which Napoleon alluded to a marriage, with which in his private character he appeared to be by no means displeased, offended and irritated M. de Metternich, without, however, having as much impression upon him as would have been produced by a tone of cold firmness. "Sire," replied he to Napoleon, "we do not desire to be at war with you, but we do desire to put an

end to a state of things, which has become intolerable to the nations of Europe, to a state of things which threatens all of us with some overwhelming destruction at any moment. Your majesty is as much interested as we can be in removing the evils which now prevail, for it is quite possible that fortune may some day be unpropitious to you, and should that be the case whilst affairs are in their present state, it is far from impossible that you should meet with some terrible misfortune."—"But what is it," said Napoleon, "that you demand of me?"—"Peace!" replied M. de Metternich, "that peace which is absolutely necessary, of which you have as much need as we, and the conclusion of which must afford as much safety to you as to us." And having said this, the Austrian diplomatist proceeded with infinite skill, rather insinuating than enunciating, to enumerate the conditions with which the reader is already acquainted. But as each condition reached his ears, Napoleon, as it were with a lion's spring, dashed into the midst of the diplomatist's discourse, as though he had just uttered some blasphemy or insult.—"Oh!" he said, "I perceive what you mean. . . . You only ask of me just now, Illyria, that Austria may gain some ports; some portions of Westphalia and the grand duchy of Warsaw for the purpose of reconstituting Prussia; the cities of Lubeck, Hambourg, and Bremen, that the commerce of Germany may be re-established; and the renunciation by me of the protectorate of the Rhine,—an empty title, as you call it—that German independence may once more exist! . . . But I know very well what all this really means. . . . You Austrians want the whole of Italy; your friends, the Russians, are anxious to get hold of Poland; the Prussians long for the possession of Saxony; the English for that of Holland and Belgium; and if I yield to what you ask to-day, you will not fail to-morrow to demand these objects of your several desires. To obtain them, however, you must first raise an army of a million of men, spill the blood of many generations, and demand them at the foot of the heights of Montmartre!" . . . —Whilst uttering these words, Napoleon lost all control over himself, and even permitted himself, it is said, to address M. de Metternich in the most insulting manner; but this the latter has always denied.

M. de Metternich now endeavoured to explain to Napoleon that such ideas were by no means now entertained, although it was by no means improbable that they might arise should the war be imprudently prolonged, that there were, doubtless, some excitable persons in St. Petersburg, London, or Berlin, whom the events of 1812 had induced to indulge in them, but that there were none such in Vienna. "Justice,"

he said, "was all that was desired, and the best means of putting an end to the pretensions of the foolish persons just alluded to, would be the conclusion of peace, of an honourable peace; of such a one, in fact, as that which Napoleon was now offered, and which would be to him both honourable and glorious." Somewhat soothed by these words, Napoleon replied, "That if the abandonment by him of a certain amount of territory had been alone required, he would have consented to make the sacrifice; but the coalition had been formed for the purpose of dictating conditions to him, and forcing him to accept them, and thus depriving him of his prestige."—And then, with a burst of military pride which well became him, he added, "your sovereigns, born to their thrones as they have been, cannot comprehend the sentiments which animate my breast. Vanquished, they return to their capitals, and are but little affected by what has taken place. But I am a soldier; honour and glory are necessities of my life; I can never suffer myself to appear humiliated in the midst of my people, I must, and will remain great, glorious, and admired!" "What end, then," interrupted M. de Metternich, "is there to be to the present state of affairs, if defeat and victory are equally to be reasons for continuing these calamitous conflicts?" "What I do," replied Napoleon, "is not for myself alone, but for that brave nation which so readily sheds its noble blood at my summons. Such devotion forbids me to entertain any weak considerations with regard merely to my own welfare; it is my duty to preserve for France the greatness she has purchased by such heroic efforts." "But sire," rejoined M. de Metternich, "this brave nation, whose courage all the world admires, has need, itself, of repose. I have passed through the ranks of your regiments, and seen that your soldiers are mere children. You have anticipated your conscriptions, and called to arms a generation which has not yet arrived at manhood; and when this generation shall have been destroyed by the present war, will you levy that which shall be younger still?" These words, which repeated the reproach which was most frequently in the mouths of his enemies, touched Napoleon to the quick. Panting with an anger which distorted his features and deprived him of all control over himself, he threw, or let fall, his hat to the ground, which M. de Metternich did not attempt to pick up, and stepping close up to him, said, "You are not a soldier, sir; you have not, as I, a soldier's spirit; you have not lain in camps; you have not learned to regard as naught the lives of others as well as your own. What do I care, do you suppose, for the lives of two hundred thousand men?" This outburst,

the soldierly roughness of which we have suppressed, produced a great effect upon M. de Metternich, who exclaimed, "Let us open, sire, let us open all the doors and windows, that all Europe may hear you, and the cause I am defending with you may have the benefit of your words!" Recovering his composure to a certain extent, Napoleon said, with an ironical smile, "After all, the Frenchmen whose lives you are so anxious to defend, have not so much reason to complain of me. I have lost, it is true, two hundred thousand men in Russia, of whom one half were the finest French troops, whose loss I regret . . . oh! bitterly regret. . . . But with respect to the others, they were Italians, Poles, and chiefly Germans." . . . And as he concluded these words, he made a gesture which implied that their destruction was a matter of the most perfect indifference to him.—"That is all very well," replied M. de Metternich, "but you must acknowledge that that is scarcely a reason to give to a German."—"You spoke for the French and I have answered you for them," replied Napoleon.—The conversation having reached this point, the emperor employed an hour in relating to the Austrian diplomatist how he had been surprised and overcome in Russia by bad weather, and by bad weather alone. Not having seen M. de Metternich till now since the catastrophe of 1812, he took pains on this occasion to re-assume in his eyes the prestige of invincibility, and to prove that all his losses had been simply due to the opposition of the elements. Walking quickly to and fro, whilst he spoke, his foot happened to strike against his hat, which lay in one corner of the room, and he recurred to the fundamental idea of his discourse—which was, that Austria, in whose behalf he had so often remitted the punishment she had justly incurred, and from whom he had demanded—"thereby committing," he said, "a great fault"—an archduchess in marriage, had, nevertheless, dared, in return for these favours, to take up arms against him.—"A fault," interrupted M. de Metternich, "if the Emperor Napoleon were simply a conqueror, but not if he were a far-sighted politician and the founder of an empire."

"Fault or no fault," exclaimed Napoleon, "the fact is, that you wish to declare war against me! Be it so, then. But what resources have you which will enable you to carry it on? Two hundred thousand troops in Bohemia, you say, as though you could make me believe such nonsense. At the very most you have no more there than one hundred thousand, and I am strongly inclined to believe that of those no more than eighty thousand are in a state to take the field."

He then led M. de Metternich into his cabinet, showed him his memoranda and maps, told him that M. de Narbonne

had covered Austria with his spies, that it was in vain, therefore, to attempt to frighten him, Napoleon, by mere fables, and that he knew for certain that the Austrian forces in Bohemia did not even amount to a hundred thousand. Passing from this subject, Napoleon said to M. de Metternich—"In truth, you had better refrain from mixing yourselves up with this quarrel, for the danger you would incur by so doing, would far exceed any advantage you could hope to derive from it. You want Illyria? Well! I will let you have it. You are anxious for the conclusion of an European peace? I will conclude one that shall be perfectly just towards all. But as for the peace which you endeavour to bring about through your mediation, it is, in fact, a peace which you are striving to force me to accept, and submission to which would make me appear in the eyes of the world as one who had been vanquished, and was forced to accept such terms as might be offered him. And this, too, when I have just obtained two brilliant victories!"—M. de Metternich referred once more to the plan of arbitration, endeavouring to point out to Napoleon, that it was not proposed with a desire to place any constraint upon Napoleon's will, but simply in the friendly spirit of an ally, a friend, a father; and that it was tolerably certain that when the conditions suggested by it became generally known, they would be considered to show great partiality in the arbitrator for his son-in-law.—"Oh! you persist, then;" interrupted Napoleon, with anger, "you are determined to lay down the law to me? Well! We will have war, then! But remember! *We meet at Vienna!*"

This memorable interview, which did not, as we shall presently see, decide the question of peace or war, but which did display, in the most inopportune manner, what were Napoleon's real feelings on the subject, lasted five or six hours; the evening being so far advanced when it concluded, that the speakers could scarcely distinguish each other's countenances. Unwilling to dismiss M. de Metternich as in the midst of a quarrel, he added a few words in a much gentler tone, and then appointed fresh interviews for the following days. In the meantime, the habitués of the imperial ante-chamber had been much excited by the length of the interview; and the traces of anxious expectation on their countenances became still more visible, when M. de Metternich reappeared amongst them. Major-General Berthier ran up to him to learn some tidings of what had taken place during the interview, and asked whether he were content with the emperor? "Yes!" replied the Austrian minister, "I am content with him, for he has set my conscience at rest, and, on my oath, I believe your master has lost his reason."

It was not from the violence displayed during this interview that arose its injurious effect upon the fortunes of the empire, but from the sad conviction which it could not fail to leave upon the mind of M. de Metternich, that Napoleon would never consent to accept the moderate conditions which were the ultimatum of the Austrian cabinet. Fortunately, however, M. de Metternich, considering it indispensable to his own glory and security to obtain, by means of a peace, the conditions which he thought necessary, was ready to sacrifice his pride to his policy, and to restrain any display of passion so long as he should appear to have any chance of succeeding in his aim. Napoleon was at full liberty, therefore, to give way to his ill-humour, provided he should, ultimately, adopt a wise course and accept the favourable peace which was offered him. And we may add, moreover, that when any one had suffered from an outburst of his temper he received some prompt recompense, for whenever Napoleon had given way to a fit of ill-humour, he was ever ashamed of having done so, and speedily recovering himself, hastened to caress those whom he had just before insulted, and made every effort to induce them to forget what had taken place.

His interview with the Austrian minister had scarcely concluded, when Napoleon was already filled with regret, at having allowed to his passionate disposition such unrestrained sway, and thus failed to obtain from this interview any of the advantages he had hoped to make it afford. In fact, so far from having discovered the secrets of the Austrian minister, he had simply revealed his own, by making apparent the immovable obstinacy of his pride, and frustrating his chief design, that of procuring a prolongation of the armistice, by showing too clearly that the armistice would not lead to peace. He immediately, therefore, ordered M. de Bassano to hasten to M. de Metternich and enter into conversation with him on that essential topic, of which but little had been said during the late interview, the Austrian mediation, its form, conditions, and the period at which it was to be exercised. And as M. de Metternich might even suppose, from Napoleon's language, that he had rejected it, M. de Bassano was now directed to draw up, in concert with him, a convention with respect to the manner in which it was to be executed.

The following day was, accordingly, devoted by M. de Metternich and M. de Bassano to a discussion respecting the mediation, nothing having been said respecting the treaty of alliance, the most important articles of which Austria had so ill advisedly been furnished with the opportunity of renouncing. The communication between the two diplomatists was solely upon the mediation, the manner of its execution, and

the disposition which Austria would display towards France. An attempt was made to draw up a convention with respect to the form of the mediation, but no agreement could be come to, because M. de Bassano was anxious to surcharge it with precautions which M. de Metternich considered inconvenient. The details, however, were debated without bitterness, and in the tone of persons resolved to come to an understanding. The articles of the proposed convention agreed on between them were sent to the emperor, and it was arranged that on the 30th of June he should grant M. de Metternich another interview, for the purpose of coming to an agreement with him with respect to the still disputed points.

On the 30th, accordingly, M. de Metternich, accompanied by M. de Bassano, had a second conference with Napoleon, and found him as changed as a sky which a storm had just left serene. He was frank, cheerful, and full of amiable repentance. "You are determined to quarrel with us, then?" he said to M. de Metternich, in a tone of the most gracious familiarity; and then, taking the proposed convention out of the hands of M. de Bassano, he read the disputed articles, one after the other, exclaiming at the conclusion of each, without regard for the feelings of his minister, and as though M. de Metternich's opinions were his own, "but that is not common sense!" Then turning to M. de Bassano, he said to him, "sit down and write;" and dictated to him a form of convention which was as simple and clear as it could be, and entirely removed all the difficulties which had been raised. "Does this form satisfy you?" he then asked M. de Metternich. "Yes, sire," replied the illustrious diplomatist, "with the exception of some expressions." "Which?" asked Napoleon; and M. de Metternich having pointed them out, Napoleon altered them to his entire satisfaction. And thus, at length, the terms of this convention (which declared that with the desire of re-establishing at least a continental peace, the Emperor of Austria had offered his mediation to the Emperor Napoleon; that the latter accepted it, and that the plenipotentiaries of the various powers were to meet at Prague, on the 15th of July at the latest), being settled, Napoleon, still speaking in the frank tone he had adopted from the commencement of the interview, said to M. de Metternich, "But this is not all; there must be a prolongation of the armistice; for how can we bring to an issue between the 5th and 20th of July, a negotiation which must refer to the interests of the whole world, and which, to be thoroughly satisfactory, should rather be the work of years?"—This question, which was an embarrassing one, would appear at

first sight to admit of an answer only in the affirmative, and M. de Metternich, who was not unaffected by Napoleon's display of condescension throughout the interview, and was unwilling to compromise the mediation to which he attached so much importance, for the sake of a few days, more or less, in the duration of the negotiations, replied, "That he hoped to be able to prevail upon the Prussians and Russians to agree to the prolongation of the armistice, although they were convinced that the armistice itself was injurious to them, and of service only to Napoleon; but he objected to allow it to be extended, as Napoleon wished, to the 20th of August, with six additional days for its *denunciation*, declaring that if the negotiations were conducted with good faith, they might be completed in a single day." To this Napoleon replied, "That forty days at least were necessary to enable him to judge of his adversaries' real intentions, and to declare his own.—As for myself, you may be sure," he added, "that I shall not make known my real intentions until the fortieth day."—"In that case," replied M. de Metternich, "the thirty-nine days preceding the fortieth will be useless." The conversation having taken this jocose turn, a settlement of the disputed point was evidently not far distant, and after some further discussion, M. de Metternich appeared disposed to prolong the armistice to the 10th of August, with six days' notice of the renewal of hostilities, which would be a prolongation of twenty days—from the 26th of July to the 16th of August. Napoleon would have been glad to have obtained a still longer period in which to complete his preparations, but considering it prudent to make sure at least of the delay now offered, he declared that he accepted M. de Metternich's proposition, and a last article was added to the convention, to the effect that in consequence of the short time which now remained for negotiation, according to the terms of the armistice signed at Pleiswitz, the Emperor Napoleon engaged to refrain from denouncing this armistice until the 10th of August (the 16th of August including the six days' notice), and that the Emperor of Austria undertook to obtain a similar engagement on the part of the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Russia. As Napoleon was anxious that this agreement should be signed immediately, he at once dismissed, overwhelmed with caresses, the Austrian minister whom he had thus, by changing his lion-like for his siren aspect, known how to lead into compliance with his views, and induce to consent to the only arrangement he really desired, which was a prolongation of the armistice.

The true policy of the Austrian court, which so passionately desired the success of the mediation, would now have con-

sisted in keeping Napoleon without a single pretext for loss of time, and with this view, informing him immediately that the convention constituting the mediation, and the prolongation of the armistice were accepted, and that the negotiators, as had been agreed, would meet punctually on the 5th of July. But, unfortunately, this course was not adopted. M. de Metternich setting out from Dresden on the 30th of June, the very day of the signature of the convention, arrived at Gitschin on the 1st of July, giving great delight to his master by announcing to him that the mediation was accepted, since this circumstance removed the Austrian court from the very embarrassing position of an ally of France, to the independent and powerful position of arbitrator between her and her enemies. M. de Metternich had no difficulty, therefore, in obtaining from the Emperor Francis the immediate ratification of the convention; but either because he had not clearly perceived Napoleon's purpose of procuring delay, or because he had to submit to actual difficulties, M. de Metternich himself now furnished pretexts for loss of time, by demanding that the meeting of the plenipotentiaries should be deferred from the 5th to the 8th of July. Having demanded this delay, he then addressed the sovereigns assembled at Reichenbach, for the purpose of announcing to them the acceptance of the mediation, as well as for the purpose of prevailing upon them to agree to the prolongation of the armistice, and to send without delay their plenipotentiaries to Prague.

The allied monarchs at Reichenbach had not, when signing the armistice of Pleiswitz, fully comprehended its nature. They had seen in it at first simply an advantageous means of avoiding the immediate consequences of the battle of Bautzen, without taking into consideration the advantages which it would also afford to Napoleon; but now that they had escaped from the peril of the moment, and beheld the daily development of Napoleon's armaments, they began almost to regret a suspension of arms which had saved them, and were by no means inclined to consent to its prolongation. There was another circumstance, moreover, which rendered them averse to the prolongation to which M. de Metternich had agreed, and that was, that whilst Napoleon had the most fertile portion of Silesia from which to procure provisions, they had only the least fertile portion, and had reason to fear a failure of the means of subsistence for their troops. Moreover, amongst the Germans, and especially amongst the Prussians, every adjournment of hostilities was considered an additional step made by Austria in her pacific policy, and a species of treason. There would naturally, therefore, be some difficulty in inducing the allied sovereigns to consent

to a protraction of the armistice; but as, on the other hand, they could not at this moment refuse anything that Austria might desire, they could not, by rejecting the prolongation of the armistice, declare that her engagement with Napoleon to procure thus its prolongation had been imprudent and fruitless. They consented, therefore, to this measure, but at the same time, desired, in consideration of the time already lost, and the distances their plenipotentiaries would have to travel, that the day for their meeting at Prague should be the 12th, instead of the 8th. M. de Metternich informed M. de Bassano of these arrangements, but with respect to the prolongation of the armistice expressed himself as though it were a matter of course, and refrained from communicating its official acceptance by the Prussian and Russian sovereigns.

Nothing could be more agreeable to Napoleon's plans than delays of which he was not himself the cause; but he replied to M. de Metternich on this occasion, as though he rather submitted to than rejoiced at the further delay of which the latter had just informed him; directing M. de Narbonne, who filled at Prague as at Vienna the office of French ambassador, to express his regrets on this subject, and also to complain of the want of any official notification of the consent given to the prolongation of the armistice. He authorised him, also, to declare that when the Russian and Prussian negotiators should have set out for the place of meeting, France would appoint and despatch hers, and to hint that they would probably be MM. de Narbonne and de Coulaingcourt.

Whilst making these communications Napoleon resolved to obtain by means of these delays, which the Austrian court had consented to aid him in obtaining, fresh delays, which he intended to make appear natural consequences of those of which he was not the cause. He had long since proposed to make several excursions, for the purpose of making himself acquainted, as was his wont, with the places which were to be the theatre of war, and he was anxious, if time would allow, to traverse the banks of the Elbe from Kœnigstein to Hambourg, and to go, even, to pass a few days at Mayence with the empress, who was impatient to see him, and on whom he wished, moreover, to bestow public testimonies of affection, as a means of increasing the Austrian Emperor's difficulty in ignoring the paternal bonds which united him with France. He now resolved to commence these excursions by that one of them which would enable him to inspect the important points of Torgau, Wittenberg, and Magdebourg, and by setting out before he could receive from Prague the communications which he complained of not having received,

before he could be informed of the names of the plenipotentiaries appointed by the allied powers, the precise period at which they were to meet, and the formal acceptance of the prolongation of the armistice, to avoid the necessity of making his own reply until his return, and thus gain a delay of four or five days, which would appear to be the consequence of the loss of time from the 5th to the 12th of July. He suddenly declared, therefore, that having deferred his departure to the 9th, without having received any message from Prague, he found himself compelled by the urgent necessities of his army to set out from Dresden on the 10th. At the same time, however, that he might not afford his enemies the opportunity of carrying him off, in spite of the armistice, by a troop of Cossacks, he refrained from stating the direction in which he should proceed, and forbore also to say how long he should be absent, but intimated that he would not be away more than three days at the most.

On the morning of the 10th of July, accordingly, he set out in all haste for Torgau, and at the very moment of his departure, arrived in Dresden news of the latest events in Spain — events which, although they might have been foreseen, could not but be a surprise as agreeable for our enemies as painful for us, and have a disastrous influence upon the general posture of our affairs. And of these events it is proper that the reader should here be informed, so intimate is their political connection with those of which Germany was at this time the theatre.

After the junction of the three armies of the centre, Portugal, and Andalusia, the situation of the French in the Peninsula still offered fair chances of success. Marshal Suchet maintaining his position, by his most advanced corps at Valencia and by two other corps in Catalonia and Aragon, was master of that portion of Spain the possession of which was most essential to us; whilst Joseph was at Madrid with the army of the centre, having in front of him, spread along the Tagus from Tarançon to Almaraz, the army of Andalusia, and in his rear, on his right, between the Tormès and the Douro, the army of Portugal. In this position there was no reason for fear, if the forces recently concentrated should remain so, and thus be always ready to fall en masse upon the English upon their first appearance. In January, 1813, these three armies numbered about eighty-six thousand men.

Had it not been for the disastrous effect produced by the late events in Russia, the position of Joseph would have now been a tolerably favourable one; but these events had excited the public mind of Spain in a most remarkable manner, and renewed throughout the country the hope of being speedily freed from our rule.

The cortès of Cadiz continued to direct, in a manner which was very wanting in method, indeed, but with the utmost enthusiasm, the affairs of the insurrectional movement in Spain, whilst Lord Wellington conducted in a manner which was as well ordered as it was firm, that of Portugal. The cortès had, as has been already narrated, put an end to their constitution, and, copying exactly that which had been adopted by France in 1791, had arranged to have but a single government assembly, and a king whose power should consist only in a suspensive veto. In the meantime, until this king should be restored to them, the cortès assumed that in themselves was embodied the entire sovereignty, adopted the title of majesty, and bestowed that of highness upon an elective regency composed of five members, and invested with the executive power in the absence of Ferdinand VII. And now the cortès had opposed to them besides the French and Joseph's few adherents, all the friends of the old régime which they had abolished, and found themselves engaged in a continual contest with the regency, which they regarded with suspicion, because it had been composed of the exalted personages of the church and the army; circumstances which explain the fact that when Seville and the whole of Andalusia had been abandoned by the French, the cortès still preferred to remain in Cadiz, having more confidence in the population of this city than in that of any other. Had the Russian disasters, had the defeat of Salamanca not occurred, Joseph, less thwarted and better provided with money, might have succeeded after a time in obtaining a large party, through the divisions amongst the Spaniards themselves.

At this moment the disunion existing amongst them was much aggravated by the rise of a question relative to the command of the armies. The success of Lord Wellington and the qualities which the Portuguese army had displayed under his command, had suggested to certain members of the cortès, the idea of offering him the command-in-chief of the Spanish troops, and this project, although at first receiving some degree of opposition from Spanish pride and jealousy, was ultimately adopted, and the post of generalissimo was conferred on Lord Wellington, who, having received the sanction of the English government to its acceptance, proceeded in the course of the winter to Cadiz, for the purpose of conferring with the regency upon all the questions which would naturally arise from his future command. But although received on his arrival with great distinction, he was at the same time attacked in such a manner by the journals, the organs of the national jealousy, that he more than once

regretted having exposed himself to such treatment, and would even have resigned the command he had accepted, had he not feared that such a step would have been a disastrous blow to the insurrection. He had been endowed with almost all the authority he required, but he much feared that he should be unable to raise an effectual Spanish army from the want of money and officers. Money, indeed, he was promised by the Spanish officials, but they had no resources from which to supply it; and with respect to officers, it would have been useless for him to have attempted to supply this want by Englishmen, for the Spanish army, notwithstanding the example of the Portuguese army, would never have permitted foreigners to command them. He resolved, therefore, to devote his attention almost exclusively to the Spanish army of Galicia, which was to serve under his immediate orders.

Returning to Fresnada, on the northern frontier of Portugal, he employed all the winter in making preparations for the approaching campaign. His intention was to have about forty-five thousand English troops, thoroughly disciplined; twenty-five thousand Portuguese, and thirty thousand Spaniards; as well organised and equipped as circumstances might permit, and with this force to advance upon the north of the Peninsula, for the purpose of making a blow at the very root of the power of the French in Spain. As, however, the concentration of the three armies of Portugal, the centre, and the south, had assembled at Madrid a force of eighty or ninety thousand French troops, he regarded his proposed enterprise as a very hazardous one, and was unwilling to attempt it save with the utmost circumspection, and on condition that the insurgents of Catalonia and Murcia, supported by the Anglo-Sicilian army, should make a strong diversion in his favour upon Valencia, whilst the English fleets, seconding the efforts of the guerillas of the Asturias and the Pyrenees, should afford continual occupation to our army of the north. Being consulted with respect to the project of an invasion of the south of France, whilst Napoleon should be engaged with the war in Saxony, he replied that the first care of the English should be to force the French to repossess the Pyrenees, and to propose to enter France only in their track.

These opinions of the British General Commanding-in-Chief, sufficiently indicate that the course to be pursued by the French to render this campaign more fortunate than those which had preceded it, was to keep their armies concentrated, and then to determine on the position upon which it would be best to establish them. Unfortunately, the deci-

sion on the latter point was not very wisely made. Marshal Jourdan's opinion was, that since it was necessary to make head against the Anglo-Portuguese army in old Castille, between Salamanca and Valladolid, it would be advisable to advance to Valladolid, retaining there only such matériel as might be requisite, despatching to Vittoria the sick and wounded, prisoners, and munitions of war. But although this opinion was thoroughly wise, it was urged by him, unfortunately, with but too little energy, and much was required to overcome Joseph's repugnance to evacuate Madrid. Since he had seen Lord Wellington fly before him and had been able to re-enter his capital in triumph, he had persuaded himself that he was still King of Spain; and to propose to him now to leave Madrid, was to propose to him to become once more a vagabond king, to restore to the Spaniards all the hopes they had lost, to drag once more along the highways a crowd of unhappy wretches, whose fortunes were bound up with his own, and to deprive him of his revenue, which consisted of the octroi of Madrid, and of what could be collected from the two or three surrounding provinces. Nevertheless, Joseph's mind was too clear-sighted to have absolutely refused to contemplate the idea of quitting Madrid when Marshal Jourdan proposed it, and it is probable that if the latter had insisted upon it more strenuously this measure would have been adopted. In the meantime, the proposal remained in abeyance until the arrival of despatches from Paris, which would contain Napoleon's precise instructions relative to the conduct of the campaign.

We have already intimated Napoleon's feelings with respect to Spain in 1813. Disgusted at an enterprise which had deplorably divided his forces, he would have gladly withdrawn from it had he been able, but having drawn the English to the Peninsula, it was not in his power to relieve himself of them at his pleasure. By opening the gates of Valençay, for example, to Ferdinand VII., he would but have had the English at Toulouse or Bourdeaux instead of at Burgos or Valladolid. It was necessary, therefore, to continue to contend with them beyond the Pyrenees, for the purpose of avoiding the necessity of having to carry on the struggle on this side of them. But, nevertheless, Napoleon had, as we have already seen, reduced this task to its narrowest limits for the campaign of 1813, by diminishing his armies in Spain, and confining his plans to the preservation only of old Castille, the Basque provinces, Catalonia, and Aragon. His secret intention was to treat with England on the basis of the restoration of Spain, minus the provinces of the Ebro, to Ferdinand VII., making compensation for this diminution

of territory by the gift of Portugal, which the house of Bragantia could afford to lose since it had found an asylum in the Brazils; and it is in this intention that may be discovered the secret cause of his having consented for the first time, to admit the representatives of the Spanish insurrection to a congress.

In the meantime, disgusted at the fact that his couriers could not make the journey from Paris to Madrid under thirty or forty days, he resolved to re-establish a regular line of communications between the two countries at any price, and with this view gave orders that measures should be taken for the destruction of the guerilla bands which infested Navarre, Guipascoa, Biscaye, and Alava; and that these measures might be the more effectually carried out, desired that Joseph should evacuate Madrid, for the retention of which he cared little, since he had resolved to yield the Spanish crown to Ferdinand VII., and transfer his court to Valladolid, that he should then reclaim the French troops in old Castille, bring up the army of Portugal from Burgos, and supply General Clausel with a large portion of it for the purpose of destroying the guerillas; that he should move back the army of Andalusia from Talavera to Salamanca, and the army of the centre from Madrid to Segovia, leaving at the most, but one detachment in that capital, and that only that it might not appear to be definitively abandoned. And, finally, he directed that an offensive attitude should be given to the army of Andalusia, for the purpose of leading the English to believe that we still entertained designs upon Portugal. In making these arrangements, with the hope that they would be the means of destroying the guerilla bands, and preventing the English from attempting any invasion of the south of France, Napoleon allowed himself, unfortunately, to fall under the influence of several illusions. In the first place, it was not probable that Lord Wellington could be induced to suppose that we had designs upon Lisbon, at a time when we were compelled to evacuate Madrid; and, moreover, there was no necessity to render him anxious with respect to Portugal, for the purpose of retaining him in the Peninsula, since by vanquishing him in Castille, at Salamanca, at Valladolid, at Burgos, it mattered little where, we should at once throw him back once more behind the lines of Torres Vedras. But this great object was evidently compromised, by placing the army of Portugal at the disposal of General Clausel, for the purpose of the destruction of the guerilla bands of the north of Spain, whilst at the same time it was very doubtful whether the troops thus placed at this general's disposal, would be sufficient to enable him to carry into effect the proposed design.

Napoleon's instructions, transmitted through the minister of war in the month of January, and reiterated in February, could not reach their destination the first time until the middle of February, the second until the beginning of March, that is, thirty days after they had been despatched, a loss of time which was much to be regretted, and which was a necessary consequence of the occupation of all the routes by the bands of insurgents. It was very painful to Joseph, as we have before said, to abandon Madrid, but his own reason and Marshal Jourdan's advice had already shown him that it was necessary to make this sacrifice, when Napoleon's orders arrived, and they did but serve to lead him at once to put into execution a resolution already adopted.

When the removal from Madrid to Valladolid had been effected—which was not until the beginning of April—the troops were distributed in the following manner. The army of Portugal was transferred from Salamanca to Burgos, and was reduced by the dismissal of all but the actually effective troops, from eight divisions to six, of which three were sent to General Clausel to aid in putting down the guerilla bands, whilst one was retained at Burgos, and the remaining two were échelonné in advance of Palencia, ready to support the cavalry posted along the Esla, and in a position to watch the Spanish army of Galicia. The army of Andalusia, transported from the valley of the Tagus to that of the Douro, and connecting itself by its right with the army of Portugal, occupied the Douro and the Tormès, ready to make head against the Anglo-Portuguese army encamped in Le Beira. Its divisions occupied Zamora, Toro, Salamanca, and Avila; but one of them, that of General Leval, was left at Madrid, for the purpose of continuing an apparent occupation of the capital, and receiving its revenues. Finally, one of the two divisions of the army of the centre was established at Valladolid itself, and the other at Segovia, in order to afford support to the division Leval which remained *en l'air* in the midst of new Castille.

Had these three armies, which in January had numbered eighty-six thousand, but now numbered no more than seventy-two thousand men, been united into a single one under a single commander, such as General Clausel, who was as active in the battle-field as he was obedient to the royal staff; and had it been concentrated between Valladolid and Burgos for the purpose of repose, the repair of the matériel, and the establishment of magazines, all might yet have been saved. But, unfortunately, this course was not adopted. The three armies were left separated, because Napoleon was unwilling that so large a force as that which they would have formed

when concentrated, should have been at Joseph's immediate disposal; the consequence was that the staff of each army resolved to maintain its independence, and would not obey the orders of the general staff with respect to the formation of magazines, until they received positive orders to do so from Paris; and as there was a month's delay in awaiting these orders, the most valuable time for the formation of the magazines was lost. Finally, after three divisions of the army of Portugal had been sent to General Clausel, to aid in the destruction of the guerilla bands, it was found necessary to send him a fourth, and to march a fifth as far as Briviesca. Only one division, therefore, was left under the command of General Reille, and even that had to be divided, one of its brigades being posted at Burgos, the other at Palencia, behind the cavalry which guarded the Esla. There were, consequently, should the Anglo-Portuguese troops suddenly arrive, but two of the three armies ready to oppose them; the advantages of the concentration of these armies, after the unfortunate battle of Salamanca, which might have led to the re-establishment of our fortunes in the Peninsula, being already almost annulled. Had the reinforcements which were thus sent to General Clausel been sufficient, indeed, to enable him to destroy the guerilla bands, the ill effects of this fresh dispersion of our troops would not have been without compensation, but this Spanish Vendée was as difficult to put down as had been the French Vendée, and it had become evident that that object could never be effected by mere force, without the aid of additional influences, as well moral as political.

Supported by the English vessels of war, Porlier, Campillo, Longa, Mina, and Merino, sometimes united, sometimes separated, but always well informed of all they could require to know, avoided our columns when they were in force, attacked them when they had separated in the hurry of pursuit, and manœuvred in such a manner, that although General Clausel had fifty thousand men with whom to oppose them, and pursued them with the greatest activity, he could seldom come up with them, and scarcely ever succeeded in keeping open the communications.

Whilst the troops, which were the last means of making head against the English, were exhausted in the useless pursuit of these guerillas, the months of April and May passed by, and the moment for extensive operations having arrived, Lord Wellington quitted his cantonments; entering upon the campaign with forty-eight thousand English troops, twenty thousand Portuguese, and twenty-four thousand Spaniards, the latter being better armed and equipped than usual.

His intention was to cross the Esla with his left, which was under the command of Sir Thomas Graham, and to refrain from attacking with his centre and right the line of the Douro, until his left should have gained a position, by crossing the Esla, in the rear of the French troops by whom the Douro was defended.

On the 11th of May, his left executed its first movement and spread along the Esla, and as General Reille's cavalry, being supported but by one brigade of infantry, was not in a position in which it could display either hardihood or vigilance, it could neither know of nor prevent the passage of this river by the English troops, which, however, did not hasten to advance against us, since one wing was unwilling to march without the other; and it was not till the 20th of May, that Lord Wellington moved with his right upon Salamanca and the Tormès. On the 24th, General Gazan was informed of his advance at the head of considerable forces.

The French army which ought to have been prepared and concentrated on the 1st of May in the environs of Valladolid, now found itself surprised in the most unfavourable of positions. Had Marshal Jourdan been a younger man, and Joseph a more active and determined one, it is probable that they would have kept themselves more clearly informed of the movements of the English, have recalled, at the first approach of danger, in spite of the imperial orders, which after all were rather instructions than orders, those divisions of the army of Portugal which had been sent to General Clausel, or at least have concentrated more thoroughly the troops actually at their disposal. And finally, in spite of the opposition of the several staffs, have formed at Burgos those magazines without which it was impossible, in such a country as they now were, to manœuvre with any degree of freedom. But Jourdan, disgusted with a régime and a war of which he had long since foreseen the deplorable consequences, bending beneath the effects of old age, and anxious only to return to France, did little more than point out the faults which were committed; whilst Joseph, perceiving clearly the error of the existing system, and frequently enraged at the course his brother pursued, still knew not how to disobey him, or to assume, as general and king, that authority for the assumption of which he certainly could not have been punished.

And thus it was that Lord Wellington, advancing on the 11th of May with his left, and on the 20th of May with his right, found the army of Andalusia dispersed from Madrid to Salamanca; that of the centre from Segovia to Valladolid; that of Portugal from Burgos to Pampeluna.

On the 25th orders were sent to the division Leval to evacuate Madrid, and to fall back upon Valladolid, orders at the same time being sent to all the troops on the lines of the Tormès, the Douro, and the Esla, to retreat slowly, so as to afford time to the division Leval to fall back; and as General Reille had only one of the two brigades of the division Maucune for the support of his cavalry, one of the divisions of the army of the centre (Darmagnac's), was now placed at his disposal. The remainder of the army of the centre was left échelonné upon Segovia, for the purpose of awaiting the division Leval. The army of Andalusia, the most complete of the three, was to retreat from Salamanca upon Tordesillas, falling back very slowly, so as to afford time for the concentration of all our dispersed troops. To these measures, which were rendered necessary by the posture of affairs, was added the despatch of a message to General Clausel, informing him of the approach of the English, desiring him to send back the five divisions of the army of Portugal, and urging him to come to Valladolid himself, with some troops of the army of the north, so as to raise the force by which the English were to be opposed to eighty thousand men. Finally, a despatch was sent to Clarke, the minister of war, informing him of the state of affairs, and entreating him to exert himself to the utmost for the concentration of the French forces. This minister, remaining alone in Paris since Napoleon's departure for Germany, contented himself with blindly repeating Napoleon's orders, and but a few days before the appearance of the English, had ordered that another division of the army of Portugal should be sent to Aragon, for the purpose of keeping open the communications with Marshal Suchet. But little assistance, therefore, was to be expected of the Duke de Feltre, save the transmission by him to General Clausel of information of the approach of the English — a service which might possibly be of no little value, since the interrupted state of the communications between the army of the north and Valladolid, might prevent his receiving the news from thence until after the lapse of three or four weeks.

Having rallied his cavalry, General Reille retreated in good order upon Palencia, and with the infantry divisions Maucune and Darmagnac, secured from attack the route from Valladolid to Burgos, which was our army's line of retreat; at the same time General Villatte, posted on the Tormès, defended it valiantly, and by these means, and by Lord Wellington's prudent slowness of movement, General Leval was enabled without loss to evacuate Madrid and repass the Guadarrama in safety, carrying with him the last remains

of our establishment in the north, and joining the army of the centre at Segovia. On the 1st of June our troops held the following positions:—General Reille was between Rio-Secco and Palencia with his cavalry and two divisions; the army of Andalusia at Tordesillas on the Douro, with its four divisions; and finally, the army of the centre at Valladolid, with a French division and a Spanish division—a total force of about fifty-two thousand men.

Our troops being now grouped around Valladolid, there were three courses open to them. The first, to await and engage the enemy, which would have been imprudent, since the latter were ninety thousand strong, and since every retrograde step on our part, added to our chance of being joined by one or more of the divisions of the army of Portugal. The second, to retreat upon Burgos, Miranda, and Vittoria, until joined by the army of the north. The third, to remain on the line of the Douro, and to manœuvre on this stream, ascending it as far as Aranda, or even as far as Soria, from whence a route which Marshal Ney had followed in 1808, would lead us to a point between Tudela and Logrono at which we might be certain of meeting with General Clausel and even Marshal Suchet, should extraordinary events require the general concentration of all our forces. These projects were taken into consideration and discussed, and the choice fell upon the second, which consisted in a possible retreat upon Burgos, letters being at the same time despatched to General Clausel, requiring him to restore the divisions of the army of Portugal which had been placed at his disposal.

This retreat, accordingly, commenced, and as Madrid had been abandoned, so now it became necessary to abandon Valladolid, that second capital which we had created in old Castile. As we had, fortunately, ten thousand excellent cavalry, and as the enemy was not very enterprising, we were enabled to effect our retrograde movement without any disastrous incident. Lord Wellington, indeed, awaiting but not pursuing fortune, knew that a general engagement was inevitable, but at the same time resolved, as was his wont, not to fight except on ground favourable to himself, and appeared to be content for the present with driving us back towards the Pyrenees. It is difficult to understand, however, how so keen-sighted a general should hasten, on his own part, to drive us upon our reinforcements, rather than endeavour to engage us, when instead of seventy thousand men our army numbered but fifty thousand.

On the 6th of June our troops reached the environs of Palencia, and a reconnaissance executed by Joseph and

Jourdan, made them thoroughly aware that the plan of the English, was to make their reinforced left press continually upon our right. On the 9th the retreat had continued as far as Burgos, which place the failure of provisions had made it desirable to reach as speedily as possible, but from which a similar cause made it equally necessary to retreat without delay; for the numerous convoys of sick, of *expatries* and artillerymen accumulated at Burgos, had eaten up the scanty supplies of provisions which had been formed there, and scarcely sufficient remained for the support of the troops even for a few days. These convoys were now again removed, being carried to Miranda and Vittoria; and this was a mistake, for the resolution to retreat to the Pyrenees having been once adopted, all that could embarrass the army should have been sent to Bayonne. A delay of a few days was made at Burgos, for the purpose of consuming the provisions which still remained there, and of affording time for the concentration of the scattered troops; and, indeed, as the division Lamartinière, which was the largest division of the army of Portugal, and had been lent to the army of the north, was found here, and increased General Reille's troops by six thousand men, he was enabled to restore to the army of the centre the division Darmagnac, which had been temporarily borrowed from it.

Before quitting Burgos the course which should be pursued was again discussed, and it was debated whether the army should follow the great Bayonne route, in accordance with the orders which had directed the re-establishment of the communications with France, or whether it should not rather effect a transverse movement, so as to debouch upon the Ebro at Logrono instead of arriving there by Miranda—a course which would almost certainly lead to a junction with General Clausel. This plan was earnestly supported by Generals Reille and d'Erlon, but Marshal Jourdan and Joseph persisted in proceeding directly upon Miranda and Vittoria; and as no news had been received with respect to General Clausel, they sent him, this time under the escort of fifteen hundred men, information of the approach of the army in the direction of Vittoria. The course which was adopted was, then, that of retreating upon the Ebro by Briviesca, Pancorbo, and Miranda.

On the 12th of June, General Reille finding that the English were again attempting to outflank our right, wished to force them to deploy their forces, and kept in the rear of the Rio Hormaza. The English displayed a force of about twenty-five thousand men, but General Reille, who had not half that number, manœuvred with so much *aplomb* and vigour, that

he succeeded in slaying three or four hundred of them, with a loss to himself of not more than fifty, and repassed the Rio Hormaza, and even the Arlanzon, in perfect order. It was evident that the English, without being anxious to give us battle, were determined to make us yield ground by continually outflanking one of our wings. On the 13th it was resolved to march from Burgos, and as it was known that Lord Wellington was now provided with a powerful siege-train, and as, moreover, our army could not afford to leave two or three thousand men behind for its defence, it was determined to destroy this fortress, together with the munitions of war with which it was filled, and which it would be impossible to carry away. On the 13th, accordingly, whilst on its march upon Briviesca, the army was saddened by hearing a terrible explosion, which was the sign of a definitive retreat, and which being executed without the necessary precautions, caused, as well to our own troops as to the city, a considerable amount of injury.

On the 14th the French army arrived at Briviesca, on the 15th at Pancorbo, on the 16th at Miranda, at which last point it was on the brink of the Ebro, and within a step of Vittoria at the very foot of the Pyrenees. In the meantime, the enemy had advanced by its left as far as Villarcajo, continuing its manœuvre of outflanking our right; but news was also received that General Clausel, immediately after receiving information of the approach of the English, had hastened to move towards the army the divisions Sarrut and Foy, and had himself advanced by Logrono with the two remaining divisions of the army of Portugal, and two divisions of the army of the north.

As General Clausel was expected to arrive at Logrono by the 20th, the most simple course to have now pursued would have been to have descended the Ebro from Miranda to Logrono, which would have involved a détour of a few leagues at the most, and have ensured the junction with the troops under this general's command. But Joseph and Jourdan were filled with fears lest the direct Bayonne route should be intercepted by the enemy; and two distinct opinions held possession of the staff, the one party proposing to direct the army by a transverse movement upon Logrono and Navarre, for the purpose of rallying General Clausel, without paying any attention to the movement of the English against our right, since it was not probable that they would entertain the idea of crossing the Pyrenees, before they had gained over us some decisive victory; whilst the other party proposed, on the contrary, that extreme attention should be given to the movement by which the English threatened our

communications, and to meet this movement by remaining on the great Bayonne route, and desiring General Clausel, who was every moment expected, to march his troops thither also. The first opinion was that of General Reille and the Count d'Erlon, the second that of Marshal Jourdan and King Joseph, who were fatally influenced by the orders sent from Paris.

The conflict between these two opinions was very vehement at Miranda, for the moment had arrived when it was necessary to choose between them. General Reille maintained that it was necessary to descend the Ebro as speedily as possible. He also maintained that as General Clausel had announced his arrival on the Ebro in the environs of Logrono, it was necessary to hasten to descend thither for the purpose of joining him, and that every consideration should yield to the great object of effecting the concentration of our forces, and repeated the opinion he had always held, that the movement by which the English endeavoured to outflank us was not a serious menace, so long as they should not have really vanquished us. Marshal Jourdan and Joseph, on the contrary, feared above all things a movement on the part of the English, which by leading them by Orduna upon Bilbao and Tolosa, should place them between us and Bayonne, on the other side of the great chain of the Pyrenees. Moreover, as the convoy comprising the sick and wounded, and the Spaniards who accompanied our retreat from Madrid, was now at Vittoria, to descend upon Logrono would be to leave it unprotected, and to surrender it into the hands of the enemy; and finally, as Vittoria had been named to General Clausel as the place of rendezvous, he might very probably proceed thither without visiting Logrono, in which case our descent upon this latter place would leave him as much exposed to danger as the convoy.

It must be acknowledged that the advice given by General Reille and the Count d'Erlon, although the better, as we shall presently see, had lost much of its apparent merit since the convoy had been sent to Vittoria, and General Clausel had been directed to proceed thither, for, setting aside the alleged fear of being turned by Orduna, the danger of leaving the convoy, and even General Clausel himself, entirely exposed, by descending obliquely upon Logrono, was a very specious inducement to continue to march directly upon Vittoria.

Whilst adopting the direct line of march upon Vittoria, Joseph and Marshal Jourdan were also anxious to preserve themselves from any danger of being turned by Orduna and Bilbao, and ordered General Reille to advance by Puente-

Larra upon Osma, and by Osma upon Orduna and Bilbao, whilst the rest of the army advanced immediately upon Vittoria. They hoped to be joined at Vittoria by General Clausel, the junction of whose troops would afford an accession of strength, greater than that which had been lost by the departure of General Reille, and resting thus upon the Pyrenees, with Generals Gazan, d'Erlon, and Clausel, whilst General Reille should be on the other side of these mountains, to oppose the enemy in every direction with a barrier of fire. But whilst making these arrangements, care should have been taken to forward communications to General Clausel, not merely by peasants or single officers, but by a regiment of cavalry, and also, to send positive orders to hasten the departure of the convoy from Vittoria, in order to avoid an encounter with it on its road, and the dangerous confusion which would necessarily ensue.

On the 18th, General Reille advanced upon Osma with the divisions Sarrut, Lamartinière, and Maucune, and had scarcely set out when he was assailed by a cloud of enemies, from whom he escaped only by the exercise of the utmost vigour and presence of mind. Arriving at Osma, he found numerous hostile troops, Spaniards of the army of Galicia, posted towards Barbarossa, at all the approaches of the mountains, in a manner which seemed to show that they were about to cross the Pyrenees at Orduna for the purpose of cutting off the Bayonne route; but this they did not do, their real object being merely to arrive at the foot of the mountains before us, so as to be able to take commanding positions on our flank, in case we should have resolved to fight a defensive battle at the foot of the Pyrenees, or to precede us to the *col de Salinas*, for the purpose of cutting us off before we should have regained the French frontier.

General Reille finding the Orduna route intercepted, readily renounced an operation which he considered ill-advised, and determined to regain by a lateral movement, the great route from Miranda to Vittoria. In the meantime, Joseph on his side, set out during the night of the 18th of June for Vittoria, and on the morning of the 19th all our troops were in full march upon this city, which, situated at the foot of the Pyrenees on the Spanish side, rises in the midst of a pretty plain which is entirely closed in by mountains. If we take up a position with the Pyrenees behind us, we have upon our right mount Arrato, separating us from the valley of Murgnia, whilst in front of us lies the sierra *de Andia*, and on the left stand the hills across which passes the route from Salvatierra to Pampeluna. A little river named the Zadarra waters the whole of this plain, flowing at

first along the Pyrenees from amongst which it has its source, and then skirting the base of mount Arrato to the right, for the purpose of escaping by an extremely narrow defile across the sierra de Andia.

The bulk of our army, coming from Miranda and the banks of the Ebro, traversed the great Bayonne route, which runs directly into the plain of Vittoria, by the defile traversed by the Zadarra. General Reille arrived at it by a lateral direction, and entered it by the various *cols* of the mount Arrato. The corps with which Lord Wellington had always attempted to outflank us, and which was composed of Spanish and English troops, might have anticipated our arrival at the passes of mount Arrato, and thus have occupied the plain of Vittoria before us, had not General Reille held it in check by the vigour with which he disputed the ground during the whole of the 19th, on the evening of which day our three armies had safely effected their junction.

It now became a matter of urgent necessity to determine what should be the course of future resolutions. As it was not to be supposed that Lord Wellington would permit us to repossess the Pyrenees without giving us battle, unless, indeed, we fled before him from Vittoria across the *col de Salinas* in a manner which, besides the shame attendant upon it, would necessitate the abandonment of General Clausel to the greatest perils, since he would in that case be left alone upon the other side of the Pyrenees, and which would, moreover, although in a less degree, compromise the safety of Marshal Suchet and all the troops under his command, distributed from Saragossa as far as Alicante. To preserve, therefore, the honour of our arms, and the troops of General Clausel, as well as to secure the safety of those of Marshal Suchet, it was absolutely necessary that we should engage the enemy in battle at the foot of the Pyrenees, in the basin of Vittoria, where the junction was to be effected with General Clausel. As, however, it was possible that a delay of one or two days might intervene before this junction could take place, and as the total available force of our army at this time amounted only to about fifty-four thousand men, care should have been taken to obtain as many advantages of ground as possible, to relieve the army of the presence of the immense convoy by which it was accompanied, and to send to General Clausel, not merely by ill-paid peasants but by means of a regiment of cavalry, fresh and precise information with respect to the place of rendezvous.

But of these various precautions none were taken; the 19th being allowed to pass by without the removal of the convoy, or the despatch of any messengers to General Clausel besides

peasants, on whom no reliance could be placed, and who, even if they had been faithful, would have been in great danger of being stopped. On the following day, the 20th, instead of mounting their horses and proceeding to reconnoitre the country, Jourdan and Joseph remained quietly in Vittoria; the former labouring under a violent attack of fever, whilst the latter, able to see only with his master's eyes, deferred making any reconnaissance until the morrow. With respect to the convoy, however, its presence with the army being a source of continual embarrassment, it was resolved that its departure should take place immediately, under the protection of the division Maucune.

The only measures taken on our side during the 20th, consisted in sending to Tolosa the convoy, which ought to have been despatched thither on the 19th, in posting General Gazan with the army of Andalusia opposite the defile (*La Puebla*), by which the Zadarra flows across the sierra de Andia; Count d'Erlon, with the army of the centre behind General Gazan; and in the rear to the right, along the Zadarra, General Reille, with the two remaining divisions of the army of Portugal, for the purpose of holding in check the *corps tournant* of the English, which was approaching by the Murguia route; to all the other pieces of negligence being added the neglect to cut a single one of the bridges of the Zadarra. Between our several infantry corps were placed our fine cavalry, which, unfortunately, could be of but slight service on the ground which we now occupied, the basin of Vittoria being seamed by numerous canals. It numbered nine or ten thousand troopers, and our infantry, consequently, numbered no more than forty-three or forty-four thousand combatants; a force about half that of the enemy.

On the following day, the 21st, as General Clausel had not yet appeared, and as the enemy could not be supposed to be much longer inactive, Joseph and Jourdan wished to reconnoitre the ground for the purpose of preparing for the struggle which was evidently impending. Marshal Jourdan, somewhat recovered from his fever, although still suffering under it, managed to mount his horse and proceeded with Joseph to reconnoitre the plain of Vittoria. On the right of our position, in the rear, General Reille with the French divisions Lamartinière and Sarrut, and the remains of a Spanish division guarded the bridges of the Zadarra; the *pont de Durana*, situated in the mountains on the side of the Pyrenees, being guarded by the Spanish division, whilst the *pont de Gamarra-mayor*, situated at the entrance of the plain, was occupied by the division Lamartinière, and that of

Arriagua, which was situated in the midst of the plain, and above Vittoria, was defended by the division Sarrut. Behind these divisions were posted, besides the light cavalry, several divisions of dragoons, ready to pour down upon any of the enemy's troops which might cross the Zadarra. But better than all these measures would have been the destruction of the bridges of this little stream, and the defence of its fords by artillery.

Advancing in a direct line towards the entrance of the plain, at the *débouché* of the Puebla defile, Jourdan and Joseph ascended an eminence named Zuazo, which cut the Vittoria basin transversely, and commanded the outlet of the defile, and then Marshal Jourdan's practised eye immediately perceived that it was there that should be posted General Gazan, at the head of the whole of the army of Andalusia, that the height should be fortified with artillery, and that Count d'Erlon should be posted on the right upon the Zadarra, for the purpose of effecting a junction with General Reille and guarding the *pont de Trespuentes*, which debouched upon the flank of the Zuazo height.

Officers of the staff were immediately sent to General Gazan, directing him to execute these various measures; but it was too late, for the battle at that moment began. Lord Wellington, as could be readily foreseen, was unwilling, after having accompanied us so far, to allow us to cross the Pyrenees without first giving us battle, so as to be able, if possible, to cross them himself in the track of a vanquished army. He had sent forward General Graham with two English divisions, with the Portuguese and Spanish troops forming his left, on the Murguia route, across the passes of mount Arrato, for the purpose of endeavouring to force General Reille upon the Zadarra. He had moved his centre, composed of three divisions under Marshal Beresford, across the other passes of mount Arrato, that it might thus debouch upon the Zadarra, towards the middle of the plain close to the *pont de Trespuentes*, opposite General d'Erlon, and on the flank of the Zuazo height. Finally, his right, composed of two English divisions, under General Hill, and of the Spanish division Morillo, which had followed our army along the Miranda route, was to penetrate the Puebla defile, and debouch at the very foot of Zuazo. All these corps were already on their march, when Marshal Jourdan and Joseph sent to General Gazan the order to retreat towards the Zuazo height, from whence it would be possible to crush any troops which might force the Puebla defile, or any which might cross the Zadarra at Trespuentes.

When the aide-de-camp, who was the bearer of these orders,

reached General Gazan, the latter, who was already engaged with the enemy, declared that it was impossible that he should execute them. Upon this, Joseph hastened up to his position, and at once perceived the posture of affairs. On the right were to be seen Beresford's troops, which, having crossed the nearest *cols* of mount Arrato, were attempting to pass the Zadarra at Trespuentes; whilst in front, in the Puebla defile, was General Hill, who had thrown to the right upon the heights of the sierra de Andia, the Spanish division Morillo, in order to support the English troops which sought to force the passage.

Jourdan and Joseph now ordered General Gazan to send a brigade, to endeavour to dislodge the Spanish troops from the heights of the sierra de Andia, and to support it by a whole division should it be necessary; and as soon as the height should have been retaken, to crush the Spaniards in the Puebla defile, and following them in their flight, to throw himself upon General Hill's flank. In the meantime, he was to bar the defile with the divisions Darricau and Conroux, to hold the division Villatte in reserve on the left, and to employ the division Leval on his right, in observation of the troops under Beresford, which threatened to cross the Zadarra at Trespuentes. Count d'Erlon, in position behind General Gazan, was to watch the Zadarra, and to be ready to fall upon the troops which should attempt to pass it, at any point between himself and General Reille.

Scarcely had these orders been issued, when the firing extended in a vast circle on our left, front, and right. General Gazan's first attempts to drive the enemy, in accordance with the orders he had received, from the heights on our left, which formed the extremity of the sierra de Andia, being made with insufficient force, were ineffectual, the rocky and wooded ground enabling the Spaniards to offer a vigorous resistance. Pressed by Marshal Jourdan to act with greater vigour, he sent first one brigade and then another from his front, to support the brigade which had first been sent to take the heights; but the result was, that these two brigades which would have been more than sufficient if they had been advanced *en masse*, and simultaneously upon the height which was on our left, remained half-way, exchanging fire at a disadvantage with the well-posted Spaniards, and affording no support to the brigade of the advanced-guard, which suffered considerable loss. Two hours were thus lost without the acquisition of any decided advantage; a loss of time which was so much the more to be regretted, because had it been well employed, the Spaniards might have been driven from the heights of the sierra de Andia into the Puebla defile, the

English troops which were endeavouring to cross this defile equally repulsed, and immediate succour carried to General Reille, who was soon to be vigorously attacked.

The king and the marshal reiterating these orders, General Gazan resolved at length to advance the division Villatte, which was posted a little in the rear on the left, against the heights which he had now so long and fruitlessly attacked. The division Villatte rapidly climbed the slopes of the sierra de Andia, under a plunging fire of the most murderous description, in spite of which they drove back the Spaniards from the lower part of the slopes to the upper, and thrust them into the woods with which the heights were crowned. But in the meantime, the English divisions under General Hill, perceiving that our front was enfeebled by the absence of the brigades which had been removed from it (being those of Generals Conroux and Darricau), and perceiving, moreover, that an important village situated on our right, and named Subijana de Alava, had been completely exposed by the departure of the division Villatte, threw themselves upon this village, debouching vigorously from the defile, and succeeded in taking it. At the same moment, the English forces broke into the plain, and it became very difficult to repulse them. Marshal Jourdan considered that it would be advisable to throw upon them one of the divisions of Count d'Erlon, whose troops had been posted in reserve in the rear on the right. But Count d'Erlon, perceiving that Beresford's troops threatened to cross the Zadarra at Trespuentes, had sent his two divisions in succession in that direction; there remained, consequently, no reserve, and to add to the embarrassment, heavy firing began to be heard in the direction of the lower part of the plain.

Yielding to these various circumstances, the king and the marshal now ordered a retrograde movement upon the Zuazo height, from whence it would be possible by means of a powerful artillery fire, to check the advance of the enemies who had invaded the plain by all its avenues, some passing the Zadarra at Trespuentes, some entering it in front of us by the Puebla defile, and others descending into it on our left from the heights of the sierra de Andia. At the same time, Marshal Jourdan ordered General Tirlet, who had the chief command of our artillery, to establish a battery on the Zuazo height.

These orders being more accurately executed than those which had been given to General Gazan, produced a result which might have been decisive; for if, at the moment when the English troops, advancing from the Puebla defile and crossing the Zadarra at Trespuentes, were thrown into con-

fusion by the fire of the forty-five pieces of cannon, which General Tirlet had without loss of time established on the Zuazo height,—if at this moment, we say, four or five thousand men had been available, and hurled upon the broken masses of the English troops, it is most probable that they would have been driven back into the defile, suffering a severe check and considerable loss. Unfortunately, General Gazan, instead of falling back upon the transversal height of the Zuazo, had gone towards the left to take up a position half-way up on the flank of the sierra de Andia, near the division Villatte, by which means an open space was left between his troops and those of Count d'Erlon, who did his best with his two divisions, to defend the passes of the Zadarra above and below Trespuentes. There remained, therefore, on the Zuazo height, on which all depended, but an unsupported force of artillery. At the bottom of the plain, General Reille, attacked at Durana, at Gamarra-mayor, at Arriagua, defended himself most valiantly, and now losing one, now another of the three bridges, ever retook them by the exercise of the utmost vigour; but at the same time he intimated that if he were not speedily reinforced, he should be compelled to give way. And now Marshal Jourdan, clearly comprehending the existing state of affairs, advised Joseph to order a retreat along the great Bayonne route, by Salinas and Tolosa, for the purpose of saving the artillery; for if the adoption of the route by Salvatierra and Pampeluna would lead to a junction with General Clausel, it was also tolerably certain that it would lead to the loss of all the cannon on account of the bad state of the roads.

The order for a retreat had scarcely been given when it was executed, but without that concert and *l'ensemble* which would have obviated the inconveniences attending a retrograde movement. Count d'Erlon, not seeing the English on his left, and perceiving the English cavalry ready to pour down upon the plain, fell back in the direction of the Zadarra, and thus left Vittoria exposed. The enemy's cavalry threw itself in this direction, and created there an almost indescribable confusion. The convoy, to the defence of which a division had been devoted, had not yet wholly departed. There remained a park of artillery numbering a hundred and fifty pieces of cannon, a great amount of baggage, and a large number of fugitive families, as well as of soldiers who had been sent out in foraging parties. The appearance of the English dragoons filled these persons with an extreme terror, which they expressed by an immediate flight, and the utterance of loud cries. Their first movement was in the direction of the great Bayonne route and the *col de Salinas*; but General

Reille, disputing with varying fortune, but the utmost determination, the upper Zadarra, covered this route with fire and blood. The fugitives betook themselves in the next place to the Pampeluna route by Salvatierra. General Tirlet, who had hastened to Vittoria to conduct the retreat, knowing the bad state of the Salvatierra route, and knowing also that the arsenals of the frontier were well stored, gave orders that the artillery should be abandoned, care being taken only for the preservation of the men and horses.

The retreat which had at first been in the direction of Salinas and Bayonne, was now towards Pampeluna, or in other words, in the direction of Navarre; and at this moment the position of General Reille became one of great peril; for this general, having maintained his position as long as possible on the Zadarra, driving back the English and Spanish troops to its farther bank, whenever they had succeeded in forcing one of the three bridges which he had to defend, had determined, when he saw that the retreat had taken a direction towards Salvatierra, to fall back in this direction also. But to escape in safety from the position he held, it was necessary that he should hold in check, on the one side, the hostile troops which had crossed the Zadarra before him, and on the other, those which had debouched from Vittoria on his rear. In spite, however, of incessant attacks on the part of the enemy's cavalry, whose charges he received in square and repelled with considerable slaughter, he succeeded in conducting his troops in safety to the Salvatierra route, along which were hurrying, in headlong confusion, the various corps of our army, and the straggling line of the vast convoy which we had conducted with so much trouble from Madrid to Vittoria.

Our loss during this fatal day amounted to about five thousand in killed and wounded; that on the side of the English being almost as great. But it must be added that we left in the hands of the enemy about fifteen or eighteen hundred prisoners, as well as two hundred pieces of cannon, not lost in action but abandoned on account of the want of a road by which they could be carried away; more than four hundred caissons, and an infinite number of baggage waggons. Joseph failed to save even his own carriage which contained all his papers.

It will naturally be asked, where at this moment was General Clausel with his fifteen thousand men, and what was being done on the other side of the mountains by General Foy, who, reinforced by several small garrisons and the soldiers of General Maucune, had also under his command fifteen thousand men, the presence of whom would have been

of the greatest use on the fatal plain of Vittoria? These thirty thousand men, added to the fifty-four or fifty-five thousand under Joseph, would have been able to defeat the English and drive them back into Portugal—a result which would have facilitated the conclusion of a peace, and on such terms, probably, as would have completely satisfied Napoleon's pride. But on this occasion, as on so many others, there was a want on our side of proper management. General Foy, who was only separated from Joseph by the mountain of Salinas, had only learned the presence of the army at Vittoria by the appearance of the division Maucune, escorting the convoy; and had the movement, now executed by this division, been executed two days earlier, the convoy might have been placed in safety, and a reinforcement marched upon Vittoria of ten or twelve thousand men. As for General Clausel, as soon as he had received information of the advance of the English and the retreat of our army, he had assembled his divisions in all haste, had reached Logrono on the 20th, and sought on all sides to obtain news of Joseph, and, although unable to procure direct information, was led by various circumstances to conclude that the French army had marched from Miranda upon Vittoria. On the 21st he determined to advance by Penacurada to the other side of the sierra de Andia, thinking it probable that this movement might lead him to Joseph's army. He accordingly advanced, and at the close of the day learned that a battle had taken place, which had not had for us, alas! a fortunate result; and on the morning of the 22nd, being anxious to learn the real state of affairs, he had the boldness to ascend the sierra de Andia to obtain a view of the plain of Vittoria. Perceiving, from the summit of this sierra the extent of our disaster, and that he was separated from Joseph by the victorious English, he found that it was necessary to take measures for his own safety, and regaining the banks of the Ebro, descended as far as Logrono; and then, the English, who had pursued us into Navarre, being always between himself and Joseph, he took the resolution—as wise and bold an one as any to be found in the history of military tactics—of marching towards Saragossa, not only for the purpose of saving his own *corps d'armée*, but also for the purpose of covering Marshal Suchet's rear and securing his retreat.

In the meantime, Jourdan and Joseph had reached Pampeluna with an army terribly discontented with its leaders, but still undemoralised, and capable, especially with the aid of the natural strength afforded by the Pyrenees, of offering a formidable resistance to the English. Acting under the advice of Marshal Jourdan, Joseph now sent, after

leaving a garrison in Pampeluna, the army of Andalusia into the valley of *Saint Jean-pied-de-port*, that of the centre into the valley *de Bastan*, and that of Portugal into *la Bidassoa* valley, so as to close up all the avenues, and gain time for the re-establishment of the artillery, and the reorganisation of the three armies into one. Whilst he was making these arrangements, General Foy, aided by General Maucune, skilfully and bravely made head against the English, who endeavoured to descend from Salinas upon Tolosa, and drove them back to some distance.—Spain was lost, but the frontier was still our own, and the empire which had long been an invader, was not yet, although too soon to be, invaded.

Such was the campaign of 1813 in Spain—a campaign rendered famous by the disastrous battle of Vittoria, and by its being the conclusion of our occupation of this country, in which during six years we had uselessly spilled the blood as well of our own troops as of the Spaniards; and should we be willing to examine its events dispassionately, we can have no great difficulty in discovering the true causes of the reverse which for us was its result. And the chief cause of this result, as of so many others similar to it, must be looked for in the orders given by Napoleon himself, who, regarding Spain as but an accessory of his immense enterprises, failed to devote to the operations conducted in it the necessary forces, and permitted himself to indulge in calculations which were unfitted to secure their success. The forces which he had this year left in Spain, amounting as they did to eighty thousand men, would have been sufficient to maintain a position in Castille against the English; but with the two-fold object of preserving the northern provinces, which he intended to reserve to himself on the conclusion of peace, and of alarming the English for the safety of Portugal, for the purpose of deterring them from undertaking any enterprise against the south of France, Napoleon had again involuntarily caused the dispersion of our lately-concentrated troops from Salamanca to Pampeluna; a result of the battle of Vittoria, for which it is impossible to find any other cause, than the orders sent from Paris, issued by Napoleon at a great distance from the scene of the events to which they were to apply, before he could receive information of the events themselves, and reiterated by the minister of war with an obstinacy which was quite inexcusable, when the course of affairs and the remonstrances of Marshal Jourdan had pointed out the danger which must result from them. But to this principal cause must be added another, an old and fruitful source of disaster to our arms in the Peninsula, and which

was the want of unity in the command of our troops there. The existence of this defect must be attributed to Napoleon, who always refused to grant to his brother Joseph the necessary authority, whilst the latter knew as little how to assume it as the generals under him knew how to accord it.

Unable to follow in detail the course of events in Spain, absorbed as he was by the war which he personally carried on in Saxony, Napoleon, trusting implicitly to the despatches sent to him by the minister of war, who, whilst writing in the most friendly tone to Joseph, sent the most unfavourable reports to Dresden;—Napoleon, we say, had now a double cause of irritation; the deplorable results, and the errors which had led to them, and which could not but disgust his keen military genius. The results were, that Spain was lost, that the French frontier was threatened, that the most efficacious means of negotiating with England were annulled; that, as Spain was no longer ours to yield, new sacrifices must be added to those which Austria already demanded; that the arrangement of a peace, must, consequently, be more difficult than ever, and that, finally, all those who believed that the moment had come for the destruction of France, must necessarily be inspired with a large degree of confidence. With respect to the faults, they were gratuitously aggravated in Napoleon's eyes by the minister Clarke, who concealed the fact that Jourdan had earnestly remonstrated against the orders reiterated from the bureaux of Paris; that the resistance offered by the individual staffs of the several armies to the commands issued from head-quarters, had proved a serious inconvenience; that the English forces numbered almost a hundred thousand, and the French, at the most, no more than fifty thousand. Indeed, with respect to this last circumstance, he stated the numbers of the English as forty or forty-five thousand, entirely ignoring the Portuguese or Spanish troops, and set forth the French army as, consisting not of the troops which were actually on the field of battle, but of those which might have been there, if the orders from Paris had not dispersed them, and made it appear as though, whilst the enemy's troops numbered only forty-five thousand, ours had amounted to some eighty or ninety thousand.

We may well understand that Napoleon, considering on one side the results, and on the other the faults, real and imputed, of Joseph and Marshal Jourdan, who had already gravely displeased him, and having by his side a formidable accuser in the person of Marshal Soult, fell into a state of excessive irritation on receiving information of the events in Spain. And this excessive irritation burst forth in a feeling of anger against his brothers generally; whilst he should, on

the contrary, in justice, have recognised the fact, that his own ambition, rather than that of his brothers, had led to the adoption of that policy which had produced the existing state of affairs, and that after having given them thrones or placed them in the command of armies, he had omitted nothing which could tend to render their task more difficult than it naturally was. He had, in fact, required of them that they should entirely ignore the interests of their subjects, and that they should effect all that he required of them, without any, or with scarcely any, resources; a course of conduct which was excessively cruel on his part, and had caused more than one family scandal, such as was the abdication of the King of Holland. With respect to Joseph, especially, after having brought this prince from Naples, where he held a position suited to his character and his talents, and transferred him to Spain, with scarcely a reference to his own feelings on the subject, throwing him into the midst of a frightful war, to carry on which he afforded him some momentary assistance, but in the midst of which, when he himself became wholly engrossed in the Austrian war in 1809, and the Russian war in 1812, he left him without reinforcements or money, exposed to the hatred of his subjects, and the disobedience, or even arrogance, of his generals; at the same time refusing to listen to his suggestions, which were generally justified by the event, only replying to them by uttering mockeries respecting his pretensions to military skill, and his manners—mockeries of which the echo had spread from the French court to that of Spain, and tended to aggravate the disregard testified towards the new monarch. Napoleon really loved the several members of his family, but, spoiled by the possession of unlimited power, he held the rights of his brothers in as little account as those of peoples.

He now treated Joseph with extreme severity.—“I have too long compromised my own affairs for the sake of serving the interests of these *imbéciles*,” he wrote to the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, to the minister of war, and to the minister of police; and after this preamble proceeded to give orders, with reference to Joseph, of a character as severe as they were humiliating. In the first place, he selected as his successor in the command of the armies of Spain, a man the choice of whom could not fail to be in the highest degree offensive to Joseph, being no other than Marshal Soult, who was at this time in Dresden, and on whom Napoleon now conferred the title of his lieutenant in Spain, with extraordinary powers; directing him to set out immediately for Bayonne, for the purpose of rallying the army, and making head against the English. In the next place he ordered

Joseph to quit Spain immediately; to refrain from visiting Paris; to retire to Marfontaine, and to remain there in a state of complete seclusion; and sent directions to Prince Cambacérès to forbid all the high state functionaries from visiting him, and to arrest him should he not obey his, Napoleon's, orders.

Become distrustful with respect to the fidelity of men, since he had been compelled to acknowledge the fickleness of fortune, he suspected in every direction the existence of plots against the regency of his wife and the succession of his son. This was the real reason of his having been unwilling to leave the Duke of Otranto and Marshal Soult in Paris, and of his having under various pretexts left him without employment at Dresden; this was the reason which had led him to give orders for the arrest of his own brother.

Had the events of Spain, whilst they caused his enemies to be more *exigeants*, at the same time rendered him more reasonable and conciliatory, a great evil would have been productive of a great good; but, unfortunately, it was not so. After having visited Torgau, Wittenberg, and Magdebourg, after having passed in review the corps which he was desirous of inspecting, and ordered the execution of the works he had projected on the Elbe, Napoleon returned to Dresden to continue the terrible game of losing time, endeavouring to delay making any explanation with respect to the conditions of peace until the conclusion of the armistice, and to obtain a fresh prolongation of the armistice by feigning at the last moment to negotiate in good faith. Prussia and Russia had chosen their plenipotentiaries, and had sent them to Prague, where they had arrived on the 11th of July, the day before that on which it had been determined that the congress should meet. It had been supposed that Prussia would have chosen as her representative on this occasion, the Chancellor de Hardenberg, and that the representative of Russia would have been M. de Nesselrode; but each of these powers being anxious, on account of England, to appear to be induced to take part in this congress only by the solicitations of Austria, had avoided sending to it any representative who should be of equal prominence with M. de Metternich. Prussia had chosen M. de Humboldt, whose name was already illustrious in the scientific world, but was as yet unknown in that of politics, and who was the brother of the *savant* who is one of the glories of the age. Russia had chosen the Baron d'Anstett, an Alsatian (consequently a Frenchman), a member of an emigrant family, a man of some mind, but possessed of little personal influence, and inspired with sentiments of extreme hostility towards France.

As soon as these two negotiators had arrived in Prague, they *communicated their powers* to the mediator, and speedily began to utter complaints of the disrespect shown to them by the non-arrival of the French plenipotentiaries, and the absence of even any intimation with respect to the time at which they might be expected. M. de Narbonne, who had returned to Prague as ambassador, and who, it had been hinted, was to be one of our plenipotentiaries, had been furnished with neither powers nor instructions; and to all the remonstrances which M. de Metternich transmitted to Dresden, M. de Bassano replied that the fault lay with the Austrian cabinet, which had permitted the emperor to set out for Magdebourg without officially communicating to him the ratification of the new convention, prolonging the armistice to the 16th of August. To this reproach M. de Metternich had replied, "That as the French court had actually received information of this ratification, it might, whilst awaiting the arrival of the official communication of it, have nominated the plenipotentiaries and made them set out for the place of meeting; a course which would have satisfied those duties of politeness, which are as much an obligation upon one state with respect to another, as they are upon individual members of society with respect to each other." M. de Bassano, however, without paying any attention to this answer, again declared that M. de Metternich was alone the cause of the delay.

Napoleon having returned to Dresden on the 15th, after a journey of five days, and having at length received the ratification of the new convention by Austria, Prussia, and Russia, could no longer defer the nomination of his plenipotentiaries, and he now, accordingly, entrusted MM. de Narbonne and de Coulaincourt with the duty of representing him at the congress of Prague; and he could not have selected wiser or more enlightened men, or any inspired with sentiments of a higher order. In nominating M. de Coulaincourt, Napoleon acted in accordance with the secret hope which he always entertained, of coming to a direct understanding with Russia, and of concluding a peace which, sacrificing Germany to the two great empires of the east and west, should at the same time be equally satisfactory to Russia and to France—truly a sad kind of peace, which might, possibly, have flattered Napoleon's own self-conceit, but could have been in no way serviceable to the true interests of his empire. M. de Coulaincourt, on whom these illusions were partly founded, was far from being deceived by them himself, and as he was one of those rare persons who are at the same time courtiers and honest men, he had plainly declared to Napoleon that it was vain to indulge in the hope of

obtaining a species of surreptitious peace, by the defection of one of the allies from the others. He added entreaties that he might not be sent to Prague without being entrusted with full powers to seize the occasion which offered, of serving and saving his country, and even went so far as to intimate that if this latitude were not granted him, he would not accept the mission which it was intended he should fulfil. Napoleon, who was anxious that M. de Coulaincourt's name should give an air of reality to a feigned negotiation, promised that he should have full powers, and the illustrious negotiator, relying upon this promise, submitted to his master's will.

The selection of plenipotentiaries which Napoleon had thus made was universally approved, and produced an impression at Prague which in some degree corrected the effect of our continual delays. Although it was now the 16th of July, and no more than thirty days remained for the completion of the negotiations, it was still possible even now, that all might be saved, when an unhappy incident occurred to give Napoleon the specious pretext which he required for the loss of still more time. There were assembled at Neumarkct, commissioners of the several belligerent powers, in permanent commission, for the daily regulation of all matters appertaining to the armistice. And when the French member of this board communicated to the others the last convention, which prolonged the armistice to the 10th of August, with a delay of six days between the denunciation of the armistice and the renewal of hostilities, the Prussian and Russian commissioners appeared to be now informed of it for the first time, and to hear of it with considerable astonishment. Having communicated on the subject with head-quarters, they received from the Commander-in-Chief, Barclay de Tolly, the confirmation of the convention, and at the same time were informed that hostilities were to recommence, not on the 17th of August, but the 10th. And this was a declaration as strange as it was unexpected; for according to the real meaning of the convention, the armistice could not be denounced before the 10th of August, and if it were denounced at that time, there would still, according to the terms of the first convention and all the rules usually observed in such cases, be a certain period of delay in the actual resumption of hostilities; and this period of delay, which was fixed at six days in the first convention, would naturally, in accordance with custom, the intention of the contracting parties, and the terms in which it was drawn up, be an essential item of the second convention. But from hence arose the misapprehension which was to furnish Napoleon with the unhappy pretext above alluded to. The Prus-

sian and Russian sovereigns were surrounded by persons, whose patriotic ardour had scarcely permitted them to agree to the first armistice, greatly as they needed it, and whilst they had been unwilling to refuse the second to M. de Metternich's earnest remonstrances, they had scarcely dared to announce that they had done so; and the Emperor Alexander, accordingly, as he was on the point of setting out for Trachenberg, where there was to be held a general conference of the members of the coalition, had mentioned to General Barclay de Tolly, without entering into details, that he had consented to a prolongation of the armistice until the 10th of August, but that he had refused to allow it to continue a day longer. In expressing himself in this manner the Emperor Alexander had alluded only to the principal delay, and had not intended to exclude that of six days, which was to intervene between the conclusion of the armistice and the recommencement of hostilities. But Barclay de Tolly, exact to excess in the minute observance of forms, refused to accept any explanation to this effect, and declared that he would not venture to take upon himself to decide upon a point of so much difficulty, and that it must be referred to the Emperor Alexander himself.

When Napoleon was first informed of this strange misunderstanding, he was much displeased, regarding it as founded in an attempt to deprive him of those additional days before the recommencement of hostilities, which he considered of so much value, at a time when every hour was fruitful for him in valuable results. But as, on recalling to mind the discussions which had taken place between himself and M. de Metternich, and the calculations which they had made together respecting this subject, he could not suppose that the second convention would not receive its correct interpretation, he ceased to feel any anxiety on the subject, and resolved to turn it to his own use, by making it the source of a new and quite plausible pretext for the loss of still more time. He immediately directed M. de Narbonne to declare at Prague, that as the meaning of the convention in virtue of which the belligerent powers were about to meet and negotiate was contested, it was conformable neither to his (Napoleon's) dignity nor to his safety, to treat with persons who were so regardless of their engagements, and that he should refrain from sending M. de Coulaincourt until he should receive a categorical explanation, on the subject of the objection which had been raised by General Barclay de Tolly.

When information of this new difficulty arrived at Prague (on the 18th of July), it produced an impression which was

as vehement as it was natural. The Prussian and Russian plenipotentiaries affected to be irritated and offended to a much greater extent than they really were; M. de Metternich was filled with consternation, and the Emperor Francis deeply wounded; for the Austrian monarch and his minister were not only sincerely grieved, as they saw the chances of the conclusion of a peace fade away, but also felt humiliated at the part which they had been made to play, and which now exposed them to the jeers of those who were opposed to their mediatorial policy.

M. de Metternich had an interview with M. de Narbonne, and showed every sign of being profoundly vexed; declaring that the fresh difficulty raised by Napoleon was merely frivolous, that it was one which might have been set at rest at the first meeting of the plenipotentiaries, and that Napoleon might have obtained with respect to it, not only the favourable opinion of the Prussian and Russian plenipotentiaries, but also the decisive opinion of the mediator, which was, in fact, already known to him. There was no valid reason, therefore, for the loss of more time, when scarcely twenty days still remained to the 10th of August; and it was impossible to avoid seeing in this conduct, a determination on the part of Napoleon, to avoid taking any genuine measures towards the conclusion of a peace during the whole period of the armistice. "But let him not suppose," continued M. de Metternich, "that he will succeed by this means in procuring the further prolongation of the suspension of arms for a single day. As soon as the 10th of August shall have arrived, there will be no longer time for the negotiation of peace, for war will be immediately declared. And let him not suppose that with respect to this war Austria will be neutral. No! After having endeavoured to the utmost of her power to bring about a peace on reasonable conditions, the only course open to her, should the Emperor Napoleon reject these conditions, will be to array herself in arms against him. Should she remain neutral (which he so much desires), the allies would, doubtless, be vanquished by him; but Austria's turn would come next, and she would have well deserved the blow which would then fall upon her. We shall not, then, commit this fault; but on the other hand we are as yet—I pledge you my word and that of my sovereign—free from engagements with any Power whatever. At the same time I can also pledge you my word that at midnight on the 10th of August we shall have entered into engagements with all the world except France, and that on the morning of the 17th you will have a force of three hundred thousand Austrian soldiers added to your enemies. It has

not been readily, it has not been without grief—for he is a father and loves his daughter—that my master has taken this resolution; but his duty to his people, to himself, and to Europe, demands that he should seize the opportunity of putting an end to the existing state of affairs; and, moreover, the only alternative open to him is to become himself, at some future period, victim to a state of subjection to you, worse than that under which you made Prussia suffer. Of course, we know very well how great a risk we run, however numerous our armies, when we venture to encounter the Emperor Napoleon at the head of the soldiers of France; but having well considered this risk, we prefer it to dishonour and slavery. Let it not be said hereafter that we have in any way deceived you! Until midnight on the 10th of August all may be arranged; but when that hour shall have passed by, there will no longer be the possibility of any respite, and your lot will be war—war with all the world—even with us!” “What,” said M. de Narbonne, “not one moment’s delay, even if negotiations should have already commenced?” “Only on one condition,” replied M. de Metternich, “only on condition that the proposed bases of peace should be accepted in their entirety, and that details alone should remain to be arranged.”

M. de Narbonne, who thoroughly comprehended the present posture of affairs, now wrote to M. de Bassano that it was absolutely necessary to determine upon a war with the whole of Europe or to negotiate seriously; and that this latter course would be necessary, even if the only object were to obtain a fresh prolongation of the armistice. He urged, therefore, that M. de Coulaingcourt should be immediately sent to the congress, as the Prussian and Russian plenipotentiaries were constantly threatening to withdraw (and they had a right to do so, since it was now the 20th of July, and they had been waiting since the 11th), and if they quitted Prague all would be at an end.

This wise advice, however, founded though it was on a most perfect acquaintance with the real state of affairs, received but little attention from M. de Bassano, and still less from Napoleon. But the latter was, nevertheless, anxious to obtain a fresh prolongation of the armistice, and as he doubted very much the possibility of obtaining it from Prussia and Russia, inspired as they appeared to be by a spirit of passionate hostility, he considered that a still better means of attaining the object he had in view would be, to allow hostilities to recommence with Prussia and Russia, whilst at the same time deferring yet for a time their commencement with Austria, by which means he would gain

time for effecting the destruction of the two first, before engaging with the third, *whose turn would then come*, as M. de Metternich had said. To enable him to succeed in this scheme, it would be requisite that towards the close of the armistice, he should open a negotiation in such a manner as to inspire M. de Metternich and the Emperor Francis with some hopes that peace might still be concluded, to continue the negotiation concurrently with an actual state of hostilities, and thus, probably, retard Austria from taking an active part in them, since it was manifest that she would be very unwilling to be at war with France, so long as there should be any probability of the acceptance of her conditions. Intending, therefore, to pursue this course, he now sent to M. de Narbonne his powers and instructions, which had been hitherto withheld, together with the authority granted to each of the two plenipotentiaries of acting the one without the other. There could be no longer, therefore, any good ground for saying that the negotiations were suspended, since M. de Narbonne was perfectly competent to carry them on on the part of France, even to their conclusion. But although the merits of M. de Narbonne were duly appreciated, not only in Austria, but throughout Europe, M. de Coulaincourt was regarded as the only one of the two French plenipotentiaries who was really acquainted with Napoleon's views, and so long as he was absent from Prague, there was a general tendency to consider the negotiation as simply futile. With reference to this idea, Napoleon declared that as soon as the Neumarckt enigma should have been cleared up, he would despatch M. de Coulaincourt to the congress.

At the same time, M. de Bassano, incessantly endeavouring to model his behaviour upon that of his master, and to imitate his culpable but heroic indifference in the midst of danger, wrote to M. de Narbonne—"I send you more *Powers* than power, and you will have your hands tied, whilst your legs and mouth will be free, so that you will still be at liberty to walk about and eat." This was the tone of the French minister at that fateful moment, when the destinies of his master and his country were to be decided for ever.

Having indulged in this joke, M. de Bassano proceeded to inform M. de Narbonne that he might now exchange powers with those of the other plenipotentiaries, but that he was still to adhere to that method of conducting the negotiation upon which France had already insisted. He was, consequently, to offer that the exchange of powers should take place in a common conference, and when this formality should have been fulfilled, to propose the discussion of the

subjects of the negotiation, in conferences in which all the plenipotentiaries should take part, in the presence of the mediator, who should thus be both present at and participate in the negotiations, but should not be their *intermédiaire exclusif*.

When all these questions of form should have been settled, M. de Narbonne was to submit as the first basis of negotiation the *uti possidetis*, that is, that each power should retain what it held at the present stage of the war, as though none of the events of 1812 and 1813 had occurred.

When M. de Metternich learned that M. de Narbonne had received his powers, he was but little consoled by that fact for the absence of M. de Coulaincourt, especially when he knew that M. de Narbonne wished to present and exchange his powers in a general meeting of the plenipotentiaries, at which the mediator should preside, but in which the plenipotentiaries should freely discuss the matters on hand, without regarding the mediator as the only channel by which the negotiation was to be conducted. This latter point, as we have seen, had acquired much importance since Napoleon had clearly indicated by his selection of M. de Coulaincourt, that he was desirous of coming to a direct understanding with Russia at the expense of Austria; and from the moment this selection had been made, Prussia and Russia, in order that they might not be suspected of being willing to favour Napoleon's intention, affected to be more resolved than even Austria herself, to adhere to that form of negotiation, by which the mediator would be made the sole channel of discussion. Thus MM. Humboldt and d'Anstett, and especially the latter, had hastened to place their powers in the hands of M. de Metternich, and the latter, accordingly, declared to M. de Narbonne, that as far as he was concerned, he should be willing enough to consent to an exchange of powers at a general meeting, but that the plenipotentiaries of Prussia and Russia had already placed their powers in his hands, that they were thus legitimated, and that it was very unlikely, if only from natural *amour-propre*, that they should be willing to undo what they had thus done. He proposed to them, in fact, that they should yield on this point, but they refused, and the negotiation, therefore, notwithstanding that M. de Narbonne had received his powers, could not proceed a single step.

In the meantime, Napoleon, ceasing to entertain the illusory idea that it might be possible to enter into a separate negotiation with Russia, was the more anxious to retain Austria in a state of inactivity some days after the 17th of August. For peace itself he was by no means anxious, being unwilling for any consideration to abandon the Hanseatic

towns constitutionally annexed to the empire, to renounce the title of protector of the confederation of the Rhine, or to re-establish Prussia on the very morrow of her defection. Each of these sacrifices would be, doubtless, a cruel blow to his pride, but he should have considered himself fortunate, after the disasters he had suffered, that his pride alone was to be punished for the errors which produced them, and that he was required to sacrifice nothing that France could really regret; for, as we have already said, and must now repeat, when there were left to him beyond the Alps and the Rhine, Holland, Piedmont, Tuscany, Rome, as French departments, with Westphalia, Lombardy, Naples, as family principalities, more was yielded to him than France could desire, or could firmly grasp. And, indeed, it is difficult to understand how, when the chief portion of that chimerical greatness which he desired had been granted to him, he should compromise it for Hambourg or Lubeck, or for an empty title, such as that of protector of the confederation of the Rhine! Doubtless, if the honour of his arms had been at stake, we might conceive that he should be unwilling to yield, for it is better to lose provinces than the honour of our arms — better, as well for the safety as the dignity of a vast empire. But after the battles of Lutzen and Bautzen, in which children had avenged the misfortunes of our veterans, the honour of our arms was safe, our real greatness was secure, and even, also, that exaggerated and useless greatness which Napoleon desired. Napoleon's pride alone remained unsatisfied, and to this personal feeling, it is sad to say, he was ready to sacrifice not only the real greatness of France, that which she had acquired without his aid during the Revolution, but also that factitious and fabulous grandeur with which he had crowned her by his prodigious exploits. To this personal feeling was he also about to sacrifice his wife, his son, and himself.

In the meantime, these subjects occupied Napoleon's mind both seriously and constantly, whatever serenity his countenance might wear, by reason of that faculty which he enjoyed in so high a degree, of employing his thoughts upon a thousand matters of business of every variety; and whatever might be the feelings of confidence with which he might contrive to inspire himself by the magnitude of his military projects. Constantly engaged, as he now was, in making excursions around Dresden, which frequently extended to thirty or forty leagues a day, and which, as they were made partly on horseback, his growing *embonpoint* rendered the more laborious, he never lost sight of these serious subjects; and whilst studying on the Bohemian frontiers the battle-

fields which were so soon to be covered with blood, he discussed them with the persons of every profession who accompanied him on his campaigns. Absolute as he was by reason of his power, his clear-sightedness always made him in some degree dependent on the ideas of those who might be around him, for he could not see disapprobation expressed on their countenances without feeling a strong desire to argue against and dissipate the ideas from which it arose.

The prevalent feeling, indeed, with respect to the dangerous character of the existing posture of affairs, unloosed the tongues of the courageous, and saddened the countenances of the timid. The military men who had regarded the position on the Elbe as a most excellent one, when the war had to be waged only against the Prussians and Russians, were terrified, now that the Austrian forces were also to be in the field against us, to find themselves on the Elbe with the possibility of being turned by these latter forces on the side of Bohemia, and of thus having the enemy in our rear, between us and Thuringia. At the same time, the politicians saw very clearly that Austria, constrained by the public opinion of Germany, and urged on by an anxiety to secure her own interests, was ready to imitate Prussia, and thus to leave France, now in a state of exhaustion, to struggle against the whole of Europe, rendered vigorous by passion. Both politicians and military men, therefore, were of opinion that the mediation and its conditions should be accepted, even if less advantageous than they really were. Doubtless, neither soldiers nor diplomatists would have wished that France should have resigned, for any consideration, her natural frontiers, but if they had been told that she was offered the possession, either direct or indirect, of Mayence, Cologne, Antwerp, Flushing, Amsterdam, the Texel, Cassel, Turin, Milan, Florence, Rome, and Naples, they would on their knees have besought Napoleon to accept the conditions which granted him such territories as these. They were, however, left in ignorance of the real state of affairs, vague statements being made to them of the demand of sacrifices which could not be submitted to without dishonour. Still, although left in ignorance of what these sacrifices really were, they supposed that France was still too much feared to render it probable that any conditions should be proposed in which she was offered less than her natural frontiers, and in this supposition of conditions which were far less favourable than those really offered us, they were anxious to submit to sacrifices of mere pride, rather than encounter the danger of a struggle with the whole of Europe.

Politicians and military men discussed these subjects in the

ante-chambers of the palace, or in their bivouacs, closing their lips at Napoleon's approach, but sometimes so tardily as to afford him the opportunity, of which he seldom failed to take advantage, of continuing and taking part in the discussion, should he condescend to do so. When discussing the state of affairs with military men, answers to their objections did not fail him, for if they were right when they remarked that our position on the Elbe would be exposed to being turned, in the case of our being at war with Austria, they were equally in error, on the other hand, when they proposed, as many of them did, that he should adopt the line of the Saale; a line which was very short, might be easily forced at all points, and was exposed to being turned by Bavaria as that of the Elbe by Bohemia. To have adopted this line, would have been to have exposed our armies to be driven back upon the Rhine within a week; and it would, moreover, have been strangely inconsistent to abandon in the field, what had been so obstinately clung to in the cabinet. There was no middle course between accepting M. de Metternich's conditions, or defending the territory they would deprive us of in the field, and this could only be done on the Elbe. But whilst Napoleon's keen logic was sufficient to silence the objections of those around him on this point, the case was far otherwise when the discussion turned upon the political question of peace or war. For on that point, Napoleon, perceiving that he was in the wrong, suppressed the truth, and making vague remarks to the effect that the sacrifices at present demanded of him would, if granted, speedily attain the most immoderate bounds, hinted that Austria would soon even venture to demand the restoration of Italy. And at this point of the discussion he would become excited, expatiate on the honour of the empire, and exclaim that it would be better to perish than to submit to the conditions now proposed; the more especially as they were proposed by the Austrian court, which after having given him an archduchess in marriage, and accepted his alliance in 1812, took advantage of the first disaster which had come upon him, to turn against him. To these objections the opponents of his policy rejoined, by admitting that it was disagreeable to have to make sacrifices, especially to those who were to a certain extent traitors against us, but at the same time falling back upon the urgent necessity of peace.

Amongst the most indefatigable supporters of a peace policy, was M. de Coulaingcourt, who never ceased to entreat Napoleon to endure a temporary vexation, for the purpose of saving France, the army, and his own dynasty, and in the performance of this bold and patriotic task, he had met with

a singular auxiliary in the person of the Duke of Otranto, M. Fouché, who, although endeavouring to regain the imperial favour which he had lost, did not hesitate to obey the inspiration of his good sense, and also, perhaps, of an idea that the fall of the emperor would not be without danger to the men of the Revolution, and boldly maintained that it was absolutely necessary to conclude a peace. In one of the conversations to which we are here alluding, at which had been present M. Daru, M. de Coulaingcourt, M. de Bassano, and even the King of Saxony, M. Fouché went so far as to say to Napoleon that if he did not speedily conclude a peace, he would render himself odious to France, and would thereby endanger not only his own fortunes, but those also of his son and his dynasty. "France," he added, "had been compelled, as a matter of honour, to make one final effort, because she could not withdraw, as though vanquished, from her great duel with Europe, but that after the battles of Lutzen and Bautzen, she had a fair right to consider her honour vindicated, and on the sole condition that she should be allowed to retain possession of the Rhine and the Alps, her right to which none of her enemies disputed, she might remain satisfied. And if," he continued, "in spite of the evident possibility of now concluding a peace, war should still be continued, she could not but regard herself as sacrificed to an extravagant system, which had no other foundation than Napoleon's personal feelings, and which she detested as much as Europe, because she suffered as much as Europe from its effects."

To these bold declarations, which irritated Napoleon excessively, he could only reply by repeating, that the sacrifices demanded of him by the allied powers were excessive, that his submission to them would only lead to other demands still more extravagant, and such as none of those who objected to his policy could wish him to yield; that the refusal to resign what was not absolutely necessary was the only means of retaining what was; and that one or two more battles must yet be fought, a few more days of warfare yet be endured, for the purpose of preserving a greatness acquired by twenty years of bloodshed, and of procuring a genuine and substantial peace. In short, in this conversation as in all the others on this subject in which he took part, his art consisted in concealing the real state of affairs, and in leaving his hearers in ignorance that the only sacrifices required of him, were Hambourg and the protectorate of the confederation of the Rhine. But whilst he contrived by his eloquence and address to embarrass his disputants, who were, moreover, ignorant of the real state of the negotiations, he

could not convince them, or remove from their minds the fears inspired by the fatal resolution which it was but evident he had adopted. One only amongst them, appearing to be free from any apprehension of peril, ventured to affirm that the genius of the emperor, ever fertile in resources, would enable him to triumph over all his enemies, and replace him in, at least, as exalted a position as that which he had occupied in 1810 and 1811. This was, as the reader will have readily guessed, M. de Bassano, and his conduct in expressing himself in this manner was the less excusable, in as much as he alone knew the real state of affairs, and that it was only for the sake of Hambourg and the title of protector of the confederation of the Rhine, that the fortunes of the empire were about to be endangered. At the same time we must add, for the purpose of reducing this minister's responsibility, which would otherwise be so fearfully heavy, to its proper limits, that he had very little influence with Napoleon, who seemed to be but slightly affected by his magnificent prognostics.

And in Paris as well as in Dresden, Napoleon met with this opposition to his policy. The minister of police, the Duke of Rovigo, who heard more clearly than any other man the murmurs of public opinion, and who, by disregarding, had become so habituated to Napoleon's anger that he no longer feared it, frequently ventured to write to him what none of his other ministers dared to say to him, namely, that the conclusion of peace was an urgent, an indispensable necessity, that all the enemies of the government, who had been hitherto hopeless and dispersed, were now taking courage as well as hope, that the revolutionists who had so long lain crushed beneath the memories of '93, and the Bourbons who had so long and so entirely been forgotten, were again attempting to attain a political existence, and that the latter were even issuing manifestoes which were read without indignation, and with a certain degree of interest. All these assertions were true, and it was quite certain that the idea of a government for France other than that of Napoleon, an idea which during fourteen years had been entirely forgotten, failing to be entertained even at the time of the retreat from Moscow, began now, in the protracted continuance of an unsettled state of affairs, to be forced into the minds of so many persons, that there was every prospect that it would be generally entertained should the war continue; and that as in 1799 General Bonaparte had been sought as a refuge from anarchy, so the Bourbons would now be sought as a protection from a perpetual state of war. These were the reflections and opinions which the Duke of Rovigo, more or less openly, more or less

adroitly, attempted to bring before Napoleon's attention with a courage which does him honour, but which would have been both more meritorious and more useful had Napoleon's respect for his advice been greater than it really was. Prince Cambacérès could not have ventured to have said as much on these subjects as the Duke of Rovigo, although he regarded them with even more serious attention, for the reason that Napoleon would have regarded similar opinions from his lips of more authority, and would have listened to them, consequently, with even less patience. Becoming tired, at length, of the Duke of Rovigo's letters, Napoleon directed Prince Cambacérès to inform the duke that they annoyed him, that he, Napoleon, was alone capable of judging what was the right course to pursue, for the purpose of obtaining for France a peace which should be at once safe and honourable; that the Duke of Rovigo, in meddling with this matter, was busying himself about affairs of which he was entirely ignorant; and that, in short, he was in future to be silent with respect to them.

Having thus stopped the mouth of the Duke of Rovigo, Napoleon's next step was to give some employment to the Duke of Otranto; an opportunity for so doing arising from an accident which was as strange as it was singular. The unfortunate Junot had never, since he had been wounded in the head in Portugal, recovered either his physical or moral strength. In the Russian campaign he had failed to display his accustomed ardour, although he had been less to blame than was asserted, and the reproaches with which Napoleon overwhelmed him had had the effect of destroying his reason. Sent to Laybach as governor of Illyria, he had there suddenly shown such manifest signs of madness, that it had been found necessary to convey him under restraint to Bourgogne, his native country, and he had there died. Napoleon, thereupon, appointed M. Fouché governor of Illyria—a post but little in accordance with his political eminence, but which he had accepted because he was glad to re-enter the public service in any way. On his road to his new government he would meet with M. de Metternich at Prague, and be able to take advantage of former relations, to urge upon this diplomatist the propriety of the views of the French court. But the slight advantage which might thus be derived from this appointment, would be more than counterbalanced by the bad effect which it could not fail to produce in Austria, as being a sign that we were very far from being willing to resign Illyria to her.

Still persisting in his plan of gaining time, Napoleon resolved, as one means of effecting this object, to set out,

upon the opening of the negotiations, upon a second journey, the object of which would be a visit to the empress at Mayence, and which would, doubtless, cause fresh delays in the progress of the negotiations. He accordingly set out, leaving behind the necessary powers for M. de Coulaincourt, who was to proceed to Prague as soon as a satisfactory answer should have been received from the commissioners assembled at Neumarckt, with respect to the precise period during which the armistice was to continue.

It was now the 24th of July, and it was not probable that an answer could arrive from Neumarckt before the 25th or 26th. On the day after its arrival M. de Coulaincourt was to set out; on arriving at Prague he was to lose a day or two in making the acquaintance of the plenipotentiaries, and to employ five or six more in discussing the exchange of the powers, and the method in which the conferences should be conducted. By these means it would be easy to cause a delay which should extend unto the 3rd or 4th of August, and then, as Napoleon would most probably have returned to Dresden, he would be able to give fresh directions with respect to the course to be adopted.

In the meantime, the two months which had been lost, as far as respected the negotiations, had by no means, as may be readily imagined, been lost with respect to the military preparations. The infantry, encamped in good quarters, well fed and well disciplined, had greatly improved in all points during this space of time, and in none more than in that of number; whilst the cavalry had gained an entirely new aspect, being now both numerous and well mounted. In addition to the light cavalry attached to each army, Napoleon had four fine reserve corps of cavalry, under the Generals Latour-Maubourg, Sebastiani, de Padoue, de Valmy. The guard, which consisted of five infantry divisions, also comprised twelve thousand troopers, together with two hundred well-served pieces of cannon. Fifteen hundred *guards of honour* had arrived in Dresden under General Dejean; and having lost, *en route*, the unsatisfactory disposition with which they had been at first inspired, had arrived full of aspirations to distinguish themselves in the eyes of the grand army. General Vandamme's corps, which Napoleon had expected at Magdebourg, was in excellent condition; and so, also, were the four divisions organised at Mayence, which were now marching towards Koenigstein, where they were to take up their quarters. The supplies of provisions which had been ordered from every direction were arriving at Dresden by the Elbe, and more than fifty thousand quintaux of grain and flour had already been collected there. The energy of Marshal

Davout had succeeded in causing the resurrection, so to speak, of the defences of Hambourg, and they already carried two thirds of the three hundred pieces of cannon with which it was intended that it should be armed. All his military preparations, in short, were being carried out in due accordance with Napoleon's designs, and the successful manner in which they progressed, whilst it by no means tended to render Napoleon more inclined for peace, authorised M. de Bassano to spread abroad declarations that his master's forces were immense, his genius more exalted than ever; and that Europe had cause to tremble, since it was not for the strong to submit to the feeble.

At this time, for the purpose of giving some animation to the camps, in which the young troops had now, with the exception of the hours employed in drill, for two whole months lain idle, Napoleon gave numerous and liberal prizes to be contended for by shooting at marks; the advantages of which proceeding were, in addition to the incalculable one of rendering the troops much more skilful in the use of their weapons, that it gave the men occupation and amusement, and furnished many of them with the opportunity and means of regaling their comrades. He also had the officers supplied with their pay, that they might be enabled to enjoy the last few days of repose, which were to be for many, alas! the last of their lives. At the same time, he arranged that the *fête de Napoléon*, which would properly fall on the 15th of August, should be celebrated on the 10th, in order that its festivities might not be in too close proximity to the fresh scenes of carnage, which he foresaw would attend the renewal of hostilities, which was to take place on the 17th.

On the 26th a satisfactory reply arrived from the Neu-marck commissioners, with respect to the precise period during which the armistice was to continue; it being admitted that although it might be *denounced* on the 10th of August, it would not expire until the 16th (inclusive), and that hostilities, accordingly, could not be resumed until the 17th. The misunderstanding with respect to this matter had been caused, as we have already seen, by the vague manner in which the Emperor Alexander had announced a concession so repugnant to the inclinations of the war party which surrounded him. He was now at Trachenberg, a little town of Silesia, to which he had proceeded from Reichenbach with the King of Prussia and the greater number of the generals of the allied forces, for the purpose of conferring with the King of Sweden upon the plan of future operations. This reunion, which had been much desired by the two sovereigns, who were anxious definitively to enlist Bernadotte in their

cause, and to put an end to his protracted hesitation, was far from being relished by the Russian and German officers; for it was said that an important command was about to be conferred upon the Prince Royal of Sweden, and extraordinary honours had already been prepared along his route, for the purpose of touching him in his most sensitive point—his vanity; and all this display of attention towards a man who, in the eyes of the Russian and German officers, was no more than a French general, and far from having a right to be numbered in the foremost ranks of French generals, excited, in the highest degree, the national jealousy of the two staffs; the prospect of being placed under his orders being especially disagreeable to them.

Unfortunately, these staffs had reason to experience similar feelings with respect to another French general, a great warrior, endowed with the most genuine civic and military virtues, who, unlike Bernadotte, whose moderate services had been rewarded by a crown, had received exile as the reward for services of the greatest value, and who, overcome by *ennui* and the feelings of irritation inspired by a rival's good fortune, had allowed himself to be persuaded to leave America for Europe. We allude to the illustrious Moreau, who, induced to visit Stockholm by Bernadotte, who seemed anxious to lead others into imitating his example, had permitted himself to be led blindly into an abyss, under the influence of feelings which he believed to be honest, because the genuine indignation which filled his heart, prevented him from seeing how great a share the craving for occupation had in producing them. His arrival produced a great sensation at the present time, and, as it was rumoured that he was about to become the Emperor Alexander's adviser, the jealousy of the Russian and German officers received fresh fuel, bursting forth into exclamations that these sovereigns "seemed to believe that French generals could be overcome only by French generals."

However this might be, Bernadotte had come to Trachenberg, travelling, not as the Russian and Prussian monarchs had, with extreme simplicity, but with all the ostentation of a monarch traversing his states, on some solemn occasion. After having reviewed some of his troops, which had already taken advantage of the armistice to pass into Prussia, he had advanced close to Stettin, in which was posted a French garrison, with a brain inflamed with the idea that, Napoleon having become odious to Europe and a burden to France, and the Bourbons being entirely forgotten, it remained for him to replace the former upon the French throne. But whilst he was displaying himself on horseback under the

walls of Stettin, in the sight of its French garrison, some guns were fired at him, and when his officers complained of this to the brave General Dufresse, the governor, of this violation of the armistice, he ironically replied, "It is nothing. The guard have discovered a deserter and are firing at him; that is all!"

Arriving at Trachenberg in the midst of a numerous escort, and accompanied by a magnificent retinue, the Prince of Sweden was received there by the Russian and Prussian monarchs with a display of respect which could not have been greater, had he possessed the genius of Napoleon himself, or of the great Frederic. The real cause of this display, however, was not so much any talent he might himself possess as the fears which these monarchs entertained with respect to his fidelity, and their desire to be able to show to the world a lieutenant of Napoleon's, so weary of his tyranny as to be ready to turn his arms against him. After protracted hesitations he had agreed at length, when the allies had broken with Denmark and had definitively adjudged Norway to Sweden, to join them with twenty-five thousand Swedish troops, in return for whom he was anxious to be appointed generalissimo of all the armies which should not be under the immediate command of the two sovereigns. He was persuaded, however, to modify his pretensions, and after discussions which lasted from the 9th to the 13th of July, the following plan of campaign was determined on; the Austrian troops assembled in Bohemia, Bavaria, and Styria, being regarded as certain to co-operate with the Russian and Prussian armies.

Fully appreciating the danger of encountering Napoleon in the field, the allies proposed to vanquish him by the overwhelming number of their troops, which would amount, they hoped, to eight hundred thousand. From the position which he occupied at Dresden, and which he evidently intended to make the central point of his operations, they determined to drive him by means of three great armies; the first of which, consisting of a hundred and thirty thousand Austrians, and a hundred and twenty thousand Prussians and Russians, should operate by Bohemia upon Napoleon's flank, whilst the second, composed of a hundred and twenty thousand Prussian and Russian troops, under the command of General Blucher, should march directly upon Dresden by Liegnitz and Bautzen, and the third, numbering a hundred and thirty thousand, and entrusted to the Prince of Sweden, and composed of Swedish, Prussian, Russian, German, and English troops, should move from Berlin upon Magdebourg. According to the plan which had been laid down, these armies

were to act with great caution, to avoid direct encounters with Napoleon himself, to fall back when he advanced, to attack any one of his lieutenants whom he might leave on his flank or in his rear, again to fall back at Napoleon's approach to support the threatened lieutenant, and to continue this system until he should appear to be so far enfeebled as to render probable the success of a direct attack upon himself. And if, in spite of the advice given to each of the commanders-in-chief of these armies to be guilty of no rashness, to act cautiously with respect to Napoleon and boldly with respect to his lieutenants, they should expose themselves to and suffer defeat, this would not be any cause for despair, since there remained a reserve of three hundred thousand men ready to recruit the armies in the field, and to render them indestructible by continually renewing them.

This plan, which proved that Napoleon's adversaries had taken advantage of the lessons which he had given them, was formed, not by the Swedish Prince, but by the Russian and Prussian generals, who were accustomed to our mode of warfare. Bernadotte, who was now placed in command of one hundred and thirty thousand men, and who had never before been at the head of more than twenty thousand, was much discontented with the position accorded to him, considering it due to his royal rank and military talents, that, in addition to the army entrusted to him, he should have the command of the army of Silesia, and that Blucher should be subject to his orders. To such an arrangement, however, there were insurmountable objections, for Blucher was surrounded by the most distinguished and patriotic of the German officers, and the very idea of serving under Bernadotte, whom they hated as a Frenchman and a traitor to his country, filled them with disgust. He had been induced, therefore, to give up his strange pretensions, by the representation that the three armies would act so far apart, that it would be impossible that they should be under a single command, and on the condition that if ever it should be necessary for the army of the north (as Bernadotte's army was named), to act with the army of Silesia, he should then have the chief command of both of them.

These arrangements having been made, Bernadotte departed, intoxicated with the incense offered to him by royal hands, and the two monarchs returned to Reichenbach to await the issue of the negotiations. It was on their return, that the commissioners at Neumarczt had sent the reply which has been mentioned above, and which left Napoleon without any pretext for delaying any longer to send to M. de Coulaingcourt to Dresden.

On the 26th, this worthy and courageous person received

from M. de Bassano, the instructions which Napoleon had left for him before his departure for Mayence, and the difficulties which he was to raise on matters of form, were so complacently detailed and so manifestly set forth as a means of causing the loss of time, that M. de Coulaincourt was filled with consternation. He had accepted, only that he might be able to arrange a peace which he considered absolutely necessary, the post of plenipotentiary at Prague, which could not but be more painful to him than any other, since after having enjoyed the particular favour of the Emperor Alexander, he must now expect to be treated by him, either personally or through his agents, with distressing coldness; and to have to expose himself to such treatment for no good purpose, and to take part in an empty farce, was as offensive to his self-respect as to his patriotism. He set out, however, supported by the solitary hope that he might obviate to some extent, at least, the effects of his master's unfortunate disposition, and on leaving Dresden addressed to Napoleon the following letter, which history ought to preserve.

“To the Emperor Napoleon,

“Dresden, 26th of July, 1813.

“Sire,

“I am fain, ere I quit Dresden, to give some expression to the feelings which surcharge my heart, that I may be able to proceed to Dresden with a mind entirely devoted to the duties with the performance of which your majesty has entrusted me. It is two o'clock. M. the Duke of Bassano has just placed in my hands the instructions, which the absence of the reply from Neumarckt, and your majesty's orders, have hitherto compelled him to withhold; and they are so different to the arrangements to which your majesty appeared to consent, when I took upon myself to accept this mission, that I should not hesitate even now to decline the honour of fulfilling it, if it were not that, so much time having been already lost, even hours are reckoned up at Prague, whilst your majesty is at Mayence and I am still at Dresden. This being the case, unwilling as I am to take part in negotiations so illusory as those which are about to commence, I am anxious above all things to fulfil my duty, and I obey. To-morrow I shall be *en route*, and the following day at Prague, as I have been ordered; but permit, sire, that your faithful servant should now frankly express his opinions on the present state of affairs. So dark a cloud hangs over the whole political horizon, that I cannot resist the desire of entreating your majesty to take, in time, some prudent resolution. Pray let your majesty be convinced that there is no time to lose,

that the public feeling of Germany is irritated to the utmost, and that this popular exasperation, even more than the fears of cabinets, gives to the progress of events a movement which is at once swift and irresistible. Austria is already too deeply compromised to draw back, should not a continental peace reassure her. Your majesty will understand very well that it is not in behalf of this power that I wish to plead, that it is not for any recompense for her abandonment of us in the hour of our adversity that I now ask, that my anxiety is not even for the withdrawal of her hundred and fifty thousand bayonets from the field of battle, although this is certainly an object of consideration ; but it is that general rising of Germany against us, which the old ascendancy of this power renders her capable of exciting, that I entreat your majesty at any price to avoid. All the sacrifices which at the present moment you may make for this purpose, and which, consequently, must tend to the prompt conclusion of peace, will render you, sire, more powerful than your victories have rendered you, and will at the same time make you the idol of your subjects, &c."

The manner in which M. de Coulaincourt was received at Prague was worthy of him, and of the estimation in which he was held throughout Europe. As soon as information was received of his approach, all conferences were suspended until he should have arrived, and they were resumed by him with the revival of the question already raised by M. de Narbonne, respecting the interchange of powers and prosecution of the negotiation by the plenipotentiaries in a common meeting, over which the mediator should preside, but in which the plenipotentiaries should be at full liberty to confer freely the one with the other. M. de Metternich repeated what he had already said to M. de Narbonne ; to the effect, that as the Russian and Prussian plenipotentiaries, as well from *amour-propre* as from interested views, were resolved not to consent to yield to Napoleon's views on this subject, all discussions with them upon it must be perfectly useless ; that as, moreover, it was very evident that Napoleon was resolved that the negotiations should have no effectual result, it would be vain, indeed, to make any great exertions to obtain concessions as mere matters of form. That as it was possible, however, so unaccountable was Napoleon's character, that he might, even at the last moment, send orders to his plenipotentiaries to treat upon acceptable bases, Austria would refrain until midnight on the 10th of August from entering into any engagements with other powers ; but that from that moment Austria would be irrevocably numbered amongst our enemies, and would be of all of them the one most resolved to vanquish us or to perish in the attempt.

Convinced by M. de Metternich's tone and manner, of his sincerity, M. de Coulaincourt immediately wrote to M. de Bassano and to Napoleon, informing them yet once again of the real state of affairs, and the imminent danger which existed that Austria would almost immediately join the coalition, and thus render complete and definitive the coalition of Europe against us. So convinced, indeed, was M. de Coulaincourt of the peril of our position, that he endeavoured to enlist M. de Bassano in support of what he considered the only true policy, by touching his ambition, entreating him to hasten to Prague clothed with full powers to sign a peace, the conclusion of which would render him, M. de Bassano, the object of universal gratitude, and would save innumerable victims, and amongst them, probably, France herself.

M. de Bassano, however, who had no will but his master's, and would as soon have thought of defying that of God as his, contented himself with replying to M. de Coulaincourt's earnest remonstrances by granting him some latitude with respect to the question of form, permitting the two French plenipotentiaries to give a certified copy of their powers to the mediator, who might transmit it to the Prussian and Russian plenipotentiaries, so that this preliminary communication might take place in the manner our opponents desired; but insisting, at the same time, that the definitive exchange of powers should take place in a common conference. With respect to the form of the negotiation itself, he consented that the Prussian and Russian plenipotentiaries should proceed by means of written notes, but on condition that the French plenipotentiaries should be at liberty to discuss these notes in conferences at which all the plenipotentiaries should be assembled. Miserable subtleties these, and unworthy of the serious posture of affairs; but M. de Bassano wrote to Napoleon, informing him that he had granted them, in order that all the questions relating to the form of the negotiations, might be completely arranged before his return to Dresden, when, if it should suit his views to render the negotiation a genuine one, he would find all the preliminary discussions concluded.

Napoleon was at this moment at Mayence, whither he had gone, as we have said above, for the purpose of passing a few days with the empress and of inspecting with his own eyes the progress of his military preparations. Setting out on the night of the 24th of July, he had arrived on the evening of the 26th at Mayence, where he was awaited by a brilliant court which had accompanied the empress from Paris, and a great

number of his agents who had proceeded thither to receive his personal orders. He found the empress much distressed and somewhat terrified by the existing state of affairs, and she gave way in his presence to the tears which she concealed from the public gaze. But the secret of the interview between Napoleon and his empress at Mayence has remained unknown—probably because there was none. Napoleon's object in seeking this interview was not to burden his empress with the performance of any task, but to see and console her, and to discover whether she had received from Vienna any clandestine communication which might throw some light upon the designs of the Austrian cabinet. As, however, Austria had already candidly declared her intentions through the mouth of M. de Metternich, it was impossible that Napoleon should procure any additional information with respect to them from Marie Louise.

The Duke of Rovigo had expressed a strong feeling of anxiety to meet the emperor at Mayence, for the purpose of enlightening him with respect to the state of public opinion, which had assumed a very serious aspect since it had begun to be suspected that the congress, the assembly of which had been so long delayed, would have no real result. In fact, the majority of the country was full of chagrin and gloomy apprehensions; whilst hate was taking the place of the affection with which Napoleon had once been regarded, and smothering the feeling of admiration. In lower Germany and Holland the cry was "*Vive Orange!*" whilst throughout the whole of Germany were to be heard cries of "*Vive Alexandre!*" And if in France none dared to cry "*Vive les Bourbons!*" it was no less certain that they were gradually resuming a place in the popular mind, and from hand to hand was transmitted the manifesto which Louis XVIII. had published at Hartwell, and which would, doubtless, have produced a general effect, had it not contained too many traces of the prejudices of the emigration. These were the details which the Duke of Rovigo was anxious to communicate to the master to whom he was so faithful a servant, but Napoleon, unwilling to be annoyed by what he called the *grumbings* of the interior, refused to receive him, and ordered him to remain in Paris, on the pretext that his presence there was necessary.

In accordance with the usual custom of a government which is obstinately resolved to persist in its errors, and sees in the manifestation of public opinion something which it ought to repress, rather than a lesson upon which it ought seriously to meditate, Napoleon now took measures against the clergy of the most extraordinary and vigorous character. The clergy

naturally neglected no opportunity of multiplying its manifestations of hostility towards his government, especially in Belgium, and thus, by its own errors, called into existence others on the part of Napoleon. Ignoring the concordat at Fontainebleau, they persisted in refusing to acknowledge the new prelates whom Napoleon had nominated, and whom Pius VII., after having promised to do so, had refused to institute. The more prudent of these prelates had refrained, in order to avoid giving occasion for scandal, from visiting their new sees; but the new bishops of Tournay and de Gand, who both proceeded to their dioceses, attempted to officiate publicly in their cathedrals, and provoked by so doing, a species of rebellion amongst their clergy and their flocks, who on the appearance of the prelates at the altar, simultaneously fled, leaving the latter almost alone.

Napoleon met this proceeding by ordering that the *béguines* who had taken part in it should be dispersed, that certain members of the chapters of Tournay and Gand should be imprisoned, the other sbeing removed to distant parts of the country; that the same course should be pursued with respect to the professors of the seminaries of Tournay and Gand, who had led their pupils into a participation in the disorder, and that of the pupils themselves, those who were eighteen years of age should be sent to Magdebourg as conscripts, whilst those who were under this age should be restored to their families.

Placing no limits to the exercise of his will, Napoleon soon added to these proceedings one which was still more extraordinary; for, on receiving information that certain public functionaries, who had been prosecuted by the government, on the charge of having made very serious defalcations in the taxes of the city of Antwerp, had been acquitted by the juries before whom they were tried, he gave way to a violent fit of passion, and directed, in spite of the remonstrances of the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès and the other officers of the administration of public justice, that the decision of the Antwerp jury should be annulled by a *senatus consultum*, and that another court should try not only the accused persons who had just been acquitted, but also certain members of the jury which had acquitted them, who were suspected of having allowed themselves to be bribed. He alleged, in support of this course, an article of the constitution of the empire, which empowered the senate to annul such verdicts as should be of a nature calculated to effect the safety of the state, but it, nevertheless, involved almost as many irregularities as possible, for even admitting that the 55th article of the constitution of the 16 Thermidor, year ten (4th of

August 1802), was still in force, it was evident that the judgment in question was not one of those which had been referred to as of a nature to affect the safety of the state, and also, that although this article of the constitution might grant the right of abrogating certain verdicts, it in no way authorised the prosecution of those by whom they had been passed. To these objections, however, which were duly submitted to him, Napoleon refused to pay the slightest attention, not only ordering that the *senatus consultum* should be drawn up as he desired, and immediately submitted to the senate, but even signing and publishing a letter in which he took the whole responsibility of the step upon himself. The report of the counsellor of state, who was charged with the presentation of the *senatus consultum*, contained the following phrase, which completely expresses Napoleon's opinion with respect to the royal power, and contains views which certainly would never have been admitted to be correct, even before 1789;—"As our ordinary laws afford no means of annulling such a decision as this, it is necessary that the sovereign's hand should interfere; and as the sovereign is the very fountain of the law, he is endowed with all the powers necessary for securing the welfare of his kingdom, for defending it from injury, or relieving it from any actual evil."

But whilst thus arrogating to himself the possession of unlimited power, he did not fail to mingle with his arbitrary acts others which were in the highest degree benevolent. And amongst these latter may be mentioned the case of M. Muraire, the first president of the court of cassation, a distinguished magistrate, who had fallen from certain circumstances into great pecuniary difficulties, from which Napoleon, as soon as they were brought before his notice, immediately relieved him, by the grant of some hundreds of thousands of francs from his private treasury, which was, as has been already shown, the army's last resource.

Napoleon took advantage of his sojourn at Mayence, to bestow some attention upon the state of his finances. He had taken on account of his private treasury seventy-two millions, on account of the bank ten millions, and on account of the *caisse de service* sixty-three millions, of the new bills issued upon the communal property, the alienation of which had been resolved on, and was now sanctioned by law; and thus was formed a resource of one hundred and forty-five millions, realised in advance, and which caused no emission of these bills, since the treasuries in which they were deposited retained them *en porte-feuille*. In the meantime, however, the expenses of the treasury during the past six months, had exceeded the ordinary receipts by two hundred millions; an ex-

cess which M. Mollien did not dare to meet, by making use of the bills drawn on the *caisse d'amortissement*, lest they should suffer an excessive depreciation. A few, indeed, had been issued for the purpose of introducing them to the notice of the public, and had been negotiated at a discount of not more than five or six per cent., but to have extended the issue of them to any considerable extent, would have been both difficult and dangerous. A further portion might have, however, been paid away in exchange for the goods supplied by the great army and navy contractors, who, anxious to continue the immense transactions they were carrying on with the state, were not over particular with respect to the manner in which they were paid, and were, moreover, in such want of money, that they would have been glad to receive it, even in a form which they could not realise except at a loss of ten or fifteen per cent. By these new bills, also, might have been paid those persons who were compulsory contractors, so to speak, to the government, being the landed proprietors, farmers, or merchants, upon whom requisitions had been levied of produce, manufactures, or horses, which they were to supply for ready money. But M. Mollien, who was averse to any but the regular methods of conducting business, preferred to make the contractors and the persons on whom requisitions had been levied wait for their money, rather than issue paper which would be exposed to be qualified as *assignats* as soon as its introduction into circulation, should appear to be in the least forced. The consequence was that the contractors began to murmur, uttering complaints of the delay made in satisfying their claims, and making the delay a reason for dilatoriness in the execution of their contracts; and it was on this account that Napoleon now turned his attention to the matter, at a time when he could only find time to listen to matters referring to the army.

Addressing M. Mollien, Napoleon argued with him that a fall of nine or ten per cent. in the market value of the new securities would be a matter of little moment, since a heavy rate of interest punctually paid, would maintain their real value, and that such a depreciation certainly could not be equal to the inconvenience of delaying the payment of those persons, whose claims it was so urgently necessary to satisfy. By the issue of the new bills to the government contractors, those of them who had no urgent need of ready money would be thus placed in possession of an advantageous security, whilst those to whom it was an immediate necessity would be able to obtain it at a discount; the only inconvenience of which would be, that the market value of the new bills would suffer a depreciation of nine or ten per cent.,

which the exact payment of the rate of interest which they carried would soon render a matter of indifference to the regular holders.

This specious argument would have been almost completely founded on truth, if the depreciation in the value of the new securities could have been limited to ten, to twelve, or even to fifteen per cent. But who could say to what discount they would next fall if once they were issued in any considerable quantity? This was what M. de Mollien feared, and what Napoleon refused to consider, for he ordered that about thirty millions of the bills of the *caisse d'amortissement* should be issued in Paris in payment of the government contractors, and about eighteen or twenty millions in the provinces, in payment of the *requisitions*. Fifty millions worth were thus to a certain degree forced into circulation; and at the same time, that the realisation of the communal property might be expedited, Napoleon directed the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès to make arrangements for the speedy conclusion of this business by means which should be at once summary and uninterrupted.

Having thus afforded a somewhat violent relief to his finances, Napoleon, whose mind was constantly occupied with the subject of the levy of troops, devised a conscription of a new species which he hoped to render bearable, by giving to it an air of urgent necessity and local importance. As the frontier of the Pyrenees, for example, was by the late events in Spain rendered liable to danger, he proposed to raise thirty thousand men, of the four last classes, in the departments lying between Bordeaux and Montpellier, for the purpose of securing this portion of the empire from invasion. As the soil which these new recruits would be called upon to defend would be their own, Napoleon considered that the urgency of the necessity which induced him to levy them must silence all complaints; and he resolved to apply the plan to the departments of the north and east, demanding of them sixty thousand men, under the pretext of a local and imminent danger. But as these conscriptions would speedily take the form, and have the effect, of a general conscription, he determined to defer the second of them for two or three months, only levying at once the thirty thousand men required of the departments bordering on the Pyrenees.

Occupied as he was with the formation and developement of these various measures, as well as with the review of his troops and the constant inspection of matériel Napoleon had not much time to bestow upon the empress, but, nevertheless, he did not fail to bestow upon her testimonies of the greatest affection, testimonies which were very sincere,

and at the same time had a political aim, since he was anxious that the new war into which he was about to enter with Austria, should not cast any shadow upon a marriage which he ever regarded as an important element of his policy, and since, also, he was desirous, by being a good husband, to place the Emperor Francis under an obligation, as it were, to be a good father. But in manifesting these signs of affection he did but yield, we must repeat, to the inclinations of his own heart, for he was touched by the affection with which he appeared to have inspired this noble daughter of the Cæsars, and he returned it with as much ardour as the other engrossing and exciting matters which occupied his attention, permitted. Anxious to preserve her from anxiety as far as possible, he forbore to tell her how inevitable was the approaching war, and how serious would be its character; and with this object of saving her from the pressure of the heavy cares of the moment, he directed her to make a voyage on the Rhine, from Mayence to Cologne, during which she would receive the homage of the populations on each bank; and arranged, further, that after having spent a few days in Paris, she should undertake a journey into Normandy, for the purpose of presiding at Cherbourg at an imposing ceremony—being that of the admission of the waters of the ocean into the celebrated basin which was commenced in the reign of Louis XVI. and had now been completed in his own.

Having been from the 26th of July to the 1st of August with Maria Louise, he embraced her in the presence of his whole court and, leaving her in tears, set out for Franconia. He had already inspected at Mayence the divisions of Marshal Augereau; and at Wurzburg he found those of Marshal Saint Cyr, which were now actually on their march towards the Elbe, where they were to take up the position of Königsstein. After having inspected the citadel, the magazines, and in short, the whole military establishment of Wurzburg, which he wished to make one of the important points of his line of communication, he proceeded to Bamberg and Bayreuth, where he saw successively the other divisions of Marshal Saint-Cyr, and the Bavarian divisions which were intended to form a portion of the corps of Marshal Augereau. After inspecting everything with great minuteness, and giving such orders and encouragements as he considered necessary, he set out on his return to Dresden, where he arrived on the evening of the 4th of August.

The sight of the troops which he had inspected on his route, and his incessant meditations on the plan of the approaching campaign, had redoubled his confidence as well

in his army as in the resources of his own genius. Watching the approach of the terrible struggle which was so soon to take place, considering his chances of success, reminding himself how brave his soldiers were, and how he, himself, on a time, had plucked victory from the very midst of danger, from positions in which his opponents had only found opportunities of error—allowing his thoughts, we say, to be engrossed with such reflections as these, whilst he failed to take into due account the patriotic passions which he had aroused against himself, and the strength of which might very probably compensate for the want of military skill, he felt within himself a species of ardour which gave an air of animation to his whole person, and beamed in his eyes with the light of hope and courage. Those who were around him at this time were struck with it, and to the wiser of them it appeared to be a subject rather for disquietude than satisfaction.

On the very day of his return to Dresden, he received despatches from MM. Coulaingcourt and Narbonne, in which they entreated more earnestly than ever for permission to carry on the negotiation in good faith, to which, annoyed, apparently, by their importunity, he replied by reproaching them with having permitted M. de Metternich to address them with too little reserve, as though he were offended by the frankness of the latter, in stating that under certain circumstances Austria would join his enemies. But having given this undeserved reprimand, he devoted his attention to a matter which was far more serious, and which was the retention of Austria from actually taking the field, until he should have been first able to crush the Russians and Prussians. And now, since this object could only be attained by appearing to negotiate in good faith, Napoleon resolved to realise M. de Metternich's prognostic, that matters might be happily settled even at the last moment. Napoleon resolved to direct M. de Coulaingcourt, secretly and exclusively, to make a confidential communication to M. de Metternich, in which he, Napoleon, would offer to consent to conditions, which would involve the sacrifice of the grand duchy of Warsaw, and the restoration of Illyria, whilst still refraining from giving up the Hanseatic towns, or the protectorate of the confederation of the Rhine; for he thought that at the last moment Austria would consent to yield on these points, or that she would, at least, by the commencement on his part of a sincere negotiation, be induced to refrain from entering the field against him, even after hostilities should have been renewed with the allies.

Putting this resolution into execution, he directed M. de Coulaingcourt (who was to keep the matter a profound secret

from M. de Narbonne, so that it might wear a more confidential aspect), to seek an interview with M. de Metternich, to address him on the matter in hand without preface, to declare that he, Napoleon, was anxious that advantage should be taken of the five days which still remained, for the purpose of arriving at a mutual good understanding with respect to the subjects of the negotiation, and that Austria should now, since the shortness of the time remaining available for negotiation forbade any indulgence in vulgar *finesse*, finally and precisely announce her real wishes, so that they might receive immediately an equally precise and equally decisive answer.

Unfortunately, whilst making to Austria this overture, which, although tardy, had still some chance of success, Napoleon added to it a note, referring to the official negotiation, of a very offensive character, since it declared, with considerable plainness, that the difficulties with respect to the form of the negotiation which had been raised by the representatives of the belligerent powers, revealed their real intention, which was no other than a design to involve Austria in the war against France at the expense of any amount of bad faith or trickery. And this strange note, MM. de Narbonne and de Coulaincourt were jointly to present to M. de Metternich; just before M. de Coulaincourt, taking M. de Metternich aside, was secretly to make to him the proposition above described.

The despatches containing these contradictory instructions reached Prague on the 6th of August, and whilst causing M. de Coulaincourt considerable surprise, filled him with a mingled feeling of joy and sadness, for the period still available for the purpose was so short, that he despaired of bringing this negotiation, *in extremis*, to any good issue, and he feared moreover that the official note would create an effect most prejudicial to his efforts.

Offended at the official note, M. de Metternich was in the highest degree astonished, when, a few minutes after the two French plenipotentiaries had left him, M. de Coulaincourt returned to make to him Napoleon's secret communication. It arrived at so late a moment, and he was so accustomed to despair that Napoleon would ever be inclined to enter upon a course leading to peace, that he could scarcely believe that he was now sincere, and for this reason alone failed to experience and to manifest that pleasure on the occasion, which he otherwise would have had. He expressed his regret that this step had not been taken some days earlier, as in that case, without violating the secrecy which Napoleon insisted should be observed with respect to this secret communi-

cation, it would have been possible to sound the Prussian and Russian plenipotentiaries with respect to certain delicate points, and to settle the questions on which the belligerent courts were at issue. However, as Napoleon desired to be informed by the Austrian Cabinet of the conditions which she was prepared to support, and the adoption of which by Prussia and Russia she was ready to demand, he would go, he said, to consult his master, and would be able, he hoped, within twenty-four hours to give a reply.

M. de Metternich proceeded accordingly to Brandeiss, where the Emperor Francis was at present residing, found him as indignant, as everyone had been at Prague, at the official note of the 6th of August, and inspired him with a feeling of astonishment, which was at least equal to his indignation, by making him acquainted with the unexpected step taken by the principal French plenipotentiary. Although the character of this proceeding was perfectly in accordance with Napoleon's brusque and undisciplined character, it was yet impossible but that a step towards peace made by him thus at the last extremity should be regarded with suspicion. But whether it were made in good faith or simply as a *ruse*, both the Emperor Francis and his minister at once agreed that it was necessary to reply to his demand without hesitation, since if he really desired peace, it was right to come to a frank explanation with him, and if his purpose were only to provoke some inadmissible proposition, it was of importance to frustrate this project by submitting to him those conditions to which Austria had so long adhered, and which, certainly, France could not regard as dishonorable.

They were, as we have already so frequently said, the division of the grand duchy of Warsaw, and the bestowal of the larger portion of it upon Prussia; the abolition of the Confederation of the Rhine; and the re-establishment of the Hanseatic towns; and, finally, the restoration of Illyria to Austria. The fulfilment of these conditions was so absolutely necessary, if Germany was to be re-endowed with any portion of independence, that it was impossible to devise or propose any others; and, therefore, as the adhesion of Prussia and Russia to those bases was quite certain, whilst it was equally certain that the renunciation of Spain by Napoleon, and the re-establishment of the Hanseatic towns would so far satisfy England as to render her unwilling to continue the war alone, it was resolved to communicate these conditions to Napoleon, who was already well acquainted with them, and with the same stipulation for secrecy, which he had himself made, to demand an answer within forty-eight hours.

M. de Metternich returned to Prague on the 7th, but was

suddenly recalled to Brandeiss by his master, who was all at once seized with a feeling of disinclination to carry on these secret communications. After a fresh examination of the subject, however, M. de Metternich proceeded to convey to M. de Coulaincourt the answer which had been agreed on, telling him that his, M. de Metternich's, master had demanded whether this unexpected and tardy communication now made by Napoleon was a step of necessity, or of fraud; that it pleased him to imagine that it was the former, but that in either case he considered it right to answer it, since the conditions which he proposed were such as might freely be avowed to the whole world, and especially to France. He then made, verbally, the following declaration, authorising the French minister to transcribe it immediately from his dictation.

*Instructions to the Count de Metternich, signed by the
Emperor of Austria.*

"M. de Metternich will require an assurance from the Duke of Vicentia, on his word of honour, that his government will preserve the most profound secrecy with respect to the matter in question.

"Having become acquainted, by means of confidential preliminary communications, with the conditions on which the courts of Russia and Prussia are prepared to negotiate a peace, and having accepted these conditions as my own, because I perceive that they are necessary to the well being of my states and those of the other powers, and that they are the only ones which could really lead to a general peace, I do not hesitate to declare the terms which form my *ultimatum*.

"I shall expect an answer either in the affirmative or negative on the 10th.

"I am resolved, as are also the courts of Russia and Prussia, to declare, on the 11th, that the Congress is dissolved, and that I unite my forces with those of the Allies for the purpose of obtaining a peace compatible with the interests of all the powers; and I now declare in brief the final conditions which, if not now accepted, must be referred to the decision of arms.

No proposal made after the 11th can have any connection with the present negotiation.

*The conditions regarded by Austria as those on which it would
be possible to arrange a peace.*

"The dissolution of the duchy of Warsaw, and its re-division between Austria, Russia, and Prussia; Dantzic being accorded to Prussia.

“The re-establishment of Hambourg and Lubeck as free Hanseatic towns; and an arrangement to be eventually come to as one of the terms of a general peace, with respect to the other portions of the 32nd military division, and the renunciation of the Protectorate of the Confederation of the Rhine, so that the independence of all the actual sovereigns of Germany should be guaranteed by all the great powers.

“The reconstruction of Prussia with a tenable frontier on the Elbe.

“The cession of the Illyrian provinces to Austria. A reciprocal guarantee that the possessions of the greater and lesser states, as settled by the terms of the peace, should severally suffer no injury or alteration at the hands of any of them.”

After this highly important communication, which confounds all the falsehoods which, in certain quarters, have been set forth upon the subject, M. de Metternich made some explanations, which were also of great moment. He said that up to the evening of the 10th of August, Austria would remain free from any engagement with the belligerent powers; that up to that time she would be able to treat confidentially with Napoleon, as she had hitherto; be free to adopt some of his propositions, and even compel their acceptance by the allies, to whom she was at present bound by no treaty; but that after that time she would be so bound; would be compelled to communicate to them every proposition which might be made to them, and be able only to accept such conditions of peace, as they should be willing to receive.

These observations deserved the most serious attention, for the difference between negotiating before the close of the 10th of August, and after that time was, that in the former case we should have to depend only on Austria, who longed for peace because it feared war; and in the latter case, we should have to depend on the will of the Allies, who were averse to peace, because they expected to obtain more from war, and were under the sway of the passionate influences of the time.

The Duke of Vicentia reported with great exactness the communication which had been thus made to him, and, at the same time, renewed his remonstrances in words which were as well chosen as they were touching.

“Sire,” he said, addressing Napoleon, “this peace will cost you, perhaps, some pain to your vanity, but will detract nothing from your glory—for it will take nothing from the real greatness of France. Grant then, I conjure you, this peace to France; grant it in consideration of her sufferings, of the noble devotion she feels towards you, and of the stern neces-

sities of the moment. Allow time for the subsidence of the fever of irritation against us with which at present all Europe is convulsed, and which even the most decisive victories in our favour would rather still further excite than calm. And this demand for peace I make, not for the mere honour of signing it, but because I am certain that in concluding it you would perform an act than which nothing could be more useful to your country, or more worthy of yourself and your exalted reputation!" What was to be the effect of these noble prayers of a noble heart we shall hereafter see!

Napoleon received M. de Metternich's reply at three o'clock in the afternoon of the 9th, and should have sent his own answer on the evening of the same day, submitting to the very moderate sacrifices demanded of him and forwarding at the same time such powers to M. de Coulaingcourt as would enable him to sign the basis of peace before midnight of the 10th. But, unfortunately, he did not take this step, for regarding, in the first place, the determination expressed by Austria of joining the Allies on the 11th, as mere diplomatic language intended to intimidate him, and hasten his movements; being unwilling, in the next place, to avoid war at the price of such sacrifices as those which were demanded of him, and placing, also, a blind confidence in the strength of his arms, he was in no haste to adopt or communicate his final resolutions, and thus neglected to take advantage of that moment which, in a political sense, was the most important of his reign. And what was M. de Bassano's course during those fatal hours? Did he not pass them at his master's feet, repeating with his utmost energy the ardent, the patriotic prayers of M. de Coulaingcourt.

It was not to such prayers as these, but to echoes only of his own thoughts, that Napoleon listened during the hours which were to bear away with them his greatness and ours! After having passed the night with M. de Bassano in considering and reconsidering the state of his armies, he became convinced that he was powerful enough to meet every danger, and to persist in his own views. He resolved, therefore, to consent only to the following conditions:—He was willing that a portion or even the whole, if Russia and Austria were willing to resign it to her, of the Grand-Duchy of Warsaw should be annexed to Prussia; but as, whilst thus granting her some increase of territory, he was most unwilling that she should be rewarded for what he called her treason; he was anxious to drive her back beyond the Oder, to take from her, for the purpose of bestowing them upon Saxony, Brandenburg, Berlin, and Potsdam, to remove her to a position between the Oder and the Vistula, to make her thus

a Polish rather than a German power; to permit her to choose as her capital either Warsaw or Königsberg, and, withholding Dantzic from her, to make of it once more a free town. He wished to place Saxony in the position Prussia at present held between the Oder and the Elbe, and to bestow upon the former kingdom all the territory extending from Dresden to Berlin. With respect to Lubeck, Hamburg, and Bremen, considering these cities as essential portions of the Empire, he would not even speak of their separation from it. He was equally resolved not to resign the Protectorate of the Confederation of the Rhine; since it was acknowledged that it was a mere title, and his enemies desired to deprive him of it only for the purpose of humiliating him. With respect to Illyria he was ready to yield it to Austria, but was at the same time determined to retain Trieste, which was all that Austria really coveted. He affected, also, to be resolved to keep in his own hands several positions beyond the Julian Alps, such as Villach and Goritz, and, in fact, all the gates through which a descent might be made into Illyria.

Such were the propositions which were the result of the meditations of this fatal night. But as, however, there was no probability that Austria would be able to obtain of her future allies the abandonment of Berlin on the part of Prussia, for the purpose of annexing it to Saxony, and thus forming of this latter kingdom a species of feigned Prussia, he authorised M. de Coulaincourt to give up this first proposition, should it not be accepted, and to consent that Prussia should possess, besides such part of the Duchy of Warsaw as should be granted to her, all the territory which she held between the Oder and the Elbe.

On the morning of the 10th, Napoleon sent for M. de Bubna, who was sincerely anxious for the conclusion of a peace, and who, unfortunately, from a desire to conciliate him, lent himself somewhat too readily to the views of his powerful interlocutor. Having informed him of the secret negotiations carried on with M. de Metternich, Napoleon communicated to him the state of his troops, openly displayed to him the strong inclination he felt to make this campaign of Saxony, his confidence that its results would be in his favour, and his consequent carelessness as to whether peace or war should be the result of the negotiations at Prague. He then proceeded to lay before the Austrian minister his conditions, to which the latter could not, of course, assent, but to which he did not object with sufficient peremptoriness to dispel the illusions entertained by Napoleon. On two points especially, those of the Hanseatic Towns, and the Confederation of the Rhine, as he had never found his Court so

resolved with respect to them as to the others, he now appeared very undecided, and Napoleon indulged in the hope that he might be able to conclude a peace without submitting to those two conditions which he found so especially repugnant.

Having dismissed M. de Bubna with directions to communicate to his Court the particulars of the above interview, he sent a dispatch to M. de Coulaincourt containing his final resolutions; caring little for the fact that this dispatch could not reach its destination until the 11th, and, whilst awaiting its answer, whatever it might be, continuing his preparations for the renewal of hostilities.

The 10th of August passed, therefore, at Prague, without the arrival of any dispatch from Dresden, to the great satisfaction of the Prussian and Russian negotiators, the great grief of M. de Coulaincourt, and the great regret of M. de Metternich, who could not but tremble at the prospect of a fresh war between Austria and France. Several times in the course of the day he visited M. de Coulaincourt for the purpose of learning whether any reply had been received from Dresden, and each time, finding M. de Coulaincourt sad and silent, because he had nothing to say, he repeated that, as soon as midnight should have passed, Austria would no longer be an arbitrator, but one of the belligerent powers, and no longer able, consequently, to dictate to the Allies conditions of peace.

After having vainly waited during the whole of the 10th, M. de Metternich signed, at length, Austria's adhesion to the coalition, and, on the morning of the 11th, announced to MM. de Coulaincourt and Narbonne (the latter of whom had remained in ignorance of the secret negotiation)—announced, we say, with evident chagrin, that the Congress of Prague was dissolved, and that Austria, impelled to do so by the duty she owed to Germany and to herself, found herself forced to declare war against France. At the same time, the Prussian and Russian Plenipotentiaries announced that they were about to depart, throwing the responsibility of the failure of the negotiations upon France; and left Prague accordingly with an undissembled joy, which was shared by all Austria; the only exceptions being in the case of M. de Metternich, who foresaw the possible consequences of a fresh rupture with Napoleon, and of the Emperor Francis, who was full of anxiety on account of his child.

In the course of the 11th, M. de Coulaincourt received at length the dispatch so earnestly expected on the previous evening, and although he could not flatter himself with the expectation that he should be able to obtain all that

Napoleon desired, he thought it not impossible that even now he might be able to procure a certain degree of assent to his propositions. Hastening to the Austrian minister, he found him distressed that the dispatch had not arrived sooner, vexed that M. de Bubna should have been made acquainted with the secret negotiation, and convinced that Napoleon's propositions could not be accepted; but at the same time disposed to admit, that if France should agree to the views of Austria, with respect to the restoration of Trieste, the re-establishment of Prussia, and the abolition of the protectorate of the Rhine; it might be possible to defer the decision of the question of the Hanseatic towns, until the conclusion of peace with England. He added, however, that although Austria would have been able twenty-four hours earlier to have imposed those conditions on the Allies, it could now only propose them, and could not be at all certain that they would be accepted.

As the Congress was now broken up, and war was formally declared by Austria against France, the Russian and Prussian plenipotentiaries left Prague, and the French plenipotentiaries could not with propriety remain there. It was agreed, however, that if Napoleon should consent, M. de Narbonne should be allowed to depart alone, and that M. de Coulaincourt should remain to await the result of the overtures which M. de Metternich was to make to the Sovereigns of Prussia and Russia, who were to arrive at Prague within two or three days. It could not but be very disagreeable to M. de Coulaincourt, to prolong his residence in Prague, at a time when the Emperor Alexander would be also there, and circumstances would render it impossible that they should meet. But as everything which could afford a chance of the conclusion of a peace appeared to him to be not only supportable, but even highly desirable, he willingly consented to remain. Informing Napoleon of what had taken place between himself and the Austrian minister, he repeated his representations in favour of peace, urged him to grant him some latitude in conducting the negotiations, and to send him authentic powers for the signature of any agreement which might be made, since at this last moment the least defect in any matter of form might be regarded as a fresh pretext, and cause his, M. de Coulaincourt's definitive dismissal.

These communications reached Napoleon at the time when he was fully prepared for war, and as little distressed as surprised at the dissolution of the Congress. On the very day on which the Congress had been dissolved, the armistice had been denounced by the commissioners of the belligerent

powers—a measure which fixed the 17th August as the day on which hostilities were to be resumed ; and as there was but a very slight probability that the negotiations broken off in this public manner could be resumed by means of any private communications, Napoleon acted as though he had no expectation that they would. However, whilst ordering M. de Narbonne to leave Prague immediately, he authorised M. de Coulaincourt to remain there, and consented that his last propositions should be transmitted to Prussia and Russia, and not in his own name, but in that of Austria, since he did not consider it, he said, consistent with his dignity to submit propositions to the belligerent powers. He sent M. de Coulaincourt the formal powers he had requested, but refrained from granting him any latitude in conducting the negotiations, his conditions being unalterable with respect to the Hanseatic Towns, the protectorate of the Rhine, and even Trieste, which he wished to retain, notwithstanding the restoration of Illyria to Austria.

On the 10th of August he celebrated his fête, which was usually held on the 15th, and endeavoured, so far as possible, to preserve the light and facile spirits of his troops from the oppression of gloomy images. His corps d'armée were all prepared, and from the 11th began to leave their cantonments for the purpose of becoming concentrated under their appointed leaders, and advancing to their several positions on the line of battle. The works which he had ordered to be executed at Koenigstein, Lilienstein, Dresden, Torgau, Wittenberg, Magdebourg, Werben, and Hambourg, were completed, or nearly so ; and the vast stores of provisions which he had had conveyed by the Elbe from Hambourg to Magdebourg, and from Magdebourg to Dresden, were already at the required points. He determined that he would himself set out on the 15th or 16th of August, when he would proceed to Silesia and the frontier of Bohemia, where he expected to see the commencement of hostilities. In the meantime he wrote to General Rapp, at Dantsic, reassuring him with respect to this new struggle, conferring on him extraordinary powers, recommending him to defend the fortress entrusted to his charge to the utmost, and promising to release it from blockade almost immediately. To the Governors of Glogau, Custrin, and Stettin, he wrote in similar terms ; and to Marshal Davout, at Hambourg, and General Lemarois, at Magdebourg, that they were to be on their guard, that the war was about to recommence in terrible earnest ; but that he was prepared to meet all his enemies, even though they should include Austria, and that he hoped, before three months were over, to have punished

them for their impertinent propositions. He did not, however, for he dared not, tell to any one on what terms he might have concluded a peace; but contented himself with intimating to the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, who was the real head of the Government of the Regency, that he would speedily be informed of the Austrian demands; that for the moment it was necessary to keep them secret, but that they were in the highest degree extravagant and offensive. To the Duke of Rovigo, whom he respected somewhat less, he ventured to tell a downright lie on this subject, writing to him that his opponents wished to deprive him of Venice; founding this untruth, apparently, on his usual declaration, that to demand Trieste was to demand Venice, which was as true as it would be to say, that to demand Magdebourg was to demand Mayence, because the one is on the road to the other. Being anxious to preserve the Empress from anxiety, he directed the Arch-Chancellor to make her set out for Cherbourg, in order that she might not become informed of the renewal of hostilities until after some great battle had been gained, and the greatest dangers had passed by.

At this moment arrived in Dresden one of those of his lieutenants, whom Napoleon found most useful on the battlefield—namely, the King of Naples, whose presence at this time was desirable, as well with respect to matters of war, as with reference to politics. We have seen how, weary of Napoleon's yoke and alarmed, also, with respect to the fate of the Imperial dynasty, Murat had taken care to attach himself to Austria and her mediatorial policy, and that, distrusting even his wife, he had ended by concealing himself from her, and had fallen into a state of febrile agitation. We have seen, also, that Napoleon, for the purpose of completing the army of Italy, and making trial of the good faith of the Neapolitan court, had demanded of it a division of its troops, and that Murat, carrying on an intrigue with Austria, and anxious, moreover, to keep his own army in his own hands, had refused compliance with his brother-in-law's request. When, however, Napoleon, in accordance with his usual mode of operations, summoned Murat to comply with his requisitions under pain of a declaration of war, Murat, tormented with doubts with respect to Napoleon's destiny, had fallen into a state of perplexity which was little removed from madness, but was ultimately induced by the counsels of his wife and the letters of the Duke of Otranto, with whom he was once more in secret correspondence, to obey his brother-in-law's commands: and as he was anxious that the reconciliation, if it were to take place at all, should be complete, he set out to place himself at the head of the

cavalry of the grand army, and arrived in Dresden on the eve of the commencement of the campaign. Napoleon received him graciously, feigning to ignore the past, but still permitting himself to express a certain degree of contempt for his conduct, which Murat perceived very plainly, and in silence.

Accompanied by Murat, then, Napoleon set out on the night of the 15th August for Bautzen, so as to be at the advanced posts twenty-four hours before the recommencement of hostilities, and evidently without any expectation that peace would result from the united efforts of MM. de Coulaïncourt and Metternich. The French plenipotentiary could, in fact, only offer but very unsatisfactory propositions, since Napoleon had persisted in almost all his pretensions; but yet, had Austria been still free she would probably have yielded to them, in preference to braving the chances of war for the sake of Trieste and Hambourg, the latter of which places was of far greater moment to Prussia and England than to herself. Unfortunately, however, she was no longer free to act as she chose, being able only to tender her advice to her allies, and no longer able to threaten them with the refusal of her alliance should they reject it; and M. de Metternich, discussing the subject with more than usual freedom, and under the influence of evidently sincere feelings of regret, showed very plainly that he despaired of compliance on the part of the Allies.

It was agreed that as soon as the Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia should have arrived in Prague, M. de Metternich should submit to them in the name of his master, the overtures in question, and give a reply to them before the 17th of August. In the meantime it was arranged, for the purpose of giving an air of propriety to the position of the Duke of Vicentia, who was uniformly treated with the respect which was his due, that he should await M. de Metternich's reply at the Chateau de Kœnigsal, situated near Prague, and belonging to the Emperor Francis. He would thus be relieved from the necessity of actually residing in the same town with the Emperor Alexander, and of witnessing the demonstrations of joy with which the Allies received the news of the approach of hostilities and the adhesion of Austria to the European coalition.

From the 11th of August a portion of the Prussian and Russian staffs had begun to arrive in Prague, for the purpose of concerting military operations with that of the Austrian army. At the same time an army of a hundred thousand Prussians and Russians entered Bohemia for the purpose of joining the Austrian troops; and the officers of the three

countries embracing each other, uttered exclamations of joy, because they were about to fight, side by side, in what they called the cause of European liberty. In all directions, indeed, there prevailed what may be called a convulsive gladness, for it was a feeling compounded of hope, of fear, and the resolution of despair.

On the 15th the Emperor Alexander made his entry into Prague, and was received there with the honours due to his rank, and to that position as the liberator of Europe, which was universally accorded to him by all except the Austrian Government, which was offended at the enthusiastic demonstrations of which he was the object; and which was by no means disposed to exchange the domination of France for that of Russia. As soon as he had arrived M. de Metternich and the Emperor Francis informed him of the secret negotiation which had arisen from the official negotiation during the last days of the Congress of Prague, and demanded his opinion with respect to it.

Intoxicated with success, and an ambition which he was resolved to satisfy at any risk, and at any expense of conciliatory demonstrations towards his allies both new and old, the young Russian Emperor affected an air of great humility, and with every testimony of respect for the Emperor Francis, and without hinting at any desire for the dethronement of Napoleon, which would involve that of Marie Louise, intimated a hope that he would be speedily able by means of his arms to obtain better conditions than those at present offered, and an independence for Germany which should be infinitely better guaranteed. He was able, moreover, to bring forward a reason which could not fail to be all powerful with Austria; and this was, that if the abandonment of the Hansatic Towns by Napoleon were not insisted upon, it would be impossible to obtain the adhesion of England, with whom they were bound in strict alliance; and in addition to this reason he was also able to dazzle the eyes of the Austrian Government with a very seducing bait in the form of the possibility that, should the Allies be victorious, it might regain a portion of Italy. Consequently, without awaiting the arrival of the King of Prussia, Alexander replied in writing to M. de Coulaingcourt, through the hands of M. de Metternich, that their Majesties the Sovereign Allies, after having duly conferred with each other, considering that any genuine idea of peace could only be such as was consistent with that plan for a general pacification which their Majesties had hoped to mature by means of the negotiations of Prague, could not regard the articles now proposed by His Majesty the Emperor Napoleon as

likely to conduce to the great end which they had in view, and that, consequently, their Majesties considered them unacceptable. A statement which was equivalent to a declaration that they considered them unacceptable in respect to England.

Although expecting this reply M. de Coulaincourt was much distressed on receiving it; his good sense leading him to expect that the greatest evil must result from the continuance of the war; and in a final interview with M. de Metternich he exchanged expressions of regret with that minister at the course of events; but at the same time agreed with him, that it might be possible to open a congress even during the progress of actual hostilities. Writing to M. de Bassano, he expressed in bitter terms his indignation at having been employed in an altogether illusory negotiation, and on meeting Napoleon, displayed respectfully, but firmly, his serious distress that this last opportunity of concluding a peace should have been neglected.

Such was this celebrated and unfortunate negotiation with Austria, which, commenced as it was under the influence of the most disastrous illusions, was conducted with a want of tact which, when we consider the natural keenness of Napoleon's intellect, can only be explained as being the result of passion.

And now the roar of the cannons was heard along a line of one hundred and fifty leagues in extent, stretching from Kœnigstein to Hambourg; and Napoleon, aroused by the clamour of arms, speedily forgot in the consideration of the vast military plans from which he expected far more effectual results, the meetings and messages of diplomatists. We have now reached the point in our narrative at which it will be advisable to examine the plan and the nature of the force with which he was prepared to enter upon the second part of the campaign of Saxony; but to enable us to enter upon this inquiry with the greater readiness, it will be necessary in the first place to consider what were the plan and forces of his enemies.

It will be remembered that it had been agreed by the Allies at Trachenberg, that three principal armies should march against Napoleon, acting on the offensive, but with great caution; and that that one of the three against which Napoleon might direct his own movements should slacken its march, whilst the two others should endeavour to throw themselves on his flank and rear, and crush the lieutenants to whom he should have entrusted their defence. These three armies, which were to be severally, the Bohemian, the Silesian, and the army of the North, would number, it

was hoped, including the Italian and Bavarian corps, five hundred and seventy-five thousand active troops, accompanied by one thousand five hundred pieces of cannon, without taking into account two hundred and fifty thousand men who were to form a reserve, stationed at various points in Bohemia, Poland, and Old Prussia. And these enormous numbers had now been almost realized, for the armistice of Pleiswitz, in addition to its having been the means of leading Austria to join them, had enabled the Allies to double the number of their troops.

The forces of the Coalition had been distributed as follows. About one hundred and twenty thousand troops, half of whom were veterans, were posted in Bohemia at the foot of the mountains which separate this province from Saxony, and ready to penetrate their defiles. Seventy thousand Russians under Barclay de Tolly, and sixty thousand Prussians under General Kleist, had passed, as soon as war had been declared by Austria against France, from Silesia into Bohemia, and formed with the Austrian troops the great army which was intended to turn the French position at Dresden by a march into Saxony. The *point de mire* of this army, which was called the Bohemian army, was Leipsic, and the Allies supposed that it would be impossible for Napoleon, attacked in front on the Elbe by two other armies, to resist so formidable an assault as that which they were prepared to make on his rear with two hundred and fifty thousand men. Out of deference towards Austria, and in accordance with the plan of conciliating her as much as possible, the command-in-chief of the army of Bohemia was entrusted to Prince Schwarzenberg, who had negotiated the marriage of Marie Louise, had commanded the Austrian auxiliary corps in 1812, and had been but recently sent on a mission to Paris; and who was somewhat embarrassed by having filled offices of so opposite a character, as well as much terrified at the idea of encountering such an opponent as Napoleon, although he had spoken much in the Aulic Council of the weakness of the French army, and consoled himself for the annoyances of any false position by the pleasures of gratified pride. It was indeed a distinguished honour for him to be entrusted with so great a command in the presence of the Allied Sovereigns; and to a certain extent he was not unworthy of it; for he was prudent, had some experience in warfare on a large scale, and was endowed with a tact which qualified him for dealing with the various elements which composed the Coalition.

To the flattery of the Austrian Court involved in this

appointment, was added another act of respect, which was equally well calculated to gratify it. By a secret article of the *traité de subsides* concluded with the British Government at Reichenbach, it had been agreed that it should be afforded certain pecuniary assistance should it take part in the war, and Lord Cathcart, who had already arrived in Prague, had already drawn bills upon London for the purpose of supplying it as speedily as possible with the financial resources which it required.

Next to this, the principal army, came that of Silesia, which was composed of the Russian corps of Generals Langeron and St. Priest, amounting together to more than forty thousand men, the Prussian corps of General d'York, which numbered almost thirty-eight thousand men, and, lastly, another Russian corps, of some seventeen or eighteen thousand men under General Sacken. This army, commanded by the impetuous Blucher, and numbering almost a hundred thousand men, was to cross the boundary line which had separated, during the armistice, the hostile forces, to pass the Kазbach and the Bober, and to drive us back upon Bautzen, should Napoleon himself not be in the field in that direction. Blucher was strongly recommended to act with the greatest prudence; but surrounded as he was by the most ardent Prussian officers, besides having as the chief of his staff, General Gneisenau, a man of an excitable and impulsive temperament, he was not accompanied by persons in the least likely to remind him of these wise instructions.

The army of the North assembled around Berlin was the third of the active armies, and was to be commanded by the Prince Royal of Sweden, numbering altogether about one hundred and fifty thousand men of all nations: it comprised, twenty-five thousand Swedes and Germans under General Steding; eighteen thousand Russians under Prince Woronzow; ten thousand light horse, partly Cossacks, under Wintzingerode; forty thousand Prussians, under General Bulow; thirty thousand more Prussians, under General Tauenzien, the latter being intended, more especially, to blockade fortresses; and finally a mixed body of twenty-five thousand troops under General Walmoden, composed of Englishmen, Hanoverians, Germans, men from the Hanseatic Towns and from all the provinces subject to our rule. One portion of this numerous army was to remain before the fortresses of Dantsic, Custrin, and Stettin, whilst another was to watch Hambourg, and a third, which was to be the most considerable one, and numbered eighty thousand men, was to move upon Magdebourg, pass the Elbe there, if possible,

and threaten Napoleon's left flank ; the army of Bohemia at the same time threatening his right.

To these three active armies, which numbered five hundred thousand men, and were accompanied by fifteen hundred pieces of cannon, were added a body of twenty-five thousand troops, intended to watch Bavaria ; and another of fifty thousand which was to make head against Prince Eugene on the side of Italy. And we may here mention, that whilst Austria attached but little importance to what took place in this latter region, considering, and with reason, that the fate of the world would be determined on the Elbe between Dresden, Bautzen, Magdebourg, and Leipsic, she nevertheless considered it quite possible that Prince Eugene's troops might enter her capital, and removed from it, therefore, what it contained of value in the way of archives, arms, and objects of art.

To the troops above enumerated must be added the reserves which Austria possessed to the amount of sixty thousand men, between Presbourg, Vienna, and Lintz ; the Russian troops, to the number of one hundred thousand men, under General Benningsen, and Prince Labanoff, in Poland ; and the ninety thousand Prussian recruits who had now completed their drill.

We may now judge how far Napoleon had been in error, when he accepted the armistice of Pleiswitz, which he had signed, in the first place, in compliance with the urgent entreaties of the Austrian Court, and because he believed that whilst the two months during which it lasted, would enable him to increase his armies by two hundred thousand men, they would have the effect of swelling the ranks of the Allies by only half that number. The contrary had been the result ; for whilst he had but added one hundred and fifty thousand men to his troops, the Coalition had added to theirs, if we include the Austrian forces, almost four hundred thousand. He had not failed, however, to make active and admirable use of these two months, and his plans were well calculated to defeat those of his enemies.

The position of the Elbe had been selected by Napoleon, as we have already stated, as the best, and, indeed, the only advantageous one. Dresden, as well fortified as it could be since its walls had been thrown down, was to be the centre point of his operations, and his principal establishment. Seven or eight leagues to his right, at the point where the Elbe flows through the mountains of Bohemia into Saxony, he possessed the fortified posts of Kœnigstein and Lilienstein, together with a solid bridge and magazines, which enabled him to manœuvre at will on either bank of the river. On his left at Torgau, fifteen leagues below Dresden, he had fortified works, provisions, and bridges ; and the same at

Wittenberg and Magdebourg; the latter being a vast fortress, regularly fortified, in which he had placed, besides a great mass of ammunition and provisions, all the sick and wounded of the spring campaign. The improvised post of Werben protected the gap between Magdebourg and Hambourg; and, lastly, Hambourg covered the lower Elbe. It was, doubtless, possible for the enemy to cross the Elbe between Magdebourg and Hambourg, because the space between these two places was but imperfectly defended by the works at Werben; but this was an enterprise which no enemy could accomplish so long as the great army commanded by Napoleon in person, should not have lost its *point d'appui* of Dresden.

Divining the projects of the enemy as thoroughly as though he had been present at the Trachenberg conferences, Napoleon had perceived very clearly that he would have to encounter three separate armies: one on his right in Bohemia, one in front in Silesia, and one on his left, threatening the Elbe, between Magdebourg and Hambourg; and the arrangements which he had made to meet those several attacks, were such as left nothing to desire. The new corps of Marshal St. Cyr, numbering thirty thousand men, and composed of four divisions, had been recently brought from Mayence to Dresden, and was now posted at Königsstein, on the left bank of the Elbe, in such a manner as to close the avenues by which the chief army of the Allies might descend from Bohemia into Saxony, on our rear. The corps of General Vandamme, which also numbered thirty thousand men, detached from the army of Marshal Davout, and brought from Hambourg to Dresden, had been posted above the corps of Marshal St. Cyr, but beyond the Elbe, so as to guard on the right of this river, the defiles of the mountains of Bohemia opening into Lusatia. Somewhat further in Lusatia, but still at the foot of the mountains of Bohemia, at the defile of Zittau, were posted the corps of Poniatowski and that of Marshal Victor, the formation of which had been completed during the suspension of arms. Finally, still further, in Silesia, on the line which had divided the belligerent troops during the armistice, on the Katzbach and the Bober, were the four corps of Macdonald (the 11th), of Lauriston (the 5th), of Ney (the 3rd), of Marmont (the 6th), numbering together a hundred thousand men. In the rear, close to Bautzen, were the Imperial Guard, which had been raised during the armistice from twelve to forty-eight thousand men, and the three cavalry corps of reserve of Generals Latour-Maubourg, Sebastiani, and Kellerman, composed of twenty-four thousand well mounted troops.

On the left, three corps, those of Oudinot (the 12th), of Bertrand (the 4th), of Reynier (the 7th), were charged with the task of opposing the army of the North, commanded by Bernadotte.

His troops having been thus posted, Napoleon resolved to prepare in the following manner for all the eventualities of this formidable campaign. The army of the Prince of Schwarzenberg, which was by much the most numerous and the one which threatened our right flank, might descend by two paths—namely, in our rear by the great Peterswalde route, or in front of us by the road leading from Bohemia into Lusatia and passing through the Zittau defile. It could only approach by one of these two paths, and Napoleon was equally prepared for its appearance by either. Marshal St. Cyr with his four divisions occupied on this side of the Elbe the Peterswalde causeway; one of his divisions being *de garde* at the bridge thrown across between the rocks of Kœnigstein and Lilienstein, whilst two others occupied the *camp de Pirna*, which commanded the great Peterswalde road, and the fourth with General Pajol's light cavalry, watched all the inferior roads by which the Dresden position might be turned. Should the enemy, therefore, attempt to descend on the rear of Dresden, either for the purpose of attacking that city or of moving upon Leipzig, Marshal St. Cyr, after having taken due advantage of the facilities offered by the nature of the ground to delay the march of the Allies as much as possible, would throw garrisons into the forts of Kœnigstein and Lilienstein, and then fall back upon Dresden, when there was every reason to suppose that he would be able to maintain his ground for at least a few days in an entrenched camp already sedulously prepared. In any case, arrangements had been made so as to provide him with prompt and decided support; for within forty-eight hours, General Vandamme would be able to carry to his aid his three divisions severally posted at Stolpen, Rumbourg, and Bautzen; and in forty-eight hours more, that is four days after the appearance of the enemy, Napoleon himself would be able to march to Dresden from Gœrlitz with forty-eight thousand men of the Guard, twenty-four thousand of the cavalry reserve, and twenty-four thousand of the corps of Marshal Victor, and thus raise the number of our troops at Dresden to some one hundred and seventy thousand.

Should the enemy, on the other hand, descend from Bohemia into Lusatia, not on this side of the Elbe but beyond it; not in Napoleon's rear but in front of him; and debouch by Zittau upon Gœrlitz or Bautzen, the same arrangements would render a prompt concentration of troops equally easy.

Napoleon had resolved to post at the Zittau defile, Poniatowski's corps, which numbered twelve thousand men, ready to support the corps of Marshal Victor, whose troops it would raise to thirty thousand, posted in a strong and carefully selected position; when, within twelve hours they could be joined by the cavalry which were at Gorkitz, and the division Vandamme which was at Rumbourg; and where, within twelve hours more they could also be joined by Vandamme's two other divisions, and one of the four corps established on the Bober.

Should neither of the two hypotheses, however, in respect to which these precautions were taken, be realized, and should the army of Bohemia, leaving a corps in Bohemia, join its principal mass to that of Silesia, and attack us in front with two hundred and fifty thousand men on the Bober, the four corps of Ney, Lauriston, Marmont, and Macdonald, forming a total of one hundred thousand men, might either maintain their ground on the Bober, or fall back on the Neisse and the Spree, and be there reinforced by the Guard, the cavalry reserve, and the troops under Victor, Poniatowski, and Vandamme. And thus, in the event of the realisation of the third proposition, which was the only imaginable one after the other two, we should meet the enemy with a force equal to his own, even without making use of the troops under Marshal St. Cyr.

There still remained, indeed, one other hypothesis, for which Napoleon had purposely refrained from taking any precautionary measures, and this was, that the enemy determining to turn him in a still bolder manner, should descend by the Leipsic route, and daringly endeavour to place themselves between the grand army and the Rhine. This was an hypothesis which caused Napoleon little anxiety, and at which, indeed, he smiled. "*It is not from the Rhine, but from the Elbe,*" he observed with rare penetration, "*that I have to take care that I am not cut off.*" The enemy, he said, who should venture to advance between him and the Rhine, would never return; whilst the hostile army, which should succeed in establishing itself between him and the Elbe, would cut him off from his real base of operations. Who, indeed, would dare to march upon the Rhine, leaving Napoleon behind him unvanquished and at the head of four hundred thousand troops?

Having thus prepared on his right and front, to meet the two armies of Bohemia and Silesia, Napoleon had also made preparations on his left for holding in check the army of the North, and also for accomplishing an object which he considered of great importance; and which was

to enter the capital of Prussia in triumph, in the person of one of his lieutenants, and to exact there a vengeance which, avoiding cruelty, should be of the most humiliating nature to the public feeling of Germany. He had directed Marshal Oudinot to march, with his own corps, those of Generals Bertrand and Reynier, and the cavalry reserve of the Duke of Padua, from Luckau upon Berlin; and as this force, which was about sixty-five or sixty-six thousand strong, might be reinforced *en route* by General Girard, who was posted in advance at Magdebourg, with about eight or ten thousand men of the garrison of that place and five thousand of the division Dombrowski, it would number nearly eighty thousand men, and have nothing to fear, either from the skill or the forces of the Prince Royal of Sweden, who could not bring actually on the field of battle more than ninety thousand men; and who, moreover, would soon have to face another formidable enemy in the person of Marshal Davout, who was ready to issue from Hambourg at the head of twenty-five thousand French and ten thousand Danish troops, and threaten Berlin by Mecklenberg, whilst Oudinot should advance towards it by Lusatia. There was the greatest probability, therefore, that Napoleon, whilst holding in check in his front and right the gigantic forces of the Coalition, would be able to enter Berlin by his left, and thus have the opportunity of punishing Prussia for her desertion, and the Prince of Sweden for his treason, and of effecting a communication with his garrison on the Oder and the Vistula;—a result which would be, doubtless, of the most illustrious nature, and might well inflame Napoleon's imagination; but the movement which he had directed to be made by his left, was of a very extended one: the various corps by whom it was to be executed, were widely distant from each other, and their co-operation depended upon a number of circumstances which could scarcely result without exception in our favour. His generals, without having lost their wonted courage, had yet lost that feeling of confidence which is so powerful an ally in critical situations; his troops were young and mixed and Bernadotte's troops, whom they would have to encounter in the field, although of various nationalities, were bound together by that most powerful of all ties, a common feeling. When we add that, should one of his lieutenants be vanquished, he would have to march a considerable distance to his aid, we must admit that at this point, and this only, Napoleon's skilful plan was faulty.

A natural result of the defect here pointed out was, that the four corps which guarded his front in advance of the

Elbe, were removed too far from Dresden. From the banks of the Bober, where were posted the corps of Ney, Marmont, Macdonald, and Lauriston, to the banks of the Elbe, or, in other words, from Lowenberg to Dresden, was a distance equivalent to six days' march; a distance too great to allow Napoleon time to support with his reserve the corps which were at Lowenberg, and also those which were at Dresden; for should he be summoned to the one place, some great disaster might happen to one of his lieutenants at the other, during the six days which must elapse before he could arrive to his support. In fact, to manœuvre with success concentrically around Dresden, as he had formerly manœuvred around Verona with a reserve posted at the central point of the circle of operations, and carried as it might be required to all the points of its circumference, the circle should have been smaller, and its radii consequently of less extent. And this defect was not the result of inadvertence on the part of Napoleon, but of that over-eagerness to lay his grasp upon Berlin and the Vistula which had already perverted his policy, as it now spoiled his military combinations.

Napoleon's forces were far from being equal to those of the Coalition. The corps of St. Cyr, Vandamme, Victor, Poniatowski, grouped on his right; those of Ney, Marmont, Macdonald, Lauriston, ranged on his front, together with the Guard and cavalry reserve posted in his centre, would form an army of two hundred and seventy-two thousand men of all arms ready to take the field. The troops of Oudinot, Girard, and Davout, marching upon Berlin, formed another of one hundred and ten or one hundred and fifteen thousand, and thus raised to three hundred and eighty thousand, at most, the total number of troops with whom we were able to meet the Coalition. And if we even add the twenty thousand men in Bavaria, the sixty thousand in Italy, and the ninety thousand men posted in the principal fortresses, we shall only enumerate a force of five hundred and fifty thousand troops, which is still very inferior to the eight hundred thousand at the service of the Coalition. The reserves of the Allies were, it is true, comprised in this force of eight hundred thousand men; but as Napoleon could not, at the most, draw more than fifty thousand men from his reserves for active service in the field, he could not, in any case, meet the eight hundred thousand men of the Coalition with more than six hundred thousand. This difference of strength, however, would not have prevented him from being victorious had the moral strength been on his side instead, as was unfortunately the case, against him.

But the fact was, that his adversaries, exasperated to the utmost, were resolved either to conquer or to die; and his own troops, heroic as they were, were inspired only by feelings of honour, and were led by generals whose confidence had been destroyed, and who began to feel that we were in the wrong, not only with respect to Europe but also with respect to France and good sense.

Having inspected the Kœnigstein and Lilienstein positions, and that taken by St. Cyr and Vandamme on his rear and right, Napoleon proceeded, on the 15th, to Gorlitz, where he found the Guard and the cavalry reserve. From thence he had proceeded to visit the Zittau gorge, the defence of which was entrusted to Poniatowski and Victor; and after he had established Poniatowski upon a mountain, named Eckartsberg, which was opposite the mouth of the defile, and offered means of barring its passage, he advanced some leagues, escorted by the light cavalry of his Guard, for the purpose of reconnoitring a country which it was quite possible he should, at a future time, have to traverse; and to learn what was the direction pursued by the enemy, of whose movements he knew nothing, because the thick wall of mountains which separated him from them on his right, was in the nature of a curtain which it was extremely difficult to penetrate. He listened, therefore, with extreme attention to the slightest rumours afloat, and, as is usual in such cases, received only the most contradictory reports. All accounts, however, agreed in stating that a corps of the Prussian and Russian army had passed from Silesia into Bohemia, for the purpose of co-operating with the Austrian army. This was the corps which, together with the Austrian troops, was to form the grand army which was to be under the command of Prince Schwarzenberg.

On receiving this information, Napoleon entertained for a moment the idea of throwing himself into Bohemia at the head of a hundred thousand men, by the Zittau route, and attacking the Prussian and Russian troops before their junction with the Austrians. By advancing rapidly on the right, towards Leitmeritz, he would have been able to cut in two the long line which the Coalition troops would occupy before being assembled around Commotau; and it would have been then quite possible for him to strike, at the very opening of the campaign, some terrible blow; but it was quite possible, on the other hand, that when he had entered Bohemia he might miss the troops of the Allies, already concentrated on his right between Tœplitz and Commotau, and consequently able not only to resist his attack, but also, by descending upon it by Peterswalde, to reach Dresden before

he could return thither himself; whilst, should he find them, and give them battle upon his road, he would have to engage them in a position which, whether he were victorious or vanquished, must be highly disadvantageous to him: for if he should vanquish the enemy he would be unable to pursue them into the interior of Bohemia; and should they vanquish him, he would have to repass the Zittau defile in their presence. Napoleon, therefore, had little inclination to carry out the idea above mentioned, although it was warmly supported by Marshal St. Cyr, and would only have done so had he received most reliable information that sixty or eighty thousand Prussians and Russians were within distance still separated from the hundred and twenty thousand Austrians whom they were to join.

Mounting his horse on the morning of the 19th of August, Napoleon entered Bohemia at the head of some thousands of cavalry, and plunging into the gorges beyond Gabel showed himself at the entrance of the fair *bassin* of Bohemia to its astonished inhabitants. The result of the inquiries which he now made was to inform him that the Prussian and Russian troops, coming from Silesia, traversed the foot of the mountains in the interior of Bohemia, for the purpose of joining the Austrians and of descending, probably, into Saxony, in the rear of Dresden. In executing this movement the Allies would traverse the Elbe between Leitmeritz and Aussig; and everything tended to show that they were already either on the banks of the river, or beyond it in the environs of Tœplitz. The moment, therefore, for throwing himself upon them, even had such a measure been at any time advisable, being now past, it was necessary that Napoleon should return to Saxony as speedily as possible, for the purpose of combating the enemy around Dresden on the battle field which he had selected with so much care. Napoleon, however, took pains to make the fact of his presence amongst them thus known to the inhabitants, in order that the rumour of it might reach the head-quarters of the Allies; his reasons for this course being as follows.

It was evident that the plan of the Allies, after they should have crossed the Elbe in Bohemia, was to enter Saxony and to descend upon Dresden, and after they should have gained possession of this city, to advance upon Leipsic, for the purpose of taking up a position between the Rhine and the French army. The adoption of this course by the Allies would be in every way favourable to us, for by acting thus in Napoleon's rear, they would expose themselves to the danger of having him upon their lines of communication, and would be in a position in which the loss of a battle must

involve almost certain destruction. This being the case, it was important that Napoleon should make a vigorous attack upon the army of Silesia which was before him, in order to render it incapable for a time of active operations, and then to return to devote his whole attention to the operations around Dresden. To ensure the success of such a project, it would be advisable to delay the onward march of the Allies for a day or two, since he had to hasten upon the Bober before returning to the Elbe; and there could be no better means of causing this delay than Napoleon's presence in Bohemia, since his presence there could not fail to excite the Allies to a thousand disquieting, or at least embarrassing conjectures.

Having returned to Zittau by the defiles of the *Riesen Gebirge*, Napoleon employed the following day, the 20th, in posting the corps of Poniatowski and Victor at the entrance of the Zittau defile in such a manner, that those corps might be able to maintain themselves for three days at least against the most violent attacks. Napoleon also took care to secure their line of communication with General Vandamme, who had been posted between Zittau and Dresden in the direction of Stolpen, that he might be able to move in a single day either upon Zittau or Dresden. Having completed these several measures, Napoleon resolved to await during one more day the complete manifestation of the enemy's designs; being at the same time entirely free from any sentiments of fear, the precautions which he had taken in all directions, being such as to relieve him of all anxiety. In fact, the eighty thousand men on the side of Berlin, marching under the command of Marshal Oudinot, and supported by the thirty-five thousand of Marshal Davout; the troops lying in wait under St. Cyr and Vandamme on the two banks of the Elbe; the two corps which guarded the gorges, leading into Bohemia at Zittau; the hundred thousand men who awaited on the Bober under Marshal Ney, the moment when the enemy should attempt to cross it; and, finally, the Guard and cavalry reserve, posted at Gorlitz in such positions as to be immediately ready to defend the threatened points, formed altogether an admirably woven web, in the midst of which its contriver was ready at any moment to pounce upon any who might venture to touch its extremities.

On his return to Gorlitz, Napoleon received information there, that the army of Silesia had invaded on the 15th the neutral territory which it should have respected as such until the 17th, and that it was advancing in the direction of Bohemia. Napoleon immediately set in motion the cavalry

and three divisions of his guard, leaving the others at Gorlitz, and made arrangements for being on the Bober on the following day, the 21st.

Hostilities having commenced in Silesia before the period assigned for their resumption by the armistice, the four corps under the command of Ney had scarcely left their cantonments when they found themselves in the presence of the enemy. Two of these corps, those of Macdonald and Marmont, were on the Bober, the first on the right towards Lowenberg, the second on the left, in the direction of Buntzlau. The two others were beyond these, on the Katzbach, and in a position of still greater danger, that of Lauriston being in the environs of Goldberg, and that of Ney between Leignitz and Haynau. Being almost turned by the sudden appearance of Langerou's corps on their right flank, those two corps were, indeed, in a state of extreme peril; but Lauriston's corps falling back from the Katzbach on the Bober with great coolness and energy, rejoined Macdonald at Lowenberg without accident; and Ney, who was the most advanced towards our left, instead of simply falling back upon Buntzlau for the purpose of passing the Bober at that point, boldly deployed between the Katzbach and the Bober, and braved the attack of Blucher, who was moving onward against Lowenberg. On perceiving his position Blucher turned his forces against him, and, Lowenberg being thus freed from the danger of imminent attack, Ney descended upon Buntzlau, and passing the Bober there joined his forces to those of Marmont.

On the 20th, our four corps were behind the Bober, and Napoleon, who arrived on the morning of the 21st, was anxious to engage the enemy without further delay. Blucher's forces, including those of the Russian General, Sacken, who had remained a little in the rear on his right, numbered about one hundred thousand. Napoleon, who had more than one hundred and thirty thousand, employed the morning in directing the construction of wooden bridges across the Bober, and giving the necessary orders to ensure the execution by his army of a prompt and vigorous march, since he had no time to lose, expecting, as he did, to be speedily recalled to his rear by the movements of the Grand Army at Bohemia. He consequently resolved to debouch from Lowenberg with Macdonald and Lauriston, passing the Bober at that point, and drawing Ney and Marmont, who were to cross the Bober at Buntzlau, upon his left.

Towards the middle of the day our troops crossed the Bober at Lowenberg, and moved rapidly forward; the division Maison, which formed our *tête de colonne*, driving

before it the troops under General d'York without allowing them a moment's respite. The whole of Lauriston's corps followed, supported by that of Macdonald. On our left, the Marshals Ney and Marmont debouched from Buntzlau, closing in upon our centre. And now Blucher, finding himself thus vigorously attacked, and suspecting that Napoleon was in his front, acted in accordance with the instructions given to him to run no risk when there was a prospect of encountering his formidable adversary in person, and fell back behind a small stream named the Haynau, and flowing between the Bober and the Katzbach.

On the 22nd, Napoleon continued his march on the offensive; the corps of Lauriston and Macdonald advancing directly upon Goldberg, for the purpose of driving Blucher beyond the Katzbach, whilst Ney and Marmont still moved on our left with the same object. Animated by the presence of Napoleon, the troops were inspired with the utmost ardour, and speedily compelled the enemy to abandon with considerable loss, the little stream behind which they had taken refuge, to repass the Katzbach, and to take up a position at Goldberg.

It had now become evident that it was not with the troops under Blucher that the principal action would take place; and, in fact, on that very evening, Napoleon received from Marshal Saint-Cyr information which showed very evidently that the main army of the Allies was debouching by Péterswalde, upon the rear of Dresden, with the intention either of seizing this town, or of advancing upon Leipsic with the audacious idea of placing themselves between the French and the Rhine. And thus was realised that one of Napoleon's two hypotheses which was the most desirable of the two, and for which he had most carefully prepared. He immediately stopped his guard, which was still on its march, and which, fortunately, had not yet passed Lowenberg, in order that it might, after a brief halt, take the road to Dresden. He also sent in the same direction the corps of Marshal Marmont, and a great portion of the cavalry reserve; and at the same time wrote to General Vandamme and Marshal Victor directing them to fall back upon the Elbe, leaving Prince Poniatowski at the Zittau gorges.

Having given these orders during the evening of the 22nd, Napoleon was desirous that on the following morning the corps of Lauriston, Macdonald, and Ney, which with the cavalry of General Sebastiani, composed a mass of eighty thousand men at least, should once more attack the enemy and drive it beyond the Katzbach; and at daybreak, accordingly, Lauriston's corps on the right, that of Macdonald in the centre, and the cavalry of Latour-Maubourg on the left,

deployed along the Katzbach, whilst Ney, three leagues lower down, advanced with his own corps and Sebastiani's cavalry in front of Leignitz. Blucher had posted the Russian troops under Langeron, and the Prussian troops under d'York, behind the Katzbach and on the heights of Wolfsberg. The division Girard, throwing itself upon the banks of the river, in the direction of Niederau, had a desperate conflict with the Prussian division under Prince Mecklenbourg, and eventually compelled them to fall back beyond the Katzbach, which it crossed in their wake. In the meantime, General Lauriston having effected his passage in the direction of Seyfnau, attacked the Wolfsberg heights, which he three times succeeded in wresting from the Russians, and as many times was forced to resign. But a final effort, made by the 135th of the division Rochambeau, gave them into our hands and decided the action in our favour. And Blucher, finding himself to be outflanked two or three leagues on his right, by the movement of Marshal Ney upon Leignitz, fell back in all haste towards Janer.

This useless violation of international law cost the Prussians a loss of some eight thousand men ; and ourselves about half that number ; but this result did not, unfortunately for us, shake the courage of our enemy, who was fighting with all the vehemence of despair. Napoleon, who had experienced the inconvenience of leaving several Marshals together when he was not himself present amongst them, and who foresaw the imminence of desperate battles for which it was well to have Marshal Ney at hand, resolved to make this Marshal accompany himself ; to confide the command of the third corps to General Souham, and to leave the troops on the Bober under the command in chief of Marshal Macdonald, whom he directed to leave his light troops in observation between the Bober and the Katzbach, but to encamp with the bulk of his forces behind the Bober itself, between Lowenberg and Buntzlau, and to establish posts of communication on the right in the Bohemian mountains, on the left in the plains of Lusatia, so as to be constantly informed of the enemy's movements. The principal tasks entrusted to him were, in the first place, to defend the Bober against Blucher, and, in the next, to intercept the routes leading from Bohemia into Prussia, so as to check the advance of the detachments which the enemy might possibly throw in the direction of Berlin, against the corps of Marshal Oudinot. And in adopting these measures Napoleon was led by his anxiety to expedite Oudinot's march on Berlin, to make the most injudicious sacrifices ; for Macdonald, left at forty leagues distance from Dresden, although free for a moment

from the enemy, might be once more attacked by him, with renewed vigour, and even incur great danger, before aid could possibly reach him.

Having taken these measures, and seen Blucher in full retreat upon Jauer, Napoleon set out, about noon, for Gorkitz, where he found an abundance of news from Dresden, and learned that the King of Saxony, the inhabitants, and the generals to whom the defence of this important post had been entrusted, were terrified at the immense masses of hostile troops which were advancing from Bohemia, and descending the mountains in the rear of the Saxon capital.

The Grand Army of the Allies, which, composed of Prussian, Russian, and Austrian troops, to the number of two hundred and fifty thousand men, was to turn the position of the Elbe by Bohemia, had, in fact, executed the plan arranged at Trachenberg, and had debouched into Saxony by all the defiles of the *Erz-Gebirge*. But the troops had scarcely, however, set out on their march, when the instability which was incident to the military tactics of the Allies, and which resulted from the want of any real commander-in-chief amongst their generals, led to a modification of the plan determined upon at Trachenberg. The nominal command-in-chief had been conferred upon the Prince Schwarzenberg as a means of propitiating Austria; but the Emperor Alexander regretted in his heart that he had not taken it himself, and the more so when Generals Moreau and Jomini arrived in his camp with reinforcements which would, he believed, carry the affairs of the Allies to a glorious issue.

General Moreau, who, as we have already said, returned from America on hearing the rumour of Napoleon's disasters in Russia, without any other object save such as might be involved in a vague hope of honorably re-entering his country, had formed a plan which was not without some chance of success. Having learned that the Emperor Alexander had more than a hundred thousand French prisoners, all deeply exasperated against the author of the expedition to Moscow, he had conceived the plan of arming forty or fifty thousand of them, transporting them in English ships to Picardy, and marching them upon Paris, the result of which would be, he maintained, the overthrow of the Imperial throne, provided the Allies would furnish him with a treaty of peace, which should leave France free to choose her own form of government, and secure to her the possession of a territory extending to her natural limits, the Alps and the Rhine. Entirely without any connexion with the Bourbons, or any sympathies in their favour, he never-

theless admitted that endeavours should be made to reconcile this ancient family with the French Revolution, and that it should be recalled for the purpose of establishing a government which should be at once firm and liberal, and should put an end to the protracted troubles with which France had been afflicted. It was under the influence of these ideas that he had come to Stockholm, where his old comrade, Bernadotte, had covertly excited still further his feelings of exasperation, and then sent him to the Russian head quarters. Alexander received the exile with every testimony of respect and friendship, and calmed the scruples which he still felt by declaring to him that the Allies had no desire to deprive France of any portion of her greatness ; that they were quite ready to offer her the fair conditions of the treaty of Junéville ; and that they had no intention of imposing upon her any particular form of government, being anxious, on the contrary, to acknowledge that which it might itself choose, even supposing it were that of a Republic. Rejecting as impracticable the plan of arming the French prisoners, he cautiously led the unhappy Moreau to adopt the resolution, not indeed of serving against France, but of remaining with the sovereigns who were fighting against her ; an apparent difference which was sufficient to deceive Moreau, but which had no real foundation. To complete his seduction to the cause of the Allies, Alexander made use of his sister, the grand Duchess Catherine, widow of the Duke of Oldenberg, a princess of remarkable spirit and personal attractions ; and she, as well as her brother, treating Moreau as a friend, and overwhelming him with adroit flattery, assisted in inducing him to enter a path on which he was to meet with the cruellest of all deaths, being that which was to take from him with his life, if not his glory, at least his innocence.

From the time that Moreau had been by his side, Alexander regretted that he did not himself possess the commandship-in-chief of the allied forces ; in which case he would have made Moreau the chief of his staff, and with his aid have conducted the operations of the war. But as it was impossible to make Prince Schwarzenberg receive Moreau, either as a superior or a subordinate, the latter found himself in the camp of the Allies in the character of a private friend of the Emperor Alexander's, and already cruelly punished for the fault which he had committed by having to endure a position, in the midst of the enemies of his country, which was false, awkward, and almost humiliating.

General Jomini, a Swiss by birth, an excellent military writer, and possessed of no slight merits as a staff officer, had rendered to the French army at Ulm, the

Berezina, and Bautzen, services for which he had been very poorly recompensed at Bautzen, especially, after having pointed out to Marshal Ney the line of march which it was most advisable to take, he had received, instead of a reward, a punishment which he owed to the Prince, Major-General, whose susceptibilities he had frequently wounded. Sensitive and irritable, and having frequently desired to pass from the French service to that of Russia, which had not failed to show considerable readiness to receive him, he had at length, on the occasion of this last insult, given a loose to his anger, and during the armistice passed over to the Russians, without, as has been said, betraying to them plans of which he was ignorant, or failing in his duty to his country, since he was a Swiss, but committing, nevertheless, an error in not subjecting his private causes of offence, even if well founded, to the claims of an association in arms, and preparing for himself by the course which he adopted griefs which were destined to embitter his life. Received with all honour by Alexander, he gave free expression to his opinions, displeasing the Generals of the Allied forces by speaking in praise of Napoleon and the French, whom he was already almost sorry to have quitted, and censuring without reserve all the plans which had been formed at Trachenberg. He had not much trouble in proving to Alexander that the plan of marching upon Leipzig, was, for many reasons, unadvisable; and General Moreau coinciding in his views on the subject, it was resolved to renounce this project, and instead of leaning to the left to incline to the right, and to move upon the banks of the Elbe. The two first columns, being that which had passed by Peterswalde, and that which had passed by Zinnwald and Altenberg, had marched close to Dresden, but it was necessary to draw back the third by Marienberg and Sayda, upon Dippoldiswalde, and the fourth by Zwickau, and Chemnitz upon Tharandt. The Allies had thus moved towards Dresden without having any very precise ideas what they were to do in this new position, which, however, had the advantage of enabling them at any time to advance to the capture of Dresden, the loss of which could not fail to be of the greatest possible detriment to the French cause. Whilst they were executing this transverse movement from left to right, along the foot of the *Erz-Gebirge*, the Allies received information of the appearance of Napoleon in Bohemia; a circumstance which gave rise to an apprehension that he might be about to march upon Prague, and rendered more evident than ever the advantageousness of a retrograde movement on the part of the Allies along the road towards the Elbe.

It was thus that the grand army of the Allies came to

deploy its imposing masses around the fair capital of Saxony: the column which was first perceived being the Russian column, under Wittgenstein, which, descending the nearest to the Elbe by the Peterswalde route, encountered Marshal Saint-Cyr in front of the Camp de Pirna. What is called the Camp de Pirna, consists of a very elevated plateau, the sides of which are at almost every point perpendicular, and which, resting on the Elbe, is supported on the left by the fort of Kœnigstein, and on the right by the château de Sonnenstein and the town of Pirna. The great Bohemian route running by Péterswalde, passes this plateau at such a distance, that although almost, it is not quite, commanded by it; and, therefore, although itself impregnable, it does not form in itself an absolute means of shutting up the Péterswalde route. At the same time, it is a position from whence the operations of any enemy following the Péterswalde route may be effectually harassed, if not entirely frustrated.

Marshal Saint-Cyr, after having thrown the first of his two divisions into the forts of Kœnigstein and Lilienstein, between which a bridge was thrown across the Elbe, had placed the second on the Péterswalde route in such a manner as to delay the enemy's march, and at the same time be able to fall back upon Dresden as had been ordered. In the meantime the third of Marshal Saint-Cyr's divisions watched the second débouché, being that which opens from Toeplitz upon Zinnwald, Altenberg, and Dippoldiswalde, and the fourth, posted on the right of Dippoldiswalde, and watching the great Freyberg route, served as a support to General Pajol, who was skirmishing with the advanced guards of the Austrian cavalry, as it came up by the more distant débouchés.

On the 23rd August, Marshal Saint-Cyr having confided to his first division, as we have already said, the defence of the Kœnigstein and Lilienstein forts, and all the posts on the banks of the Elbe, fell back in good order upon Dresden, where there were now, therefore, besides the garrison, three divisions of infantry, together with the cavalry under Lheritier and Pajol. And this force, supported by field works and the fortifications of the city itself, and well provided with artillery, was amply sufficient to afford Marshal Saint-Cyr the means of disputing the possession of Dresden with the enemy, and to give Napoleon time to execute his manœuvres around it.

It was on this state of things that Napoleon founded his calculations, on receiving at Gohlitz the details of what had taken place on the side of Dresden. Aware, from the presence of considerable masses of troops in the rear of Dresden, that the Allies had adopted the plan which con-

sisted in turning him, advancing upon the left bank of the Elbe, and descending into Saxony from Péterswalde, and having foreseen and provided against this movement by posting at Dresden a force sufficient to repulse a first attack, and to hold in check Prince Schwarzenberg's army for some days at least, he now devised one of the most excellent and formidable combinations which were the fruits of his genius, and one which, had it been executed according to his views, might have brought the whole war to a sudden termination.

Napoleon returned from Silesia preceded or followed by the most moveable portions of his army, which he made fall back towards the Elbe. The enemy, wishing to turn him, had crossed the Elbe in the interior of Bohemia, under the shelter of the mountains which separate this country from Saxony, and, that he might punish them for this rash movement, Napoleon now resolved to ascend as far as Kœnigstein, and after having effected there the passage of the Elbe, to establish himself at Pirna, to intercept the Péterswalde road, to descend on the enemy's rear with one hundred and forty thousand men, to drive him to Dresden, and thus to have him between the French army and the Elbe.

Inflamed by this idea, Napoleon hastened to explain to M. de Bassano, by a letter written in cypher, the formidable plan which he had devised, directing him to keep it secret, but to exert himself to the utmost to conduce to its success. He wrote also to Marshal Saint-Cyr, pointing out to him once more all the means of defence presented by the city of Dresden, and then took up his quarters, on the 25th of August, at Stolpen, on the right bank of the stream, and an equal distance from Kœnigstein and Dresden.

Established at Stolpen, Napoleon made all those arrangements which he considered necessary for the success of his new plan. Vandamme's corps, three divisions strong, had already fallen back upon Kœnigstein, at the first appearance of the grand army of the Allies; the half of one of its divisions, that under General Teste, having spread along the Elbe, from Kœnigstein to Dresden, for the purpose of preventing the enemy from repassing the river, and confining them to the left bank; whilst the two others passed over by the bridge thrown across the stream between Kœnigstein and Lilienstein, to attack the camp de Pirna, under which the enemy had defiled without occupying it in force, to take possession of it, to effect a junction there with the first division of Saint-Cyr, which had been left at Pirna, and to take up a position, *à cheval*, on the Péterswalde road. That Vandamme might have four whole divisions at his disposal, Napoleon borrowed of Marshal Victor the brigade of the

Prince de Reuss, and adding to it Corbineau's cavalry, thus raised the forces at Vandamme's disposal, to more than forty thousand men, of whom thirty-six thousand were infantry, and almost five thousand cavalry. He posted in the next place, the whole of his guard, and Marshal Victor, who had returned from Zittau, around Stolpen in such a manner that they might be able to follow General Vandamme as soon as he should be master of the Camp de Pirna, hastened the march of Marshal Marmont, and had as many boats as possible gathered together for the purpose of throwing three additional bridges between Kœnigstein and Lilienstein. When these bridges should have been constructed, he would have at his immediate disposal one hundred and twenty thousand men to throw on the enemy's rear; and his intention was, whilst he should himself repass the Elbe at Kœnigstein, to send Latour-Maubourg's cavalry to cross it at Dresden, so as to deceive the Prince de Schwarzenberg, and induce him to suppose that the whole French army was about to debouch by that city. In order that the Elbe, which he desired to make an insurmountable obstacle to the progress of the enemy, might be more securely guarded, he ordered Marshal Saint-Cyr, Lheritier's cavalry, and two battalions of infantry to defend the Meissen, situated eight leagues from Dresden; and, finally, as he considered that the troops might enjoy a day's repose without danger, since all appeared calm around Dresden, he determined that Vandamme should not pass over the bridge thrown across the Elbe between Lilienstein and Kœnigstein to attack the Camp de Pirna until the evening of the 26th.

Unfortunately, the population of Dresden began to be much excited as it beheld the approach of the coalition troops. From the 23rd to the 25th, only the first column, that which had followed the Peterswalde route, was visible; but during the following days, the other columns had appeared in their turn and covered the heights which overlooked the city. The last Austrian column was alone absent, for having passed by Carlsbad and Zwickau, its road to Dresden had been longer than that of the others. Alexander's advisers, with Jomini at their head, were eager to attack immediately Saint-Cyr's three divisions, which they beheld upon the plain, and by entering Dresden in pursuit of them, to destroy at a single blow our whole establishment upon the Elbe. But Moreau, on being consulted, objected that it was improbable that Saint-Cyr would await in that exposed position, the attack of overwhelming masses, had he not behind him some support in the shape either of reserves of troops, or defensive works, and that it would be highly injudicious to risk a repulse at the

very commencement of hostilities. Prince Schwarzenberg declaring, however, in the midst of the discussion, that in any case it would be necessary to defer the attack for a day, since his fourth column had not yet arrived; the decision on the course to be adopted was remitted to the following day.

The accumulation of the troops of the allies around Dresden, did not fail to inspire the inhabitants with terror, and message after message was sent to Napoleon urging him to hasten up in person with all his reserves, to repulse the formidable attack with which the city was threatened. In reply to these entreaties, Napoleon sent Murat to execute a reconnaissance, the result of which was simply to confirm the fact of the presence of a considerable hostile army around Dresden, which it was apparently about to attack; and upon his being still further urged to proceed thither in person, he wrote to Marshal Saint-Cyr, detailing anew the means by which Dresden might be defended, and to this letter the Marshal contented himself with replying that he would do his best, but that in the presence of such masses of hostile troops as were then around him, he could not answer for what might be the issue. The necessity, however, of preserving Dresden from the enemy's grasp was so great, that Napoleon, discontented with the Marshal's extreme reserve, sent his officer *d'ordonnance*, Gourgand, to this city that he might be able to give him complete information of the actual state of affairs.

Gourgand, who was a brave and spirited officer, but unendowed with a judgment sufficiently cool to enable him to fulfil successfully the mission with which he had been entrusted, arrived in Dresden on the 25th, at a moment when the populace and the court were equally overcome by alarm, when the generals themselves began to lose their ordinary sang-froid, and when the inhabitants, withdrawing en masse from the principal portion of the city, called the Old Town, and exposed, from being situated on the left bank of the Elbe, to the enemy's attack, proceeded to the faubourg on the right bank, called the New Town. In the meantime, Marshal Saint-Cyr and General Durosnel, who were entrusted with the defence of the city, the one as commander of the 14th corps, and the other as Governor of Dresden, on being closely interrogated by Gourgand, gave such answers as led him to suppose they had but little confidence in the strength of the position, and induced him, on his return to Stolpen, which took place at eleven o'clock on the same evening, to draw such a picture of the dangers which threatened Dresden as to overcome Napoleon's usually firm judgment, and made him forget the important considerations which he had him-

self explained to Marshal Saint-Cyr. Believing, in fact, that he could carry out his first plan only at the expense of sacrificing the old town of Dresden—a sacrifice not only opposed to the dictates of humanity, but also of those of policy, since it could not fail to render our alliance a source of disaster to Saxony—Napoleon now determined, instead of throwing the whole mass of his forces by Kœnigstein upon the enemy's rear, to effect this movement with only the forty thousand under Vandamme, and with a hundred thousand others to debouch directly upon Dresden. And this new plan, although offering fewer advantages than the former, was nevertheless calculated to have very effectual results, and was at the same time less hazardous, since Napoleon, by concentrating a hundred thousand men upon Dresden, would save it from the enemy, and have the means of vanquishing the enemy under its walls, whilst Vandamme would be posted at Kœnigstein ready to obtain from his victory the greatest possible advantage.

Having determined at midnight, with a promptitude which never ceased to be one of his characteristics, upon his course of action, he immediately gave the necessary orders; moving upon Dresden his old guard, which had already arrived in the environs of Stolpen, the cavalry under Latour-Maubourg which had arrived there, and the half of the division Teste, which remained on the bank of the Elbe, commanding that they should march throughout the night, so as to reach Dresden by day break, and that they should take up a position behind that of Marshal Saint-Cyr. He gave similar instructions to the guard and to Marshal Marmont, who were yet on the Lowenberg road, and to Marshal Victor, who had quitted Zittau on his way to Kœnigstein; and at the same time explained to General Vandamme what he would have to do during the following day, the 26th, directing him to march his forty thousand men across the bridge which had been first thrown over the river, between Lilienstein and Kœnigstein, debouch on the left bank of the Elbe, attack and take possession of the Camp de Pirna, and establish himself across the chaussée de Péterswalde. To these instructions he added the assistance of an enlightened counsellor, in the person of General Haxo, whom he directed to become the excitable Vandamme's guide and mentor. Having made these arrangements, he took a few hours' repose, and at daybreak set out at a gallop for Dresden, where he arrived at about 9 o'clock on the morning of the 26th of August, the first of two justly celebrated days.

The enthusiasm excited amongst the troops and inhabitants

on Napoleon's arrival in Dresden was ardent in the extreme; the former receiving him with a species of military fanaticism, and the latter hailing him as the deliverer of their wives and children from the horrors of war. Visiting the King of Saxony for the purpose of supporting his drooping courage, Napoleon exhorted him to banish his fears, and then went to the front of the entrenched camp in order to join Marshal Saint-Cyr, who was at the head of his troops, and handling them with his accustomed ability.

The principal portion of Dresden being situated on the left bank of the Elbe is that, of course, which we first arrive at on coming from the banks of the Rhine. A series of heights, detached from the mountains of Bohemia, envelope the city, and form around it a species of amphitheatre. It was on this amphitheatre that the allied troops were arrayed, having France behind them as though they had come from it, as our troops had Germany behind them. Our line of defence, resting on the old town, presented a semicircle, while the two extremities rested on the Elbe, the left extremity being at the Pirna faubourg, and the right at the Friedrichstadt faubourg; and it was at the exterior line of this series of defensive works that Marshal Saint-Cyr had placed his troops. His first division having remained with Vandamme, he had posted the second on the first half of the circumference of the city, extending from the Pirna barrier to the Dippoldiswalde barrier. He had ranged his fourth division on the other half of the circumference, terminating in the faubourg de Friedrichstadt. In front of the Pirna faubourg was a vast public garden, called the Gross-Garten, which was, in relation to the arrangements of the day, a strong point in advance of our left; and there Marshal Saint-Cyr had established his third division, but with the precaution of leaving only simply posts in the advanced portion of the garden, and placing the bulk of the division in the rear, that it might not be cut off from the enceinte of the city, with which the Gross-Garten was not immediately connected. He had distributed his posts with infinite skill, in such a manner that they should afford each other mutual support; and between the redoubts had placed field artillery, to fill up the spaces which were not sufficiently covered by the fire of the fixed artillery. The Russian troops under Wittgenstein, Miloradovitch, and Barclay de Tolly, which had descended from Péterswalde and fronted our left, would attack between the Elbe and the Gross-Garten, by the Pirna and Pilnitz barriers; whilst the Prussians, under General Kleist, would attack the Gross-Garten, and the Austrians, who formed the enemy's left and consequently fronted our right, would con-

duct the attack between the Dippoldiswalde and Freyberg barriers. So, at least, the distribution of the enemy's forces, under the semicircle of the heights, gave reason to suppose.

Having reconnoitred this line under a heavy fire from the enemy's sharpshooters, Napoleon approved of all Marshal Saint-Cyr's arrangements, and communicated to him his own plans. The cuirassiers and the old guard were already at hand, but the young guard could not reach Dresden until late in the day, whilst Marshals Marmont and Victor were at a still greater distance; Napoleon determined, therefore, to post a portion of the old guard at the various barriers, retaining the remainder in the rear, at the principal point of the city, and to place Murat, with the whole of Latour-Maubourg's cavalry on the Friedrichstadt plain, which extends in front of the faubourg of that name, and which formed the extreme right of our line of defence, so as to occupy the space which the fourth division of Marshal Saint-Cyr was not sufficient of itself to fill. As the portion of the line between this division and the second, in other words the centre, appeared insufficiently provided with troops, Napoleon sent to this point a portion of the garrison of Dresden, consisting of Westphalian troops; and at the same time ordered General Teste to re-enter the city with his brigade, which had been left at the Elbe for the purpose of supporting Latour-Maubourg's cavalry on the Friedrichstadt plain.

It was thus that Napoleon awaited the onset of the two hundred thousand hostile troops in front of him, and which, when it was past midday, had made no other attack than such as consisted in a fire of sharpshooters on our left, and which was answered by Marshal Saint-Cyr's third division (44th). And the cause of this delay on the part of the enemy was, as might be easily imagined, the result of a fresh difference of opinion amongst the members of the staff. It had been agreed on the previous evening to defer all discussion until the following day, the 26th, when the fourth column would have arrived, and the plans of the French would be more apparent. But when the morning of the 26th was come it was seen that the state of affairs was entirely altered, Marshal Saint-Cyr having prudently fallen back upon the works defending the city, and thus taken a position, in attempting to drive him from which five or even ten thousand men might be uselessly sacrificed. Under these circumstances General Jomini, whose spirit was as just as ardent, declared himself of General Moreau's opinion, and as the Emperor Alexander supported their views it appeared to be decided to fall back upon the Dippoldiswalde

heights, for the purpose of taking up a position which should be at once safe and menacing. But the King of Prussia, completely under the sway of the passion which inspired his troops, said in a tone of cold determination, that after having made so ambitious an attempt in Napoleon's rear, to retire without having made a demonstration against Dresden would be to show both fickleness and weakness, and would be a course especially calculated to chill the patriotic ardour of his soldiers. To this General Jomini replied that war was not an affair of sentiment but of calculation; that had an attack been ventured upon on the previous evening, that of the 25th, it might have had some chance of success, but that now its result must be doubtful, even with the sacrifice of six thousand men. Moreau supported these views, whilst Alexander, according to his usual habit, appeared in a state of doubt, and the King of Prussia manifested a spirit of cold discontent, when an inhabitant of Dresden, taken prisoner at the advanced posts, and required to tell what he knew, declared that Napoleon had entered Dresden, and not alone, and gave such details as precluded the possibility of entertaining any doubt on the matter. As, moreover, the Russian column, which had descended by Péterswalde, had perceived beyond the Elbe the masses of the French army hastening towards Dresden, in such a manner as showed that its defence would be most determined, there was no longer room to doubt that the most advisable course would be to take up, without loss of time, the Dippoldiswalde position. The Austrian Generalissimo, however, had on the previous evening issued the order which had been agreed on for a vigorous demonstration against Dresden, and now, either from the difficulty of countermanding with sufficient quickness orders issued to a mass of two hundred thousand men, or from the repugnance of the troops themselves to withdraw without giving the enemy battle, the order to attack was not countermanded in time, and at the moment the bells of the Dresden churches sounded the hour of three a tremendous cannonade resounded from the lines of the allied troops, to the astonishment of the allied sovereigns, who were only intent upon a movement of retreat. The attack having now begun, however, it was too late to stop it, and it soon raged on all sides of the city against which it was directed.

Wittgenstein's corps, forming the Allies' right, and consequently opposed to our left, advanced between the Elbe and the Gross-Garten, in front of the Pirna faubourg, in spite of the desperate resistance of the men of the 43rd division, and aided by the progress of the Prussians in the Gross-Garten, of which, with great difficulty, their numbers

enabled them to take possession. The 43rd division, in fact, consisting of but six or seven thousand men, and being attacked by more than twenty-five thousand of the enemy, was unwilling to persist in maintaining its ground so far as to incur the danger of being cut off from the city itself, and it gradually retreated, therefore, falling back between the Pirna and Dohna barriers, and obstinately disputing Prince Antoine's garden, which was situated in the rear of the Gross-Garten, and joined the 43rd division (Saint-Cyr's fourth) which was entrusted with the defence of the remainder of the enceinte.

Such was, about five o'clock in the evening, the state of affairs at this point of our line, where the enemy had approached our redoubts with vigour, but had not taken any. In the centre the attack had made greater progress, for the Austrians, perceiving an immense mass of cavalry, which already covered the Friedrichstadt plain on their left, had directed all their efforts against our centre, and attacking each of two redoubts in this portion of our line with fifty pieces of cannon, succeeded in forcing our soldiers to evacuate one of them, situated in the Mocinski garden, and occupied it with their own troops. This was the only one of our redoubts of which they had gained possession, but they were on the point of carrying two others, and the Russians on their right were already at the foot of two more. Although it was now late, and the enemy had but little time left in which to act, the danger of the moment was very serious. In spite of the orders given him to reserve the old guard, Friant, who was in command of the grenadiers of this corps, and was posted in reserve in the Pirna faubourg, had ventured to carry some companies of these brave troops into action, leading them through the Pilnitz and Pirna barriers, and driving back before them, at the bayonet's point, the Russian columns which had approached too closely. In the meantime, at the opposite extremity, that is to say, at the *Porte de Freyberg*, the fusiliers had acted in the same manner, and driven back the Austrians. But these proceedings, bold as they were, had not, fortunately, cost any great degree of loss to the old guard, which Napoleon was anxious to reserve, whilst according to the young guard the honours and experiences attending posts of great peril.

But at this moment the columns of this young guard arrived, impatient to measure their strength with that of the enemy, and filling Dresden with cries of *Vive l'Empereur!* They consisted of four excellent divisions of eight or nine thousand each, two under Marshal Mortier, and two under

Marshal Ney. Immediately on their arrival, Napoleon hastened to send two of these divisions (those of Decouz and Roguet) to the Pilitz barrier, for the purpose of driving back the Russians, who had continued to gain ground; and the two remaining ones (those of Barrois and Parmentier) to the Pirna barrier, that they might overmaster the Prussian troops, which, after having taken the Gross-Garten, were supporting the Austrians near the redoubt of the Moczinskoi garden. At the same time, he ordered Murat, who had been rejoined by General Teste's infantry, to charge with all his cavalry on the Friedrichstadt plain.

In an instant the whole aspect of affairs underwent a change; for the four divisions of the young guard issuing from the Ziegel and Pilitz barriers with the force and fury of torrents, in conjunction with the 43rd and 44th divisions, drove back the enemy at every point, and retaking the redoubt situated at the end of the Moczinskoi garden, made prisoners there of six hundred Austrian soldiers. At the same moment, General Teste with the brigade which remained at his disposal, issued from the Freyberg gate and took possession of the village of Klein-Hamburg, whilst Murat, deploying with twelve thousand horse at our extreme right, drove the Austrians from off the Friedrichstadt plain, and compelled them to regain the heights. And now, repulsed in every direction, and recognizing in these vigorous measures the strength and skill of Napoleon's own hand, the allies retreated, leaving in our hands three or four thousand of their troops in killed or wounded, and two thousand prisoners; the loss of our own troops, which had fought under cover, being only two thousand altogether.

Delighted with the successes he had obtained during this first day, Napoleon anticipated that he should gain still more brilliant ones on the morrow. He had ascended several times during the day one of the city towers, and gazing from thence upon the semi-circle of heights by which Dresden was surrounded, suddenly conceived the idea of a manœuvre not inferior to any he ever executed. On our left the Russians forming the extreme right of the allied army, were posted between the Elbe and the Gross-Garten. A little less to the left, towards the centre, were the Prussians under General Kleist, who had been driven from the Gross-Garten and had fallen back under the Strehlen heights. Quite at the centre were a portion of the Austrian troops, opposite the Dippoldiswalde and Freyberg barriers, on the Racknitz and Plauen heights; and there, between the centre and our right, was a narrow and deep gorge, through which flowed a little river, the Weisseritz, which falls into the Elbe between

the Old Town and the Friedrichstadt faubourg. It was beyond this gorge, called the valley of the Plauen, on the extreme left of the allies, and on our extreme right, that were posted the greater part of the Austrian troops, who were thus separated from the rest of the allied army by a species of gulf, across which it was impossible to advance to their support. This side of the field of battle was, moreover, more suitable than the other for the manœuvres of cavalry; and Napoleon, comprehending at a glance the advantages which were offered by this circumstance, determined to reinforce the King of Naples, to throw him by a *détour* to the right, in a sudden and unexpected manner, upon the Austrians, who must inevitably, as they could receive no aid, be driven into the Plauen gorge; and after having thus destroyed the allies, left, to send Ney with the whole of the young guard, against their right, to drive them back en masse upon the heights from which they had attempted to descend. From this double movement would result a double advantage, for in the first place it would enable our troops to snatch from the enemy on our right, the grand Freyberg route, which was in every way the most convenient for their retreat; and in the second place, it would drive them on the left, upon that Péterswalde route, on which Vandamme awaited them at the head of forty thousand men, and thus reduce them to the necessity of returning to Bohemia by scarcely formed roads, in traversing which they could not but suffer enormous losses.

Having formed these plans with the most marvellous promptitude, Napoleon gave the necessary orders on the spot, before taking either food or sleep. On the right he posted General Teste, under Marshal Victor, and both under Murat, who would thus have at his disposal twenty thousand infantry and about twelve thousand cavalry, with orders to turn the Austrians by their left, and to pursue them vigorously towards the Vallée de Plauen. He ordered Marshal Marmont, who at this moment arrived, to establish himself at the centre, at the Dippoldiswalde barrier, near the Moczinski barrier, with the old guard and the artillery reserves behind him. To Marshal Saint-Cyr he gave orders to concentrate his three divisions, to range them in close column between the Dippoldiswalde and the Dohna barriers, their right resting on Marshal Marmont's troops, and their left on the *Gross-Garten*. These two corps posted near Napoleon, who intended to take up his position at the centre, (as he made known to all his lieutenants, that they might go there to him for his orders) were to receive their instructions on the ground, and from his own mouth. Finally, at the extreme left, Ney with the whole of the young guard, and a portion of the cavalry under

Nansouty, was directed to defile behind the Gross-Garten with forty thousand men, to turn round this garden, to expel the Russians from the plain which extends from Striesen to Döbritz, and to drive them back upon the heights, when the allied army should have been sufficiently disordered on the left. Unless circumstances should demand a different course of action, Napoleon's intention was to act on the offensive by his two wings, and to remain immoveable at the head of fifty thousand men in the centre of the line, which he had strengthened by more than a hundred additional pieces of artillery.

Napoleon was now, with one hundred and twenty thousand men, about to engage two hundred thousand, which was the number the allied army had attained after the arrival of Klenau's Austrians. Of these two hundred thousand there were one hundred and eighty thousand before Dresden, and twenty thousand before Pirna under Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg. But to counterbalance this inequality in numbers, Napoleon had the advantage of his combinations, and the forty thousand men under General Vandamme posted at Pirna, where they would be much more useful than they would have been before Dresden.

After he had given the most precise directions for the execution of the measures on which he had determined, Napoleon went to sup with the King of Saxony and his Marshals; and then, without revealing his plans, announced his expectation of a decisive battle on the morrow, which would be disastrous to the allies, and surrendered himself throughout the evening to an unusual spirit of mirth, retiring only at a late hour for the purpose of enjoying a little repose between two battles.

In the meantime, in the camp of the allies, where the day did not end thus gaily, it was resolved, after some deliberation, to remain on the hills surrounding Dresden, where they held a most excellent position. But no one thought of the Plauen Gorge, beyond which was a portion of the Austrian army, in a position in which it would be impossible to afford it any succour should it be imperilled. Indeed, Prince Schwarzenberg, from fear of a deficiency of strength at the centre, withdrew a portion of the troops which he had beyond the Plauen vale, and thus enfeebled his left wing, which he should have reinforced, and which, it is true, he thought would have been compensated for the loss of the troops of which he deprived it by the arrival of the second half of Klenau's corps.

On the following day, the 27th of August, it rained heavily, and during the intervals between the showers a

thick mist enveloped the field of battle, a circumstance which was distressing to the soldiers of the two armies, but favourable to Napoleon's plans. The early hours of the morning were passed in manœuvres, which, on our side, commenced by General Teste establishing himself, with the eight battalions which were under his command, in front of the village of Löbda, and at the entrance of the Plauen gorge, for the purpose of preventing the Austrian grenadiers under Bianchi from debouching from it, as they had done on the previous evening. Marshal Victor formed his three divisions, of which one was reduced to a brigade, in columns, at the foot of the heights, awaiting the execution of Murat's turning movement on the left of the Austrians; and Murat himself, leading Latour-Maubourg's heavy cavalry along the Priesnitz road, hastened to ascend, unperceived by the enemy, to the plateau on which he was to manœuvre. At the centre, Marmont, having the old guard behind him, and a strong force of artillery in front, took up a position at the foot of the Racknitz heights, ready to receive the instructions which Napoleon, whose own position was close at hand, should give him by word of mouth. A little to the left, but still in the centre, Saint-Cyr, having concentrated his three divisions, which on the previous evening had been distributed around the city, took up a position in advance of the Gross-Garten, where he would be ready to attack the Strehlen heights. Finally, at the extreme left, Ney, with the young guard and Nansouty's cavalry, defiled in columns behind the Gross-Garten, for the purpose of turning it and advancing to encounter the Russian troops between Gruna and Döbritz.

The positions of the allied troops were the same as those occupied by them on the previous evening, with the exception of certain rectifications, and they awaited almost immovably the attack for which they perceived across the mist the French troops preparing.

As soon as the troops had taken up their respective positions, and it became possible to discern objects across the mist, a cannonade was exchanged between the opposing forces, which soon became violent, the two armies having together not less than twelve hundred pieces of ordnance in position. In the meantime General Teste, on the right, took possession of Löbda, from which he drove the Austrian sharpshooters, and penetrated as far as the entrance of the Plauen gorge; whilst Marshal Victor, having formed his troops into several columns, commenced climbing the heights in the direction of the villages of Töltschen, Rosthal, and Corbitz, which he had been instructed to seize; and whilst

Murat deployed his sixty squadrons on the right of the *chaussée de Freyberg*, threatening the Austrians' left.

At the centre, Saint-Cyr, posted a little to the left of Marmont and the Old Guard, quitted the walls of the *Gross-Garten*, against which he had rested, took Strehlen from the Prussians, and engaged them in a terrific combat between this place and the *Leubnitz* heights; whilst Ney, having deployed between Gruna and *Döbritz*, advanced towards *Reieck*, driving before him Wittgenstein's advance guard.

With the exception of the serious engagement which took place between Saint-Cyr and the Prussians, in the direction of Strehlen, little took place up to eleven o'clock in the morning, save a violent cannonade, and the execution of manœuvres on the two wings. The allies, however, being unable to perceive what was taking place on their left, beyond the valley of *Plauen*, and perceiving on their right the steady and imposing march of Marshal Ney, were in doubt as to what course they should now pursue; when an idea conceived by General Jomini, and which consisted in throwing the Prussian troops upon Ney's flank, as soon as he should have arrived at *Prohlis*, whilst Barclay de Tolly should at the same time attack him in front with the Russian reserves, was proposed to and accepted by Alexander, and messengers were sent to the cold and methodical Barclay de Tolly, to persuade him to concur with all his forces in the execution of a manœuvre which was to be, it was thought, decisive.

But whilst this danger, more or less real, threatened Marshal Ney, the left of the allies was menaced by a danger about which there could be no doubt. About half-past eleven, Murat and Victor arrived in line beyond the *Plauen* gorge, and having well concerted their attack, began to execute it with promptitude and vigour. Marshal Victor carried to his left the division Dubreton, the division Dufour, reduced to one brigade, to his right, and held the division Vial in reserve. In the meanwhile, Murat, continuing to manœuvre, endeavoured, by advancing as far as *Comptitz*, to outflank the Austrian's left, formed by the division Meszko. When Murat appeared to have gained sufficient ground on the left of the Austrians, Marshal Victor gave the signal, and our troops advanced at quick march upon the three villages, *Töltschen*, *Rosthal*, and *Corbitz*. Led by energetic officers, our young soldiers pushed forwards with the utmost eagerness, in spite of a murderous fire of cannon and musketry, which the Austrians directed against them, and having first taken possession of the enclosed gardens which preceded them, threw themselves upon and

took the three villages, and then followed the Austrians who had fallen back upon the rising ground behind them. Suddenly the division Aloys Lichtenstein, perceiving a vacant space between two of our divisions,—that of Dubreton, which had advanced somewhat to the left towards Töltschen, and the division Dufour which was at Corbitz,—endeavoured to penetrate it, whereupon it was charged at a gallop by Bordessoulle's cuirassiers, who instantly broke and sabred two of its squares. The division Dufour then continued its advance along the Freyberg road, whilst on the left Dubreton's two brigades drove the Austrians towards the Plauen gorge, and overpowering them, took more than two thousand prisoners. At the same time Bordessoulle's cavalry renewing its assaults upon the division Aloys Lichtenstein drove it to the summit of the heights between Altfranken and Pesterwitz, and then thrust it down upon Potschappel, in the deepest part of the Plauen gorge, with the loss of many men and cannon. In the meantime, Murat, who had continued to watch the division Meszko, for the purpose of preventing its junction with Aloys Lichtenstein, now pushed it vigorously in the direction of Comptitz, for the purpose of driving it beyond the heights. Having repulsed with loss, the charge of three thousand Austrian horse, he attacked Meszko's infantry with his cuirassiers, and drove it before him with continued slaughter, for more than a league along the Great Freyberg road; until at length being outflanked and surrounded by our squadrons, the six or eight thousand men of which it was composed were compelled to lay down their arms. In two hours Murat had slain or wounded four or five thousand men, made twelve thousand prisoners, and taken rather more than thirty pieces of cannon. The rout of the enemy's left wing was in fact complete; and it may be fairly said, that it no longer existed.

Whilst these events were taking place on the allies' left, a strange accident occurred at the centre, where Napoleon was exchanging a vigorous cannonade with the Austrians, and where he himself directed the operations of his batteries in the very thickest of the fire. At the same time, the Emperor was at a point exactly opposite, at Racknitz, accompanied by General Moreau, who seeing the danger of the position, advised him to withdraw somewhat further back. This advice had barely been given, and was on the very point of being executed, when a bullet from the batteries of which Napoleon was personally directing the fire, struck the general on his legs, and hurled him and his horse to the ground. A strange stroke of fortune, this!

which made the instrument of his death, a ball from a French cannon, fired, as it were, by Napoleon's own hand.

As the news of this incident spread throughout the allied army, together with information of the disasters suffered on its left wing, and the refusal of Barclay de Tolly to execute the manœuvre against Ney which had been proposed to him, an officer came from Pirna to announce that Vandamme, debouching from Kœnigstein, had taken this post from Prince Eugène of Wurtemberg. And now, alarmed at the misfortunes suffered on their left, exposed to a violent cannonade in the centre, and threatened with being outflanked on their right by the movement of Marshal Ney, who advanced uninterrupted from Reick upon Prohlis, and fearing that the Péterswalde route would speedily be in the hands of Vandamme, the generals surrounding Alexander and the King of Prussia betook themselves to the consideration of the plan it would now be desirable to pursue, and as Prince Schwarzenberg, frightened at the loss of twenty thousand men on his left, and in want of ammunition by reason of the dilatoriness of his transports, peremptorily refused to continue the battle, it was resolved to retreat towards the Bohemian mountains by which the allied troops had entered Saxony.

As column after column of the enemy was perceived retreating behind the crest of the hills by which Saxony is surrounded, the most vehement delight spread throughout the ranks of our army; and Murat's horse, still following the Freyberg route, every moment took large numbers of prisoners, together with baggage waggons and artillery. At the same time the cannonade at the centre was directed against the enemy with even increased vigour, and Saint-Cyr and Ney *s'ebraulant* on the left climbed the heights in pursuit of the Russians. At six o'clock in the evening we had taken fifteen or sixteen thousand prisoners and forty pieces of cannon, whilst ten or eleven thousand of the allied troops lay killed or wounded on the earth. Our own loss during the day amounted to eight or nine thousand men, the greater number of whom had been struck down by the enemy's fire.

Napoleon returned to Dresden at even fall in the midst of the most enthusiastic cries from the populace, who were delighted at having been relieved from the presence of the two hundred thousand troops of the allies, who would not have released them from the French until they had previously made Dresden endure all the horrors which attend the taking of a town by assault. Having been exposed for more than twelve hours to incessant rain, the brim of his hat

hung down upon his shoulders, and he was covered with mud; but he did not the less beam with satisfaction. He went to the King of Saxony, who expressed the most lively gratification at the events of the day, and in the midst of the congratulations, sincere or affected, which met him on every side, he continued to repeat one question. At the moment when the bullets which had struck Moreau fell into the midst of the Emperor Alexander's staff, Napoleon had clearly perceived from the splendour of the uniforms that the group must be the staff of one of the sovereigns, and was never tired of asking throughout the day—"And who is it, then, whom we have killed?" A few minutes after his return to Dresden the question was answered in the most remarkable manner. The illustrious man who had been wounded had a dog which had remained in the cottage where his master had been carried to receive the first attentions required by his wounds, and this dog was now brought to Napoleon, bearing upon his collar the inscription; "*I belong to General Moreau.*" And thus it was that Napoleon became informed of Moreau's presence and death in the allied army!

The allies having retreated to the summit of the heights which surround Dresden, deliberated upon the line along which it would be advisable to conduct their retreat; some advising the adoption of a position at the debouching of the Bohemian mountains—advice which had also been given by General Moreau before the battle; and others, amongst whom was Prince Schwarzenberg, expressing a wish for an immediate retreat into Bohemia, beyond even the Eger. To remain on the slopes of the mountains in the presence of a victorious enemy so accustomed as Napoleon was to turn a victory to the greatest possible account, was not to be thought of, and it only remained to decide by what roads the passage across the mountains should be effected. And with reference to this subject it had to be considered on the one hand, that the Péterswalde route was much endangered and might possibly be completely barred by Vandamme, who occupied a position on the Pirna plateau, and on the other, that if the retreat were not conducted by this route Prince Eugène de Wurtemberg and the Count Ostermann, who had been sent to his aid, would be left unsupported, and almost inextricable confusion would be caused on the secondary roads by which the retreat must then be conducted. It was ultimately decided that the bulk of the Russian troops under Barclay de Tolly should follow Count Ostermann by the Péterswalde route, re-opening it by force if necessary, and that the Prussian and a portion of the Austrian troops should take the route passing by Altenberg, Zinnwald, and Tœplitz;

and, finally, that the remainder of the Austrian army should proceed by the Freyberg road for the purpose of gaining the great road running from Leipzig to Prague by Commotau. The result of these arrangements was, that the allied army would return to Bohemia in three columns instead of the four of which it had been previously composed.

On the following morning the troops of the allies proceeded on their march as had been arranged on the previous evening, pursued by the French corps, which, however, were kept at some distance from the enemy by the bad state of the roads. At every step the allied troops left behind them wounded, stragglers, and baggage waggons, which fell into our hands, and continued their march overwhelmed by dismay. The King of Prussia saw in the events of the last few days the continuance of his ordinary bad fortune, and Alexander asked himself whether the gleam of success on which he had relied had not been a sad illusion, and if he had not hoped too much in flattering himself that he should vanquish Napoleon.

Barclay de Tolly finding the Péterswalde route much encumbered, and perceiving that he should be soon close pressed, began to fear that he should be unable to strike the Altenberg route sufficiently soon, and suddenly resolved to take a new direction with the bulk of the Russian army, and to turn to the right for the purpose of regaining the same Altenberg route which was being traversed by the Prussians and a portion of the Austrian army, at the risk of producing upon it the most frightful state of confusion. He sent orders to Count Ostermann to fall back upon himself, and to leave Prince Eugène to return alone by the Péterswalde route to Bohemia.

These orders gave rise to a vehement dispute between Prince Eugène de Wurtemberg and Count Ostermann; for the former, who was struggling with General Vandamme for the possession of the Péterswalde route, was reasonably unwilling to remain without support, exposed to the danger of finding Vandamme on his flank, in his rear, or even in front. Besides, he remonstrated, if Vandamme's corps should be permitted freely to enter Bohemia, it would probably post itself at Toeplitz, at the very neck of the roads which the retreating columns were following, and cause them no little embarrassment, Count Ostermann, on the other hand, unwilling to compromise the safety of the troops of the guard which had been entrusted to him, refused for a time to yield to the Prince's urgent remonstrances; but ultimately, persuaded by the convincing reasons brought forward by the latter in support of his views, he determined at length to

follow the Péterswalde route, and even to fight his way along it, if necessary, so as to arrive before General Vandamme at the Tœplitz debouche.

On the morning of the 28th, accordingly, Prince Eugene and Count Ostermann began to advance along the Plateau de Gieshübel, which is situated below that of Pirna, and separated from it only by the Gotleube rivulet, and having succeeded with some loss in reaching its extremity, issued by the Gieshübel slope, and thus gained the Péterswalde route. But although Vandamme had been prevented by the difficulty attending the conveyance of artillery over roads broken up by the inclemency of the weather, from checking the progress of the Russian troops, he pursued them with the utmost vigour, engaged their rear-guard at Gieshübel, where it lost a thousand men, and pursued them closely as far as Hollendorf, where he impatiently awaited orders from Napoleon, as to his future movements.

Such were the operations of the enemy during the 28th, and in the meantime, Napoleon, who had risen at a very early hour, sent orders in writing, to the effect that Marshal Mortier with the young guard, and Marshal Saint-Cyr with the 14th corps, were to advance to Gieshübel, one of the defiles of the Péterswalde route, for the purpose of effecting a junction with Vandamme; that Marshal Marmont should follow the allies by the Altenberg route; and that Murat, who was accompanied by Victor's corps, should pursue them with the utmost vigour along the great Freybourg route. Having ridden at daybreak with Marshal Marmont, and observed with his own eyes the enemy's retreat, Napoleon had beheld, on arriving at the heights of Dresden, the various columns of the allied troops, directing their course towards the wooded mountains of the Erz-Gebirge. Struck by the transverse movement from left to right, executed by the Russian troops of Barclay de Tolly, and perceiving that Marshal Marmont's corps was manifestly insufficient to deal with the masses of hostile troops which this movement would have the effect of throwing upon the Altenberg route, he ordered Marshal Saint-Cyr to fall back from Dohna to Maxen, for the purpose of approaching Marshal Marmont, and pursuing the enemy in concert with him.

Having given this order by word of mouth, Napoleon proceeded to Pirna, where he arrived about noon, and where, after having partaken of a slight repast, he was seized with a pain in the stomach, to which he was subject after exposure to damp. The attack was not, however, of a nature to prevent him from giving orders, and taking such measures as circumstances rendered necessary. But at this moment

he received the despatches which he awaited with impatience from the environs of Berlin, and the banks of the Bober; and which informed him that Marshal Oudinot having, in the first place, been prevented entering Berlin by the inundations, had, in the next place, failed to attack the enemy in sufficient force, and had his corps severely handled; whilst Marshal Macdonald, on the Bober, had allowed Blücher to surprise him, and had suffered considerable loss. And thus the horizon of Napoleon's fortunes, after having been so perfectly serene, began to be overcast with shadows. He had always regarded the march upon Berlin as of great importance, both politically and as a matter of military tactics; and now, the reverses suffered by Marshals Macdonald and Oudinot having rendered the execution of this march as well more difficult as of more doubtful issue, it appeared to him that he ought immediately to return to Dresden to direct the measures which the posture of affairs demanded. Convinced, as he was, that the Russian columns had had time to regain the Péterswalde route, and that all that Vandamme could now do was to pursue them vigorously, he thought that it would be sufficient to leave at Vandamme's disposal all the divisions he had already confided to him, and making him descend into Bohemia by the Péterswalde route, to move him upon Tœplitz, where he would strike the line of retreat of the allied troops. It was very probable that Vandamme, posted at Kulm or at Tœplitz, would make more than one good capture, and would be able, by falling back between Tetschen and Aussig, to carry off a great portion of the matériel of the allied troops whenever they should endeavour to recross the Elbe. And in this position Vandamme would render another service by occupying the direct Prague route, to which Napoleon attached the highest importance, in accordance with the idea which he had conceived since he had received Oudinot's and Macdonald's despatches, of executing an overwhelming march upon Berlin or Prague, for the purpose of falling unexpectedly on the army of the north, or completing the defeat of that of Bohemia. Considering, then, the position of affairs under this new aspect, he left at General Vandamme's disposal not only his two first divisions, Philippon and Dumonceau, with the brigade Quoyot, forming the half of the division Teste, but also the first division of Marshal Saint-Cyr, which had been lent to him, and a brigade of Victor's corps, to recompense him for the loss of the half of the division Teste. As he added to these troops General Corbineau's cavalry, Vandamme would have under his command what was equivalent to four divisions of infantry and

three brigades of cavalry, the whole amounting to at least forty thousand men. Having given Vandamme his orders, Napoleon posted Mortier at Pirna, with four divisions of the Young Guard, that he might, if necessary, afford support to General Vandamme, from whom he would not be more than seven or eight leagues distant; and then, having sent directions to Saint-Cyr, Marmont, Victor, and Murat, to pursue the allied troops with the utmost vehemence, he set out for Dresden, where he ordered the old Guard to join him.

Saint Cyr, Marmont, Victor, and Murat, continued to pursue the enemy very closely throughout the 28th, taking altogether about five or six thousand prisoners, and a large quantity of matériel. The loss which the allies had suffered on the previous day to about twenty-five thousand men, and as this number was now raised to thirty-two or thirty-three thousand, they began to give such evident signs of discouragement as could not but excite hopes in our army of important results, should the enemy be vigorously pursued.

On the following day, the 29th, Vandamme, excited by the orders which he had received on the previous evening, resolved to make the Russians expiate their success in passing before him on the Pirna plateau. Having long suffered under a sense of bitterness at not having been raised to the rank of Marshal, whilst it had been bestowed upon some whose merit was inferior to his own, this general, whose genuine military talents were unfortunately somewhat blemished by manners too redolent of the camp, and an excessive violence of temper, now found circumstances bringing him under the Emperor's notice, and flattered himself that he should at length obtain the rewards which he considered that he had long deserved, and felt inspired by a zeal which, serviceable as it might have been at any other time, was too calculated at the present moment to hurry him beyond the bounds of prudence. He boldly advanced, then, on the morning of the 29th, on the Russian rear guard, and attacking between Hollendorf and Péterswalde a Russian column, which attempted to check his progress, utterly routed it, with the loss of two thousand men.

After this exploit, Vandamme continued to pursue the Russians with the utmost vigour; and having crossed the mountains, and descended into the plain in their track, arrived about noon at Kulm, from whence he commanded a view of the vast basin in which the enemy's columns, closely followed by our troops, now began to debouch. As soon as he appeared at this point, the troops under Eugene de Wurtemberg and Ostermann's guards took up a position in front of him, for the purpose of covering the débouché de Tœplitz,

of the importance of which they were fully aware, and where Vandamme had desired to bar the road to the enemy's columns, which had taken the routes parallel with those of Péterswalde. Unfortunately, however, the French general had at his immediate disposal only his advanced guard, the remainder of his troops following in a long line through the gorges; and as the Russians were in force, and appeared to be resolved to maintain their ground, he resolved to halt until the remainder of his troops should have come up.

Taking advantage of this interval to learn what had been the proceedings of the allies, we shall find that Alexander had passed the night of the 28th at Altenberg, at the foot of the Erz-Gebirge mountains, and having crossed the one known as the Geyersberg, had arrived on the other side early on the morning of the 29th, when he immediately perceived the necessity of offering a determined resistance to Vandamme, for the purpose of securing the retreat of the allied army. He had lost the counsellor in whom he had placed so much confidence, General Moreau, for he was now being carried dying on his soldiers' shoulders; but there still remained to him Jomini, whom, in spite of his impetuosity, Moreau had pointed out as very capable of giving good military advice. And now General Jomini, supported by many others who were strongly disposed to decry the Austrians, and especially Prince Schwarzenberg, animadverted bitterly on the plan of retreating beyond the Eger, declaring such a movement to be not only unnecessary, but even dangerous; and the Emperor Alexander, who began to understand the art of war somewhat better, appreciated the force of the objection, and was very disposed to modify his plans accordingly. Ever eager at the least gleam of hope to engage the French troops in battle, all the generals by whom Alexander was now surrounded, were of opinion that the moment had now come when they should resume the hand to hand struggle with the enemy, and that, instead of retreating beyond the Eger, it was necessary to maintain their ground. As Barclay de Tolly and General Diebitch, who had become chief of the staff, coincided with their opinion, orders were given to Prince Eugene de Wurtemberg and d'Osternann to remain firm in front of Kulm; and at the same time M. de Metternich, who was at Duchs, the château of the celebrated Wallenstein, where the allied sovereigns were now assembled, was persuaded to give orders that all the Austrian troops should converge on the left, for the purpose of forming in line with the Russian troops, which had descended from Péterswalde.

Some hours must necessarily elapse, however, before any

considerable amount of forces could be brought into line in accordance with these orders; and Vandamme finding the fugitive troops halting and becoming rapidly more numerous, resolved to dislodge them at once from the position in which they appeared inclined to establish themselves, for the purpose of protecting against us the Geyersberg débouchés. He had at this moment at his immediate disposal only the brigade de Reuss, but with that alone he now drove the Russians from Kulm, where they had attempted to maintain their ground, and from the village of Straden, upon which they retreated. Beyond the village of Straden, however, there was a second position situated behind a ravine, and, apparently, of considerable strength. Resting on the side towards our right on the mountains, it was supported in the centre by the village of Priesten, which stood on the Tœplitz route, and was flanked on its left by wide grass lands, intersected by canals and the village of Karbitz. Vandamme was anxious by an immediate attack on the village of Priesten to prevent the Russians from establishing themselves there, but he now for the first time encountered an obstinate resistance, and was repulsed by a charge of the Ismailow guards. As he had neither his heavy artillery nor masses of infantry at hand, he was compelled to await the arrival of the division Monton-Duvernet; and it would evidently have been better to have deferred further operations, until the presence of his whole corps had enabled him to engage the enemy with sufficient forces. As however, a considerable time must necessarily elapse before his other divisions could be at hand, his anxiety to cut off the enemy's retreat led him to attack the enemy with the nine battalions, which alone were present at this moment, of the fourteen of which General Monton-Duvernet's division was properly composed. Carrying these nine divisions to the right towards the wood, he renewed the combat, and drove the Russians upon Priesten; but being suddenly assailed by forty squadrons of the Russian guard, our troops again found themselves in a position in which, instead of advancing, they could only with some difficulty keep the ground they had already gained. At two o'clock in the afternoon appeared the first brigade of Vandamme's first division (Philippon), and the second brigade followed under General Fezensac. But although the troops of these brigades entered into action immediately with the utmost vigour, Vandamme perceived too late that this desultory mode of attack could have no effectual results, and determined to establish himself on the Kulm height, which, situated at the débouché of the Péterswalde causeway, commanded the plain. After one vain attempt to

drive us from this position, the Russians fell back in their turn, and resumed their position at Priesten.

General Vandamme's intention was to remain at Kulm, until Mortier, who had remained in his rear at Pirna, should come to his aid; and that Saint-Cyr and Marmont, who were on his right on the other side of the mountains, crossed them in the track of the allies. As these movements might be easily executed in twelve or fifteen hours, he hoped, by making active use of all the forces at his command, to be able to lay before the Emperor on the following day, the 30th, results which should be not wholly contemptible. He wrote that same evening to Napoleon, informing him of his position, requesting reinforcements, and announcing that he should remain immovable at Kulm until they arrived.

As letters sent from Kulm on the evening of the 29th could not reach Dresden until the morning of the 30th, the orders issued in accordance with demands made in such letters could not be executed in time to afford Vandamme the aid he required sufficiently early on the 30th. But the fact was, that Napoleon, supposing from the information he had already received that the allies were in a state of complete rout, and that whilst the unslacking vigour with which they would be pursued by Saint-Cyr, Marmont, and Murat, would drive them across the mountains in disorder, Vandamme, posted on the other side, would be enabled to take large bodies of them prisoners, and, perhaps, close against them entirely the Altenberg débouché. He was, moreover, at this moment, entirely absorbed by a vast combination, which would enable him, he hoped, to advance upon the Berlin route five marches from Dresden, to crush the army of the north, to humble by one and the same blow Prussia and Bernadotte—to revictual the fortresses on the Oder—to send *encouragements* to those on the Vistula, and thus to give a new aspect to the war, the theatre of which would be transferred for a time to the north of Germany. And thus Berlin, and the fortresses on the Oder and the Vistula, which had already caused him to give too wide a scope to the circle of his operations, once more engrossed his attention, and turned it from the direction in which, for some hours at least, it should have been concentrated. Entirely carried away by the singularly great but singularly ill-timed idea by which his mind was now occupied, he sent orders in the course of the morning of the 30th, to Marshal Mortier, then at Pirna, to send to Dresden two of the divisions of the young guard, and with the two others to proceed to the aid of Vandamme; to Murat, to place at the disposal of him, Napoleon, half the heavy cavalry, and with the remainder to continue the

pursuit of the enemy along the Freyberg road; to Marshal Marmont, to push the enemy with the utmost vigour upon the Altenberg and Zinnwald *débouché*; and to Marshal Saint-Cyr, to aid Marmont in this operation, or, which would be better, to endeavour to gain the Péterswalde causeway by a side road, so as to effect a junction with Vandamme.

In the meantime, the allies were far from being occupied with such vast plans as these, being only anxious to escape from the perils to which they had exposed themselves by imprudently descending upon the rear of Dresden. Desirous before all things to hold Vandamme in check, they carried to the left all the Prussian and Austrian troops which arrived at Töplitz by the Altenberg road, and posted them behind Priesten and Karbitz, hoping, by that means, to prevent the French general from debouching from Kulm, and so to procure time for the safe passage of their columns across the mountains. There was great cause for anxiety, however, in respect of the Prussian corps under Kleist, which was to have followed the Austrian corps in the first movement of retreat, and was to have passed with it by Dippoldiswalde, but which had been prevented from executing this movement by the transversal movement executed by Barclay de Tolly, who had abruptly fallen back from the Péterswalde causeway upon the Altenberg road, for the purpose of avoiding Vandamme. Delayed in its march, and forced to wait until the road was free, this corps was still on the evening of the 29th on the other side of the Geyersberg, and was considered to be in a position of extreme peril. The King of Prussia, therefore, after having conferred on the matter with the Emperor Alexander, sent Colonel Schöeler, one of his aides-de-camp, to General Kleist, to inform him of the presence of Vandamme at Kulm, to give him liberty to choose by which road he would endeavour to release himself from his perilous position, and to promise him that the enemy would be energetically opposed before Kulm on the following day, for the purpose of affording him leisure to traverse the mountain and debouch in the basin of the Eger.

On the morning of the 30th of August, the two armies found themselves occupying the same positions as on the previous evening; the allies facing Vandamme, with their left, composed of Russian troops, close to the mountains, their centre, also composed of Russian troops, in advance of Priesten, and, *vis-à-vis*, with Kulm, and their right, consisting of Austrians and the cavalry of the allied army, in the Karbitz grass lands.

Anxious as they were to assume the offensive for the purpose of favouring General Kleist's passage across the moun-

tains, and supposing, as they did, that Vandamme had only 30,000 troops at his disposal, they resolved to attack him without further delay.

The French general, on the other hand, having perceived from daybreak the disproportion between the enemy's forces and his own, and expecting every instant the appearance of General Mortier in his rear, and that of Marshal Saint-Cyr on his right, was desirous of remaining on the defensive until the arrival of his reinforcements. At 8 o'clock, the enemy's sharpshooters opened their fire, and ours replied; but no proceeding on either side foreboded the imminence of a serious engagement, until, suddenly, on our left, the Russian horse, under General Knorring, were perceived crossing an eminence which commanded the grass lands, and rushing upon a battery of field guns, which was somewhat in advance of our line of cavalry. Three pieces were taken, and a battalion of the 13th leger, which attempted to defend them suffered severe loss. The light cavalry brigade of General Heinrodt, led by the gallant Corbineau, then charged the Russian cuirassiers and repulsed them; but Colleredo's Austrian infantry, moving up to the support of the latter, Heinrodt's chasseurs were compelled to fall back, General Corbineau, who was wounded in the head, having to quit the field.

Vandamme now advanced the brigade Quoyot from the centre towards the left, where it had scarcely arrived when it was attacked by the whole of General Knorring's cavalry, and supported during more than an hour, formed into squares, the enemy's attempts to break them. At length, upon the enemy's cavalry attempting to turn our squares and approach Kulm, it was charged in its turn by the cavalry brigade of General Gobrecht, and thrown back upon the Austrian army. The enemy's object evidently was to throw us back upon the Péterswalde route by outflanking us, but his efforts had as yet been unsuccessful; and as we still remained in possession of the plain on the left, and were firmly posted in the centre and on the right, where the enemy appeared to be afraid of attacking us, we had, apparently, nothing to fear.

Suddenly, however, about ten o'clock in the morning, heavy firing was heard in our rear, and dense columns made their appearance in that direction, believed by Vandamme to be Mortier's troops arriving from Pirna. Terrible was his surprise, however, when, on running up, he perceived the Prussian uniform, and found that they were the troops of General Kleist, which had descended by the Péterswalde causeway. Let us turn our attention to the

accidental but fortunate and despairing movement which had released them from a position of frightful peril, and thus thrown them on our rear. At Kulm it had been apparent to General Kleist that, as he was between the Péterswalde route on the left, which was occupied by Vandamme, and the Altenberg route on the right, which had been encumbered all the day by the Russians and Austrians, and which was at that moment intercepted by Marmont's corps, it only remained to him to follow the foot-paths right before him, leading across the mountain, with the risk of meeting with Vandamme on his road. Moreover, as Saint-Cyr's corps was close on his rear, if he were now to hesitate for even a moment, his force might very probably be attacked and destroyed. In the presence of this triple danger, then, the Prussians, possessed by a transport of enthusiasm, climbed the mountain paths before them, prepared, should they lead them into the midst of the forces of Vandamme, to cut their way through them or perish in the attempt. And when they found themselves, thirty thousand strong, on Vandamme's rear, and discovered that the French General was assailed in front by a hundred thousand of the allied troops, they hastened to attack him, with the confident hope of obtaining some important result.

Vandamme immediately perceived that the only course now open to him was to reascend the Péterswalde causeway and to pass through the midst of the Prussian columns; abandoning his artillery for the purpose of saving his army. He lost no time in giving the orders necessary to the carrying out this resolution; and the brigades Quytot and Reuss forthwith quitted the plain on the left for the purpose of regaining the Péterswalde causeway, whilst Philippon and Mouton-Duvernet slowly fell back. At this sight the sixty Russian battalions which were opposite our right and centre, sent forth shouts of delight, and followed us. Mouton-Duvernet and Philippon held them in check, and they also suffered severely from the fire of our cannon posted on the heights of Kulm. But on the left in the plain, where there now remained only the brigade Dunesme, this brigade was beset by a formidable mass of enemies. In the rear, the brigades Quytot and Reuss, attempting to regain the Péterswalde route in close column, made a vigorous charge upon the Russians; at the same moment a brigade of cavalry, that of Montmarie, followed by many *soldats du train*, threw itself upon the Prussian artillery and took it. General de Fezensac, summoned to this point by Vandamme, contributed with the remnant of his brigade to the common effort. And this effort, as Kleist's first line had been broken

through, for a moment appeared likely to be successful, if Mouton-Duvernet and Philippon, falling back in time and in good order, should aid in forcing the Prussians' second line. But a strange accident now took place, and overthrew all the calculations of the unfortunate Vandamme; for our cavalry being charged by the enemy on the left of the route, and thrown back upon the right, precipitated itself in that direction, followed by a multitude of artillerymen who were separated from their pieces; and this body of fugitives, rushing upon the troops of Mouton-Duvernet and Philippon, threw them into a state of confusion, which ended in a general movement of retreat towards the woods. Dunesme's brigade alone remained on the plain, assailed in every direction, and defending itself with the utmost heroism, but ultimately broken and overwhelmed, a portion of its troops being killed or taken prisoners, and the remainder flying for refuge to the woods. Vandamme and Haxo, wounded and lingering last of all in the midst of peril, were made prisoners.

Such was the unfortunate affair of Kulm, which cost us five or six thousand men killed or wounded, seven thousand prisoners, forty-eight pieces of cannon, and two generals, and which, whilst costing the allies some six thousand men, relieved them from their position of defeat, re-inspired them with the hope of victory, and effaced from their minds the remembrance of the disasters they had suffered on the 26th and 27th of August.

Where can we look for the cause of this singular catastrophe? Shall we attribute it to Vandamme, saying that he ventured too much? or to Mortier and Saint-Cyr, complaining that they failed to afford him timely succour? or to Napoleon, on the ground that he trusted too much to the favourable progress of affairs? or shall we rather regard it as the legitimate consequence of the military skill displayed by the generals of the allied armies? The facts above narrated almost of themselves sufficiently answer these questions, and account for one of the greatest reverses of fortune of which the pages of history retain any record.

Vandamme, whose many faults were counterbalanced by many fine qualities, is certainly not blameable for the unfortunate results of these days; for if, after having wisely established himself at Kulm, it was General Kleist instead of Marshal Mortier who appeared in his rear, this was an extraordinary accident, to hold him responsible for which would be a crying injustice. During the catastrophe which followed, Vandamme preserved all his presence of mind, and took the only resolution which offered a chance of escape,

namely, that of retracing his steps and passing through the midst of the Prussian troops. He is not fairly open to reproach, and the supposition that he lost himself in a too eager pursuit of that Marshal's baton which, far more than others, he deserved for military services already performed, is a calumny upon a man whose misfortunes render him an object for pity rather than blame.

If it be admitted, however, that Vandamme is not to be blamed, having been unfortunate only in the fact that a Prussian corps appeared in his rear instead of the French one which he expected, what are we to say of the French generals who might have supported him, and more particularly of Marshals Mortier and Saint-Cyr, the only ones posted within reach of Kulm? Marshal Mortier established at Pirna, liable to be dispatched thence either to Dresden, on the one hand, or to Tœplitz on the other, might certainly, had he acted with more self reliance and vigilance, have hastened up to Vandamme's aid; but it was, at the same time, perfectly natural that, in the strict fulfilment of the orders he had received, he should await in complete immovability the expression of Napoleon's will; and with respect to the precise order given to him to aid Vandamme with two divisions, it is sufficient to state that this order did not reach him until the catastrophe had already taken place.

It would be well if we could say as much with respect to Marshal Saint-Cyr; but the fact is that, directed as he was to keep constantly on the track of Kleist's corps, he should never have lost sight of him for an instant, and had he fulfilled this positive duty the necessary result would have been, that when Kleist's corps fell upon Vandamme, it would itself have been attacked by a French corps in the rear, and would probably have been itself broken and routed instead of helping to break and rout the army of Vandamme. But unfortunately Marshal Saint-Cyr, never zealous for the success of any operations but those with the execution of which he was himself directly charged, and ever inclined rather to seek difficulties than to seek to overcome them, employed the 28th in moving to Maxen, and on the following day, the 29th, only advanced to Reinhards Grimme, thus making a movement of no more than a league and a half on the very day when it was important that the enemy should be pursued with the utmost vigour, and allowed Kleist to disappear from before him and fall upon Vandamme's rear, whilst he employed himself in inquiring of the staff whether he should not follow Marmont on the Altenberg route. On the following day, the 30th, when he received the order directing him to endeavour to effect a junction with Van-

damme by a lateral route, he at length aroused himself, and by the road which had led Kleist upon Vandamme's rear, and which should have conducted himself upon Kleist's rear, arrived just in time to hear the cannon which announced our disaster.

As for Marshal Marmont, he pushed the enemy as vigorously as he could, and engaged in several skirmishes which resulted to his advantage, but he was too far from Vandamme to be able to move up to his support. Posted decidedly on the right, he could not attempt to cross the mountains in advance of Saint-Cyr without exposing himself to falling alone amidst a crowd of enemies; and the catastrophe is not, therefore, to be attributed to any error of his. With respect to Murat, it is sufficient to say that it was impossible that he should have had any share in the deplorable event which took place at Kulm, since he and his squadrons were traversing at the time the great Freyberg route.

Of the persons who may be considered the responsible actors in this catastrophe it remains, finally, to speak of Napoleon himself, who, by sedulously following his lieutenants, might have made them converge towards a common point, and by his presence would certainly have obtained what he hoped and expected. But he was turned aside, on the 28th, from this duty, by the news which reached him from the neighbourhood of Lowenberg and Berlin, and also, it must be added, by the confidence he felt that the orders he had given were of themselves sufficient to secure the results he desired. Ever recurring to past experiences, Napoleon believed that he had done sufficient to render him certain of obtaining the most splendid triumphs. But unfortunately times were changed, and to have accomplished the destruction of the grand army of Bohemia would have required, at least, Napoleon's incessant superintendence of the execution of his designs. But now, distracted as he was by the passionate desire of obtaining all results at once, Berlin and Dantzic were as much means of leading him into error as Moscow had been during the previous year. Indeed, that he might strike a serious blow at Prussia and Germany, at Berlin, and be able to boast that his power extended from the Gulf of Tarentum to the Vistula, he had entertained the idea from the very commencement of this campaign of sending one of his corps to the Prussian capital, and keeping a garrison at Dantzic; and for the sake of these objects he had, as we have seen, allowed an error to creep into the finely-conceived plan he had formed for the conduct of the campaign, giving an excessive extent to the circle of operations, the central point of which was to be at

Dresden, placing Macdonald at Lowenberg instead of at Bautzen, and sending Oudinot against Berlin instead of establishing him at Wittenberg. And as the same cause continued to produce the same effects, he was anxious, on learning the misfortune which had happened to Macdonald, to succour him as soon as possible; and being also anxious to lead in person Oudinot's army to Berlin, he turned from Pirna and Kulm, where he ought to have been with his guard, and neglected to achieve victories, the consequences of which would have been of the utmost advantage to him, for the purpose of running after others, and thus exposed himself to the danger of losing everything from an over anxiety to obtain everything at once.

But for this catastrophe at Kulm alone must he be blamed, for in the details of the several manœuvres he had committed no fault. And at the same time it must be observed that the actual results were but little due to the merits of his enemies; a sentiment of despair rather than calculation having led them to carry into execution a combination which had the most unexpected and important consequences, and which was certainly due, not to the skill of the Emperor Alexander, to whom its merit has been attributed, but to the determination of the Prussian troops either to cut their way out of their perilous position or perish in the attempt. We must look, then, not so much to the military skill of the allies, although they were far from being deficient in this, as to the passionate spirit of patriotism which inspired them, and which rendered them comparatively indifferent to defeat, for the cause of their seizing with such promptitude the opportunity offered them at Kulm. Another important moral lesson to be drawn from these great events is, that care should ever be taken not to drive men to despair; since to do this is to endow them with a supernatural strength which may enable them to overthrow the best calculations, and to frustrate the plans of the most consummate skill.

The allies who, when they abandoned the battle-field of Dresden, regarded themselves as completely vanquished, and sadly questioned whether, in attempting to vanquish Napoleon, they had not undertaken an enterprise against destiny itself, suddenly, at the spectacle of the defeat and capture of Vandamme, regarded themselves as being once more in an excellent position, and believed that the balance of fortune between themselves and Napoleon was at least in equilibrium. It is true that the two days' fighting at Dresden, and the pursuit during the 28th and 29th, had cost them in killed, wounded, or prisoners, some forty thousand men, whilst the defeat of Vandamme had, at the most, cost us no more than

twelve thousand. But, nevertheless, the result was that a feeling of confidence had re-entered their hearts, and they resolved to close with Napoleon at every opportunity, and leave him not a moment in repose. For the allies, not to be vanquished was almost to be victorious; whilst for Napoleon, on the contrary, to have failed to annihilate his adversaries was to have done nothing. On such extreme and almost impossible conditions had he based his hopes of safety.

Let us conclude this sad story by mentioning that the only man who had for a moment been opposed to Napoleon, Moreau, died very near him at Tann. Both his legs had been cut off, and he had borne the operation with that tranquil courage which was his distinguishing characteristic. But his sufferings were terrible, and he had had to undergo a journey of twenty leagues, carried on the shoulders of men, the foes of his country, in a state of extreme bodily anguish. On the other side of the mountains, all the allied sovereigns, the King of Prussia, the Emperor of Austria, and the Emperor Alexander, had hastened to his side, and overwhelmed him with marks of esteem and regret. The most exalted personages, M. de Metternich, the Prince of Schwarzenberg, and the generals of the coalition, paid him visits; and the Emperor Alexander, who had conceived for him a genuine friendship, even clasped him in his arms. But Moreau, whose impetuous spirit had ever been an honest one, was rather embarrassed by than proud of these demonstrations, and asking himself what had been the real nature of the course he had pursued, repeated incessantly, "And yet I am not to blame! I only desired the good of my country. . . . I wished to free her from a humiliating yoke." Another exclamation which frequently escaped his lips was, "That Bonaparte is always fortunate!" He had uttered these words at the moment when the bullet struck him, and he repeated them many times before he expired. Bonaparte fortunate? He had been, and he might appear to be so to the eyes of a dying rival, but Providence was soon to pronounce its will respecting him, and to inflict upon him a fate sadder, perhaps, than that of Moreau, if indeed any fate can be sadder than that which makes a man die in the ranks of the enemies of his country.

BOOK L.

LEIPZIG AND HANAU.

THE course of events in Silesia and the environs of Berlin, during the operations of the belligerent armies around Dresden—The forces and instructions left with Marshal Macdonald when Napoleon returned from the Bober to the Elbe—Anxious to execute his instructions, and fearing to lose the advantages of acting on the defensive, this Marshal sets his troops in motion on the 26th of August—General Blücher attacks the division Charpentier and Sebastiani's cavalry, and drives them from the Janowitz plateau—This accident compels the whole army to make a retreat, which a heavy fall of rain lasting during several days, renders almost disastrous—Capture and destruction of the division Puthod—Marshal Macdonald's troops reduced from seventy thousand men to fifty thousand—His retrograde movement upon the Bober—Events on the side of Berlin—March of Marshal Oudinot at the head of the 4th, 12th, and 7th corps—Composition and strength of these corps—The army of the Prince Royal of Sweden—Arrival in front of Trebbin—The first positions of the enemy taken during the 21st and 22nd of August—Isolation of the three French corps during the 23rd, and disastrous combat engaged in by the 7th corps at Gross-Beeren—Retreat of Marshal Oudinot upon Wittenberg—Many soldiers desert their ranks, especially from those of our Allies—It is the knowledge of these serious checks which induces Napoleon on the 28th, to withdraw from Pirna upon Dresden, and turns his attention from Kulm—Being in ignorance as yet of what had happened to Vandamme, he forms the project of changing the theatre of the war, and transferring it to the north of Germany—Important results which might have proceeded from the execution of this project—On receiving information of the disaster at Kulm, Napoleon, compelled to restrict his scheme of action, reorganizes Vandamme's corps, confides it to the Count de Lobau, sends Marshal Ney to replace Marshal Oudinot in the command of the three corps moved back upon Wittenberg, and proposes to post himself with his reserves at Hoyerswerda, for the purpose of sending from the one side, Marshal Ney upon Berlin, and of taking on the other, a threatening position on the flank of General Blücher—Departure of the guard for Hoyerswerda—Macdonald turns Napoleon by fresh disquieting suggestions from the execution of his last project, and induces him to advance immediately upon Bautzen—Arrival of Napoleon at Bautzen on the 4th of September—Blücher's prompt retreat during the 4th and 5th of September—Napoleon has scarcely re-established Marshal Macdonald upon the Neisse, when a

second appearance of the army of Bohemia on the *Chaussée de Péterswalde* draws him back to Dresden—His interview at the advanced posts, with Marshal Saint-Cyr, on the 7th—Plan of action for the following day—In the meantime, Napoleon receives information of a fresh disaster, which has happened to his troops on the Berlin route—Marshal Ney, having received orders to march upon Barut, had made a flank movement on the 5th of September, in front of the enemy, which leads to the calamitous battle of Dennewitz—Retreat on the 7th of September, upon Torgau—A portion of the Saxon troops disband—Napoleon receives this news with calmness, but begins to entertain feelings of anxiety with respect to his position—Indirect instructions given through M. de Bassano to the minister of war, to arm and provision the fortresses of the Rhine—In conformity with the plan agreed on with Marshal Saint-Cyr on the 7th, Napoleon, during the 8th, acts vigorously against the Prussians and Russians, for the purpose of driving them back into Bohemia—In accordance with the advice of Marshal Saint-Cyr, the French troops follow on the 9th and 10th, the old Bohemia route, being that of Fürstenwalde, by which there is hope we may be able to turn the enemy—The impossibility of carrying the artillery across the Geyersberg, prevents the completion of this movement—Unaware that at that moment the Austrians were separated from the Prussians and Russians, and eager to repair the checks suffered by his lieutenants, Napoleon ceases to advance, and returns to Dresden—The plan of action adopted by the allies, and its too successful execution—Napoleon's forces reduced from three hundred and sixty thousand active troops on the Elbe, to two hundred and fifty thousand—In consideration of this state of things Napoleon contracts the circle of his operations, moves Macdonald with the 8th, 5th, 11th, and 3rd corps close to Dresden, posts the Count de Lobau behind excellent field works, sends a strong detachment of cavalry to disperse the bands of partisans in his rear, reorganizes Ney's corps on the Elbe, places Marshal Marmont and Murat at Grossenhayn for the purpose of protecting the arrival of his commissariat stores, and takes up his own position in the midst of his guard at Dresden—Third appearance of the Prussians and Russians at Péterswalde—The works, the construction of which he had ordered between Pirna, Gieshubel, and Dohna, not being completed, Napoleon is compelled to march yet once more, along the Péterswalde route, for the purpose of driving back the enemy into Bohemia—Prompt retreat of the allies—Napoleon's return to Pirna, and anxiety to establish himself well in his position, so as not to have to exhaust his strength in useless excursions—His resolution to establish his troops on the Elbe, from Dresden to Hamburg during the winter—Projects of the enemy—Blücher prevails on the Allied Sovereigns to employ General Benningsen's reserve in Bohemia, and after having thus reinforced the Grand Army of the allies, to march it upon Leipzig, whilst he should himself join Bernadotte, cross the Elbe with him in the neighbourhood of Wittenberg, and reascend to Leipzig with the armies of the north and of Silesia—First movements in execution of this design—Napoleon immediately perceives the enemy's intention and makes all his troops repossess to the left of the Elbe—Leaving only Macdonald with the 11th corps on the right of this river, Napoleon immediately discovers the intentions of the enemy and makes the whole of his troops pass over to the left of the Elbe—Leaving Macdonald only on the right of this river, he marches Marmont and Souham, the one by Leipzig and the other by Neissen, upon the Lower Elbe, for the purpose of affording support to Ney—He sends Lauriston and Poniatowski to the route running from Prague

to Leipzig, for the purpose of supporting Victor against the army of Bohemia—A pause of some days to allow time for the development of the enemy's plans—Blucher having stolen away for the purpose of joining Bernadotte, and crossing the Elbe at Wurtembourg, Napoleon quits Dresden on the 7th of October with the guard and Macdonald, and descends upon Wittenberg with the intention of fighting Blucher and Bernadotte first, and then falling back upon the grand army of Bohemia—Excellent plan formed by Napoleon for the purpose of driving back Blucher and Bernadotte upon Berlin, and surprising Schwarzenberg—A decided movement made by Blucher and Bernadotte upon Leipzig, changes all Napoleon's plans—Finding that the allies are on the point of concentrating themselves upon Leipzig, Napoleon hastens to arrive there before them for the purpose of preventing their junction—Return of the grand French army upon Leipzig—A terrible battle, the greatest of the age, and probably of any age, fought during three days under the walls of Leipzig—Napoleon retreats upon Lutzen—Destruction of the bridge of Leipzig, which causes the destruction or captivity of a portion of the French army—Death of Poniatowski—March upon Erfurt—Defection of Bavaria and arrival of the Austro-Bavarian army in the environs of Hanau—Rapid movement of the French army and the battle of Hanau—Humiliation of the Austro-Bavarian army—Return of the French to the Rhine—Their deplorable condition on arriving at Mayence—Operations of Marshal Saint-Cyr on the Elbe—The capitulation of Dresden—Situation, strength, heroic conduct, and misfortunes of the French garrisons uselessly left on the Vistula, the Oder, and the Elbe—Character of the campaign of 1813—Ominous presages to be drawn from it.



BOOK L.

LEIPZIG AND HANAU.

The serious and unexpected events which, suddenly engrossing Napoleon's attention, withdrew him from Kulm, had taken place on the Katzbach in Silesia, and at Gross-Beeren in Brandenburg. Marshal Macdonald, whom Napoleon had left in pursuit of Blucher, had met with a species of disaster, and Marshal Oudinot, whom Napoleon thought to be on the point of entering Berlin, had had to fall back in consequence of an unfortunate engagement with the enemy, under the cannon of Wittenberg. And the manner in which these events had been brought about we must now examine, if we would form an accurate idea of the situation of affairs, and be able to comprehend the plans which had absorbed Napoleon's attention during the 28th, 29th, and 30th of August, and had prevented him from hastening up with all his reserves to the aid of the unfortunate Vandamme.

After he had thrown back the army of Silesia from the Bober upon the Katzbach, Napoleon had left Marshal Macdonald to march in pursuit of it at the head of a force of eighty thousand men, consisting of the 3rd, 5th, and 11th corps, and ten or eleven thousand Poles under Prince Poniatowski, posted on the Bohemian frontier in the rear and on the right of Marshal Macdonald, for the purpose of guarding the Zittau débouché. The instructions he had given to Macdonald, were to the effect that he was to drive Blucher back beyond Jauer, then to establish himself strongly upon the Bober, between Lowenberg and Buntzlau, in such a manner as to keep the army of Silesia at a distance from Dresden, and to prevent the army of Bohemia from throwing detachments in the direction of Berlin.

An incident, however, which at first sight appeared to be of but little importance, had the effect of producing a most

disastrous change in this apparently advantageous state of affairs. Napoleon, at the moment of his departure, had ordered Marshal Ney to follow him to Dresden; and as this order did not express with sufficient explicitness that it referred to the Marshal only, and not to his troops, the 3rd corps itself had been set in motion on the Dresden route, and the result had been that the left wing of the French army had appeared to be in retreat. Blucher, whose character and position rendered him anxious to resume the offensive, had concluded from the retrograde movement of a portion of our line, that Napoleon was no longer present, and that the moment was an opportune one in which to return once more to the attack of the French army. At the same time, Marshal Macdonald, equally anxious to restore to his troops the attitude they had appeared to lose, hastened without due thought to carry them forward, and thus exposed them to a violent and immediate check.

The 3rd corps, (General Souham's) having first made a march backwards, and then a march forwards, in order to return to Liegnitz, had resumed on the 25th of August its original position. The 11th corps (General Gérard's) forming the centre, had not quitted Goldberg, and the 5th (General Lauriston's) forming the right, had also remained in its position. Having all his troops in line then, Marshal Macdonald resolved to advance on the following day (the 26th) upon Jauer, the position which Ney had in obedience to his instructions to occupy. Although Napoleon did not wish to establish his army of Silesia at any point more distant than the Bober, he yet desired that it should have its advanced posts on the Katzbach, from Jauer to Liegnitz, in order that it might the more readily obtain provisions, and the more surely intercept any detachment that might be sent from Bohemia to Berlin.

Although at Goldberg, Marshal Macdonald was on one of the arms of the Katzbach, and, consequently, very much beyond the Bober, there was a point of this river on his right which still remained in the possession of the enemy, being that of Hirschberg, in the mountains. He detached, therefore, a division of the 11th corps (General Ledru's), and ordered it to ascend the river on our side, that is by the left bank, whilst the division Puthod, of Lauriston's corps, should ascend it by the right bank, and thus surprise Hirschberg by both banks.

Macdonald resolved to march himself upon Jauer, with the corps of Lauriston and Gérard; and as he would have to cross on his way to Jauer no watercourse of any considerable size, but only a few ravines more or less deep, on which the enemy would probably be found posted in strength,

he flattered himself that he should be able to drive them from their position either by the direct attack of the troops under Gérard and Lauriston upon Jauer itself, or by a flank movement upon Liegnitz, to be executed by those under Generals Souham and Sebastiani.

He ordered, in fact, General Souham to set out from Liegnitz with the 3rd corps, and to take the route from this town to Jauer, which would lead him across the Janowitz plateau to the very flank of the enemy's position there; and he hoped that the appearance of twenty-five thousand French troops in this direction would take from the enemy any idea of resisting the attack in front which was to be executed by Generals Lauriston and Gérard. But unfortunately there was a considerable distance between the road which General Souham was to follow on the Janowitz plateau, and the route which Generals Gérard and Lauriston would have to traverse for the purpose of marching directly upon Jauer. General Gérard, the least distant of the two, would ascend the deep ravine of the Wutten-Neiss, a small and rapid stream falling from Jauer into the Katzbach, after turning the Janowitz plateau. For the purpose of establishing some connection between the two principal masses of his troops, Marshal Macdonald assigned to General Sebastiani an intermediate route, that from Buntzlau to Jauer, which, following at first the Wutten-Neiss ravine, and then crossing that river, terminated in the Janowitz plateau.

On the 26th it was found that a storm of rain, which had lasted during the whole night, had swollen all the rivers and rendered the roads almost impassable. In his eagerness, however, to resume offensive operations against the enemy, Marshal Macdonald refused to take into account the inclemency of the weather, and demanded that his orders should be immediately carried into effect; and accordingly, whilst the divisions Puthod and Ledru ascended the two banks of the Bober on their way to Hirschberg, Lauriston's and Gérard's corps marched upon Jauer; our active skirmishers succeeding, in spite of the difficulties of the nature of the ground and the weather, in dislodging those of the enemy, and compelling them at every point to fall back. On the left, however, matters did not proceed quite so satisfactorily.

General Sebastiani, who had set out somewhat tardily, had not reached the entrance of the Wutten-Neiss ravine when General Gérard had already penetrated it, and when Lauriston, who was marching parallel to him, was very much in advance. General Souham, in the meantime, having found the Katzbach overflowed at Liegnitz, had endeavoured to find a passage above it, and had thus entered upon the same

route as that pursued by General Sebastiani. The consequence was, that there were twenty-three or twenty-four thousand infantry, and five or six thousand cavalry, and more than a hundred pieces of cannon ingulphed in the Wutten-Neiss ravine at the very moment that the Prussian cavalry, reconnoitring, had descended the Janowitz plateau, and not perceiving our troops, had advanced into the ravine a considerable distance. General Gérard, perceiving from the opposite bank of the Wutten-Neiss, the Prussian squadrons, opened fire on their rear; the effect of which was to lay many of them low, but at the same time to warn them of the danger of their position, and to cause them to retrace their steps with the utmost speed.

This incident suggested to Marshal Macdonald the idea of throwing some battalions of the division Charpentier, one of General Gérard's two, upon the Janowitz plateau, to take possession of it, and thus aid Generals Sebastiani and Souham to deploy there; General Charpentier, accordingly, with one of his brigades and a field battery, forthwith crossed the Wutten-Neiss at Nieder-Krayn, and ascending to the Janowitz plateau deployed upon it in spite of the Prussian advanced posts. He was immediately joined on his left by General Sebastiani's cavalry; and General Souham proceeded to follow him as fast as the weather, the nature of the ground, and the accumulation of troops in the narrow defile through which he had to pass would permit.

At this moment, Blücher came up to this same point with the greater number of his troops; for, relying upon the strength of the Jäuer position, he had left there only Langeron's corps, and had moved up both York's and Sacken's to the Janowitz plateau for the purpose of meeting the flank movement by which he was threatened. On beholding our troops climbing up the brink of the ravine for the purpose of establishing themselves on the plateau, he sent forward a strong field battery, and when this had played on the brigade of General Charpentier for some time, hurled upon it a mass of ten thousand cavalry, the assaults of which our infantry bravely checked, not with the fire of their muskets, which the rain had rendered useless, but with the points of their bayonets. General Sebastiani charged this body of cavalry in its turn, and succeeded for a moment in driving it back, but he was ultimately compelled to give way, being unable to resist, for any time, forces treble his own, and was forced to make a retrograde movement, thereby leaving exposed the left of the brigade Charpentier, which Blücher then attacked with twenty thousand infantry, and, in spite of its heroic resistance, drove back into the Wutten-Neiss ravine, where it became mingled

pêle-mêle with Sebastiani's cavalry, which had also fallen back, and with the head of Souham's corps which had then arrived. The consequence being that in a state of the greatest confusion and with the loss of many cannon, the horses of which were destroyed by the enemy's fire, our troops had to retreat as far as the village of Kroitsch, where the Wutten-Neiss joins the Katzbach, and beyond which Blucher dared not pursue us.

The result of this check at a single point, which cost us at the most but a thousand men, had the effect of converting into a species of general rout, an operation which along all the other portions of our line had been successful. In fact, Generals Gérard and Lauriston, attacking with great energy the positions which Langeron had successively occupied and abandoned, had already arrived within sight of Jauer in spite of the inclemency of the weather, and were about to take possession of it, when they were stopped by the news of what had taken place on their left, and being compelled in common prudence to retrace their steps, they went back as far as Goldberg, which they reached about midnight, in a very deplorable state, having on their way fallen in with the débris of the troops which had been defeated on the Janowitz plateau, and having had to traverse a road choked up with baggage waggons and crowds of wounded. They had to bivouac in the midst of torrents of rain as well as they could, some in Goldberg and some outside of it, for the most part without either provisions or shelter, and altogether in a condition as deplorable as any could well be.

On the following morning, the skies still continued to pour forth a torrent of rain; but, fortunately, the Katzbach, which our troops had passed on the previous evening, had become so swollen as to serve as a protection against the impetuous pursuit of Blucher, whose infantry could not cross it. Nevertheless, our retreating troops were pursued by a cloud of Russian and Prussian cavalry, whose repeated attacks, although bravely held in check by our bayonets, rendered it necessary to leave on the road a great portion of our artillery, and many of our troops who had scattered themselves amongst the villages in search of food. General Souham's corps, being covered by General Sebastiani's cavalry, was able to retreat in safety across the plain and reach Buntzlau; but the corps of Generals Gérard and Lauriston, more closely pursued, and having no heavy cavalry with which to cover their retreat, found shelter in the woods which separate the Katzbach from the Bober, where they passed the night much as they had passed the preceding one. On the 28th, they were once more opposite Lowenberg, and were desirous of

crossing the Bober there, but in vain, for although the bridge still stood, the troops would have had to pass across an inundated tract of country three quarters of a league in extent to reach even the river side, and they had, therefore, to re-descend its right bank for the purpose of crossing it at Buntzlau, where Souham and Sebastiani had already arrived.

When he had re-entered Buntzlau, Marshal Macdonald was far from considering the cruel fatality which appeared to pursue him as at an end, for he had still to tremble for the safety of the division of Puthod, which was evidently in a most dangerous position. Should it not have taken advantage of the Hirschberg bridge, to cross to the other side of the Bober? The fact was, that this division, which had ascended one bank of the Bober whilst the division Ledru ascended the other, had neglected to make use of the Hirschberg bridge whilst it was yet time, and had found itself separated from its companions-in-arms by an immense tract of water. On the 29th, it descended by the right bank to a point opposite Lowenberg, near Zopten, and there, when reduced by fatigue, hunger, and the cold of the nights, from six thousand men to three thousand, it was attacked by Blucher's troops, and after a valiant defence, completely broken up.

On the 30th, Macdonald's troops were once more collected on the left bank of the Bober, but reduced from seventy thousand men to fifty thousand, and after having left behind them in the marshes a hundred pieces of cannon. Of the twenty thousand troops wanting, not more than three thousand had fallen before the enemy's fire, seven or eight thousand of the remainder having been taken prisoners, and nine or ten thousand having deserted from their ranks; a too sudden experience of the sufferings of war having excited anew in the breasts of these latter the sentiments of hatred they had felt six months before on quitting their cottage homes, for the man who sacrificed them whilst only on the threshold of manhood to his inordinate ambition.

In the meantime, our arms had suffered a reverse on the Berlin route, which, although of a less startling character than that above described, was succeeded by equally disastrous consequences.

We have seen how important Napoleon considered it that one of his corps should march upon Berlin, for the purpose of driving the army of the north far from the theatre of the war, humiliating Bernadotte, startling the minds of the Germans by entering the chief of their capitals, inflicting a severe wound on the Tugend-Bund, dissolving the scattered elements, of which he believed Bernadotte's army to be composed, and finally, to succour our garrisons on the

Oder and the Vistula. To attain these various ends he had placed at Marshal Oudinot's disposal, besides the 12th corps, which the Marshal commanded in person, the 7th, which was under the immediate command of General Reynier, and the 4th, which was confided to General Bertrand. The 12th, comprising two good French divisions and a Bavarian one, and numbering some eighteen thousand men, the 7th, formed of the French division Durutte and two Saxon divisions, and numbering twenty thousand men, the 4th, consisting of one French division (Morand's) and two foreign ones, (the Italian division Fontanelli and the Wurtembergian division Franquemont) and consisting altogether of twenty thousand men, and lastly, a cavalry reserve of six thousand men under the Duke of Padua. This army, which consisted of only sixty-four thousand men instead of the seventy thousand, which Napoleon had hoped it would have comprised, and contained, besides, many foreign troops, which were not only very indifferent soldiers, but also, in many instances, very ill-disposed towards us, was far from being as well commanded as could have been wished; for Marshal Oudinot, who was as brave and resolute on the field of battle as any one could be, was endowed with a noble modesty of nature which rendered him distrustful of himself, and unwilling to enforce the adoption of his views by his lieutenants, Generals Reynier and Bertrand. Now General Reynier, skilful and valuable officer as he was, was unfortunately full of a self-conceit, which led him to believe himself superior to most of the marshals, and to be somewhat too impatient to obtain a dignity for which he had already had to wait, he thought, too long, whilst General Bertrand, who was honoured by Napoleon's favour, and justified the honour by the most zealous application to his duties, but who was better qualified for the conduct of engineering works than the command of troops, was accustomed to display a deference which was more apparent than real, and was of a character rather obsequious than submissive. The consequence was, that Marshal Oudinot, much embarrassed by having to overrule the several pretensions of his lieutenants, only ventured to do so with an excess of delicate precaution incompatible with the prompt and vigorous exercise of a military command. Posted, however, nearer the field of action than Napoleon, and able to gather information from the rumours flying about the country, he did not allow himself, as did the latter, to entertain false news respecting the strength of the enemy and the difficulties which would be thrown in the way of the French troops by the nature of the ground. He knew that Bernadotte was at the head of a force numbering some ninety thousand excellent troops, posted in

advance of Berlin, that the Prince of Sweden had detached under General Walmoden twenty thousand troops, of various nations, to make head behind the numerous Mecklenberg canals, against the corps d'armée which had marched from Hambourg, under Marshal Davoust, and that the remainder of the one hundred and fifty thousand under the command of the Prince of Sweden, had been devoted to the blockade or siege of the fortifications on the Oder and the Vistula. Nor did the nature of the ground lessen the difficulties of the task which he had to perform. In his march upon Berlin by a route between the Elbe and the Spree, he would have to proceed between a double line of waters, which may be instanced in the one case, by the river of the Dahne, which falls into the Spree above Berlin, and in the other, by the river of the Nuthe, which falls into the Havel at Potsdam. In the bosom of the angle formed by this double line of waters, was the army of the north, established in a good position, that of Ruhlsdorf, covered with powerful artillery, and protected by an innumerable cavalry. It would be impossible for our troops, therefore, to attempt to traverse this labyrinth of woods, sands, marshes, and rivers, without incurring the twofold danger of being outflanked or turned should they proceed by a single route, or, should they proceed by several, of being so separated as to be incapable of affording to each other mutual support.

Distrusting, as he did, the promises which Napoleon had written to him to the effect that there would be within a few days, more than a hundred thousand French troops concentrated upon Berlin, Marshal Oudinot felt an extreme repugnance for the task he had been required to undertake, and which obliged him to march through a most difficult country with sixty-four thousand troops against Berlin protected by ninety thousand. On the 18th, however, he executed a transverse movement from right to left, and advanced from Baruth to Luckenwalde, from whence he resumed his route northwards, advancing between Zossen and Trebbin, through the midst of that double line of waters which has been above described.

On the 21st he had reached a position opposite Trebbin, only a few leagues from the enemy's army, which began to concentrate in proportion as the ground became contracted, and we approached. Between the two lines of waters arose a series of wooded hills, and on the side of these hills ran the two roads by which it was possible to reach Berlin. One of these two roads, that on the left, leading to Trebbin, ran across a brook and up a hill, whence it issued on Gross-Becren. That on the right, entirely separated from the preceding, after

having also ascended some hills, proceeded to debouch by Blankenfelde on the right and at some distance from Gross-Beeren. Marshal Oudinot determined to advance by both these routes at once, in the first place as a measure of precaution, since he was unwilling to incur the risk of being turned by neglecting either of them, and in the next place because his lieutenants preferred to march separately, and he flattered himself that, divided for a time, they might afterwards easily unite for the purpose of attacking the enemy en masse.

On the 21st, he attacked Trebbin with the 12th corps, threw the 4th (General Bertrand's) upon Schultzendorf, and marched the 7th (General Reynier's) between the two towards a village named Nunsdorf. The little town of Trebbin, which was well entrenched, was occupied by a detachment of Bulow's troops, whilst Taunzien's corps guarded the Blankenfelde route, which lay to the right. Marshal Oudinot began the attack by a cannonade upon the town, and then sent against it a brigade of the division Puthod, whilst the 7th corps threatened to turn it by Wittstock. These combined movements produced their effect; for the Prussians, finding themselves already outflanked by the 7th corps, whilst the division Puthod attacked them in front at the bayonet's point, repassed the stream which it had been their task to defend, and fell back on the hills in the rear. In the meantime, on the right, General Bertrand had entered Schultzendorf with the 4th corps.

On the following day, (the 22nd) Marshal Oudinot had the enemy's position on the brook Trebbin attacked at two points, and succeeded in forcing the troops of Bulow's corps to retire definitively to the central position chosen by the Prince Royal of Sweden. On the opposite side, General Bertrand, after exchanging with the enemy a vigorous cannonade, reached the Juhnsdorf position leading to Blankenfelde; and thus we had made a fresh step into this species of jungle, where our troops were forced either to separate into two portions and follow two routes, which although running parallel to each other were almost without any means of communication from one to the other, or else, in a single body, to pursue one route, and be unprotected against the danger of a flank attack by the enemy. It would, doubtless, have been possible to obviate this inconvenience by marching with the bulk of the troops along one route, and moving along the other only some detachments of light troops; but such a course would have rendered it necessary to break up the various corps, and to exercise over their several commanders an authority which Marshal Oudinot did not venture to assume.

Hoping that the enemy would not be met until after our

troops had passed Gross-Beeren, and until they should have had time to effect a junction, he appointed, with an excess of complaisance, a separate task to each of his lieutenants, deciding that General Bertrand should proceed by the right route to take possession of Blankenfelde; after which he was to advance to Gross-Beeren; and that General Reynier should proceed to the same place by the route on the left, marching on the side of the hills, and following the skirts of the woods. As for himself, he resolved, instead of marching with the 12th corps, which was under his own more immediate command, behind General Reynier, so as to afford him support should he require it—he resolved, we say, to proceed on the other slope of the hills along which the general was to pursue his march, as though he were afraid that even his mere presence might inflict upon his lieutenants a disagreeable feeling of restraint.

On the morning of the 28th of August, the several generals entrusted with the execution of the above arrangements began to carry them into effect. On the right route, General Bertrand advanced to the front of the Blankenfelde height, and finding General Tauenzien strongly posted there, was compelled to exchange a furious cannonade with him. In the meantime, General Reynier advanced without difficulty along the hills on the other side of which marched Marshal Oudinot, and débouching before Gross-Beeren, immediately attacked that village and took it. With ill-judged impatience, however, he then, instead of establishing himself in the position he had taken, advanced beyond it, and forthwith found himself with only eighteen thousand men, of whom but one-third were French, in the presence of fifty thousand of the enemy; the whole army of the Prince of Prussia being in position in front of him at Ruhlsdorf, whilst on the right was the division of General Borstell, which had fallen back on Bulow's Prussian corps, situated at the centre, but yet somewhat to the left of the Swedish army, whilst the Russian troops were decidedly on the left.

Oudinot was far from anxious to measure his strength with the force now opposed to him; but it was scarcely probable that he would now be able to avoid a contest, and the Prussian troops, under General Bulow, were, in fact, excessively eager to be permitted to post themselves on the route by which he was attempting to reach Berlin. Bernadotte, however, hesitated; not only fearing that the events of a single day might destroy the prestige with which he had endeavoured to surround himself in the midst of strangers, by declaring that it was to him Napoleon owed the greater part of his success; but also shrinking from compromising

the safety of the Swedish army, which he knew not how to replace should it be destroyed. General Bulow, on the other hand, distrusting, in common with all the Prussians, Bernadotte's loyalty even more than his valour, did not await his commands, but immediately advanced against General Reynier with the thirty thousand men under his command. This step rendered it impossible for Bernadotte any longer to hesitate, but still being unwilling to engage all his forces, he contented himself with directing his cavalry together with a large number of cannon against Reynier's left, his right being threatened by the division of Borstell. General Reynier, who in the actual presence of danger displayed all the valour proper to an old officer of the army of the Rhine, held his own against the forces which now beset him, but made a retrograde movement for the purpose of taking up a better position, in which his right rested upon Gross-Beeren, and his left on a height from which his cannon could direct a plunging fire upon the enemy. The Prussians, however, inspired by the desire of saving Berlin, and also of seizing a prey which they regarded as almost within their grasp, advanced with great resolution; and the Saxon troops, who formed the bulk of his force, giving way, and leaving his French troops unsupported, Reynier was compelled to retreat; doing so, however, in good order and in such a manner as to deprive the enemy of any wish to pursue him. Marshal Oudinot, who had hastened up to the scene of contest with the utmost expedition, arrived too late to change the fate of the engagement, but nevertheless performed good service in checking the enemy's pursuit, and many times sustained unbroken the shock of the Russian cavalry. Ultimately each of our corps returned to the position it had occupied in the morning; the 7th corps in a state of disorganization from the complete route of the Saxons, more than two thousand of whom had been taken prisoners, together with fifteen pieces of cannon, whilst many others had deserted their ranks, some to join the Swedes and some simply to fly to the rear. In the meantime, General Bertrand had made great but ineffectual endeavours to overcome the resistance offered to his progress by Tauenzien at Blankenfelde, and had refrained from pushing his efforts to the utmost point, because he believed that the success of the chief corps at Gross-Beeren would be sufficient to compel Tauenzien to leave the position he then occupied.

Had the troops at our general's disposal been entirely composed of Frenchmen, and such as could have been relied on, the check they had now suffered need not have been followed by any great consequences, for our loss, after all,

only amounted to two thousand men. But, consisting, as these troops did, half of Italians and Germans, who were ever ready to desert our ranks, and half of young French troops, who had at first been too confident of victory and were now too dispirited by defeat, it was difficult indeed to continue to march upon Berlin in the presence of ninety thousand men. Already more than ten thousand of the Saxon and Bavarian troops had quitted us, crying *sauvé qui peut*; and altogether the state of affairs was such, that Marshal Oudinot considered that it was advisable to retreat in the direction of the Elbe. On the following day, the 24th, he commenced his retrograde movement, and executed it in good order in spite of the vigorous pursuit of the Prussians, who were intoxicated with joy and pride, and believed us to be more completely vanquished than was really the case. Marshal Oudinot might have stopped and given a check to their ardour; but as the result of a successful engagement would only have been to enable him to maintain a position between Berlin and Wittenberg, in a country which offered neither support nor resources, he considered it more prudent to fall back under the cannon of the latter place, where he would be secure from danger, would cover the Elbe, and be able to procure an abundant supply of provisions.

He arrived there on the 29th and 30th of August. In the meantime, the active Magdeburg division had sallied from this place under the command of General Gérard, and after an engagement with General Hirschfeld and Czernicheff's Russian skirmishers, had been compelled to retreat before overwhelming numbers, and to re-enter Magdeburg with the loss of a thousand men and several cannon. In the neighbourhood of Hambourg, Marshal Davoust had advanced with thirty thousand troops, of whom ten thousand were Danes, in the direction of Schwerin, and having forced the Anglo-German legion, which was before him, to fall back, he was ready to continue his movement as soon as he should receive information of Marshal Oudinot's success in the environs of Berlin. In the meantime, however, he was compelled to act with much circumspection.

As soon as it became a fact that Marshal Oudinot could not reach Berlin, the concentration which Napoleon had hoped to be able to effect of more than a hundred thousand men on that capital became nothing more than an idle dream. And although the failure of this scheme was certainly in some degree due to the error of Marshal Oudinot and his lieutenants, it was principally the result of Napoleon's own fault, in despising over much what he called Bernadotte's ragged regiment, and in relying too confidently on the junction at Berlin

of corps setting out from such widely separated points as Wittenberg, Magdebourg, and Hambourg.

It was the consciousness of those serious miscalculations, and not a malady invented by flatterers, which had surprised Napoleon on the morrow of his victories on the 26th and 27th of August, and which, having drawn him from Pirna to Dresden, retained him there during the 29th and 30th of August, whilst Vandamme remained unsupported at Kulm. These miscalculations were of extreme importance—for to have, instead of Macdonald victorious in Silesia and pursuing Blücher, Blücher victorious and Macdonald routed; and to have, instead of a hundred thousand of his troops in Berlin, Oudinot fallen back upon Wittenberg, with the loss of ten thousand men, Gérard driven back into Magdebourg with the loss of a thousand, and Davoust compelled with his thirty thousand troops to hesitate in the midst of the Mecklenbourg marshes, was a state of things very different from that which Napoleon had hoped to bring about when he attempted to extend his scheme of operations from the Elbe to the Vistula. On the 30th, when he was still ignorant of Vandamme's defeat, which he only learned on the following morning, he had conceived a new and vast plan of operations. He had already frequently entertained the idea of a plan of operations, a new element in which consisted of a march upon Prague, for the purpose of striking a blow at Austria by the capture of one of its capitals, and, to a certain extent, crushing the coalition at its chief head quarters. But there were serious objections to this plan; for it would be necessary in carrying it out to cross the mountains of Bohemia, and thus incur the danger, should we be vanquished beyond them, of having to retreat through a series of frightful defiles, and would, also, even if the capture of Prague could be effected, cause a prolongation of his line, already too long, to the amount of all the distance which divides Dresden from Prague. But even had not these difficulties been sufficient to remove from his mind any idea of carrying this plan into execution, the reverses suffered by Macdonald and Oudinot would at once have done so; and he now, on hearing what rendered it impossible to entertain the idea of withdrawing to any distance from those marshes, and made him only anxious to approach them, forthwith conceived, with that inexhaustible fertility of genius which was one of his attributes, a plan in accordance with which Berlin instead of Dresden would be the centre of its operations.

The plan which Napoleon now proposed to carry into execution was, to march upon Berlin with his Guard and half the cavalry reserve, that is, with 40,000 men, to effect

a junction between Oudinot's troops and his own, *en route* to vanquish Bernadotte, to enter Berlin, to summon thither the division Gérard and Davoust's corps, to concentrate by this means on the Prussian capital the 100,000 men, on whose presence there he had so much relied; and after taking measures for the re-victualling and reinforcement of our garrisons at Stettin and Custrim, and those on the Vistula, to return to Luckau, between Berlin and Dresden, ready to fall upon Blücher's flank, should the latter venture to march upon the Elbe.

To cover Dresden during his absence he resolved to leave there Vandamme with the first corps (for, on the morning of the 30th, when he formed these projects, he was unacquainted with the disaster at Kulm), and besides Vandamme, Saint-Cyr, Victor, and Marmont, with a portion of the cavalry reserve. He proposed to place those forces, which would amount to 100,000 men, under the command of Murat, who, he hoped, would be able to maintain himself against any attack of the enemy, until his own return from striking a decisive blow at Berlin, should render such an attack altogether unlikely.

When the expedition to Berlin should have been concluded, it was Napoleon's intention to establish himself at Luckau, between Berlin and Dresden, to summon thither Marmont's corps, and all the cavalry reserve, to leave at Dresden and in the Camp de Pirna 60,000 men, to post 60,000 at Bautzen, and with 60,000 others to be ready to throw himself either upon Berlin, or Bautzen, or Dresden, as circumstances might render advisable. In this position it was certain that he would be able to meet any occasion that might arise, for, posted at three marches from Berlin, he would be on Blücher's flank, and sufficiently near to Dresden to reach it in time, should the army of Bohemia present itself before it.

Such was the plan which he formed on the morning of the 30th August; a plan, for the execution of which he had already issued the necessary orders, when the news of the disaster at Kulm arrived to destroy the whole fabric of its vast conception. He was much distressed by this news of the disaster suffered by Vandamme, and for the first time entertained the idea that he had probably presumed too much on his strength, when he rejected the conditions offered him at Prague. But although he remained for a day dismayed, so to say, by those redoubled strokes of misfortune, his spirit recovered its energy, and even its illusions on the morrow, and he then formed a new plan, which, although less vast than the preceding one, was quite as finely

conceived. In the first place he resolved to appoint another commander-in-Chief to the three corps which were to march upon Berlin, and selected Marshal Ney, who was inferior to none in courage on the field of battle, but who had never as yet directed the movements of great armies. Napoleon chose him, however, because his intrepid and confident spirit had not as yet suffered the chill of discouragement, which had already visibly affected our other generals, and sent him to Wittenberg, dismissing him with the most encouraging words and the most precise instructions.

Having ordered Ney, after he should have rallied and re-organised the 7th, 4th, and 12th corps (Marshal Oudinot was to retain the direct command of the latter), to proceed to Baruth, situated two days' march from Berlin, and there await further orders from head-quarters; Napoleon resolved to proceed himself to Hoyerswerda, distant three days' march from Baruth, and two from Dresden, together with the guard, the greater portion of the cavalry reserve, and Marmont's corps. Posted there in Lusatia, between Berlin and Gorkitz, he would be able at will to move to the left upon Berlin, and assist Ney to enter that city, or to throw himself upon the right upon Blücher's flank, should the latter, continuing to press Macdonald, become a source of anxiety on account of Dresden. Certainly, no combination could have been devised more skilful or more appropriate to existing circumstances than this, every element of which was profoundly calculated, true, and just, and which was such an one as could not have failed to succeed ten years earlier, when our soldiers had maintained unscathed the severe chances of war, when our generals were full of confidence, when Napoleon had as much reliance on others as on himself, and when his enemies, less firmly resolved to vanquish or to die, were not so determined as they now were to persevere in spite of the most disastrous defeats. But, at the time of which we now treat, such was the moral state of ourselves and our enemies, that everything was uncertain, even although our generals and soldiers were still heroes.

Having given the requisite orders Napoleon made the most skilful arrangements for the protection of Dresden during his absence; and in the first place set himself to re-organise Vandamme's corps, of which, besides the 42nd division, which had been restored to Saint-Cyr, and had suffered but little, about fifteen thousand men of all arms had returned to their ranks. But all its artillery had been lost, together, unfortunately, with some of its most distinguished officers. Nothing was known of the fate of Vandamme and Haxo, and they both were believed to have perished. When

Vandamme's secretary re-appeared, Napoleon had the general's papers seized that he might extract from it all his military correspondence, and thus remove all proof of the orders which this unfortunate officer had received from him. Napoleon had even the weakness to deny that he had given him orders to march upon Tœplitz, and wrote to all the commanders of corps, that this general having received instructions to halt upon the heights of Kulm, had been carried away by a too ardent spirit, and been destroyed through an excess of zeal. The authentic narrative which we have given of the actual facts, proves the falsity of these assertions, which were devised by Napoleon for the purpose of aiding him to preserve that influence over the minds of his generals, which at that moment it was so important he should possess.

Napoleon's first care was to find for Vandamme's corps a commander who should be as brave as himself, but more circumspect; and he selected for this purpose the Count de Lobau, an officer who possessed and deserved his entire confidence, and who united to great address and rare courage the talent and taste for the organisation of troops. Having thus given to the first corps a general so well qualified to restore to it the military spirit it might have lost through the disaster it had suffered at Kulm, Napoleon distributed it into three divisions, of ten battalions each; and having restored to it the half of the division Teste, which had been temporarily borrowed from it, and taken from it the brigade Reuss which had been temporarily lent to it, raised it to an effective force of eighteen thousand men, whom he had supplied from the Dresden arsenals with muskets and sixty-four pieces of cannon.

For the defence of Dresden in his absence he left the 14th corps (Marshal Saint-Cyr) at the Camp de Pirna, the 2nd (Marshal Victor's) at Freyberg, and lastly, the 1st (Count Lobau's) in Dresden itself. In case the army of Bohemia should again make its appearance, Marshal Saint-Cyr and Marshal Victor (between whom Pajol's cavalry was to execute an active surveillance) would be able, Napoleon considered, to retard its progress sufficiently long to give Dresden ample notice of its approach. As, however, these corps would ultimately have to fall back upon Dresden, Napoleon ordered that Saint-Cyr should post himself upon the left at the entrenched camp, where he had already fought valiantly on the 26th August, and Victor on the right, where he had decided in our favour the issue of the battle of the 27th. Should the enemy attack them seriously in these positions, they were to retire behind the redoubts, which

were increased from five to eight, and were much better armed. Napoleon nominated an officer to the special command of each redoubt; and also directed that reserve troops should be stationed behind each for the purpose of retaking it immediately should it fall into the enemy's hands. Lastly, he directed that, during an attack, Lobau's corps should be posted in reserve, behind those of Saint-Cyr and Victor, for the purpose of debouching at the last moment, as the Guard had done on the 26th August, on the enemy, at the very instant it believed itself victorious. These arrangements were, it will be observed, a repetition with many improvements of those made on the 26th August, and promised to bring about the same successful results, for the three corps of Saint-Cyr, Victor, and Lobau, numbered altogether sixty-thousand men, which was a larger force than Napoleon had had at his disposal, when he had had to resist on that day the two hundred thousand troops of the army of Bohemia. Napoleon felt, therefore, that he need entertain no fear for the safety of Dresden in his absence should the army of Bohemia, repeating its recent manœuvre, operate on the left bank of the Elbe. And should it, on the other hand, changing its line of march, attack Poniatowski and Macdonald by the right flank, he himself falling back upon it, would be in a position to crush it. Having made these arrangements, he sent to Königsbrock, on the left of the Bautzen route, in the direction of Hoyerswerda, a portion of the cavalry and infantry of the Guard, under Nansouty and Curial respectively; determining to send the remainder in the same direction on the following day. He resolved to set out for Hoyerswerda in person on the 4th, leaving M. de Bassano at Dresden for the purpose of transmitting to him information of all that might take place, and giving his orders to the several generals whom they might concern.

On the morning of the 3rd, Napoleon received despatches from Marshal Macdonald, who was, to quote Napoleon's own expression, utterly disconcerted by the vehement manner in which he had been pressed by Blücher, who had hastened to advance, as soon as the waters had somewhat subsided, for the purpose of reaping as much advantage as possible from the affair of Katzbach, and constantly outflanking Marshal Macdonald's left wing, had compelled him to retreat from Lowenberg to Löbau, from Löbau to Górlitz. And now, according to him, if he were not immediately succoured, he would very probably be driven from Górlitz to Bautzen, or even to Dresden.

Napoleon immediately perceived that it was not the time to put into execution his intended movement upon Hoyers-

werda, and that to succour Macdonald by the speediest method possible was the only course suited to the circumstances at the moment. He determined, therefore, to join him at Bautzen, and uniting his forces with his own, to advance and drive Blucher before him beyond the Neisse, the Gneiss, and all the rivers which he had passed. Having taken this resolution, he rescinded the command which had been given on the previous evening to portions of the infantry and cavalry of the guard, changing the direction of their march from Koenigsbruck to Bautzen by Camenz. At the same time he made arrangements for the arrival at Bautzen on the 4th of the remainder of the guard, of Latour-Maubourg's cavalry reserve, and Marshal Marmont's infantry. He sent word to Macdonald of the important movement he was effecting towards Bautzen, but recommended him to keep the matter secret, in order that Blucher being unwarned might have to encounter the bulk of the French army. Finally, he sent orders to Marshal Ney to change the direction of his march for the present from Hoyerswerda towards Bautzen.

On the evening of the 3rd of September, Napoleon set out from Dresden, and after a halt of some hours at Harta, arrived on the following day at Bautzen, where he received Marshal Macdonald with much kindness, openly acknowledging the difficulties he had had to encounter; and where he endeavoured to remain incognito until the arrival of the guard and Latour-Maubourg should enable him to throw himself upon Blucher with sufficient forces. But, unfortunately, the Prussian General had already been informed of the movements made by the guard on the morning of the 2nd, a sufficient indication to him of Napoleon's intentions, and faithful to his plan of falling back as soon as Napoleon should appear, he immediately halted the main body of his army at Gorlitz, and took up his own position on the height called the Land's-Crown, from whence a view could be obtained of the whole country from Gorlitz to Bautzen.

On the 4th of September, towards the middle of the day, Latour-Maubourg and Nansouty having arrived, Murat placed himself at the head of their squadrons, and galloping down upon Blucher's advanced guard, which they encountered towards the close of the day at Wittenberg, compelled them to retreat with the loss of some hundreds of men. Blucher immediately resolved to repass the Neisse on the following day, leaving at Gorlitz only a rear guard to occupy the portion of the town situated on one side of the river, whilst preparations were being made for the destruction of the bridges.

On the following morning, Napoleon set out at the head

of his advanced guard, hoping to inflict such a blow on the Prussians as should render them disinclined to make a very speedy return ; but, on entering Gorlitz, where he took or slew a thousand of the enemy's troops which still remained there, he found to his disappointment that Blucher was in full retreat, and that to pursue him would only be uselessly to fatigue his own troops and to remove himself to an imprudent distance from Dresden. He resolved therefore to halt at Gorlitz, spending two or three days there for the purpose of repairing the bridges, refreshing his own troops, and reanimating those of Marshal Macdonald. But, on that very evening, he received despatches from Dresden which made him change his plan ; for they announced the reappearance of the army of Bohemia on the Péterswalde route,—that is, in the rear of Dresden, precisely as it had formerly appeared at the period of the battles of the 26th and 27th of August. Napoleon himself believed that it was a mere demonstration for the purpose of withdrawing him from the pursuit of Blucher, and if he had had any hope of coming up with the latter, he would not have allowed himself so readily to be turned back. As, however, Blucher was already out of reach, and there was no useful purpose to be gained by his remaining at Gorlitz, he immediately returned to Bautzen, where, by travelling during the whole evening and night, he arrived at two o'clock on the following morning. Finding, on his arrival there, that the threatened attack of the army of Bohemia appeared to be a serious one, he sent word to Dresden that he would himself be there by the evening of that same day (the 6th), together with the whole of his guard. As, however, he was not thoroughly convinced in his own mind of the seriousness of this demonstration on the part of the enemy, and was unwilling to give up his projected march upon Hoyerswerda, from whence he would be able at one and the same time to support Ney towards Berlin, and to hold Blucher in check towards Gorlitz, he only sent back towards Dresden the forty thousand men of his guard. At the same time he directed Marmont, who was marching to rejoin him, to proceed towards Camenz and Königsbruck, from whence he might readily be recalled to Dresden, or pushed forward upon Hoyerswerda. He added to the troops already under his command a strong detachment of cavalry, for the purpose of enabling him to pursue the Cossacks, and to form and to maintain communications with Ney and Macdonald. He desired Marshal Macdonald, after he should have replaced Poniatowski at the Zittau débouché, to establish himself at Bautzen, and to endeavour at least to preserve the line of the Spree. Marshal Macdonald,

with a modesty which does him honour, entreated Napoleon with much earnestness to relieve him of the command-in-chief, offering to remain simply as a chief of division at the head of the 11th corps; but Napoleon had no longer any choice of generals; for they disappeared as rapidly as his troops, and he therefore used his utmost exertions to reanimate Macdonald's courage, consoling him and treating him as he would have treated him had he been victorious. He then set out for Dresden, where he arrived on the morning of the 7th.

Having stayed a day or two at Dresden, he departed for Pirna, and halted near Mugelin, where he found Marshal Saint-Cyr's rear guard. Let us now direct our attention to what had been taking place in this direction. The Prussians and Russians, without the Austrians, had débouchéd by the great Péterswalde route, already described, had attempted to obtain possession on the one side of the Pirna plateau, on the other of the Gieshübel plateau, and had driven before them the four divisions of Marshal Saint-Cyr, who occupied these several positions. Another corps, under Count Pahlen, débouching by the Furstenwald route, which Kleist had followed since the affair of Kulm, had come towards Borna, where the mountains begin to lose their elevation and sink into the plain. An immense body of cavalry thrown by the enemy in this direction had caused considerable anxiety to ours under Pajol, and would, but for this officer's energy and skill, have inflicted upon it heavy loss.

Saint-Cyr, finding himself thus pressed, had withdrawn from the camp at Pirna upon Pirna itself his 42nd division, leaving some battalions in the fortress of Kœnigstein, at the same time removing the 43rd and 44th from Gieshübel to Zehist, and the 45th, which supported Pajol, from Borna to Dohna.

It was in this position that Napoleon found Saint-Cyr, and he did not neglect the opportunity of consulting with him with respect to this fresh appearance of the enemy, which he himself was strongly inclined to regard as having no serious object, and as being one of those mere manœuvres which at this time appeared to form the whole system of the enemy's tactics. Marshal Saint-Cyr, however, appeared to be of a different opinion, considering that the vigour with which the Prince of Schwarzenberg had pushed the divisions of the 14th corps during the last two days proved that he was resolved upon making a serious attack, and that he would not have advanced so close to Dresden had his object been a simple demonstration. Notwithstanding this dif-

ference of opinion, however, both Napoleon and Saint-Cyr were agreed as to the course to be pursued, since they each of them considered it advisable to engage the army of Bohemia, should it be willing, in a pitched battle. Napoleon quitted Marshal Saint-Cyr to return the same day to Dresden, where he had orders of all kinds to give to his various corps d'armée.

To understand properly the difficulties surrounding the Commander-in-Chief of our forces at this time, we should turn our attention to what had been taking place on the side of the allies. Immediately on receiving information of Napoleon's march into Lusatia, the Austrians had executed a retrograde movement, recrossing the Elbe between Tetschen and Leitmeritz; this movement being made with the double object in the first place of providing against unforeseen events, such as the prosecution by Napoleon of operations against Prague, and in the next place of affording the Austrian army the opportunity of recovering in some degree from the rude shock it had suffered in the battle of Dresden. The Russian and Prussian troops had been left on the great Péterswalde route, in order to withdraw Napoleon in that direction by means of extensive demonstrations, and thus free the army of Silesia, against which he was marching, from his attack. And Wittgenstein and Kleist, who commanded the Russian and Prussian troops under Barclay de Tolly, had not been slack in executing the demonstrations with which they were charged, having fallen upon the four divisions of Marshal Saint-Cyr, and put all his strength and skill to the proof. At the same time Klenau, who was posted between Commotau and Chemnitz, occupied in obviating as far as possible the effect of the blow his troops had received before Dresden, sent *partisans* to Zwickau and Chemnitz, preparing for that decisive operation which the allies ever meditated carrying into execution on our rear; but this time in the direction of Leipzig instead of in that of Dresden.

In the meantime, a great series of events had been taking place on our wings. It will be remembered that on setting out for Dresden in the first place to proceed to Hoyerswerda, and then to turn back towards Bautzen, Napoleon had arranged to meet Ney at Baruth, with the intention of either supporting Ney in a march upon Berlin, or of marching upon that city himself. Marshal Ney had accordingly set out, and arriving at Wittenberg on the 3rd, had immediately received the three corps d'armée of which he was to have the command-in-chief in the place of Marshal Oudinot, and which, since the check they had suffered at Gross-Beeren,

were much weakened not only in point of numbers, but also in respect of matériel and spirit. Ney, however, who had scarcely ever held a command-in-chief, although he frequently had had under his direct orders large assemblages of troops, thought little of the real nature of his instruments in his eagerness to employ them, and reviewing his troops on the 4th, announced his intention of putting them in motion on the following day (the 5th).

The French army was posted in a semicircle before Wittenberg, the 7th corps (that of General Reynier) on the left, the 12th (that of Marshal Oudinot) in the centre, the 4th (that of General Bertrand) on the right; the army of the north pressing them so closely that the advanced posts were engaged in perpetual skirmishes. Acting in this case with much address, Marshal Ney left his right, formed by the 4th corps, in the presence of the enemy during the whole morning of the 5th, and commenced his projected movement with the centre of his army, composed of the 12th corps, which he carried behind his right in the direction of Zahne, which place he took from the enemy, crossing a little stream which ran through it in spite of considerable resistance. The 7th, which formed the left, followed the 12th, supporting it in its movement on Zahne, and when they had both defiled, the 4th, having sufficiently occupied the enemy's attention, raised its camp in its turn and joined the rest of the army, which thus, in one day, found itself brought back to Seyda, five leagues to the right of Wittenberg. This movement, which was executed with both skill and courage, had cost us a thousand men; the loss on the side of the Prussians being double that number.

On the 6th, it was necessary to proceed to Interbock, from whence a single march would bring the army to Baruth. Marshal Ney decided that General Bertrand, who continued to form the right wing, and whose troops had been less directly in contact with the enemy on the previous day, should commence the march towards Interbrock on the following morning at about eight o'clock, General Reynier following with the 7th, and Marshal Oudinot with the 12th. Close as the enemy were, it would have been easier to have marched en masse, especially during the execution of a flank march with fifty thousand men, who were opposed to an enemy numbering eighty thousand. But the fact was, that the three corps were at a distance of two hours from each other; an inconvenience which was much increased by the circumstance that the line of march lay over a sandy plain, from which a high wind raised clouds of thick dust, which rendered it impossible to see to any distance.

From eight o'clock to noon the army continued its march, constantly harassed by the enemy's cavalry, which ours had great difficulty in holding in check, and whose movements rendered it impossible to doubt that Bernadotte was aware of our plan, and was hurrying forward en masse to bar against us the Interbock road. However, it was still very possible for our troops, should they reach the Dennewitz defile before the enemy had arrived at it in any force, to force the passage, and be the first to reach Interbock, where the French army would be out of danger, and the Prince of Sweden compelled to follow without hope of reaching us.

About noon our troops were suddenly assailed by a fire of musketry, and found that they were in the presence of Tauenzien's corps, which on the previous day they had driven before them, and that they were close to the Dennewitz defile, which was the only obstacle of any difficulty which had to be surmounted on the whole of this vast plain. It will be well to give here some description of this defile.

Transversely in front of our army flowed a stream, which was somewhat shallow, but flowed between very marshy banks, and was only fordable at two places, namely, Dennewitz and Rohrbeck. This stream, after having flowed from our left towards our right, changed its direction at Rohrbeck, from which place it flowed right before us as far as Interbock, a little town, in front of which it passed with many windings. As the road, which it was absolutely necessary we should follow, for the sake of the conveyance of our park of artillery through this ocean of sand, traversed Dennewitz, we had no alternative but to force our way at this place; and Marshal Ney issued accordingly immediate orders to that effect.

The Italian division Fontanelli took the lead; its general at the head of some battalions entering Dennewitz, and crossing the stream, in spite of a Prussian detachment which attempted to oppose him. But it was not at the village of Dennewitz, but beyond it, that the enemy, posted in favourable positions extending opposite our left, was prepared to resist our progress with his whole force. Fortunately there was only present Tauenzien's corps; Bulow's corps, the Swedes, and the Russians, being still far distant.

The Italian division had scarcely passed the village of Dennewitz, when the enemy threw upon it a cloud of cavalry and a heavy fire of artillery; it nevertheless remained unshaken. On issuing from Dennewitz our troops found themselves on a plain, bounded in the distance by woods, on the left by some hills surmounted by a mill, and at some distance on the right by Interbock. On the left, close to the Den-

newitz mill, Ney placed the division Morand, the efficiency of which was doubled by General Morand's own presence with it, in the centre, the Italian division, and the Württemberg division on the right, in the direction of Interbock. Our artillery, posted on the more prominent slopes, dominated Tauenzien's, and even succeeded in silencing it. The enemy's cavalry, however, charged, and drove back our own so vigorously, that some of our squadrons precipitated themselves across the spaces between the Italian battalions, which dared not fire lest they should fire on their own friends; in consequence of which two of these battalions were broken by the enemy's cavalry, and caused some confusion in our line. Perceiving this, General Morand carried forward two battalions of the 13th on the left, and covering our broken line gave it time to re-form. The whole of the Prussian cavalry poured down upon him, but he received them in square, and repulsed all their efforts. In the meantime, however, Bulow's corps, consisting of fifty-five thousand Prussians, was already appearing towards our left, debouching from Niedergorsdorf, whilst Reynier and Oudinot, on the other hand, were as yet nowhere to be seen. As Bulow's columns debouched from Niedergorsdorf they encountered two battalions of the 13th, which Morand had posted on an eminence on the left, to serve as a point d'appui to our line of battle, and compelled them to fall back. Ney, however, advancing with two battalions of the 8th, which also belonged to the division Morand, recovered the ground which the two battalions of the 13th had been compelled to yield. At the same time, he sent officers to Reynier and Oudinot with messages hastening their arrival. The whole of Bulow's corps deployed, but Morand's division still contrived to make head against it, and to support with fifteen thousand men the assaults of almost forty thousand.

For three hours this unequal struggle lasted with varying chances of success; the enemy, however, being unable to compel us to abandon the debouché which we had gained beyond the Dennewitz brook. In the meantime the Russian and Swedish army was perceived advancing rapidly upon the village of Gölsdorf, situated on our left, at right angles with the stream which we had passed, and threatening to cut off the communications between our troops, which were engaged, and the 12th corps, which was still en route.

In accordance with Ney's orders, Reynier, as soon as he had come up with the 7th corps, sent forward Durette's division, and posted it behind Dennewitz, on the hither side of the stream, where it seized the opportunity offered by a gentle eminence to make good use of its artillery. At

the same time he threw the Saxon division Lecoc upon Gölsdorf; holding the second Saxon division (Lestoc's) in reserve. As soon as these arrangements had been made, General Durette, advancing to the top of the angle described by our line, stopped short the progress of the Prussians, who were debouching from Niedergorsdorf; whilst the brigade Mellentin, of the Saxon division Lestoc, forced its way into Gölsdorf, and, driving out the Prussians, prevented them from establishing themselves on our left. The combat continued to be carried on with a species of desperation on each side in the midst of clouds of dust, which hid from the view of the combatants every object but the troops to which they might be directly opposed.

At length Oudinot came up, passed behind the corps which had preceded him, and piercing the storm which threatened our left, on which side forty thousand Swedes and Russians were marching upon Gölsdorf, placed two of his divisions behind Lestoc's Saxons, and held the third in reserve.

But at this moment, when the arrival of Oudinot rendered it quite possible that Ney might still be able to make head with his fifty thousand troops against the eighty thousand of the enemy, and succeed in reaching Interbock without a check; at this very moment a combined attack made by Tauenzien's corps and half that of Bulow, upon the troops of General Bertrand, already thinned by the long conflict, in which they had been engaged, compelled them, about four o'clock, when they had already lost more than three thousand men, to fall back a little to the right in the direction of Rohrbeck. Ney, too much engrossed with what was taking place immediately under his own eyes, and neglecting to take a sufficiently broad view of the general aspect of the field of battle, feared that Dennewitz would be left uncovered by Bertrand's movement, and ordered Reynier to post the division Durutte at Dennewitz itself. At the same time he ordered Oudinot to proceed from Gölsdorf, where he served as a support to the Saxons, to Rohrbeck, for the purpose of forming a reserve behind Bertrand. An arrangement in which there was a double fault, for our right, since Bertrand's approach to Rohrbeck, was in less danger than our left, which was threatened by forty thousand of the enemy, and which had no sooner been carried into execution than the Russian division Borstell, supported by a cloud of cavalry, and the whole of the Russian and Swedish artillery, attacked Gölsdorf and wrested it from the Saxon division Mellentin, by which it was occupied, and which, perceiving the mass of the Swedish and Russian troops advancing

towards them, commenced a movement of retreat, which was turned into a flight by a rumour propagated by perfidious alarmists, that the clouds of dust raised by Oudinot's troops in their movement from Gölsdorf towards Rohrbeck, were evidence that the French army had been turned by the enemy's cavalry. Flying precipitately at this rumour in spite of all Reynier's efforts, the Saxon troops deserted Gölsdorf, left our left entirely uncovered, and rushed in confusion through the midst of the ranks of the 12th corps. Unfortunately all the artillery and baggage-waggons were accumulated in the interior of the angle formed by our line of battle, and a scene of frightful confusion ended in what was a complete rout. The division Durutte, Oudinot and Bertrand, did, indeed, retreat in good order, but the battle, was nevertheless completely lost, for we had been compelled to give way, and the Interbock route being now closed we had entirely failed in the object we had had in view. Six or seven of our own, and eight or nine thousand of the enemy's troops, strewed the plain; but ten or twelve thousand of ours, chiefly Saxons and Bavarians, were in precipitate flight, about to proclaim on the Elbe that the French army had been routed and even destroyed.

As it was impossible to fall back upon Wittenberg, which our army had left seven or eight leagues to the left on its march towards Interbock, the only possible line of retreat was in the direction of Torgau, and thither accordingly Ney retreated with the thirty-two thousand men of which his force now consisted, and arriving there on the 8th September found what he called a *species of hell*. For, besides the discontent which widely prevailed amongst the troops, the recriminations which freely passed between himself and his lieutenants, the crowd of fugitives which had to be reduced into something like order, and difficulty of supplying the necessities of the troops at a time when the enemy was almost at the very gates of Torgau, there was great fear that the Saxons might at any moment rise in insurrection. Open acts of disaffection had already been committed by them, and indeed, considering the circumstances of the last twelve days, it would have been wonderful, perhaps, if the case had been otherwise. Finding things in this state, Ney, as Macdonald and Oudinot had done, wrote to the Emperor, entreating him to release him from his command: "I would rather," he said, "be a simple grenadier than a general on such conditions. I am perfectly ready to shed the last drop of my blood, but let it be for some useful end."

Whilst these events had been taking place, Napoleon had entered Dresden on the evening of the 7th, and had been

recalled to Pirna on the morning of the 8th, to support Marshal Saint-Cyr against the Russians and Prussians, who appeared resolved to make their demonstration against him a serious attack. The enemy having failed to perceive the guard and the cavalry reserve, the presence of which was always a sign of Napoleon's own, had persisted in the aggressive movement; and Saint-Cyr, having fallen back as far as the little river, the Müglitz, near Muegeln, was unwilling to retreat any farther, since to repass this river would be definitively to abandon the heights, and to be altogether driven into the plains. When Napoleon himself arrived on the ground, he thought with Marshal Saint-Cyr that, with the certainty of being speedily supported, the 14th corps might venture to march *en masse* against the enemy; and, accordingly, the three divisions of this corps being immediately formed into columns of attack, prepared to pour down upon the columns of Wittgenstein and Kleist, whereupon the latter fell back with a precipitation which gave cause for much doubt respecting what would be the course of action on the morrow.

In the course of the evening, however, an aide-de-camp arrived with the news of the loss of the battle of Dennewitz on the 6th, which formed the fourth misfortune which had happened to our arms since the two great victories of Dresden, the other three having occurred at the Katzbach, Gross-Beeren, and Kulm. This last disaster was an especially serious one; for, besides the unfortunate moral effect which must necessarily be its result, it was calculated to place in peril the lower part of the Elbe, exposing us to the danger of seeing this river crossed by the enemy on our left, whilst the army of Bohemia, descending from the Erzgebirge on our right, should threaten definitively to turn us, and effect a junction with the corps which should have passed the Elbe at Wittenberg. Napoleon at once perceived all the serious consequences that might result from this event, but nevertheless remained perfectly calm, and would permit the maliciously watchful eyes of Marshal Saint-Cyr to observe no trace of distress or anger against Marshal Ney. He seemed, on the contrary, to regard the position of affairs only in the light of a curious point of military art; and in familiar conversation with Marshal Saint-Cyr, explained with admirable critical precision, and without severity, the faults which had been committed in the short campaign of three days, begun at Wittenberg and concluded at Torgau. At the same time, he appeared eager to regard these faults simply in the light of a proof of the difficulties which had had to be contended with, and displayed, with respect to this matter, a marvel-

lously equitable spirit, as though a supernatural presentiment had warned him that he would himself have need of that just judgment which he was now invoking in behalf of his unfortunate generals. Carried away by the heat of conversation, he said, that generals were too hasty in their operations, and that he would some day write a book, in which he would lay down the principles of war so clearly as to make them easy of application by all persons. Marshal Saint-Cyr, on the other hand, giving rein to his spirit of contradiction, declared that neither science nor experience had anything to do with the art of war; that great generals were born such, and gained no additional skill by the exercise of their profession; and that Napoleon himself had fought his best campaign when he was twenty-six.

But, although Napoleon thus passed the evening on which he had received the news of an event which so grievously changed his position, in a discussion on the art of war, he did not forget that all his arrangements had hitherto been made in the expectation that his arms would be victorious, and that preparations for the defence of his vast empire still remained to be made. He was anxious, therefore, that the fortresses of the Rhine should be immediately properly garrisoned; and as for himself to write to the Duke de Feltre that he began to doubt the possibility of maintaining his position in Germany would be a painful and even dangerous avowal, he determined to send to the minister Clarke, by M. de Bassano, a letter, written in cypher, to the effect—that the state of affairs was such as to promise a brilliant success to Napoleon's arms, but that it would, nevertheless, be prudent to provide for the contrary; that it was not the Russian army from which we had most to fear, but the Prussian army, this latter being considerable in numbers, whilst the spirit with which it was animated was in the highest degree ardent; that our army, notwithstanding the losses it had necessarily suffered in the victories it had already gained, was still in excellent condition and of great strength, but that the generals and officers, weary of the war, were no longer inspired with that ardour which had enabled them to perform the great deeds they had already performed; that the theatre of the war was of too wide an extent; that the Emperor was victorious wherever he was himself actually present, but that he could not be everywhere; that those of his lieutenants who held isolated commands rarely answered his expectations; that after what had happened to General Vandamme; after the disasters suffered by the Duke of Tarentum in Silesia, and the Prince of Moskowa in his march on Berlin, it would be as well, whilst refraining from

any excessive degree of fear, to neglect nothing which might be suggested by prudence. "You will do wisely, therefore," the note continued, "to see that the fortresses are put in a good state of defence, and to arrange with the director-general of provisions that they shall be provided with an extraordinary supply of them, so that should unexpected circumstances arise, his Majesty may not experience fresh embarrassments in this direction, and that you may not be found unprepared. You will understand that in writing this I have not failed to reflect well upon all that has come under my observation, and that I am strongly convinced that in so doing I am only acting as his Majesty would approve."

At an early hour on the morning of the 9th, Napoleon proceeded to reconnoitre with his own eyes the movements of the enemy, and to give such orders as circumstances might render necessary. He had at this time under his immediate command the 1st corps, posted in advance of Zehist, on the Péterswalde route; the 14th, under Marshal Saint-Cyr, in position on the Furstenwalde route, in advance of Dohna. Somewhat in the rear, at Mugeln, but still near enough to perform effective service, were three divisions of the Young Guard, under Marshal Mortier, and the light cavalry of the guard, under Lefebvre-Desnoëtte. The remainder of the Young Guard, the Old Guard, Marmont's corps, and Latour-Maubourg's cavalry, were at Dresden, ready to meet any unforeseen emergency. At some distance to the right, on the Freyberg route, Marshal Victor watched with his corps d'armée the Bohemian débouches opening upon Leipzig. The 1st and 14th corps, and the three divisions of the Young Guard, numbered altogether about fifty thousand men, a force sufficient to overwhelm the enemy then visible; but it was impossible for the French staff to be acquainted with the fact, that the Austrians were committing the fault of retreating into Bohemia, as far as Tetschen and Leitmeritz, and it was a subject of anxious inquiry where this portion of the enemy's force could be.

Napoleon's troops being at Zehist and Dohna, were on two routes, that of Péterswalde, which offered an excellent road for the transit of artillery, and that of Liebstadt, which was only practicable for artillery as far as Furstenwalde, by which place it passed, and which from this point was continued across the lofty mountain of Geyersberg by paths impassable by heavy vehicles. This being the case, Marshal Saint-Cyr now proposed that the 14th corps and the Young Guard should be carried rapidly along the latter route upon Liebstadt and Furstenwalde, then thrown on the enemy's column

which had taken the Péterswalde route, so as to cut off a larger or smaller portion of it, and afterwards carried across the Geyersberg for the purpose of intercepting the enemy's retreat towards Bohemia.

Napoleon immediately approved of this ingenious plan, although he was by no means sure that it would be possible to cross the Geyersberg with artillery; for even if it were not there would always be more chance of injuring the enemy on a line of march parallel to their own, than by attacking them directly by the Péterswalde route. Whilst, therefore, the Count de Lobau advanced with the 1st corps from Zehist to Gieshübel, and from Gieshübel towards Péterswalde, driving the enemy before him, Napoleon himself proceeded in a lateral direction with the 14th corps and the Young Guard.

In the meantime, Kleist and Wittgenstein having become informed of Napoleon's presence, although they were still in ignorance of the arrival of the reinforcements he had brought with him, had begun to retreat, although without any great precipitation; Napoleon marching parallel with them, and hoping that on the following day he would be able to throw himself from the route he was himself following upon theirs and take them in flank should it be possible to convey his artillery across the mountains.

On the following morning (the 10th of September), our troops arrived at a hill from whence could be surveyed the sad scene of the events which had happened at Kulm; and where they had on their right the heights of Geyersberg, and on their left those of Nollenberg, along which ran the great Péterswalde route, just before descending into Bohemia. Napoleon crossed this hill accompanied by Marshal Saint-Cyr and his light troops, and perceived at some distance off the enemy's troops hastening to repass the mountains, being in danger, should we succeed in carrying our artillery across the hill, of being compelled to make, through almost impracticable passes, a retreat which should be so disastrous as to afford us a brilliant revenge for the affair of Kulm.

But when the attempt to effect the passage of the artillery had commenced, it immediately became apparent that, despite the ardour with which the troops engaged in the work, it would be impossible to accomplish it under twenty-four hours, a time quite sufficient for the enemy to defile into the plain; and, consequently, as the absence of the Austrians was only a matter of conjecture, and as even without them Kleist's and Wittgenstein's corps, including the Russian and Prussian guards which remained beyond the mountains, numbered some seventy thousand men, Napoleon considered that it

would be imprudent to descend into the plain in pursuit of them; especially as many serious motives recalled him to Dresden. As soon as he found that it was impossible to cross the Geyersberg in two hours, he resolved to bring his movement in that direction to an end; but at the same time, as he was frequently assailed by the news of the irruption of the *Partisans* into Saxony, he resolved that his troops should remain in the position they then occupied—Marshal Saint-Cyr at the Geyersberg, and the Count de Lobau at the Nollenberg. His intention was, should he find these partisans to be only the avant-courier of a more considerable body now commencing the execution of a movement at Leipzig, which he had always considered probable, to hold them in check for some days by remaining above Kulm, and by this means to gain time for the execution of manœuvres proportioned to this new danger.

In accordance with this resolution, Napoleon took Marshal Saint-Cyr aside, and telling him that he had given up the undertaking on which he had entered, without explaining all his motives, the details of which would have occupied too much time, and could not be prudently confessed, he ordered him to remain two days at least in a threatening position above Tœplitz. Leaving the marshal in a state of great astonishment and discontent at the abandonment of an attempt from which he had expected such great results, Napoleon proceeded by Breitenau to Hollendorf, for the purpose of giving similar instructions to the Count de Lobau, and then returned to Brietenau, where he devoted the following day to an inspection of the several military positions of the surrounding country. On the next day, the 12th, he returned to Dresden.

Napoleon found himself on his return to the Saxon capital furnished with matter for serious thought, and even began to be in some degree oppressed with anxiety. The plan which had been adopted by the allies at Trachenberg of marching vigorously against his lieutenants, and of retreating from before himself, so as to exhaust him in fruitless expeditions, and then to surround and crush him, had become terribly apparent, and had been carried out with fearful determination. With marvellous clear-sightedness Napoleon discerned the plan in all its extent, and without being discouraged perceived the formation around him of the circle of iron in which his enemies hoped to crush him. The situation in which he was now placed revealed the only defect of the plan which he had formed for the conduct of the campaign in a circle around Dresden, and which was, that he had made the radius too long, having carried it on

the left as far as Berlin, in front as far as Lowenberg, and on the right as far as Peterswalde, the result being that he was too distant from his lieutenants to be able to direct and support them, and that he was compelled to execute long marches, now in one and now in another direction, wasting his own time, and wearing out not only the strength, but also the spirits of his young soldiers. And of this defect Napoleon himself now became so conscious, that he determined to curtail the extent of his operations so as to be in closer connexion with his lieutenants.

On the resumption of hostilities, Napoleon had had about three hundred and sixty thousand active troops on the Elbe, from Dresden to Hambourg, without counting the garrisons of the fortresses on the Elbe, the Oder, and the Vistula, or the troops of Augereau's corps, or of that of Prince Eugène, and of these there now remained available for service in the field, no more than two hundred and fifty thousand, above a hundred thousand having been lost, not only by the ordinary chances of war, but also by desertion, which went on to an enormous extent in the ranks of our allies, and to a less extent also in our own. That disastrous disposition to disband, which fatigue, cold, and hunger had developed to such a calamitous degree in the army which had made the expedition into Russia, began to reappear amongst our troops, which were now making the campaign in Germany, in a manner which gave rise to serious anxiety.

Whilst this deplorable tendency existed amongst our own soldiers, the allies on the other hand, so far from having suffered any loss by the defection of their troops, were constantly receiving fresh additions of strength by voluntary levies as well as by those which Russia was now procuring by great administrative efforts; the result being, that their effective force, instead of having fallen below five hundred thousand men, numbered nearly six hundred thousand, a formidable mass, to meet which Napoleon had only some two hundred and fifty thousand young and exhausted troops, who began to have somewhat less confidence in the good fortune of their leader, although they had as much trust as ever in his genius.

Unwilling as he was as yet to change the line of his operations from the Elbe to the Rhine, and impossible as it now was to make Berlin the centre of them, it remained to him only to contract the circle of his movements around Dresden, so that he might have a less distance to traverse when it might be necessary for him to advance to any point of its circumference, and also that, the extent of ground to be occupied by his troops being narrowed, he might keep on hand a stronger reserve.

Marshal Macdonald having been compelled to leave the Spree and Bautzen by a movement which Blucher executed against Poniatowski, driving him from Zittau to Rumburg; Napoleon had given him a new position in advance of Dresden, along a little stream named the Wessnitz, which falls into the Elbe *à la hauteur*, of Pirna; placing Poniatowski at Stolpen, Lauriston at Dröbnitz, Gerard at Schmiedefeld, and Souham at Radeberg. From any of these points Napoleon could receive news in one hour, and could reach them himself in two hours, or with forty thousand men in six.

At the same time Napoleon took pains to connect the position of Marshal Macdonald, which was beyond the Elbe, with that of Marshal Saint-Cyr, which was on this side of it, having all the accessible points of the plateaux of Pirna and Gieshübel, by which the enemy must necessarily pass on their way from Péterswalde, strongly entrenched, and posting the 42nd division of Saint-Cyr's corps at the former, and the three divisions of the 1st Corps under the Count de Lobau at the latter. At the same time, as a precaution, in case the two plateaux should be forced towards their exterior edge, Napoleon had the Château de Sonnenstein entrenched at the extremity of the Pirna plateau, and similarly the Kohlberg, at the extremity of that of Gieshübel. Finally, on the right of these two positions, opposite the old Tœplitz route, which ran by Liebstadt towards Bornä, Napoleon posted Marshal Saint-Cyr, with the three other divisions of the 14th corps, ordering him to raise strong redoubts, and to arm them with powerful batteries. He also placed, as a reserve for the divisions placed in these positions, two divisions of the Young Guard in the town of Pirna itself.

In addition to these precautions he had a bridge thrown across the Elbe at Pirna, so that the Young Guard and a portion of Saint-Cyr's corps might at any moment cross the Elbe, and fall upon the left of any army which should attack Macdonald; and, that on the other hand, Poniatowski might be able to rush down with a portion of Macdonald's troops upon the right of any army that should assail Saint-Cyr.

Marshal Victor was to remain at Freybourg, where it would be his task to watch the other débouchés which, still further in the rear of Dresden, might afford opportunities to an enemy to move upon Liepzig by the Commotau and Chemnitz route. He did not precisely intercept this route at Freyberg, but could readily do so in one or two marches; and his position at this place had also the advantage that it was not so advanced as to prevent him from falling back to

the position of Marshal Saint-Cyr, should the enemy débouche by Tœplitz upon Péterswalde or Altenberg.

At the same time as there were a great number of *partisans*, not only on the grand route from Commotau to Leipzig, but also on that from Carlsbad to Zwickau, Napoleon detached Lefebvre-Desnoëtte, with a force of three thousand cavalry, which was to be increased to one of seven or eight thousand horse and two thousand infantry, by draughts drawn from the several forces of Victor, Ney, and Margaron, for the purpose of making a vigorous pursuit of the *partisans* who infested Saxony, and had intercepted some of our convoys.

With respect to Marshal Ney, who had fallen back upon Torgau, Napoleon ordered him to give more concentration to his army, and declaring the 12th corps dissolved, recalled to his side Marshal Oudinot, who had had it under his special command. In the next place he divided the two French divisions of this corps between the 4th and 7th, and devoted what remained of the Bavarian division to the convoy of the great parks of artillery, since it could no longer be relied on in the face of the enemy. To compensate Marshal Ney for the three or four thousand men which he lost by this arrangement, he gave him the excellent Polish division Dombrowski, which had acted and was still to act with so much heroism; and now, posted between Torgau and Wittenberg with some thirty-six thousand troops, none of whom were Germans, with the exception of a few thousand Saxons, well surrounded, there was every probability that he might check a hostile army in an attempt to cross the Elbe sufficiently long to enable other troops to be moved up to his support. And to secure him this support, Napoleon, in this instance again yielding to his tendency to aim at many things at once, posted Marshal Marmont, with eighteen thousand infantry, and General Latour-Maubourg, with six thousand cavalry, at Grossenhayn, a little beyond the Elbe and half way from Dresden to Torgau, where, besides being ready to afford support to Marshal Ney, they would also protect the navigation from Hambourg to Dresden.

From the former of these cities we drew our principal supplies of provisions; for the fine of fifty millions of francs, to which it had been condemned, had been paid for the most part in corn, rice, salted meats, spirits, leather, and horses. A portion of these provisions had already been received at Dresden and consumed, and another portion, which was at Torgau, was already required to supply the necessities of our troops; for, despite the constant care and skill displayed by M. Daru in providing for the maintenance of the army, he

had scarcely succeeded in doing so,—principally because the *partisans* intercepted the routes from Leipzig to Dresden, and prevented the fulfilment of the contracts entered into with the inhabitants. It would be an important advantage, therefore, of the establishment of the troops under Marmont and Latour-Maubourg at Grossenhayn, that it would secure the safe arrival of convoys by the Elbe.

Such were Napoleon's arrangements on his return to Dresden towards the middle of September. With four corps under Macdonald in advance of the Elbe, with the corps of Lobau, Saint-Cyr, and Victor in the rear of this river, well entrenched and connected with each other by several bridges; with Ney guarding the lower Elbe in the environs of Torgau; with Marmont and Latour-Maubourg posted between Torgau and Dresden, for the purpose of protecting the shores of the stream and flanking Macdonald, or of descending to the support of Ney; and, lastly, with the whole of the guard concentrated at Dresden, and ready to furnish a reinforcement of forty thousand men to that one of our generals who might be endangered, without counting the seven or eight thousand cavalry who were scouring the country in our rear in pursuit of the *partisans*—with these arrangements, we say, Napoleon believed that the circle of his operations had been sufficiently reconstructed, and flattered himself that his troops would be able to pass the winter in their present positions without being compelled to exhaust themselves in useless expeditions in answer to mere demonstrations on the part of the enemy. And in this new arrangement there was but one serious inconvenience, and this was, that it would probably result in the loss of the fortresses of the Oder and the Vistula, the numerous garrisons of which had now been blockaded during more than eight months, and would certainly be incapable of holding out beyond the autumn. These garrisons had been left in their positions in accordance with the hope which Napoleon had entertained that a battle won would enable him to return to the Vistula; and now that he could no longer rely on the fulfilment of this hope, he saw with regret that they must be lost. At the same time, so long as he could maintain his position on the Elbe, there would still be a possibility that they might be preserved; and there was fair reason to suppose that any success obtained by our arms might be followed by an armistice, one of the essential conditions of which would be our being at liberty to revictual the fortresses of the Oder and the Vistula.

Whilst he was engrossed at Dresden with these reflections, a fresh act of the enemy suddenly recalled him to Pirna. The Austrians had only separated for a short time from the

Russians and Prussians for the purpose of refreshing and re-organising their troops somewhat in the rear of the theatre of war, and had now returned to Tœplitz, having perceived that it was a serious fault to leave Kleist and Wittgenstein alone in front of the grand French army. As soon as Wittgenstein had become informed of their return, he resolved, on the morning of the 13th of September, to repass the mountains and to appear once more in front of the camp of Pirna and Gieshübel.

Having persuaded, without much difficulty, the Prussian general Kleist to adopt his own views, they returned to the charge against Saint-Cyr and Lobau, and especially the latter. Unfortunately, the works which Napoleon had directed to be executed on the 11th at Langen-Hennersdorf, Gieshübel, and Borna, could not be completed by the 13th, and the Count de Lobau was consequently compelled to fall back upon Gieshübel, as he had so often done before. This being the case, it only remained for Napoleon to make a fresh movement towards the mountains of Bohemia, for the purpose of once more driving back beyond them the troublesome visitors who were so repeatedly making their appearance.

On the 15th, therefore, placing himself at the head of his troops, he drove the enemy from Gieshübel to Péterswalde in great disorder. But the only result of the affair in our favour was, the capture or destruction of some five hundred of the enemy's troops, who, with a determined air, took up a position in front of the Hollendorf defiles, at the foot of the ridge which separates Saxony from Bohemia.

On the following day, Napoleon, in spite of the terrible weather, resumed his march towards the Hollendorf defile, Marshal Saint-Cyr at the same time moving from Furstenwalde across the Geyersberg. During the whole of the day, the pursuit of the Russians and Prussian troops was energetically continued by our troops, and on arriving towards the close of the day in the environs of Kulm, they found the whole army of Bohemia established in strong positions, upon which it would be difficult to make a successful attack. The numbers of this army, since the return of the Austrians, amounted to at least one hundred and twenty thousand men, whilst the force accompanying Napoleon was no more than sixty thousand. This being the case, and a frightful storm exposing our soldiers to great sufferings, on the following morning, Napoleon recrossed the mountain chain, and bidding a final farewell to the Bohemian plains, took up a position at Pirna, close to the bridge which he had had constructed secretly, so that the enemy might not form any idea of the mass of forces which might within a few hours débouch upon the one

or the other bank. He concentrated the whole of his guard on this point, and held himself in readiness to lead forty thousand men to the succour of either Macdonald or Saint-Cyr. In the meantime, Marshal Macdonald observed somewhat singular movements taking place on the part of the enemy; one portion of their new troops ascending from left to right for the purpose of entering Bohemia by the Zittau débouché, whilst another portion, moving from right to left, quitted Blücher for the purpose of joining Bernadotte. As, however, it appeared that the most important events would probably take place in Macdonald's front, Napoleon considered it advisable to remain in his position at Pirna; for, in case it should be necessary for him to throw himself upon any army that might attack Macdonald, he preferred to cross the Elbe at Pirna or Königsstein rather than at Dresden.

But skilful as were all Napoleon's manœuvres, they could not prevent the war from being protracted to a disastrous length, which exhausted his young soldiers, and was wanting in those decisive actions with which Napoleon had been wont to startle France and Europe, and which were now necessary to support the spirit of his army, and to disconcert the ever increasing hate of his enemies. In the meantime, his officers, instead of boldly condemning his inordinate ambition, committed the error of finding fault with his admirable tactics; the idea most generally entertained by his staff being, that he should have fallen back upon the line of the Saale, a line which, as we have said, could not have been defended longer than a week, and a retrograde movement upon which would necessarily have involved the general retreat of our forces upon the Rhine and the immediate abandonment of all the pretensions, for the maintenance of which he had continued the war, and of which the abandonment, happy as it would have been two months since, was now almost impossible.

In the meantime, the allies resolved to terminate the campaign by a direct encounter with Napoleon. The plan they had pursued of avoiding himself, and closing only with his lieutenants, having already had the effect of reducing his forces to an amount which was no more than half, and was soon to be no more than one-third, of their own. There were some difficulties, however, in the execution of this resolution; for whilst the grand army of Bohemia was disposed to attempt a fresh descent from Bohemia into Saxony, on Napoleon's rear, and to march, as originally proposed by Comotau and Chemnitz, upon Leipzig, in combination with the army of Silesia, and whilst Blücher and his associates were no less eager than the staff of the army of Bohemia to bring the campaign to an immediate and decisive result, they were too

strongly imbued with the love of independent action to be willing to place themselves under the direct authority of this staff. As, however, it was necessary to bring forward some better reason than their mere love of independence in opposition to the plan proposed, they represented, in the first place, that it would be a matter of great difficulty for the army of Silesia to conceal its march so completely from Napoleon as to enable it to ascend into Bohemia, cross the mountains, and proceed at their foot as far as Tœplitz, without incurring at his hands some serious blow; and that, in the second place, the news received from the army of the north was far from satisfactory. The Prussian and Russian generals, and especially the Prussian generals, placed under the orders of the Prince of Sweden, complained of his inaction during the battles of Gross-Beeren and Dennewitz, formally accusing him of being guilty of a prudence which was in reality mere madness, or of an infidelity approaching treason. And of these two suppositions, the former was the right one, for he trembled to put in jeopardy his undeserved reputation; and at this very moment, when he had before him only Ney's army, now reduced to thirty-six thousand men, he remained under the protection of the cannon of Magdebourg, and was engaged in making pretended preparations for a passage of the Elbe, which he had no intention of executing. This being the case, then, Blücher proposed that, instead of displacing the army of Silesia, for the purpose of making it co-operate with that of Bohemia or that of the north, it should be united with the latter, which certainly would never act until it should be in this way constrained to do so. He proposed, then, that instead of proceeding to Bohemia himself, the army under Benningsen should be sent thither to join Prince Schwarzenberg at Tœplitz. When this movement should have been executed, his own troops would, he further proposed, execute a feigned attack upon the entrenched camp at Dresden; and then, having left some cavalry troops to deceive the French, descend sixty thousand strong upon the lower Elbe, to force Bernadotte to cross this river in the neighbourhood of Wittenberg, and to ascend with him the course of the Mulde as far as Leipzig, at the head of one hundred and twenty thousand or one hundred and thirty thousand men, whilst the Prince of Schwarzenberg, reinforced by Benningsen, should descend to the same point with a force of more than two hundred thousand. By this plan three hundred and twenty thousand men would be assembled in Napoleon's rear, and the allies would be able to compel him to accept a general engagement, which the superiority of their forces must almost certainly render advantageous to them.

This plan being regarded very justly as superior to that which had been formed in Bohemia, and the intense desire for victory with which the allies were possessed having dominated their feelings of jealousy, it was ultimately adopted, and forthwith carried into execution. General Benningsen penetrated, on the 17th, into the Zittau gorges, and on the 23rd September arrived at Tœplitz. In the meantime, Blücher, having secretly informed the Generals Tauenzien and Bulow of his projects, and urged them to keep the French constantly engaged in front at Wittenberg, Torgau, and Grossenhayn, himself executed incessant manœuvres around Dresden, for the purpose of veiling the great movement which he was preparing to carry into effect on his right, in the direction of the lower Elbe.

The incessant movement of the enemy's troops in our front, the appearance of Thielman's and Platow's light horse on our right and in our rear, the preparations which were being made in the direction of the lower Elbe (by which we mean that portion of the Elbe below Torgau), and, finally, the advanced period of the season, were signs more than sufficient to lead Napoleon to conclude that events were about to take place of the most important character; and whilst expecting with the utmost eagerness a decisive battle, which he believed could not but be decided in his favour, he held himself constantly on the alert, so as on the one hand to avoid being in any way surprised, and on the other to be ready at the right moment to fall upon the rash individual amongst the hostile leaders who should first venture to risk an aggressive movement on his rear.

On the 22nd September, a series of small events strongly excited his attention. Marshal Marmont, reinforced by the cavalry reserve of General Latour-Maubourg, had been posted, as we have seen, at Grossenhayn, for the purpose of protecting the convoys of provisions which were ascending towards Dresden and the groups of wounded soldiers who were moving down from it; and this precaution had for a time been successful, but suddenly the light cavalry of General Chastel was attacked by the heavy cavalry of General Tauenzien, and vigorously driven back; whilst at the same time General Bulow, who was bombarding Wittenberg, showed signs of being about to throw a bridge across the river in the environs of this place, and whilst, at a somewhat higher point, the Russian General Sacken, who formed Blücher's right in front of the Dresden camp, executed several very apparent manœuvres. Napoleon immediately hastening to Dresden, directed Macdonald to execute with his three corps a reconnaissance *a fond*, and to push the

enemy vigorously upon Harta, or even upon Bautzen, so as to discover whether Blucher were really there or not. He at the same time intimated to Macdonald that he would himself follow in his track, with a portion of the Guard, prepared to act vigorously against the army of Silesia, should it still be in the same position.

A reconnaissance, accordingly, conducted by all the French troops composing Macdonald's army against the various corps forming that of Blucher, was begun on the 22nd of September, and carried on the 23rd as far as Bischofswerda, when Blucher was discovered to be in the same position with the same forces; from which circumstances Napoleon concluded that he had too hastily attributed to his enemies bold designs. At the same time, Blucher employed an utterly useless feint to deceive him; sending to our advanced posts by the bearer of a flag of truce a letter for his son, who was a prisoner of our lines, signed by himself, and dated from Bischofswerda; by which means he hoped the more certainly to convince Napoleon that the dispositions of the allied troops had undergone no change and would undergo none. It was not this letter, however, to which no one attached the slightest weight, but the more serious circumstance of the presence at Bischofswerda of the three corps forming the army of Silesia, which, without precisely deceiving Napoleon, inclined them to suppose that the execution of the plan which he had discovered to have been adopted by the allies was less imminent than he had originally imagined. The consequence was, that he made the arrangements on which he had already resolved, but made them somewhat less promptly.

Having left before Dresden only the 11th corps, and relieved its chief, Marshal Macdonald, from the command of the 3rd, 5th, and 8th, he sent the 3rd (General Souham's), to Meissen, a little town situated on the Elbe, below Dresden, to which point he also moved Marmont with the 6th corps, and Latour-Maubourg, with the heavy cavalry, that they might be ready to support Ney, should the enemy attempt to effect the passage of the stream, in the direction of Torgau or Wittenberg. At the same time he carried Lauriston's corps (the 5th) to Dresden itself, and marched Poniatowski's (the 8th) along the Waldheim and Leipzig route, for the purpose of assisting Lefebvre-Desnoëttes against Thielman's and Platow's light horse, and forming the *tête de colonne* of the army, should it be necessary to fall back on the masses of the enemy coming from Bohemia..

To these measures Napoleon added some others, which prove that he felt a vague presentiment that the war would

speedily be waged on the Rhine, or at least on the Saale. In fact, he ordered General Rogniat, who was engineer-in-chief of the Grand Army since the captivity of General Haxo, to reconstruct the fortifications of Mersebourg on the Saale, and to throw bridges across this river, so as to secure for the army a certain line of retreat. At the same time he had the wounded moved in the direction of Mayence; and, foreseeing that the war would be both long and desperate, drew up a decree for the levy of twelve thousand men of the *classes anterieur* of 1812, 1811, and 1810, and another for the levy of one hundred and sixty thousand men of the conscription of 1815, which would thus be anticipated two years. That of 1814 was already at the depôts, and he hoped that when the refractory recruits were brought in, it would amount to three hundred thousand troops, who would be ready for active service in the spring. He drew up with his own hand the address which the Empress was to deliver before the senate on the occasion, and, lastly, gave direct orders to the minister of war to put the fortresses of the Rhine, and more especially those of Italy, into a state of defence. But whilst taking those prudent measures, he at the same time countermanded the collection of the vast supplies of provisions which had been ordered by the Duke de Feltre, in accordance with the terms of M. de Bassano's letter, previously cited, lest the populations should be overmuch alarmed by preparations which he considered to be, at present, at least premature.

Whilst Napoleon was thus engaged, the allies executed somewhat earlier than he had expected their double movement upon Leipzig by Bohemia and the lower Elbe. The Prince of Schwarzenberg, preceded by an Austrian column, marched from Tœplitz upon Commotau, and Blucher, after having remained motionless in Napoleon's presence during the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th of September, suddenly withdrew, for the purpose of descending the Elbe from Dresden to Wittenberg, covering his movement by an attack on the advanced posts of Macdonald and Marmont, executed by his right, under General Sacken, and leaving before Dresden, for the purpose of still further concealing his operations, Sherbatow's Russian corps and Bubna's light Austrian division, which together formed a body of some eighteen thousand men.

But, well calculated as these measures were to deceive even the most experienced eyes, General Blucher's march, concurrent as it was with the other movements of Generals Tauenzien and Bulow, and the Prince of Sweden himself, could not escape the vigilance of Marshal Ney, against whom these various operations were directed. He had seen Bulow construct a bridge at Wartenbourg, and maintain

his position there during several days; and having also perceived the other corps of the Prince of Sweden's army preparing means of effecting their passage to the opposite bank of the river, either at Barby or Roslau, he had not ventured to take any measures calculated to bring down upon his army of 36,000 men the 80,000 of the enemy, and had contented himself, accordingly, with resisting them, more especially at the point where they were preparing to effect the passage of the river near Wartenbourg, because it was the nearest to Dresden, and therefore the more diligently to be guarded. He lost no time in writing to Napoleon to inform him of the state of affairs, and to announce to him that the enemy were on the point of effecting a passage of the Elbe between Wittenberg and Magdebourg, with a considerable body of troops.

Nor were the events which had taken place on the side of Bohemia less significant. General Lefebvre-Desnoëtte had proceeded with some thousands of cavalry in pursuit of Thielman, who, having entered Saxony by a road leading from Carlsbad to Zwickau, had moved in the direction of Weissenfels, as though he purposed to cut off our communications with the Saale. General Lefebvre-Desnoëtte, after having obtained several successes over the enemy, had ultimately been compelled, by the appearance of Platow with his Cossacks, and 5,000 Austrians in his front, to fall back upon Leipzig, with a loss of some hundreds of men. This check, however, had been speedily atoned for by Prince Poniatowski, who, having repassed the Elbe, and fallen back as far as Frohbourg with the 8th corps, and the 4th of the cavalry, had fallen in his turn upon Thielmann and Platow, and inflicted upon them, a loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, of seven hundred men. These various encounters, sometimes resulting in our favour, and sometimes turning against us, were altogether advantageous to us, as serving to keep us thoroughly informed with respect to the movements of the enemy. And, indeed, the information which was now received made it sufficiently evident that, on Napoleon's left the army of the north, reinforced probably by Blucher and his troops, was traversing the lower Elbe, with the intention of ascending towards Leipzig along the Mulde, and that these several armies, after having crossed over to the left of the Elbe, would endeavour to take him in flank.

Declining, then, to be deceived by the enemy's feigned manœuvres, Napoleon forthwith directed his forces on the two points which were being simultaneously threatened, in such a manner as to place himself with his reserves between

the two allied armies, ready to fall on the one of them which should appear most accessible to his attack. He had already sent Prince Poniatowski in the rear of Dresden, along the Leipzig route, by Waldheim and Frohbourg, from whence this officer had been able to check the progress of Thielmann and Platow; and he now also moved the 5th Corps in the same direction, upon Mittweyda, for the purpose of affording him support. The 2nd corps, which had been for some time at Freyberg, watching the passes leading from Bohemia into Saxony, Napoleon now moved still farther, to the environs of Chemnitz. These three corps, to which were annexed the 4th and 5th cavalry, were to fall back towards Thuringia, along the foot of the Bohemian mountains, taking care to be always between the Grand Army of the Prince of Schwarzenberg and Leipzig. At the same time Marshal Marmont was ordered to fall back with the 6th corps and the 1st cavalry upon Leipzig, where he would be only one march distant from Murat, and not more than two from Ney.

As soon as the enemy's movements, which had hitherto been much confused, should manifest some decided plan, Napoleon determined that, leaving Saint-Cyr and the Count de Lobau at Dresden, he would himself fall back with the forty thousand men of the Guard, with Macdonald and Souham, who would join him at Meissen, and going up to the support of either Murat or Ney, as the one or the other of them might appear to be in more immediate danger, raise the army of one of them to a force of one hundred and forty-five thousand men, which would be quite sufficient he believed to vanquish first the one, and then the other of the two armies of the allies.

The corps of Poniatowski, Lauriston, and Victor, with the 4th and 5th cavalry corps, having been marched in the direction of Mittweida and Frohbourg, under the command of Murat, and the corps of Marmont and Latour-Maubourg, marched in the direction of Leipzig, Napoleon held himself in readiness at the first signal to proceed either in the one direction or the other, with 75,000 men. In the meantime a column of battalions and squadrons *de marche* having arrived at Leipzig, he ordered that it should remain there to garrison that city in conjunction with the detachments which General Margaron had already left there, and also ordered thither for the same duty the corps d'Augereau, with which he had at first intended to overcome, as well as to defend, Bavaria, but which now, perceiving that the whole fate of the war was to be decided on the plains of Leipzig, he did not hesitate to summon thither.

In the meantime the allies proceeded to carry out their plans. Blucher having arrived on the 30th September in

front of Wittenberg, replaced Bulow's corps there, and then hastened to make his preparations for effecting the passage of the Elbe. As Wittenberg was still in the hands of the French, he could not hope to be able to cross the river at that point, and therefore proceeded to throw up a bridge across it, somewhat higher up, at Elster, where he succeeded in passing over to the left bank on the 2nd October. But it still remained for him to carry the Wartenbourg position, which was no means an easy task, Bulow having already attempted it, and failed.

Marshal Ney, having learned by means of his reconnoissances, the presence of the enemy on the left of the Elbe, lost no time in sending General Bertrand thither to frustrate the objects for which this movement had been attempted. The 4th corps consisted only at this time of the French division Morand, the Italian division Fontanelli, and the Wurtemberg division Franquemont, and numbering altogether no more than 12,000 men, a very small force with which to contend with 60,000 enemies, but which was to find compensation for smallness of numbers in advantages of ground, skill, and coolness.

The Elbe as it approaches Elster, forms a very decided arc, within which it envelopes on its left flank a tract of lone and marshy ground, on which stands the Chateau de Wartenburg. To protect it against inundations a dyke had been dug, extending in the manner of a cord from one extremity of the arc formed by the Elbe to the other, and on one of the extremities of this dyke is situated the chateau, the village of Bleddin being on the other. If the enemy's troops, which had crossed the Elbe at Elster, wished to continue their progress in a direct line, they would pursue a course which must lead them to the middle of the dyke. General Morand had consequently posted the French division at this point, where the most difficult task would have to be performed; the Italians being a little to the right, and quite to the right, at the village of Bleddin, the Wurtembergians. Having made these arrangements, and ranged his artillery on the sandy height of the Chateau de Wartembourg, he awaited the Russians, who made their appearance on the third, boldly advancing without any idea of the terrible reception which was in reserve for them. Our troops allowed them to advance to within very short musket range, and then poured upon them from every point of the dyke, a sudden and unexpected fire, which completely enveloped and decimated them, and the fire of a murderous artillery being at the same moment added to that of the musketry, they were compelled to give way and to fall back in disorder upon the bridge. Again and again they returned to the charge, and

each time were forced to retreat with considerable loss. In vain Blucher had a battery established for the purpose of dismounting our artillery on the Wartenbourg height. Our artillerymen, in nowise disconcerted, turned a portion of their pieces against the Prussian battery, and having speedily reduced it to silence, redirected them upon the route, which had now become a fearful scene of carnage.

The contest had lasted for four hours, and nearly five thousand of the enemy were stretched, dead, or wounded on the marshy ground, when at length General Blucher hit upon the idea of directing a vigorous attack on our right, upon the village of Bleddin, which was defended by the Wurtembergians, who numbered only two thousand, and from whom, after a furious assault, he succeeded in taking it. On seeing this, General Bertrand threw the brigade Hullot of the division Morand on the flank of the enemy's column, but it was too late to save the village, in which the enemy had already established themselves, and after having encountered and broken three of their battalions, it was compelled to return behind the dyke, and rejoin the division Morand.

Costing the enemy, as it did, some five or six thousand men, whilst our own loss was at the most no more than five hundred, this brilliant affair may be considered one of the most remarkable of any that occurred during the whole course of our protracted wars; but it could not, nevertheless, Bleddin being taken, prevent the army of Silesia from debouching. It would be necessary, therefore, for General Bertrand to retreat upon Kemberg, for the purpose of rejoining General Reynier and the division Dombrowski, posted along the Mulde, from Düben to Dessau. From prisoners whom we had taken, it was learned that the whole army of Silesia had crossed the Elbe, and was on Ney's right, and our reconnaissances informed us that the army of the north had begun to cross the Elbe below Wittenberg, from Roslau to Barby, and was consequently on Ney's left. Let us glance at the features of the country across which these two armies were now advancing for the purpose of effecting a junction, and making a combined movement against the corps of Marshal Ney.

The Elbe, which from Dresden to Wittenberg flows obliquely from the south-east to the north-west, from Wurtenbourg to Roslau, and almost as far as Barby, flows from east to west, that it is to say, with reference to the position of our troops, from our right to our left. In its course from Wittenberg to Barby, the Elbe receives, first, the Mulde, which falls into it in the neighbourhood of Dessau, and then the

Saale, which joins it near Barby. Thus Marshal Ney had on his right and in front of him the Elbe, which flowed parallel to his position as far as Wittenberg, and then making a bend passed before him, and on his left the Mulde. He was, consequently, between Blucher, who had crossed the Elbe on his right at Wartenbourg, and Bernadotte, who, having crossed the Elbe below the point of its confluence with the Mulde, was re-ascending the course of the latter river on his left. He possessed the advantage, it is true, of having all the bridges of the Mulde in his hands, of being able, therefore, to cross to the one or the other of the banks of this river at his will, and of thus covering himself against the advance of either Blucher or Bernadotte. But unfortunately his force consisted of but 40,000 men, whilst Blucher's numbered 60,000, and Bernadotte's even more. The manner in which he manœuvred between those two armies was highly prudent, and was founded on the twofold object of keeping them separate, and of leading his own troops towards Leipzig. In the meantime, Blucher and Bernadotte had an interview, in which they agreed upon a plan of operations, to the effect that as soon as they could leave the banks of the Elbe without danger, they should carry their forces behind the Mulde, and ascend its course as far as Leipzig. But they were, at the same time, equally anxious to provide for a change of fortune against the arms of the allies, by preparing a means of retreat in the shape of reliable *têtes-de-pont* at Wartenbourg and Roslau, the construction of which would occupy at least three or four days.

Whilst these events were taking place between the Elbe and the Mulde, Marshal Marmont, whose instructions authorized him to proceed where the danger might appear to be greatest, had hastened, at the first summons from Marshal Ney, to leave Leipzig and to descend the Mulde with his corps d'armée and Latour-Maubourg's cavalry, and had halted at Eilenbourg, behind Marshal Ney, who had fallen back upon Düben.

Murat, entrusted with the duty of watching the gates of Bohemia, advanced with Poniatowski, Lauriston, Victor, and the 4th and 5th cavalry, from Mittweida to Frohborg, traversing the foot of the Erz-Gebirge, and covering Leipzig. The heads of the columns of the army of Bohemia were now plainly visible, debouching in two principal masses from Comotau upon Chemnitz, and from Carlsbad upon Zwickau.

On the morning of the 5th October, Napoleon received information of the battle of Wartenbourg, and in the course of the same day the detailed account of all the movements effected by the various corps. But the state of things which

he now knew to exist neither excited nor disturbed him; for it did but announce to him the imminence of what he ardently desired, a general engagement, and his only fear was that the allies might even now lose their courage and endeavour to retrace their steps. That it was necessary to march upon them there could be no doubt; the only question being as to which of the two masses of the enemy's troops he should first attack, and with respect to this point he did not hesitate a moment. The army of Bohemia was still at a considerable distance from Leipzig; and moreover, Murat, whose force would be raised to 60,000 men by the addition of the 12,000 who were at Leipzig, and the 12,000 of Augereau's corps, would be able to take up successive positions for the purpose of covering Leipzig, and thus gain a few days, during which Napoleon, whom three marches would carry to Düben on the Mulde, would have time to throw himself between Blücher and Bernadotte, and after defeating them one after the other, to march upon the army of Bohemia, vanquishing it in its turn. But should this latter army hasten to re-enter Bohemia, he would decline to pursue it thither, preferring to chase the vanquished troops of Bernadotte and Blücher, following them sword in hand even to Berlin, and thus realise his favourite project of rescuing the garrisons of the fortresses on the Oder and the Vistula, besides transferring, probably, the theatre of the war to the lower Elbe, where he had the two strong points of support, Magdebourg and Hambourg.

But although Napoleon was full of confidence with respect to the successful result of his plans, he did not fail to admit the possibility that his expectations might be frustrated, and had, therefore, prudently sent General Rogniat to Mersebourg to secure a safe retreat to the Saale, upon which river he proposed, should circumstances prove disastrous, to fall back, making it the basis of a new series of operations.

The evacuation by our troops of Dresden, and the portion of the Elbe comprised between Königsstein and Torgau, were evidently necessary incidents of the existing posture of affairs; and accordingly, on the morning of the 6th, Napoleon set out with the whole of his guard, young and old, for the lower Elbe, directing his march upon Meissen. As the 3rd corps (Souham's) had moved upon Torgau at the first rumour of the battle of Wartenbourg; and as Napoleon now ordered Macdonald also to proceed towards Meissen, a force of seventy-five thousand men, formed by the Guard, and the corps of Souham and Macdonald, would be in two days close to Ney, and in three in the very presence of the enemy. There still remained at Dresden the corps of the Count de

Lobau (the 1st), of Marshal Saint-Cyr (the 14th), reckoning seven divisions, and numbering together some thirty thousand men. Summoning Marshal Saint-Cyr, who had the command of these two corps, to his presence, Napoleon caused him to feel great satisfaction by the exposition of his views; for he on the present occasion thoroughly entered into the spirit of Napoleon's plans, and had been apprehensive that he should be left behind in Dresden. Napoleon directed him to evacuate in succession Kœnigstein, Lilienstein and Pirna, destroying the bridges which had been established at these various points, and employing a portion of the boats of which they were composed, in the conveyance of stores and wounded soldiers to Torgau. Whilst executing these measures the marshal was to take pains to persuade the inhabitants of Dresden that no intention was entertained of abandoning it; but as soon as they should be completed he was to hold himself in readiness to set out with his thirty thousand troops to join Napoleon at Meissen.

It remained to come to some explanation with the Saxon Court, to which Napoleon could only offer the cruel alternative of remaining at Dresden and enduring the chances of a formidable attack by the enemy, or of accompanying our army in its march, and thus being involved in the horrors of such a battle as the world had never yet seen. The good king Frederick-Augustus finding himself in a position in which he could only trust his fortunes with those of Napoleon, preferred to accompany the latter rather than one of his lieutenants, and declared to him his desire to follow him wherever he might go. A decision which imposed upon Napoleon the task of dragging in his train a whole court, consisting of old men, women, and children, who had always been accustomed to the most luxurious and tranquil mode of life, and who displayed all that simplicity and ignorance which characterized the Bourbons of Spain.

Having set in motion a portion of his troops on the 6th of October, and another portion on the 7th, Napoleon set out in person on the latter day, and after a halt of some hours at Meissen pushed on to Seerhausen, on the Wurtzen road. His great experience in warfare had taught him that the most important despatches usually arrived about midnight or one o'clock in the morning, because the generals who might be posted some ten or fifteen leagues distant, sent off in the evening information of what had taken place during the day. Should the orders required by the state of circumstances disclosed in this information be immediately dispatched, they would reach their destination in time to be executed on the following morning; and these corps posted at a considerable

distance from each other, would act as though under Napoleon's own immediate command. But this could only be the case on the condition that the Emperor should be awake and ready at the moment when the orders in question had to be despatched; and accordingly, it was his usual habit during this last campaign to go to rest at about six or seven o'clock in the evening, and rising at midnight to dictate his correspondence during the whole of the night.

Having halted at Seerhausen a short time to snatch a brief repose, Napoleon set out the same night for Wurtzen, where he arrived on the 8th, sufficiently early to despatch his orders for the day. At Wurtzen he was on the Mulde, and in a position from which he could reach either Leipzig or Düben in the same space of time. His intention on quitting Dresden had been to determine at Wurtzen itself upon his final resolution, and from this point either to throw himself upon Leipzig, should Murat be unable any longer to make head against the army of Bohemia, or, should Murat be able still to maintain his position for a few days, to descend the Mulde as far as Düben, and free himself from the armies of Silesia and the North, by driving them beyond the Elbe. All the information he had received en route concurred in showing that the greatest danger threatened in the direction of Ney, and an unfortunate misunderstanding which had arisen between this marshal and Marmont was an additional reason for his presence in that quarter. The misunderstanding alluded to had arisen from the following circumstances. Ney having fallen back after the battle of Wartenbourg as far as Düben, and having urged Marmont to come to his assistance, which the latter had done by advancing to Eilenbourg, had suddenly quitted his position, and passed behind Marmont for the purpose of approaching the Elbe in the direction of Torgau. By this proceeding Marmont was driven from his position *en appui* into one in which he was *en tête* and gravely compromised; Leipzig being at the same time exposed by the movement which Ney had required him to make, to any enterprise that Bernadotte and Blücher might undertake against it. Marshal Ney had been induced to take this extraordinary step by his desire to reinforce his army by the 3rd corps (Souham's), which he had long commanded and on which he had placed great reliance. Marmont, however, not knowing what to think of Ney's conduct, and fearing for the safety of Leipzig, had in his turn fallen back as far as Taucha.

Having formed his plan of action without loss of time, Napoleon resolved to march from Wurtzen upon Eilenbourg; in other words, to descend the Mulde with the seventy-five

thousand men he brought with him, pushing forward Ney and Marmont in advance, with the hope of being able to overtake Bernadotte and Blücher before they should have time to re-pass the Elbe. As soon as Blücher and Bernadotte should have been vanquished, he proposed to turn back upon the Prince of Schwarzenberg, should he have continued to advance with the army of Bohemia, or, should he have retreated at the news of a disaster to the arms of the allies, to continue to pursue Blücher and Bernadotte as far, perhaps, as Berlin itself.

Having ordered, in pursuance of this plan, Ney and Marmont to advance, the former by the right bank, and the latter by the left bank of the Mulde, Napoleon followed them with the whole of his guard and Macdonald. At the same time, he communicated to Murat the measures he had projected against the united armies of the North and of Silesia, and directed him, whilst avoiding any collision with the enemy, to keep constantly between him and Leipzig, where he would find a reinforcement of twenty or four and twenty thousand men, which would raise the force under his command to some sixty and odd thousand combatants. Napoleon had, in fact, posted the Duke of Padua at Leipzig, with a portion of the 3rd cavalry corps (detached from Ney's army, for the purpose of pursuing the *partisans*), together with some *bataillons de marche* which had arrived from Mayence, and the old division Margaron. These troops when joined by those under Augereau, which were on their march towards them, would form a force of twenty-four thousand men; and Napoleon gave orders that they should keep an active watch, especially on the side of the lower Elbe, against any attack which Bernadotte might possibly make upon Leipzig. Unfortunately, added to these judicious orders was one which, although quite justified by the state of circumstances at the time, cannot but be much regretted. By this order he countermanded, or rather deferred the evacuation of Dresden, for which Marshal Saint-Cyr had made every preparation; the reason being, that he believed that a decisive battle was imminent, and that he desired to be able, after the victory which he did not doubt he was about to gain, to make Dresden once more his head-quarters.

Having passed at Wurtzen the evening of the 8th and the whole of the 9th, for the purpose of affording time for the arrival of his troops in line, Napoleon set out before daybreak on the 10th for Eilenbourg, where he arrived about four o'clock in the morning. Placing himself at the head of the light cavalry of the guard, he marched upon Düben, in the midst of his troops, which were arranged in the following

order :—Ney occupied the foremost place with what remained of the Duke of Padua's cavalry and Sebastiani's corps, having Reynier on the left beyond the Mulde, whilst Dombrowski and Souham were in the centre on the Mulde itself, and Bertrand marched on the right at an almost equal distance from the Mulde and the Elbe. Napoleon followed with the cavalry of the guard and that of Latour-Maubourg *en tête*, the troops under Marmont forming the left on one side of the Mulde, the whole of the guard forming the centre on the Mulde itself, and Macdonald's troops forming the right between the Mulde and the Elbe. At two days' march in the rear followed the grand *quartier general* with all the baggage, artillery, and munitions of war, and with the worthy princes of the Saxon Court, who journeyed in a fashion corresponding to the habits of their lives. In the meantime, the enemy were perceived falling back in all directions, and yet once more Napoleon had reason to fear that the allies, resuming their old tactics, would evade his onslaught.

Believing that they would have to encounter only Marshals Ney and Marmont, Blucher and the Prince of Sweden had agreed on the 7th to march together upon Leipzig on the 9th; however, secret information reached Bernadotte and Blucher of the approach of Napoleon in person, and the former had thereupon hastened to declare that he would immediately fall back behind the Elbe for the purpose of saving himself from disaster, unless the army of Silesia should join him beyond the Mulde, and thus unite the armies of the North and of Silesia in one single mass. This plan was a prudent one, and Blucher hastened to conform to it, although the proposed movement would involve the inconvenience of forcing him to lose his bridge at Wartenbourg. It was then arranged that on the 10th General D'York, whose troops really formed the right of the army of Silesia, should pass the Mulde at Jesnitz, that General Langeron's, which formed the centre, should pass it at Bitterfeld, and finally that General Sacken's, which had become its left, should pass it at Düben. Thus all the corps of the army of Silesia were in motion defiling before us in a direction from our right to our left along the line described by the Mulde in its course from Düben to Bitterfeld. The corps of General D'York was but a short distance from the point at Jesnitz at which it was to pass the Mulde, and that of Langeron was but four leagues from Bitterfeld; but Sacken, who was at Mokrehna, between the Mulde and the Elbe, had on the contrary a considerable distance to traverse before he could arrive at Düben, and also had to execute this movement in close proximity to the French, a circumstance which rendered it an extremely perilous proceeding.

Whilst Blücher was defiling in a direction from our right to our left for the purpose of crossing the Mulde, Marshal Ney fell upon Langeron's corps, which had remained in the rear for the purpose of awaiting Sacken's corps and delivering up to it the Düben bridge, and driving it back with considerable vehemence, took from it three hundred baggage waggons. The consequence was that Sacken, who was hotly pressed by the troops of General Bertrand, was compelled to make a great circuit for the purpose of crossing the Mulde at Raguhn.

Napoleon entering Düben about two o'clock in the afternoon, learned from the statements of prisoners that he was in the presence of the whole army of Silesia, and at once resolved to pursue it in every direction; and having ordered his marshals and generals to execute the measures which he considered would have the effect of rendering it impossible for the enemy to effect the passage of the Mulde and the Elbe, he remained at Düben with the guard, Latour-Maubourg's cavalry and the corps of Marshal Marmont, for the purpose of developing there his ulterior movements.

And now, knowing that the army of the North was on his left behind the lower Mulde, and that the army of Silesia, after having crossed the Elbe at Wartenbourg on our right, was defiling along our front for the purpose of crossing the Mulde on our left and joining the army of the North, and having great reason to suppose that they were about to resume their evasive tactics, and to repass the Elbe at our approach in the neighbourhood either of Acken or Roslau, he resolved to pursue them with the utmost vehemence in the direction of Berlin, and as it was of great consequence that he should possess the power of returning at a subsequent period against the army of Bohemia, he almost instantaneously devised a project as audacious as it was skilful, and which the vast proportions of the forces with which it was to be executed enveloped with an attribute of almost unheard of grandeur. Napoleon resolved, then, to pursue with the utmost vehemence the armies of Silesia and of the North, passing the Mulde and the Elbe in their track, destroying all the bridges except those which were in our own hands, and ultimately putting these two armies to complete route. When this should have been accomplished he would reascend the Elbe by the right bank as far as Torgau or Dresden, and crossing it at one of these points, throw himself upon the army of Bohemia, which, having continued to descend the course of the Mulde in pursuit of Murat, would be then taken in a species of trap between the Mulde and the Elbe, *the bridges of which would be in our hands.*

Napoleon lost no time in giving the orders necessary for the execution of this plan, and gave them in cypher, at the same time desiring all those who became the depositories of his secret to keep it well, declaring, that for three days it would be *the secret of the army and the salvation of the empire*. He ordered Murat to act with extreme caution, holding the enemy in check and yet enticing him on, and to fall back upon Leipzig, where he would meet with the Duke of Padua, and probably Augereau also, to maintain his position there as long as possible, but rather than expose himself to an unequal struggle to fall back upon Torgau or Wittenberg, where he would find an asylum behind the Elbe. At the same time, he ordered the Duke of Padua to take measures in concert with Général Lefebvre-Desnoette for the transfer of all the valuable military stores in Leipzig to Torgau; and directed him to write to Erfut and Mayence to the effect that the French troops were in full manœuvre, that the movements in which they were engaged were of a very complicated character, and that no alarm should be felt, should news be received of the occupation of Leipzig by the enemy, for that although such an event might very possibly take place, the result of the combinations which were now being carried out would be, as it were, a thunderbolt hurled in our favour.

But attendant on this finely conceived combination there was one inconvenience, and that a very serious one, being the necessity which it involved of refraining from carrying out the proposed evacuation of Dresden; for as one of the main portions of this new plan was that, after having crossed the Elbe in pursuit of Blucher and Bernadotte, Napoleon should recross it for the purpose of surprising the army of Bohemia, and it might possibly be necessary for him in pursuance of this design to ascend it, not only as far as Torgau, but even to Dresden itself, the preservation of this city was absolutely necessary. Napoleon accordingly sent orders to Marshal Saint Cyr to maintain his position at Dresden, adding that he would probably reappear in person very shortly under its walls, after having accomplished great designs, and in pursuit of others still greater. But, unfortunately, should these designs not be realised, and should our troops be forced to meet the enemy in the position they then occupied between Düben and Leipzig, this new plan with respect to the continued occupation of Dresden would have been the means of depriving us of thirty thousand men, who might have turned a doubtful scale of victory in our favour, and who, should we be obliged, after a defeat or drawn battle, to recross the Saale, would be thirty thousand more troops added to all

those which, shut up in the fortresses of the Elbe, the Oder, and the Vistula, could not return to France, and would consequently be compelled to capitulate.

After having formed these vast plans, Napoleon resolved to spend a day or two at Düben, for the purpose of awaiting the arrival of information respecting Murat, and the various corps sent in pursuit of Blücher and Bernadotte, since he was desirous of knowing whether he should have to seek the armies of Silesia and the North behind the Mulde, passing this river between Düben and Dessau, or to seek them beyond the Elbe, passing this river at Wittenberg. The weather was frightful, and Napoleon was forced to await the result of his reconnaissances, in a little villa surrounded by floods, and in the midst of woods, which an unpropitious autumn had already smitten with decay. The forced inaction to which he now had to submit he found excessively irksome, and although still very confident in his ultimate success, he could not always resist the invasion of certain vague presentiments. His only resource was conversation with Marshal Marmont, whose equable, open, and cultivated mind pleased him much, and with whom he had formerly been on the familiar terms proper between a general and his aide-de-camp.

On the 11th the reports of his lieutenants announced to Napoleon the following results. General Bertrand had advanced to Wartenbourg with the 4th corps, and had set himself to work to destroy the grand *tête-de-pont* which Blücher had begun to construct there. Generals Dombrowski and Reynier had driven away from the environs of Wittenberg the troops which blockaded that place, and having entered it, debouched upon the right bank of the Elbe, and proceeded in pursuit of the Prussian detachments. Marshal Macdonald had taken up a position at Klemberg, behind Wittenberg, for the purpose of supporting Dombrowski and Reynier; and finally, Ney had approached Dessau, and driven back all the detachments of the enemy's troops upon the right of the Mulde. In the meantime, the statements received from prisoners, and the apparent movements of the enemy, were of a nature to throw Napoleon into a state of the greatest uncertainty. In fact, at Wartenbourg on our right, at Wittenberg in our front, and at Dessau on our left, not only had detachments of the enemy been perceived, but even entire corps and immense convoys; rendering it quite impossible for our generals to decide whether the enemy re-passed to the right bank of the Elbe on our approach, or halted behind the Mulde, ready to give us battle as soon as we should venture to cross the river in his presence. It

might also be the case that the armies of the North and of Silesia, united behind the Mulde, reascended the course of this river for the purpose of effecting a junction with the army of Bohemia in the neighbourhood of Leipzig—a movement on their part which would expose us to the very serious peril of having the whole of the forces of the coalition upon us at the same moment. It was necessary, therefore, that our manœuvres should be conducted in such a manner, as to keep us always between the forces of Bernadotte and Blücher, and those of the Prince of Schwarzenberg; in other words, between the mass of the enemy's troops which was ascending from the lower Elbe, and that which was descending from Bohemia. Having this object in view accordingly, Napoleon sent Marmont, to whose troops he added a strong cavalry division, to the left of the Mulde towards Dolitzsch, where he would be behind a detached arm of the Mulde which flows from Leipzig to Jesnitz, and from whence, should he find that the army of Silesia, or that of the North were moving in the direction of Leipzig, he might easily march thither himself in a few hours, and arrive there before them.

Having taken this wise precaution, Napoleon proceeded to carry out the measures necessary to enable him to develope his grand design, should it be the case, as he hoped, that the fear of a movement by Blücher and Bernadotte upon Leipzig was but a chimera. Ordering Dombrowski and Reynier to descend along the right bank of the Elbe, for the purpose of destroying all the bridges Bernadotte might hold on that river from Roslau to Barby, and ordering Ney to seize the bridges of the Mulde at Dessau, he left Macdonald and Klemberg to give such support to Reynier and Dombrowski as they might require, and Bertrand at Wartenbourg to complete the destruction of Blücher's *tête-de-pont*. Finally, he concentrated the troops of Latour-Maubourg and the Guard around Düben, whence they would be ready to follow Ney to Dessau, to fall upon the armies of the north and of Silesia upon the other side of the Mulde, or to proceed in the direction already taken by Marmont. And this was the manner in which—struggling with grave perplexities, and plunged in profound calculations—Napoleon passed a day many of his critics have declared him to have lost.

Rising, as was his custom, somewhat before one o'clock on the morning of the 12th, he hastened to make himself master of the information that had come in from all directions, and found that whilst one of the two armies of the lower Elbe, that of Bernadotte, had repassed to the right bank of the Elbe, the other, Blücher's, had remained on the left bank, and displayed a tendency to reascend towards Leipzig behind

the Mulde. Another piece of information, to the effect that Murat had engaged the enemy with success on the 10th, tended to confirm Napoleon in the resolution to throw himself at once upon the armies of the north and of Silesia.

The engagement just alluded to, in which Murat had been victorious over Wittgenstein on the 10th, had taken place in the following manner. Murat having advanced with Poniatowski, Lauriston, Victor, and the 4th and 5th cavalry, upon Frohbourg, had succeeded in intercepting the route leading to Leipzig by Commotau and Chemnitz, but had not been in time to intercept that leading to this city by Carlsbad and Zwickau. The consequence had been that Wittgenstein had been able to occupy Borna. Being unwilling to remain in this position, and especially anxious that the head of one of the two columns of the enemy should not reach Leipzig before him, the French marshal had resolutely fallen back on his right, and attacking Borna with the utmost vigour, had retaken it at the point of the bayonet. This engagement, which cost Wittgenstein some three or four thousand men, had rendered us masters of the Leipzig route, and replaced Murat in that position in which it was his task to cover Leipzig, against the two columns of Prince Schwarzenberg debouching from Bohemia. Murat, judging from first appearances, in his despatches to Napoleon expressed his belief that the army of Bohemia was in retreat, and urged him to neglect no opportunity of engaging the armies of Silesia and the North.

These details, which Napoleon received on the morning of the 12th, induced him once more to suppose that the allies were anxious to avoid him, and that it was, consequently, necessary that he should at once throw himself upon the armies of Silesia and the North; pursue them beyond the Elbe, and then, ascending the course of this river by its right bank, surprise the army of Bohemia by suddenly passing over to its left bank. But at ten o'clock in the morning the aspect of affairs had suddenly changed; a second letter from Murat, bringing information that instead of being in retreat the enemy was in full march upon Leipzig; that the Austrian column continuing its movement by the Chemnitz route, continued to advance upon Frohbourg and Borna; and that Wittgenstein's column, after having fallen back for a moment on the Zwickau route as far as Altenbourg, had once more boldly resumed its march upon Leipzig. Murat announced that he was himself falling back in the direction of Leipzig, and that he hoped to be able to maintain himself in a good position which he intended to take up some leagues from this city, and in which he promised to devote himself to the

ungrateful and perilous task of struggling with a force three or four times superior to his own. At the same moment, Marmont's reconnaissance discovered Blucher's army quitting the banks of the Mulde for those of the Saale, and ascending towards Halle, with an evident direction towards Leipzig.

On receiving this information, Napoleon, with the promptitude of a superior military tactician, immediately changed his plans, and resolved to advance immediately upon Leipzig. So long as he had been able to hope that he might succeed in maintaining a position between the two masses of the enemy's troops which were coming, the one from Bohemia, the other from the lower Elbe, with the power of throwing himself upon the one or the other at will, his former plan had been in the highest degree skilful and prudent; but now that the tendency of these several masses was evident, whilst he could be neither sure that Murat would be able to hold in check for any time the army of Bohemia, nor that he could himself come up with the armies of Silesia and the North, in time to prevent their reaching Leipzig, his chief object was necessarily to oppose the junction of the three armies of the allies, and for that purpose to proceed to Leipzig, to give battle as soon as possible to the army of Bohemia.

Without losing a moment Napoleon made his calculations, and before noon gave the necessary orders for the concentration upon Leipzig, of the troops under Marmont from Dolitzsch, of the Guard and Latour-Maubourg's troops from Düben, and of those under Bertrand and Macdonald from the environs of Wittenberg. At the same time, as he had reason to suppose that the army of the north had repassed the Elbe, and was anxious to render it harmless by destroying the means by which it might recross this river, he ordered Reynier, Dombrowski, and Sebastiani to complete as soon as possible the operations they had been charged to execute against the bridges of Roslau, Acken, and Barby, and with a similar object in view reiterated the orders he had given to Marshal Ney to seize those at Dessau.

Napoleon resolved to await at Düben the execution of his orders, for whilst his presence at Leipzig would be of little value until his troops had arrived there, he would be able at Düben to watch the movements of his corps d'armée, and the accomplishment of the measures which he had planned for the purpose of keeping Bernadotte at a distance. Certain encounters which took place at this time between Dombrowski and Reynier, who had crossed the Elbe at Wittenberg, and certain bodies of the enemy, known to belong to the army of the North, together with the fact that the enemy's troops engaged in the action fought by Ney on the same day

at Dessau, and which resulted in our completely routing them with a great loss, were a portion of Tauenzien's corps, which, without absolutely belonging to Bernadotte's army, had usually served with it, confirmed the supposition that the army of the North had remained on the right of the Elbe, for the purpose of covering Berlin, whilst the army of Silesia, having fallen back from the Mulde to the Saale, for the purpose of accomplishing its movement under cover of two rivers, was now moving towards Halle and Leipzig, in order to effect a junction with the army of Bohemia. Such an hypothesis certainly left many contradictions to be explained, for it was difficult to understand why the armies of Silesia and the North had, at great risk, effected their junction and the passage of the Elbe, only to separate immediately afterwards, and why Blucher had not simply proceeded across Bohemia to effect his junction with the Prince of Schwarzenberg, instead of traversing the immense circuit from Bautzen to Dessau, and from Dessau to Leipzig. But this was not the first occasion on which the generals of the allied forces had appeared to execute strange manœuvres, and it was impossible not to trust to the unanimous testimonies to the fact of the separation of the two armies of the North and the South.

As these testimonies received fresh confirmation on the 13th by reconnaissances executed in all directions, Napoleon persisted in adhering to the opinion he had already formed, but which, however, was but of little importance with respect to the measures now to be taken, as in any case the speedy and complete concentration of his forces around Leipzig was absolutely necessary. Marmont, with General Deforge's cavalry, had ascended the Mulde, between the principal arm and the little arm which passes at Dolitzsch, in a line which was constantly parallel with that pursued by Blucher's troops, which were effecting a similar movement along the Saale, and were directing their march upon Halle as we upon Leipzig. On the evening of the 13th Marshal Marmont took up a position in the rear of Leipzig, at Breitenfeld, which was opposite the Halle route, and where he was in a position to prevent Blucher from entering Leipzig. On the same day Murat fell back in good order upon the opposite side of Leipzig, into a position in which he might hold in check the army of Prince Schwarzenberg. Augereau, after having encountered the light troops of Lichtenstein and Thielmann beyond Weissenfels, not far from the plains of Lutzen, and routed them with a loss to them of two thousand men, was now at the entrance into Leipzig, towards Lindenau, and thus formed a fresh obstacle to a junction between Blucher

and Schwarzenberg. Thus on the evening of the 13th ninety thousand of our troops were already assembled in the neighbourhood of Leipzig, in such a manner as to keep separate the masses of the enemy.

In the meantime the concentration of our forces was similarly carried out on the Düben route; the guard, and Latour-Maubourg, having followed Marshal Marmont, whilst Bertrand, Macdonald, and Ney, fell back upon Düben, for the purpose of effecting the passage of the Mulde there, and Reynier, Dombrowski, and Sebastiani, returned to it towards Wittenberg. The rain pouring down incessantly caused the roads to be in the most frightful state, and unfortunately many of our soldiers, too young to endure such fatigues, loitered in the rear and encumbered the roads. The grand *quartier general*, composed of the Saxon Court, the matériel of the engineers, the artillery, and the pontoon equipages, and comprising at least two thousand vehicles, had followed Napoleon as far as Eilenbourg on the Mulde, and was half way on the road from Leipzig to Torgau; Napoleon had ordered that all the portion of this convoy which belonged to the artillery, should be sent on to Leipzig, and that all the rest should be deposited in Torgau. The Saxon Court had been left free to choose between Torgau or Leipzig, in other words, between the miseries attending a siege at the former place, or the risks of a battle at the latter. Guided by its instinctive confidence in Napoleon, it had chosen the latter, and thus added a fresh embarrassment to the many which attended our march along these encumbered and broken roads.

On the morning of the 14th, after having superintended during the whole of the night the execution of his orders, Napoleon set out in person for Leipzig. At the moment of his departure, a report received from Marshal Ney, caused him to entertain doubts with respect to the position taken by the army of the North; for it now no longer appeared on the right of the Elbe, but on the left, behind the lower Saale, and always careful to avoid any encounter with our troops. It was, consequently, much below Blücher on the Saale, and much farther than he was from Leipzig; but whilst he ascended towards Halle, that is to say, towards Leipzig, it could follow his movement, although at a distance, and in this case it might very possibly happen that we might have it also upon our own hands, and thus have to encounter three armies instead of two. On receiving this last piece of information, Napoleon sent fresh orders to Ney, Reynier, Dombrowski, and Sebastiani, who had the longest road to traverse, recommending to them the utmost expedition in

their movements; and then set out in person for Leipzig, which he reached on the evening of the same day (the 14th), and where he took up his abode in a private house, which had been prepared for him in the Reudnitz faubourg, a league and a half on the other side of the city itself, near the position occupied by Murat.

At Leipzig, in the company of Berthier, Murat, and Marmont, and the officers of his household, Napoleon displayed a feeling of thorough confidence, which was not justified by the state of affairs; for whilst he could, at the most, assemble no more than one hundred and ninety thousand troops around Leipzig, it was very probable that the enemy would bring against him from three hundred and twenty to three hundred and fifty thousand. Nor were the political circumstances of the time of a more reassuring nature. The kingdom of Westphalia had suddenly succumbed at the mere appearance of a troop of Cossacks, which Blucher, after the battle of Gross-Beeren and Dennewitz, had thrown upon Hesse, and which, everywhere, favoured by the population, had reached without difficulty the gates of Cassel. Having at his command only a battalion of grenadiers, two regiments of Westphalian cuirassiers, and a handful of French hussars, King Jerome had found himself in a frightful position; but he had nevertheless braved the storm, and sent to the Duke of Valmy at Mayence, for a reinforcement of three or four thousand French soldiers. In the meantime he ventured to make a sortie with such troops as he had, which was to a certain extent successful, and forced the enemy to fall back. The agitation of the public mind at Cassel speedily rose, however, to a great height, the greater portion of the Westphalian troops deserted, and the Duke of Valmy could not venture in the then serious state of affairs to grant the required reinforcement without a formal order from Napoleon. The result was, that Jerome was compelled to evacuate his capital and to retreat to Coblenz. On the 30th September Czernicheff entered Cassel, and the kingdom of Westphalia was abolished.

The news of this event was followed by that of another no less disastrous, to the effect that Bavaria was on the point of abandoning us; a rumour even being abroad that she had already signed a treaty of adhesion to the European coalition. It had, however, prepared us for this event by the continual complaints of its court, that its army posted on the banks of the Inn, under General Wrède, could not offer any effectual resistance to the Austrian army, and that unless it received an immediate reinforcement of thirty thousand men, it would be compelled to yield to the injunctions of the allied powers,

the spirit of dissatisfaction prevalent amongst its troops, and the unanimous opinion of its people. The departure of Marshal Augereau for Leipzig had been the signal for its defection, and it had signed a treaty of alliance with our enemies. The consequence was, that should we be compelled to retreat, we should have to encounter in our rear an army of thirty thousand Austrians, and thirty thousand Bavarians, ready to bar our path. It was absolutely necessary, therefore, that we should be victorious at Leipzig, if we would avoid a disaster which, if not more tragic, would nevertheless be more irremediable than that of Moscow.

In the meantime, in spite of the gloomy aspect of affairs, Napoleon maintained his feelings of implicit confidence in his own skill and the courage of his troops, hoping to vanquish Schwarzenberg on the first day, and Blucher on the second, and thus to escape from the species of net in which the allies were attempting to enclose him. As, however, his infantry were considerably inferior in numbers to that of the enemy, he resolved to range his own in two ranks instead of three, asserting that the third rank was useless either for firing upon the enemy or charging them with the bayonet, and choosing to forget that if useless for these purposes, it was nevertheless highly valuable as a support to the two others, and of supplying the vacancies which might occur in them during an action.

Whilst Napoleon was engaged during the evening in a discussion with Berthier, Murat, and Marmont, and others of his generals, respecting this new method of arranging his troops, his attendants suddenly announced Marshal Augereau, whom he had not yet seen, this marshal having only lately joined head quarters. "Ah! you have come at last, then, my old Augereau," he cried, "but we have been long expecting you!" And then, in a tone which had no trace of bitterness or alarm in it, but was both friendly and sad, he continued, "And so you are no longer the Augereau of Castiglione!" "Nay! I should still be Augereau of Castiglione if you would only give me back the soldiers of Italy!" replied the marshal; and then Napoleon, without being irritated by this repartée, began to complain of the general spirit of despondency which he found prevailing around him, and went on to dilate, but without acrimony, on the faults committed by his brothers. "Why! you, yourself," he said at length, addressing Murat, with a frankness of language which only the complete absence of any spirit of ill will in its tone rendered supportable, "you, yourself, have been quite ready to abandon me!" Murat eagerly repelled the imputation, adding that he was well aware that he had

many enemies who were only too ready to slander him to his brother-in-law. "Tush! Tush!" replied Napoleon, in a manner which showed that he either knew or had guessed the truth of the matter, "You have been quite ready to do as Austria has done; but I forgive you. You are good at heart, you have a genuine feeling of friendship for me, and you are a brave man. It is I who have made the mistake in placing you on a throne. If I had been contented to make you a viceroy, as I made Eugène, you would have acted as he has acted; but as a monarch you have thought more of your own crown than of mine!"

On the following morning Napoleon mounted his horse at an early hour, for the purpose of inspecting the field of battle, which it was absolutely necessary that he should do, since this battle-field, which our courage and misfortunes have immortalised, was of such immense extent that it required to be well known, to enable Napoleon to act by means of his orders in those parts of it where he could not be present in person. He commenced his inspection on the south of Leipzig, in the direction of the position in which Murat had established his troops, after falling back before the army of Bohemia.

Flowing a little above Leipzig, rather close to each other, and divided into numerous arms, the rivers Pleisse and Elster form one stream below this city, and turning somewhat to the left, fall into the Saale, which then flows towards the Elbe, in a direction almost parallel with the course of the Mulde. Now the Prince of Schwarzenberg, after debouching from the mountains of Bohemia with the grand army of the allied sovereigns, had reached Leipzig, pursuing his line of march between the Mulde, the Pleisse, and the Elster; whilst Napoleon, on the other hand, having come from the lower Elbe, had ascended these rivers as far as Leipzig itself. The Prince of Schwarzenberg had his left on the Pleisse and the Elster, and his right on the slightly sloping plains in the environs of Leipzig; Napoleon having his left on these plains and his right on the two rivers. Occupying a position which rested strongly on and included Leipzig, Napoleon might reasonably hope to keep Blücher and even Bernadotte entirely separated from Schwarzenberg. Blücher, in fact, being unable to pass through Leipzig, which was in our hands, would have to turn either to the right or the left, for the purpose of joining the grand army of Bohemia; now if he turned to his right he would have to encounter a serious obstacle in the shape of the Pleisse, the Elster, and the Saale, covering with their thousand arms a wooded valley a league in extent, and behind which it was highly probable that he might find a body of French troops;

and if, on the other hand, he should endeavour to effect his movement by the left, he would have to encounter on the vast Leipzig plain the French army returning from Düben, and would be exposed to the greatest perils. It would suffice, then, that Napoleon should hold Schwarzenberg in check on the south of Leipzig, and Blücher on the north, to prevent them from effecting a junction; and it was perfectly possible that he might engage and triumph over each singly, especially as Bernadotte was still at a considerable distance, and there was no sign of his immediate arrival. Knowing, as he did, that Schwarzenberg was the nearest, Napoleon wished to engage him in the first place, reserving the encounter with Blücher for the morrow.

The Pleisse and the Elster, sometimes united and sometimes with separate streams, and embracing a large tract of wooded and marshy ground, flowed, as we have said, from Bohemia to Leipzig, that is, from south to north. Napoleon would naturally make them the support of his right, as Charlottenberg of his left, for not only would it be a matter of great difficulty for the enemy to cross them, but he would also, after having effected this, have to climb a tract of ground of considerable steepness, before he could debouch behind our right on the Leipzig plain. In his front Napoleon had a slightly sloping plain, on which stood a few villages. A slight depression of ground, extending from Mark-Kleeberg on the Pleisse to Liebert-Wolkwitz, and passing by Wachau, separated our line from that of the enemy, and was a slight obstacle which was to be desperately disputed. On his left, finally, Napoleon had the vast Leipzig plain, studded with large villages, and threaded by a little stream—the Partha—which rising at some distance from Liebert-Wolkwitz, fell, after numerous windings across one of the faubourgs of Leipzig, into the Pleisse. Napoleon was almost without any species of support on this side, but the presence of his columns arriving from Düben would hold the enemy in check, and prevent them from venturing upon any attempt in that direction. Murat having taken up his position on the south, had posted Poniatowski at Mark-Kleeberg on the Pleisse, Victor at Wachau, Lauriston at Liebert-Wolkwitz, and in the intervals between these several positions the 4th cavalry (Polish cavalry), and the 5th, under Pajol.

On the other side of this species of valley were observed Kleist and Wittgenstein, between Gross-Pössnau, Gulden-Gossa, and Cröbern, with the Russian and Prussian Guards as a reserve; the Austrian army being partly on our right, between the Pleisse and the Elster, in the angle formed by

these rivers, and partly on our left, in front of a wood named University, opposite Liebert-Wolkwitz.

Thoroughly approving of the position taken up by Murat, Napoleon resolved to dispute energetically the line of depressed ground extending from Liebert-Wolkwitz to Wachau and Mark-Kleeberg, and with that object to double Murat's three corps, placing Augereau on the right near Mark-Kleeberg, the Guard and cavalry of Latour-Maubourg at the centre at Wachau, and Macdonald with Sebastiani's cavalry on the left beyond Liebert-Wolkwitz. At the same time, as the Austrians in their position between the Pleisse and the Elster threatened the Dölitz bridge, Napoleon, that he might not be turned by his right, posted there the brigade Lefol, taken from the troops which formed the Leipzig garrison. At this moment the corps of Lauriston, Victor, Poniatowski, and Pajol, amounted to some thirty-eight thousand men, the troops under Augereau and Lefol to twelve thousand, the Guard to thirty-six thousand, Latour-Maubourg's troops to six thousand, and those of Macdonald and Sebastiani to twenty-two thousand, the whole forming a force of about one hundred and fourteen or one hundred and fifteen thousand men, opposed to a force of one hundred and sixty thousand. Napoleon hoped, however, that some of the corps which remained in the rear under Ney, might be made available so as to procure Macdonald a reinforcement of from twenty to thirty thousand men.

Having completed his inspection of the ground, and determined upon his arrangements, Napoleon returned by the left to the Rendwitz faubourg along the bank of the Partha. It was not sufficient, however, that he should have prepared to resist the grand army of Bohemia; for it was necessary to make arrangements, also, for meeting Blücher, who might at any moment appear on the north of Leipzig. Fortunately there was on this side, beyond the Partha, a very advantageous position, which, extending from the village of Möckern to that of Enteritzsh, stretched across the route from Halle to Leipzig, and presented a large and elevated breadth of ground, resting on one side on the Pleisse and the Elster, and on the other on a great ravine. Should our troops be compelled to abandon this position, they would be able to fall back behind the Partha, and to take up a position resting on Leipzig, in front of the Halle faubourg.

It was there that Marmont, who had constantly watched Blücher during the march of our troops, had established himself for the purpose of engaging him, should circumstances render it necessary. Napoleon approved of the position he had taken, and recommended him to retain it.

Ney, with Bertrand, Souham, Reynier, and Dombrowski, whose march was retarded by the destruction of the bridges of the Mulde and the Elbe, would establish himself on Marmont's right, and as his troops should arrive would fall back round Leipzig, from north to south, and effect a junction across the plain watered by the Partha, with Murat's left. When these troops should have arrived, the circle formed by our soldiers around Leipzig would be complete.

For the defence of Leipzig itself and the great Rhine route which, entering the Lutzen plain by Lindenau, passes through Weissenfels, Erfurt, and Mayence, and which it was absolutely necessary that we should guard, as it was our only line of retreat, and as, by occupying it we prevented Blucher and Schwarzenberg from communicating with each other beyond the Elster and the Pleisse, Napoleon left the division Margaron in Leipzig, with orders to defend the Pleisse and the Elster, and the great bourg de Lindenau, which is the point at which the Rhine route enters the Lutzen plain. At the same time, Napoleon directed General Bertrand, who had marched with Macdonald, and now entered Leipzig, to hold himself in readiness to assist either Margaron in the defence of Leipzig and the Lindenau débouché, or Marmont in the defence of the Möckern position.

In the meantime, the allies had not remained idle, having made great efforts to concentrate their troops under the walls of Leipzig. Blucher and Bernadotte had, as we have already observed, fled, at Napoleon's approach, behind the Mulde, and been engaged, since their junction, in incessant disputes with respect to the conduct to be pursued. In the first place, Bernadotte was anxious that the army of Silesia should take up a position above him on the Mulde; in other words, place itself between him and Leipzig, so that he might, in case of a reverse, be able the more speedily and securely to retreat towards the Elbe; whilst Blucher, on the other hand, divining Bernadotte's motives, would have wished to see him in such a position between himself and Leipzig, that he would be forced to march upon the enemy. As Bernadotte, however, absolutely refused to consent to such an arrangement, on pretence of anxiety to maintain communications with Sweden, Blucher was forced to yield for the purpose of avoiding a rupture. After this dispute another had arisen, in consequence of Bernadotte's desire that the allied troops should pursue their march upon Leipzig, not only behind the Mulde, but also behind the Saale, so that there might be two rivers between himself and the French, whilst Blucher, on the contrary, wished to conduct his march by the shortest

route, which was covered by the Mulde only. And on this point, also, the Prussian General had ultimately yielded; but with characteristic impatience had carried only one of his corps behind the Saale, marching at the head of the two others beyond this river, on the Halle road, close to Marshal Marmont. Finally, a third dispute had arisen between the two leaders of the armies of Silesia and the North, and raised the misunderstanding between them to its height. At the sight of the French engaged beyond the Elbe in the destruction of the bridges, Bernadotte, believing that Napoleon was about to march upon Berlin, had been anxious to repossess the Elbe, so as to secure himself from being cut off from the north of Germany, which was his base of operations. His whole staff, a great portion of which consisted of Russian and Prussian officers, had, contrary to its usual custom, inclined to his opinion. He had, consequently, made use of the ultimate authority with which he was invested with respect to the army of Silesia, to command Blücher to follow him on the right bank of the Elbe. On receiving this order, Blücher denied that Napoleon was making a movement upon Berlin, and had not only formally declined to obey it, but had also recommended the Prussian and Russian officers connected with Bernadotte's army, to refrain from quitting the left bank of the Elbe. But a fact which was entirely independent of the will of either of the disputants—the destruction of the bridges by Ney and Reynier—put an end to the debate, Bernadotte being compelled by the loss of the means of effecting the passage of the river, to remain on the left bank. However, the divisions Thümen and Hirschfeld, —Tauenzien's corps—had remained on the opposite bank, and had thus caused Napoleon erroneously to suppose that the whole of the army of the North was resolved to maintain its position on the right of the Elbe, and on the route to Berlin.

On the 15th Blücher was on the Halle route, four or five leagues to the north of Leipzig, and vehemently urging Bernadotte to join him, that at the head of one hundred and twenty thousand men they might safely effect a junction with the Prince of Schwarzenberg.

In the meantime, the army of Bohemia having for its definite object to descend upon Leipzig, and to effect a junction there with the two armies of Silesia and the North, before Napoleon should have time to overwhelm them, had arrived on the 14th before Liebert-Wolkwitz and Wachau, where it had lost twelve hundred men in a cavalry engagement which it had imprudently ventured upon with Murat.

The 15th was employed in rallying and placing the troops in line, and in deliberating upon the plan of attack. That Napoleon was to be immediately attacked was unanimously taken for granted; but with respect to the manner in which the attack was to be conducted great difference of opinion prevailed between the Austrian Generals on the one side, and the Russian and Prussian Generals on the other; for whilst the latter, who had debouched directly upon Liebert-Wolkwitz, Wachau, and Mark-Kleeberg, in front of Murat, and on the right bank of the Pleisse and the Elster, wished that the attack should be directed upon this point with almost the whole of the allied forces, the Austrians, on the contrary, whilst consenting that a vigorous attack should be made upon Liebert-Wolkwitz, Wachau, and Mark-Kleeberg, demanded that the bulk of the troops should be thrown into the angle formed by the Pleisse and the Elster, and should attempt to gain possession of the Dölitz bridge. Great difficulties would, doubtless, they said, have to be encountered in the execution of this plan, but when these should have been surmounted, it would lead them to the rear of the French, and not only render the position of the latter untenable, but also render it almost impossible for them to retire in safety upon Leipzig. But whilst there were certainly several reasons in favour of this plan, there were two great objections to it, the first being that Napoleon would be able with a comparatively small force to check the advance of a very considerable one in the position at Dölitz, and the second, that when he should perceive how weak was the body of troops charged with the attack upon him in front, he would not fail to throw back his left upon it, and drive it into the Pleisse.

It does not always follow, however, that a plan is renounced because there are excellent reasons against it. The various proposals made were vehemently disputed, and at length the usual course was adopted of a compromise which, beneficial as it may be in matters of policy, is generally very dangerous in those of war. The result was, that it was agreed that the Austrian corps under Giulay, reinforced by the light troops of Lichtenstein and Thielmann, should advance upon Lindenau for the purpose of seizing the French communications with Lutzen, that is, in fact, with Mayence; whilst the bulk of the Austrian army, numbering about forty thousand men, should plunge into the angle formed by the Pleisse and the Elster, and attempt to debouch by Dölitz upon the rear of the French. On the right of the two rivers, on the right of the French, in front of the Mark-Kleeberg, Wachau, and Liebert-Wolkwitz positions, the Prussian and

Russian armies, supported by the whole of their reserves, and amounting altogether to a force of about seventy thousand men, would at the same time throw themselves upon the line occupied by Napoleon, whilst the Austrian General Klenau, at the head of some twenty-five thousand men, including a Prussian brigade and Platow's cavalry, would attempt to turn our left beyond Liebert-Wolkwitz on the Leipzig plain, and to effect communications with the armies of Blucher and Bernadotte.

Such was the plan adopted on the evening of the 15th for execution on the following morning; and the 16th of October was, accordingly, the day selected by the allies for the great and terrible struggle, on the issue of which depended the empire of the world. Napoleon had already posted his troops in their several positions. Macdonald and Sebastiani having arrived, he had directed them upon Holzhausen, to the left of Liebert-Wolkwitz, in order to check the Austrian General, Klenau. As Blucher had not yet appeared on the Halle route, Napoleon supposed that he would probably not be present on the 16th, and moved Marmont, therefore, from his position on the north of Leipzig, to one in the rear of the grand army, for the purpose of taking part in the decisive manœuvre against Schwarzenberg's right, by which he hoped to secure the victory. Ney he ordered to take the place left vacant by Marmont, and to be ready in concert with Bertrand, to hold in check any body of the enemy's forces which might appear to the north of Leipzig. Having given these orders, he took up his own position in the midst of his Guard, on horseback, on some rising ground at the *bergerie de Meusdorf*, which commanded a view of the field of battle, and where he had Liebert-Wolkwitz on his left, Wachau in the centre, and Mark-Kleeberg to the right. The enemy before him numbered some one hundred and sixty thousand men, and to meet them he had at his immediate disposal, including the troops under Macdonald and Sebastiani, about a hundred and fifteen thousand; the remainder of the French army being two leagues in the rear, to be ready for any eventualities which might present themselves in other directions.

At nine o'clock in the morning, three cannon-reports from the line of the allies, were the signal for the commencement of a cannonade of the most terrible description. From Mark-Kleeberg to Liebert-Wolkwitz the troops of the allies advanced upon our line in three strong columns, preceded by two hundred pieces of cannon. On our right, General Kleist, with the Prussian division of the Prince Augustus of Prussia, several Russian battalions, and Levachoff's cuirassiers,

marched by Cröbern and Crostewitz upon Mark-Kleeberg. In the centre, Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg, with the Russian division which had been confided to him, and the Prussian division of General Klenau, marched up on Wachau. On our left (the right of the allies), Prince Gortschakoff, with his own corps and the Prussian division Pirch, marched upon Liebert-Wolkwitz, whilst Klenau, with a fourth column, was attempting to turn by Seyffertshayn. Our artillery, which was very numerous and most advantageously posted, covered these advancing columns with projectiles; but the attempt to check their progress was in vain, and they arrived unbroken at the foot of our positions.

Kleist's column, which was directed upon Mark-Kleeberg, and numbered at least eighteen thousand men, was speedily engaged with the troops under Poniatowski, which did not amount to more than eight or nine thousand, and compelled them to retire from Mark-Kleeberg to some rising ground at the extremity of our line. Upon this Augereau was immediately advanced to Poniatowski's support, and a heavy fire of artillery was directed against Kleist, who was endeavouring to climb the position upon which he had retreated. In the meantime, Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg, with his Russian infantry and the division Klenau, was attempting in vain to enter Wachau, which was obstinately defended by Marshal Victor; whilst on our left, Gortschakoff, who had set out from Störmthal, a point more remote than those from which the other columns had started, was still at some distance from Liebert-Wolkwitz, which Klenau was preparing to outflank with his Austrians.

In the meantime, the cannonade from either line was of so furious a description, that none who witnessed it, even amongst the old generals, remembered to have seen any at all resembling it, and that Napoleon, although occupying a position somewhat in the rear of the *bergerie de Meusdorf*, was surrounded by killed and wounded officers and their horses. With his usual confidence in himself he remained calm, and permitted the opposed forces to become thoroughly engaged before taking any decisive resolution. As, however, Poniatowski's retirement from Mark-Kleeberg had caused our line to be thrown back somewhat on the right, he ordered that the 4th and 5th cavalry corps should advance to check Kleist's infantry, on the slope which they were then in the act of ascending.

General Kellerman, who was this day in command of the 4th and 5th corps, threw himself, accordingly, on the infantry of Prince Augustus, and checked its advance; but was himself immediately encountered and driven back by

Levachoff's cuirassiers, which having crossed the ravine at the foot of our positions, took him in flank. As the latter were in their turn met by a plunging fire which compelled them to fall back, the result was, that things remained in this portion of the field of battle, in an undecided state, the Prussians gaining no more ground than what they had obtained at first, and we being unable to recover Mark-Kleeberg.

In the centre, at Wachau, and on the left, at Liebert-Wolkwitz, the combat continued to be both obstinate and bloody, the former village being taken and retaken five times in the space of five hours, whilst at the latter, Lauriston, who had been attacked in front by Gortschakoff, and on the left by Klenau, had received them in such a manner as to render them by no means anxious to return.

By noon eighteen thousand men of the two armies had fallen on the field of battle, but two thirds of this number belonged to the ranks of the allies, and our line remained unbroken, and apparently proof against any assaults, except on the right, where, as we have said, it had been thrown slightly back.

And now the roar of artillery and the information brought by aides-de-camp, informed Napoleon that on the right of Leipzig Margaron had been attacked at Lindenau by Giulay, who was desirous of cutting off our communications with Lutzen, and that in the rear, or to the north of Leipzig, Marmont was engaged with Blucher, who had hastened from Halle for the purpose of taking part in the battle. Fortunately, Marshal Ney came up at this moment, with the division Dombrowski and Souham's corps, and Napoleon sent him orders that, whilst aiding Marmont to the utmost of his power, he was to send behind Macdonald to the support of the grand army, those of his divisions which he could devote to this purpose.

The battle having become at noon more fully developed, Napoleon resolved to exchange the defensive for the offensive, and to make his troops debouch simultaneously from Liebert-Wolkwitz and Wachau, for the purpose of crushing the enemy's centre, whilst at the extreme left, Macdonald, debouching from Holzhausen beyond Liebert-Wolkwitz, would in the first place drive back Klenau, and then, falling back from left to right, precipitate himself on the enemy's centre, already attacked in front from Liebert-Wolkwitz and Wachau. For the execution of this movement Napoleon made two divisions of the young Guard descend from the one side under Mortier, for the purpose of co-operating with Lauriston's troops in their attack on Gortschakoff, and two other divisions of this same young Guard from the other side,

under Oudinot, that they might throw themselves, together with Victor's troops, on Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg. Between these two columns as they advanced was the formidable battery of the Guard directed by Druot, thirty-two pieces of which (twelve pounders) were under the command of the brave Colonel Griois.

On the one side, then, Marshal Mortier, preceded by the division Maison, descended from Liebert-Wolkwitz, attacked Gortschakoff, and drove him back between the University wood and the marsh-surrounded village of Glden-Gossa; whilst on the other side, Oudinot and Victor, debouching from Wachau, repulsed Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg, and forcing him to repass the species of valley which separated the two lines, drove him back upon the *bergerie d'Avenhayn*, which was situated on the right of the village of Glden-Gossa. In the meantime, Macdonald making a movement on the left, beyond Liebert-Wolkwitz, attacked Klenau, and forced him to fall back to a considerable distance; driving one portion of his troops upon Klein-Possnau, and the other upon the University wood; from whence, had Macdonald been aided by a reserve moving up from left to right, they might have been driven on the one side upon Gortschakoff, and on the other upon the Prince of Wurtemberg and Kleist, and altogether into the Pleisse. But Marmont was at this moment engaged with Blucher, and Margaron with Giulay; whilst Bertrand remained in reserve between the two, ready to succour the one of them who might appear to be the most hardly pressed. Ney did not dare to dispose of Souham, so long as Marmont should appear to be seriously attacked, and leaving Dombrowski on Marmont's right, to make head against the masses of the enemy which were perceived in the distance, awaited the approach of Reynier, who had not yet come up.

The enemy having been already driven from the greater portion of the battle-field, were now disputing its extreme limits foot by foot, the allied sovereigns being thrown into a state of the greatest perplexity by the ominous aspect of affairs. M. de Walzogen and General Jomini had already been sent to the Prince of Schwarzenberg, to entreat him to renounce his movement of attack between the Pleisse and the Elster, and to direct his attention rather to the position of the Prussian and Russian armies between Liebert-Wolkwitz and Wachau, and the Prince, yielding to the urgent solicitations of the two generals, and perceiving the difficulty which would attend the taking of the Dolitz bridge, consented to move to the right bank of the Pleisse the reserve of the Prince of Hesse Homburg, numbering twenty thou-

sand men. But this reinforcement could not possibly arrive before three o'clock in the afternoon, and in the meantime, therefore, the allied sovereigns determined to bring into action the whole of their reserves, throwing the Russian cuirassiers upon our infantry, whilst they carried one column of Rajeffsky's ten thousand grenadiers upon *Gülden-Gossa*, and the other upon the *bergerie d'Avenhayn*.

Lauriston and Mortier on our left, in the direction of *Gülden-Gossa*, and Victor and Oudinot on our right, towards the *bergerie d'Avenhayn*, received the Russian cuirassiers in square, and with a steady fire which cast them headlong upon the dead bodies of their horses. Rajeffsky's ten thousand grenadiers, in the meantime, ranged themselves as a long wall between the *bergerie d'Avenhayn* and *Gülden-Gossa*, whereupon Drouot, who had remained between the two columns of attack with his formidable artillery, determined, neglecting for a moment the enemy's artillery, to direct the whole of his pieces upon this magnificent infantry; and advancing to a position even closer to the enemy than that which he already occupied, he overwhelmed them with a fire before which they fell in whole files at once. When they appeared to have been sufficiently broken, the division Dubreton detaching itself from Victor's corps on our right, charged the *bergerie d'Avenhayn* at the bayonet's point, and carried it. At the same time General Maison made a desperate attempt to take *Gülden-Gossa*. On the left, Macdonald, turning Klenau by Seyffertshayn, had driven back upon Gross-Possnau the Prussian brigade Ziethen, the Austrian brigades Spleng and Schaffer, and the Austrian division Meyer; but the Swedish redoubt established on the left of Liebert-Wolkwitz had remained inaccessible. Napoleon, who directed his attention to every portion of the field of battle, perceiving the 22nd leger at the foot of the redoubt, inquired what regiment it was, and on being told that it was the 22nd leger, he exclaimed, "that is impossible!—for surely the 22nd leger would not have remained thus exposed to the fire of those guns, but would have at once rushed upon and taken them?" It was not long before the 22nd, led by Colonel Charras, carried the position at the bayonet's point, and thus enabled Macdonald, by removing the obstacle in his path, to continue his movement on our left as far as the *bois de l'Université*.

It was now three o'clock, and the enemy, falling back in every direction, appeared disposed to resign to us the victory which Napoleon was well aware that he must seize, if at all, on this very day. To fail to be victorious now, would be to expose himself not only to defeat, but to absolute destruction.

He took the course, therefore, of throwing his cavalry upon the enemy's line; moving down Murat on the left between Liebert-Wolkwitz and Wachau, with ten regiments of cuirassiers; and Kellermann on the right, between Wachau and Mark-Kleeberg, with the Polish cavalry, the Spanish dragoons, and the dragoons of the Guard under General Letort. At this moment, Pajol, who was at the head of the Spanish dragoons, received a terrible shock, which rendered him unable to continue on the field, by the bursting of a shell within his horse's body.

Numbering some twelve thousand troopers, our cavalry advanced in two columns, the one on the left and the other on the right, inspired by the recollection of the victory of Dresden. General Bordessoulle, with his cavaliers, thrown by Murat upon Pahlen's horse, speedily dispersed them, and then poured down upon the Grenadiers and Russian Guards, who, after having become possessed of Gülden-Gossa, had deployed in front of this village, and completely routed them, taking twenty-six pieces of cannon. On the right, the Spanish dragoons and those of the Guard, charged Leva-choff's cuirassiers, and obtained over them the most decided success. This first movement having succeeded, it now remained only to make a vigorous advance against the enemy's centre, and to drive on the right, Kleist and the Prince of Wurtemberg into the Pleisse, and on the left, Gortschakoff upon the bois de l'Université. But it was now past three o'clock, and there were suddenly perceived heavy masses of hostile troops approaching from the other side of the Pleisse. These troops were the Austrian reserve of Hesse Homburg, and the foremost of them taking Kellermann's troops, somewhat disordered by the ardour of pursuit, in flank, broke and scattered them. The enemy's cavalry were charged in their turn by the brave Letort and the dragoons of the Guard, and compelled to fall back; but the result of these encounters was, that the movement of our cavalry on the right had been by no means of a decisive character, as much ground being lost by us as gained. In the centre, Murat after having gained great success, in the expectation of being supported, had committed the fault of sending all his squadrons into action, and of advancing on ground which he had not had the opportunity of reconnoitring. At a distance the village of Gülden-Gossa had presented the appearance of but a few groups of foliage, but on reaching it our cavalry found the enemy's infantry posted there, behind positions of great strength, and had been compelled to remain before them under fire. At this juncture the Emperor Alexander consented that the whole

of the cavalry not yet sent into action, including the hussars and Cossacks of the Imperial Guard, should be thrown upon our cuirassiers, who were, consequently, compelled to fall back, taking with them but six of the twenty-six pieces of cannon which they had so lately taken. In the course of the encounter the brave Latour-Maubourg had his leg carried away by a cannon-ball.

The battle had not been decided, then, by this general movement on the part of our cavalry, although a large portion of the field of battle remained in our possession, and Napoleon resolved to attempt one final effort. He reformed his columns of attack, ordered Mortier with Lauriston, and Oudinot with Victor, to form their troops in columns, and once more to engage the enemy, and arranged that the ten thousand men of the guard, who were the only reserve now remaining at his disposal, should be ready to advance to their support. . But at this moment a great tumult arose on our right, where bodies of the Austrian grenadiers, having crossed the Pleisse, and having advanced to the support of Kleist, at the village of Mark-Kleeberg, had endeavoured to drive back Poniatowski; whilst at the same time a most formidable movement was made upon Dölitz by Austrian troops under General Merfeld. Perceiving the danger of the situation, Napoleon checked the movement of his Old Guard, and directed the division Curial upon Dölitz; at the same time making Oudinot turn to meet the grenadiers who were pressing Poniatowski, but whom the latter, with the aid of the division Semelé (of Augereau's corps), had already successfully resisted.

As the movement of the division Curial was followed by the most happy results, ending in the capture of General Merfeld himself, and two thousand of his troops, Napoleon could not refrain, although it was now five o'clock, and nearly dusk, from once more resolving to attempt a final effort on the enemy's centre. Victor was still at Avenhayn; and it only remained, therefore, to gain possession of Göllden-Gossa. Lauriston, who had maintained his ground under a most terrible fire, had suffered the most enormous losses, but there still remained to him General Maison, who, surrounded by the mere wreck of his division, was, nevertheless, insatiate of perils until he should have taken Göllden-Gossa, and who had re-entered this fatal village, followed by Mortier. His success was on the point of deciding everything in our favour, when Barclay de Tolly, fully appreciating the importance of the danger, threw upon that point the Prussian division Firch, supported by the Russian guard, and succeeded by a desperate effort in once more driving us out

of Glden-Gossa. Maison made still another attempt to retake the position, but the darkness of night-fall speedily separated the combatants, and this attempt was the last act of the terrible battle of the 16th, which is known as the battle of Wachau, and at the conclusion of which about twenty thousand of our troops, and thirty thousand of those of the allies covered the ground either dead or dying.

On the same day two other battles had taken place, the one on the west, the other on the north of Leipzig; the one on our right, at Lindenau, the other in the rear, at Mckern. The former having taken place between General Margaron, at the head of eight or nine thousand troops, and Gilay, who, at the head of some twenty-five thousand, had attempted in vain to drive Margaron from the position he occupied at Lindenau. Nevertheless, the contest would probably have had a different result had not the sight of the division Morand and Bertrand's corps, posted between Lindenau and Leipzig, intimidated the enemy.

The battle which had taken place at Mckern, had been of a more serious description. Marshal Blucher suspecting that a decisive action was about to be fought, and unwilling to leave the Prince of Schwarzenberg to support it alone, had set out, as soon as he had heard the sound of the cannon on the morning of the 16th, by the Halle route, towards the north side of Leipzig; at the same time sending officers to Bernadotte to inform him of his position, and to urge him to come up. As, however, the army of the North could not possibly afford him any assistance on the 16th, he advanced with great caution, fearing, although he could distinctly hear the cannon of the Prince Schwarzenberg, who was only three leagues distant to the south, that he might have to encounter the larger portion of the French army unaided. The sight of our columns ascending from Dben towards Leipzig, had caused him to entertain some fears on the subject, and had led him to take the precaution of placing Langeron in observation on the Dolitzsch route. Between the Dolitzsch and the Halle routes, he had posted Sacken's Russian corps, and along the latter, which led direct to the north of Leipzig, he had carried the Prussian corps of General d'York, which being German and Prussian, was of all his troops the most ardent. The time occupied by these precautions was the cause of his not arriving in sight of Leipzig until eleven o'clock in the morning, when he could perceive nothing of the battle which was raging in the south, except the roar of the artillery, numbering some twenty thousand men, was slowly falling back from Breitenfeld and Lindenthal upon Leipzig, in accordance with the order which it received in

the morning to fall back upon Leipzig, and to traverse that city for the purpose of taking up a position where it might form the reserve of the grand army. This order, however, was conditional, and subordinate to that which might take place on the Halle route; since, should the enemy appear in that direction in force, this order was to be null, and make way for the task of resisting the hostile army under Blücher, a task which Marshal Marmont was thoroughly disposed to perform in its full extent.

The position of Marshal Marmont at this moment was a difficult one, in the first place, because he had no more than twenty thousand troops at his disposal, and because, in the second place, the height on which he had taken up his position between Möckern and Enteritzsch, had the serious disadvantage of resting on the Rietschke ravine, which, after skirting one side of the position, passed behind it, as it proceeded to open into the Pleisse at Gohlis. To obviate this inconvenience Marmont would have been glad to have crossed the Partha; but the want of time prevented him from taking this step, and fortunately so, for it would have confined us too closely around Leipzig, and deprived us of all communications with those of our troops which were still on their march.

In the position of Möckern, then, took place the third battle, which was fought between our troops and those of the allies on the terrible 16th October. Induced, as he was, by the sight of the rearmost troops of Souham, and the park of artillery ascending from Düben towards Leipzig, Blücher had left the whole of Langeron's corps in observation before Breitenfeld, and had marched against Marmont only the corps of General d'York, and a portion of General Sacken's, the whole force numbering about thirty thousand men. Directing his first attack upon the village of Möckern itself, on which rested Marmont's left, and which was occupied by the 2nd marines of the division Lagrange, he succeeded after a desperate struggle in gaining possession of it, only to be almost immediately driven out of it by the 4th marines and the 35th léger, which, executing a furious charge at the bayonet's point, completely broke one of the four divisions of d'York's corps, and retook the village which they had occupied.

Finding that he could gain no advantage at this point, Blücher now threw forward two divisions for the purpose of attacking the sloping plateau on which was posted the division Compans; and the two Prussian divisions had bravely performed the task allotted to them, but had been crushed by the fire poured upon them from our forty-four

pieces of artillery, losing almost a third of their number. A cavalry charge would now have decided the fortune of the day in our favour, and Marmont immediately gave orders for one; but, unfortunately, the Wurtemberg cavalry was but ill-disposed to our cause, and not only executed it in a manner which rendered it of no effect, but in retiring from it managed to fall in with and break one of our bataillons de marine.

The combat had been thus prolonged until the middle of the afternoon, when Blucher, becoming convinced that the bulk of the French army was not, as he feared it might have been, on his left flank, threw Langeron's corps in the direction of Dombrowski to hold him in check, and bringing up the whole of Sacken's corps, attacked Marmont's line with three Prussian divisions, supported by the whole of Sacken's Russian divisions. Upon this Marmont advanced against the enemy with the division Compans, and a struggle ensued, which proved one of the most murderous of any which took place during the war. Marmont himself received a wound in his hand, a contusion on his shoulder, and lost three of his aide-de-camps. Compans's regiment displayed the most heroic firmness, and made a resistance, which, supported as it was by the fire of their formidable artillery, would have been successful, had not a shell which burst in one of our batteries caused a confusion, which gave the enemy an opportunity of taking it, whilst at the same moment several thousands of their cavalry, pouring down upon the right of the division, now much thinned by the fire to which it had been exposed, compelled it to give way. The division Frederich's hastened up to its support, but Möckern, which was the support of our left, being at this moment carried, whilst our right was threatened by Langeron, who threatened to envelop Dombrowski, Marmont considered it more prudent to beat a retreat, which he executed in good order and without misadventure. Dombrowski, who had been succoured by one of Souham's divisions also fell back in safety, after having had the honour of holding in check at Enteritzsch the whole of Langeron's corps. And thus we had held in check with twenty-four thousand troops, sixty thousand of the bravest and most determined of our enemies; the battle having cost the latter, even according to their own account, nine or ten thousand men, whilst our loss consisted of about six thousand troops and twenty pieces of cannon, which were lost by reason of the explosion above alluded to.

Such was this terrible battle of the 16th, which consisting in reality of three distinct engagements, cost us about twenty-six or twenty-seven thousand men, and the enemy about forty thousand. A sad and cruel sacrifice, which covered our

army with immortal honour, but at the same time covered with a cloud of sorrow our unhappy country, whose best blood flowed in torrents to secure, not its greatness, but its ruin.

Although we had had the advantage at every point, as the result of the battle had not been to drive Schwarzenberg and Blücher any considerable distance apart, it might speedily be followed by a disaster; for whilst Bernadotte was coming up with sixty thousand troops, and Benningsen with fifty thousand more, our only accession of strength consisted in fifteen thousand, of whom two-thirds were ready to betray us. As soon in fact as Napoleon had failed to drive the army of Bohemia to a sufficient distance to leave him free to throw himself upon those of Silesia and the North, his position had become one of extreme peril. Nor could Napoleon himself dissemble his consciousness of its gravity, which however, could only be fully estimated after a close inspection of its absolute details.

On the morning of the 17th, after a few hours' repose, he mounted his horse and proceeded to traverse the field of battle, which even to his eyes, accustomed as they were to terrible spectacles of the kind, presented a frightful aspect. A sullen gloom lowered on every countenance. Murat, Major-General Berthier, and the minister Daru accompanied him. Our soldiers had died at their posts, but so had those of the enemy also, and it was but too evident that another struggle would but result in our maintaining our ground, whilst the allied troops would be surrounding us with an iron circle, from which we might find it impossible to escape. An immediate retreat by the Lützen route, so as to prevent the closing of the way of egress by Lindenau, was, consequently, the only resolution which remained to be taken. Napoleon himself, as he traversed the field on foot in the midst of his lieutenants, pronounced the first word in reference to that retreat which no one had dared to propose, and which was welcomed with evident, although silent approval. A retreat, however, could not but be attended with serious inconveniences; for in the first place, although the battle had resulted in the triumph of our arms, its practical signification would depend on our attitude on the following day; for, should we then be in retreat, the battle would have ended in our discomfiture. And in the next place, what was to be done in case we should retreat, with the hundred and seventy thousand French troops left at Dresden, Torgau, Wittenberg, Magdebourg, Hambourg, Glogau, Custrin, Stettin, and Dantzic, of whom from one hundred to one hundred and twenty thousand were excellent soldiers, ready

for active service in the field. Would they concentrate into one mass, and open for themselves a road into France by Hambourg and Wesel? The question was one of grave importance.

To blame Napoleon for having allowed the 17th to pass by without having decided upon some plan of action, would be but to display but a slight knowledge of the movements of the human heart. To declare himself vanquished in a pitched battle, and to abandon the hundred and seventy thousand French troops left in the fortresses of the North, without some hours devoted to meditation and regrets, would be too much to expect of any one, however exalted his character. There were other reasons, however, for some delay on the 17th, since it would afford time for the arrival of Reynier, who had not yet come up; enable us to say we had remained four and twenty hours in front of the allied armies, and having awaited them in vain had fallen back upon a more advantageous position; and grant some brief repose to our over-wearied soldiers.

Although it was thus advisable, however, to defer the retreat for a day, it was not the less necessary that every preparation should be made during the 17th for its commencement at nightfall; but, unfortunately, Napoleon, completely absorbed by the perplexities arising from the difficulty of his position, scarcely gave an order throughout the day, which he passed in a state of gloomy reverie, wandering about, sometimes alone, and sometimes accompanied by Murat, Berthier, and M. Daru, repeating perpetually that a retreat was absolutely necessary, but unable to persuade himself to order it, and indulging in the hope that the enemy, instead of attacking him on the morrow, would act in accordance with the old maxim so much in favour with prudent generals, *to build a bridge of gold for a flying enemy*.

Whilst in this state of mind it occurred to him to have an interview with M. de Merfeld, who had been made prisoner the previous evening at Dölitz, and with whom he had been long intimately acquainted, for the purpose, not only of obtaining some information with respect to the plans of the allies, but also of throwing out in the course of conversation with him certain hints of a pacific tendency. He proposed, even, to give him his liberty, and to send him into the camp of the allied sovereigns, charged with a proposition for an armistice, which would at least have the effect of causing them to lose a day in deliberations, and might even call forth on their part some acceptable proposal.

Receiving M. de Merfeld very graciously about two o'clock in the afternoon, Napoleon inquired of him whether the

allies had known, when they attacked him, that he was himself present on the field, and the general having answered in the affirmative, Napoleon rejoined, "You were resolved, then, this time, to give me battle?" M. de Merfeld replied respectfully but firmly, that the allies had, indeed, been determined to terminate the long-continued struggle by a desperate and decisive battle. After some remarks with respect to the relative numbers of his own troops and those of the allies, Napoleon inquired with an air of careless good-humour, "And to-morrow, now, shall you attack me?" To which M. de Merfeld replied that there was no doubt that the allies would renew their attack on the morrow, as they were resolved to purchase liberty at the price even of the last drop of their blood. Dissembling the impression made on him by this reply, he gave a new direction to the conversation, saying to M. de Merfeld, "This struggle is becoming very serious; is it to have no end? Are we absolutely determined never to have peace?" "Would to heaven that your Majesty were willing to have it!" exclaimed the Austrian General, "it is the only result that we require for our efforts, and would have been attained two months since at Prague, had your Majesty been so inclined." Upon this Napoleon had recourse to a series of false excuses, declaring that at Prague the allied powers had not acted with sincerity towards him, that England was averse to a peace, that she had induced Russia and Prussia to adopt her own views, and would prevail upon Austria to do so likewise. If the latter country desired peace, he added, it was for her to secure it. M. de Merfeld, after declaring that he only spoke in his private capacity, maintained in reply that England was sincerely desirous for peace, being in actual need of it, and that were Napoleon but willing to make some sacrifices for the happiness of the world and of France, peace might be forthwith concluded.—"Sacrifices," cried Napoleon, "I am quite willing to make; let England restore my colonies, and I will give up Hanover."—M. de Merfeld, intimating that this would not be sufficient, Napoleon allowed a word to escape his lips which, had it been pronounced at the congress of Prague, might have changed both his own fortunes and ours. "I will restore," he said, "if it be necessary, the Hanseatic towns. . . ." But this concession, unfortunately, came too late, and M. de Merfeld plainly expressed his opinion that, to obtain peace with England it would be necessary that he should consent to give up Holland. Napoleon loudly exclaimed against this, declaring that Holland would become in the hands of England the means of enabling her to establish a maritime despotism, for England, he was well assured,

was anxious to force him to limit the number of his vessels.

The conclusions which Napoleon was able to draw from this interview were to the effect, that whilst two months since he might have obtained peace by the sacrifice only of the Duchy of Warsaw, the protectorate of the Rhine and the Hanseatic towns, it would now be necessary for him to resign also Holland, Westphalia, and Italy. But whilst Napoleon appeared to admit that at the conclusion of a general peace, it would be requisite for him to make great sacrifices, and manifested more readiness to make them than he really felt, his thoughts were not, unfortunately, occupied so much with the subject of peace, as with the vague hope of obtaining an armistice. "Let us all," he said to M. de Merfeld, "make a retrograde step, the Russians and Prussians to the Elbe, the Austrians to the mountains of Bohemia, the French to the Saale, so as to give a little breathing time to this unfortunate Saxony, and to be able freely to carry on negotiations for peace." M. de Merfeld replied that the allies would certainly decline to accept the Saale as the line to be held by the French troops during an armistice, since they hoped to throw this back as far as the Rhine. Napoleon rejoined that he would never consent, except in case he should lose a battle, to retreat to the Rhine; and then added, "You may go, sir; I set you free on your parole. It is a favour which I grant in consideration of your merits, and of our old intimacy; and if you should think proper to turn our present conversation to the purpose of setting on foot a negotiation, or of procuring, at least, an armistice, you will find me disposed to listen to your propositions.

At the close of the day new and ominous light was thrown upon our situation. Strong columns of the enemy's troops appeared on the Dresden route, and the ranks of Schwarzenberg's army grew continually more formidable. From the belfry towers of Leipzig Bernadotte's army was plainly seen approaching from the north; and we were almost completely shut in by a circle of hostile arms on the south, the west, and the north. The only issue remaining still open to us was that towards the east, lying across the Leipzig plain. And now, at length, making a final struggle with his own heart, Napoleon resolved to order a retreat. But he adopted this plan, unfortunately, too late, and carried it out too incompletely, in his desire to make a retreat which should almost have the appearance of not being one, and should be executed in the open day. He determined that about two hours after midnight, a retrograde and concentric movement should be made upon Leipzig about the distance of a league; that

Bertrand with his corps, and Mortier with a portion of the Young Guard, should proceed by Lindenau to secure the Lutzen route; and that at daybreak the several corps of the army should defile one after the other across Leipzig, energetically repelling any attacks the enemy might venture to make upon them. He believed that he was still sufficiently strong to render the enemy unwilling to attempt to interrupt a retreat conducted in this form.

In the meantime the course of affairs on the side of the allies, had been such as by no means coincided with the illusions which Napoleon had indulged in, as the means of concealing from himself the extent of his misfortunes. Their first intention had been to fight with us incessantly, so as to wear us out by the mere force of numbers; and with this view they would naturally have renewed the combat on the 17th, but having received information of the probable immediate arrival of Bernadotte and Benningsen, at the head, respectively, of about sixty thousand and fifty thousand men, they resolved to defer the decisive attack until the following day. The communications brought by M. de Merfeld in the afternoon affected no one, except so far as they plainly revealed the state of difficulty which must have forced Napoleon to make proposals so alien to his inclinations. Never to halt until he should have been driven back to the banks of the Rhine, was the universal resolution.

The measures taken by the allies on the north of Leipzig, although carried out with less unanimity, did not the less tend to the accomplishment of their purpose. The Prince of Sweden, yielding at length to the remonstrances which assailed him on every side, had set his troops in motion on the 17th, and taken up a position behind Blücher, of whom he demanded an interview. This interview, however, the latter declined, well knowing that the object of the former was simply to induce him to cross the Partha, for the purpose of completing the circle in which the French army was being inclosed, and thus incurring the risk, which was imminent, of incurring some severe check from the enemy's forces. Weary of yielding to the exactions of an ally of whose fidelity and energy he was very suspicious, he declared that his own troops, exhausted as they were by the engagement of the 16th, were far less fit than those of Bernadotte to maintain a difficult position, and demanded that the latter should himself cross the Partha, on the left of the army of Silesia, and incur the risk of a position on the Leipzig plain, face to face with Napoleon. At the same time, however, he intimated to the Prussian and Russian generals who commanded the several corps of the army of the North, his intention of crossing the

Partha simultaneously with them on the morrow, the object of his refusal to Bernadotte having simply been, to force the latter to take a position in which it would be impossible for him to remain inactive.

In the meantime, Napoleon recognizing the real nature of his position, had resolved towards the evening of the 17th to order a retreat; not such a nocturnal retreat, however, as is authorized by the art of war, when it is necessary for an army to withdraw from before an enemy of superior force, but a retreat which was to be conducted in the open day, and in an imposing manner across the long track from Leipzig to Lindenau, which consisted of a multitude of bridges thrown across the arms of the Pleisse and the Elster. At two o'clock in the morning he was up despatching his orders, which were to the following effect. All the corps which had fought on the south, namely, those of Poniatowski, Augereau, Victor, Lauriston, Macdonald, the Guard, and the 1st, 2nd, 4th, and 5th cavalry, would fall back the distance of a league, and form around Leipzig, on the Probstheyda plateau, a compact and almost invincible circle. On the north and east Marmont, who, after the battle of Möckern had repassed the Partha, was to concentrate his forces from Schönfeld to Sellerhausen; whilst Marshal Ney, who, with Reynier, arrived on the afternoon of the 17th, formed the prolongation of Marmont's line, would throw back his right until it should meet Macdonald's left across the Lutzen plain, and thus complete the circle which the troops of the French army were to form. On the east and the north, as on the south, our troops would then slowly retrograde, driving back such bodies of the enemy as might press them too closely, and passing through Leipzig by the chaussée de Lindenau, to open which Napoleon had sent Bertrand beyond Lindenau. General Rogniat was ordered to proceed with the engineers of the Guard, to throw fresh bridges across the Saale below Weissenfels. Margaron was entrusted with the defence of Leipzig, and was to establish himself within it; Dombrowski occupying the ground without its walls as far as Schönfeld, where was posted Marshal Marmont, and where, consequently, commenced the line of Marshal Ney. As the troops already under Margaron's command were not sufficient for the task confided to him, Napoleon added to them the division of the Young Guard commanded by Mortier. Orders were given that the parks of artillery and the baggage should be immediately sent forward, so that they might have defiled across the bridges before the troops came up to them.

After he had despatched his orders, Napoleon had himself proceeded to the Reudnitz faubourg, for the purpose of

informing Ney of his plans by his own mouth, and then went on to Leipzig, where he communicated his intentions to the other generals; returning thence at an early hour to his bivouac in the midst of the ranks of the principal army.

As Montfort, the colonel of engineers who had succeeded Rogniat, who had departed for Weissenfels, had been much struck by the difficulty of making the whole army defile by the single bridge of immense length which runs from Leipzig to Lindenau, he had proposed to Berthier to construct additional ones, either above or below this, which might then be reserved for the artillery, cavalry, and baggage. This proposal, however, Berthier had rejected, saying that he knew very well how to execute Napoleon's orders, but that he was not in the habit of anticipating them. And it is probable that Napoleon himself, had the matter been brought before his notice, would not have been very ready to order what must have been a too early announcement of his retreat. However this might be, the result was that the Lindenau bridge remained as our only means of retreat, a fact which might have, in certain circumstances, the most dangerous results.

Napoleon had scarcely returned to Probstheyda, where he had his bivouac, when he perceived three great columns marching concentrically upon his new line of battle; the Prince of Hesse Homburg advancing towards our right, upon Poniatowski and Augereau; whilst in the centre Kleist and Wittgenstein marched from Wachau and Liebert-Wolkwitz upon Probstheyda, where were posted Victor and the Guard; and finally, on the left, Klenau, Benningsen, and Bubna, advanced upon Zuckelhausen and Holzhausen, against Macdonald. This latter column, turning its right around our line, and thus threatening Ney's position across the Leipzig plain.

All Napoleon's columns as they retreated had left strong rear-guards, posted as tirailleurs, which disputed the ground foot by foot, and never gave way until they had inflicted on the enemy severe loss. At Zuckelhausen and Holzhausen, where was posted Macdonald's corps, our troops made head against Zeithen's Prussian division and Klenau's Austrians, and only retreated upon Stötteritz after having made considerable havoc in their ranks. When this last position had been taken by Macdonald, our new line of battle formed a continuous line from Dölitz to Probstheyda, where, forming a right angle, it ascended northwards to the bank of the Partha, by Stötteritz, Melkau, and Schönfeld, at which places were Macdonald, Reynier, and Marmont. Probstheyda was, therefore, the point which it would be most important

for the enemy to carry, and which Napoleon was determined to defend to the utmost.

The column of the Prince of Hesse Homburg threw itself upon Dölitz, carried it, lost it, retook it, and again lost it; the Prince himself being seriously wounded, and having to retire from the field. Falling back for a short distance, our troops now took up a position at Connewitz, behind a line of water alternately stagnant or the reverse, which lay from Probstheyda to Connewitz, and ultimately fell into the Pleisse. At this point Poniatowski and Augereau established themselves in a position of invincible strength, which the Austrians in vain attempted to carry by reiterated and desperate assaults.

It was now midday, and the sound of artillery from the north announced that Blucher and Bernadotte had entered into action, and became the signal for the army of the Prince of Schwarzenberg, of a furious attack upon the decisive point of Probstheyda; which was awaited by Druot with the artillery of the Guard, and by Victor with his infantry. In advancing to the assault the enemy had to ascend a piece of sloping ground in the form of a glacis, and it was when they had reached this, that Druot, opening the fire of his guns, overwhelmed them with a storm of missiles, and hurled them back in confusion. Animated, however, by their furious patriotism, they re-formed their ranks, and throwing themselves a second time upon it, succeeded in penetrating it. But again they were driven back by the charge of Victor's infantry, and had to retreat to some distance to reform their scattered divisions.

Whilst our troops thus resisted the enemy in front of them, another appeared on the left in the shape of the Prussian division Ziethen which, having in conjunction with Klenau's Austrians made a fruitless attack upon Stötteritz, had fallen back upon Probstheyda, where, however, they were received by a portion of Druot's artillery posted on the left of the village, and which was of itself sufficient to repulse them.

As, after these attempts, in which he had had some twelve thousand men put *hors de combat*, the Prince of Schwarzenberg could not hope to carry a position which the valour of our soldiers rendered impregnable, he fell back a few hundred steps to some slightly elevated ground which rose opposite Probstheyda, and from thence exchanged with the French one of the most terrible cannonades that had ever been heard.

In the meantime Benningsen, who was opposed to our left, had attacked Melckau, but less vigorously than Schwarzenberg, because he awaited before engaging himself

seriously, the arrival of Blucher and Bernadotte, to whose proceedings we may now direct our attention.

After having refused to see Bernadotte, Blucher had ultimately consented to an interview with him at eight o'clock in the morning, and it had then been agreed that they should cross the Partha, Bernadotte stipulating that Blucher should lend him thirty thousand men. Agreeing to this arrangement Blucher had accordingly placed himself at the head of those thirty thousand men, which belonged to Langeron's corps, and having crossed the Partha in the neighbourhood of Neuttsch, had descended upon Schönfeld, where was established the second division of Marshal Marmont. In the meantime Bernadotte, who executed a long and circuitous movement for the purpose of crossing the Partha at as great a distance from the French troops as possible, effected the passage of this river at Taucha, and had then advanced in the presence of General Reynier, by Heiterblick.

In advance of Sellerhausen, where Reynier was posted, was a village named Paunsdorf, which Ney was anxious to occupy because he thought that it would enable us not only to interpose between but even to prevent the junction of the armies of Bohemia and the North. Reynier, however, was of a contrary opinion for very sufficient reasons. In fact, he distrusted the Saxons, who were continually murmuring and threatening to desert, and to whom he was unwilling to offer any temptation to leave us by pushing them forward. Ney, nevertheless, moved them in column towards Paunsdorf, taking care to place the division Durutte behind them, to keep them in check as well as to afford them support. They had no sooner, however, come in sight of the troops of Bernadotte, with whose staff many of them had been in communication, than they marched towards them, turning their pieces against our troops and firing upon the division Durutte, with whom they had served during two years. Ney hastened up to the assistance of the division Durutte, which, suddenly attacked by Bulow's corps, had the greatest possible difficulty in maintaining its position. After an heroic struggle, in which five thousand men contended during more than an hour against twenty thousand, our troops were forced to fall back upon Sellerhausen. In the meantime Marmont on the left had been supporting a desperate engagement at the village of Schönfeld, which was the essential point of our line, and which Blucher was attempting to carry with the troops under Langeron. Within the space of a few hours, the division Lagrange lost and retook the village no less than seven times. It was on the point of finally giving way, when Ney came up with one of Souham's divisions

(Ricard's), and enabled it once more to drive the enemy out of the disputed village. Between Schönfeld and Sellerhausen Marmont with the divisions Compans and Friedrichs formed in square, resisted all the assaults of the Prussian and Russian cavalry; but twenty-eight thousand men could not for any long time resist the attack of ninety thousand, and they were consequently at length compelled to yield both Schönfeld and Sellerhausen, and to fall back upon Leipzig, lest Bernadotte and Bubna, now united on the Leipzig plain, should penetrate by the breach made in our line by the defection of the Saxons.

Fortunately the cavalry and artillery of the Guard at this moment came up under the command of the Emperor himself. The rumour of the defection of the Saxon troops having reached head quarters, had filled all hearts there with dismay, and Napoleon leaving Murat at Probstheyda, had hastened up to repair this unforeseen misfortune, which put the finishing stroke to our misfortunes.

At this sight Bulow on the one side, and Bubna on the other, formed each a *crochet en arrière*, for the purpose of presenting a flank to our cavalry, which charged them with the utmost desperation, but could make no decided impression on their dense masses. Their advance, however, was checked, and then on the three fronts of this immense field of battle, extending from Leipzig to Schönfeld, on the north, from Schönfeld to Probstheyda on the east, and from Probstheyda to Connwitz on the south, a cannonade of two thousand pieces of ordnance terminated a battle which has been justly called the battle of the giants, and is the greatest of which history makes mention.

Alighting at a simple hotel situated in the centre of the town, Napoleon proceeded to despatch his orders, directing that the various corps of the army should follow the convoys of the matériel, the wounded, and the artillery, across the Lindenau bridge, and that the Guard, as soon as the passage of the bridge should have been effected, should take up a position on the Lindenau plateau, in such a manner as to present to the enemy a formidable rear-guard. At the same time, as an additional precaution against any attack by which the enemy might attempt to harass our retreat across Leipzig, he entrusted to the 7th corps and the division Dombrowski, to the 6th corps and to Souham's division of the 3rd, and to Macdonald, whose corps had suffered less than the others on the 18th, the defence of the several faubourgs of the town, whilst the Guard, the cavalry, and the remaining troops of Victor, Augereau, and Ney should accomplish their retreat. They were then to fall back themselves through an extensive

boulevard that separated the faubourg from the town, and to proceed to the Lindenau bridge, across the Pleisse and the Elster. At the same time he ordered that a mine should be prepared under the arch of the bridge nearest the town, so that it might be destroyed as soon as the last French corps should have passed, and the head of the enemy's column should appear in sight—an order easily given, but which might be of some hazard in the execution.

To these orders relative to the retreat from Leipzig he added others for the corps left on the Elbe, and which must necessarily be reduced to capitulate, unless, by the exercise of almost superhuman energy and presence of mind, they should be concentrated on the lower Elbe under Marshal Davouts, and thus be enabled to re-open the gates of France, now actually closed against them. These orders were to the effect that Marshal Saint-Cyr, who still had thirty thousand men at his disposal, and who might, by making the best use of his time, crush any opposition the enemy might offer on his road, should proceed from Dresden to Torgau, Wittenberg, and Magdebourg successively, and having collected the various garrisons, should join Davouts with seventy thousand men. The two marshals being then, as he calculated, at the head of one hundred thousand men, would be able to rescue some of the garrisons on the Oder, and at the head of one hundred and twenty thousand men to re-enter France by the Wesel.

On the morning of the 19th of October Napoleon took leave of the Royal Family of Saxony, whose ruin he had, very unwillingly, involved in his own, and to which he had for a moment restored its ancestral dreams by endowing it with the crown of Poland. Expressing great regret at being compelled to leave his ally exposed to the vengeance of the allies, he urged the old king to treat with them, and to separate his fortunes from those of France, declaring that he, Napoleon, would never consider his so doing any cause for complaint. At the same time he stipulated on his own part never to make a peace by which the interests of Saxony should be sacrificed; and then, after reciprocal embraces, quitted this worthy but unfortunate family, which were terrified to see him delay so long in the midst of dangers which threatened him on every side.

In the meantime, a fresh conflict was taking place around Leipzig between our troops and the enemy. The allied sovereigns, who had expected on this fourth day a continuance of the desperate actions which had been fought during the three preceding days, were as delighted as they were surprised, when at eight or nine o'clock in the morning they

perceived the French army moving off across the interminable Lindenau bridge on to the plains of Lutzen. Thanking heaven for a result they had scarcely dared to hope, they ordered an immediate attack on the enceinte of Leipzig, in order to render the retreat of the French army more difficult and disastrous. But on every point the troops of the allies encountered the most determined resistance, for our soldiers had become as irritated as their adversaries, and had resolved, even at the cost of their lives, to exact a severe vengeance for their defeat. The conflict could not be continued on our part, however, for any length of time, not because we were unable to protract our resistance, but because it was necessary that we should concert our movements. Unable as our officers were to communicate from one street of the town to another, they had no means of knowing whether the defence were equally successful in all directions, and whether a too protracted resistance at any one point might not expose those who made it to being cut off by the enemy from the point of retreat. Some Saxon and Baden troops which were in the interior of the town, and fired on our soldiers, added to the confusion. Influenced by the reciprocal fear entertained by each of the several bodies of troops engaged with the enemy on the east, south, and north sides of the town respectively, that it alone had made a successful defence, and that the others had given way, they made an almost simultaneous retreat, debouching from the boulevards which separated the faubourgs from the town, and hurrying towards the bridge in a confused mass, through which even the enemy's bayonets would have been unable to make an opening.

But whilst this terrible evacuation of Leipzig was thus taking place, a sudden catastrophe which might have been but too clearly foreseen, spread despair among the ranks of those who for the common safety had been entrusted with the defence of the Leipzig faubourgs. Colonel Montfort, of the engineers, had been ordered to prepare a mine under the first arch of the bridge along which our troops were now effecting their retreat, and he had, accordingly, done so, and had posted at the spot some sappers with a corporal, who awaited, match in hand, the signal to fire the train. In the meantime, Colonel Montfort, in a state of the most anxious doubt as to what he ought to do, expecting every moment to see the enemy debouch pêle-mêle with our soldiers, and unable to obtain any accurate information with respect to the several corps still in the rear, determined to proceed to Lindenau, for the purpose of receiving further instructions from Napoleon's own mouth, and set out towards the other end of the bridge, having first directed the corporal of sappers to fire the mine only in

case he should see the enemy approaching. Whilst Colonel Montfort was struggling in the midst of the mass which encumbered the bridge, unable either to advance or recede, some of Blucher's troops, in pursuit of the remnant of Reynier's corps, appearing close to the bridge *pêle-mêle* with the soldiers of the 7th corps, occasioned cries of "Fire the mine! fire the mine!" and the corporal, believing that the right moment had come, applied the match, and thus in a moment condemned twenty thousand of our troops who were still in the Leipzig faubourgs either to perish or to become the prisoners of an enemy whom the feeling of exasperation with which this war was conducted had rendered inhuman. Believing that they had been betrayed, these men uttered shouts of indignation, and swayed by the impulses of despair now rushed upon the enemy, and now threw themselves into the Pleisse and the Elster and endeavoured to cross them by swimming. Poniatowski, who had been raised to the rank of marshal by Napoleon on the preceding evening, plunged with his horse into the Elster and reached the other side, but there, weakened by many wounds, and unable to climb the steep bank, disappeared beneath the waters, buried in his glory beneath the ruins of our country and his own. Macdonald, making a similar attempt, was saved, but Reynier and Lauriston, surrounded by the enemy's troops before they had time to escape, were taken and carried before the allied sovereigns, when the Emperor Alexander, recognizing Lauriston as the wise ambassador who had endeavoured to prevent the war of 1812, took him by the hand, and had both him and his companion treated with the utmost courtesy; — a courtesy which he was far from displaying towards the unfortunate King of Saxony, who thrice during the morning sent officers to request an interview, which was refused, the one reply to his solicitations being, that he, the King of Saxony, had been taken with arms in his hands, and was, therefore, a prisoner of war; that the allied sovereigns would decide upon his fate, and would inform him of their decision.

In the meantime, the broken ranks of the French army were continuing their retreat across the numerous arms of the Pleisse and the Elster, leaving twenty thousand of their soldiers either prisoners or dying in the streets of Leipzig, or drowned in the blood-stained waters of the Pleisse and the Elster. This last of the four disastrous days of Leipzig raised the loss of the French army in killed, wounded, or prisoners, to the number of sixty thousand men. The enemy had lost an equal number in action, but their wounded had received all the grateful care that German patriotism

could lavish on them, whilst ours had met with, alas! how different a treatment.

Such was this long and tragic battle of Leipzig; one of the most bloody and certainly the greatest ever fought, and which terminated so disastrously the campaign of Saxony, which at Lutzen and Bautzen had commenced so auspiciously. Had Napoleon been a less great general, in a situation in which it would not have been necessary for him to endeavour by a single stroke to re-establish gigantic fortunes, and in which no hundred motives of pride had impelled him to shut his eyes to the truth, and had he, lastly, been less accustomed than he was to seek in bold and complicated combinations the attainment of extraordinary results, he might have succeeded in obtaining, if not victory, at least a position of safety. But the simple course by which he might have arrived at this end Napoleon's character, his pride, and present need of some extraordinary triumph, had now barred against him. If we examine the various circumstances of this campaign, we shall discover the real cause of the disasters with which it was thronged to have been, not in the diminution of our captain's military talents, but in the illusions of which he was made the victim by his pride, in the necessity he was under of regaining by a single stroke the immense prosperity he had lost, in his repugnance to acknowledge sufficiently early that he had been defeated—in all the errors, in short, which are observable in the common gambler, who risks in folly the riches which in folly have been acquired.

After such a series of reverses, to return immediately to the Rhine was the only course Napoleon could now pursue. Of the three hundred and sixty thousand troops he had at his disposal, without taking into account those in garrison, at the commencement of hostilities, there now remained to him at the most but one hundred and ten thousand, and those in a most deplorable condition. The only military weapon which he still possessed in any considerable quantity was his artillery, which was still very numerous and well served; and which, if a source of embarrassment on the road was at the same time a most precious resource on the day of battle.

The night of the 19th of October was passed by Napoleon and the wrecks of his army in the neighbourhood of Lutzen. On the following morning Napoleon hastened to Weissenfels, which was in the hands of Bertrand and Mortier, who had beaten Giulay and thus secured the possession of the Saale. Our object now was, of course, to precede the enemy's troops at the critical points on the line of our retreat. If we followed on the left, the grand route leading from Weissenfels

to Hambourg and Jéna, we should come to the famous Kosen defile where Marshal Davouts had covered himself with glory by the defence of the Awerstædt plain, and where we should be now exposed to the danger of finding Giulay, who, repulsed by Bertrand and Mortier, would probably there seek his revenge. The plan upon which Napoleon determined, therefore, was to make a détour to the right, and instead of passing the Saale at Naumbourg, to cross it at Weissenfels, then to proceed to Freyberg for the purpose of there effecting the passage of the Unstrutt, and to debouch from thence upon the Weimar and Erfurt plain; Bertrand in the meantime, advancing by a rapid movement to the left on the Kosen defile, to reach it if possible, before the enemy, and to defend himself there as long as he might be able against the grand army of the Prince of Schwarzenberg.

The orders which Napoleon gave in accordance with this plan were punctually executed; and whilst Bertrand, accompanied by Mortier, who commanded two divisions of the Young Guard, proceeded to Freyberg, took possession of the stone bridge across the Unstrutt, and then advanced to Kosen, which he reached before the enemy, the main body of the army passed the Saale at Weissenfels on the 21st, and pushed on to Freyberg where it employed the whole of the night of the 21st and the following day in effecting the passage of the Unstrutt, which it was enabled to do by the energetic resistance made by Marshal Oudinot on the banks of that river to the Prussian troops of the corps of General d'York.

In the meantime Bertrand, whose arrival at Kosen had anticipated that of Giulay, had fought a desperate battle with the latter, in which he had been completely victorious, successfully defending his position and only abandoning it when he knew that Oudinot had evacuated Freyberg, and that the whole of our columns had defiled upon Erfurt, where, on the 23rd, the entire mass of our army was assembled, and where Napoleon halted two days for the purpose of refreshing and re-organising his troops, and endeavouring to bring back to their ranks a portion of the enormous number of our troops who had scattered themselves over the country, carried away by the marauding spirit which the season, the badness of the weather, and the age of our troops had combined to spread through our army to the most enormous extent.

Napoleon took advantage of these two days of comparative leisure to write to Paris, to make his position known to the principal members of his government, and to require them to provide him with fresh levies of well-grown men in

addition to the two hundred and eighty thousand men already demanded. "I cannot," he said, "defend France with children. Nothing exceeds the courage of our French youth, but at the first sign of disaster they betray the characteristics of their age." At the same time, he demanded supplies of money, directing that five hundred millions of francs should be raised by means of a war tax, to be added to all the direct or indirect imports already in existence.

To the melancholy circumstances by which Napoleon was at this time surrounded, was added the withdrawal of Murat, who alleged as reasons for his departure the necessity of defending Italy and the hope that he might be able by his personal exertions to furnish Prince Eugene with thirty thousand well-organised Neapolitan troops. Napoleon admitted the force of these reasons, as he also admitted to himself that Murat would not fail to yield to the current that had set in against him, and would follow the example of those German princes, our allies, who after having been gorged by us for ten years with the riches of the German church, now pretended that they had been the victims of France. But whilst he perceived, as he did, that Murat's defection was but too imminent, he forgave him for it beforehand, so to say ; and on taking leave of him received his parting protestations of fidelity as sincere, and repeatedly embraced him with a heart overflowing with grief.

It had now become absolutely necessary that the army should continue its march, for the allied troops were advancing in every direction, and the presence was announced of a fresh enemy in our rear, ready to close against us our road to France. This enemy was no other than the Bavarian army, so long our companion in arms, and which was eager to atone for its long alliance with us by a defection which should resemble as closely as possible that of Bernadotte and the Saxons.

The feeble Bavarian king, attached as he was to Napoleon by the numerous benefits which the latter had heaped upon him, and supported in his policy of an alliance with France by an enlightened and ambitious minister, who had sought therein his own aggrandizement as well as that of his country, had been able as long as Napoleon was prosperous, to successfully resist the opposition offered to this policy by his wife, a vain, obstinate-minded princess, sister of the Empress of Russia and the Queen of Sweden, and by his son, who, more addicted to the arts of peace than those of war, had been in Napoleon's service and somewhat harshly treated by him. But although the Bavarian monarch was able to resist this opposition as long as he could point to the substantial benefits he derived from Napoleon's alliance, the disas-

The allied armies, after having passed two or three days in Leipzig, had been distributed in a new manner, and had then proceeded towards their ulterior destination; General Klenau being sent to reduce Dresden, General Tauenzien to continue the siege of Torgau and Wittenburg, and General Benningsen, with the so called Polish army, to blockade, and if possible, gain possession of Magdebourg and Hambourg. The Army of the North had been marched upon Cassel in order to complete, should it not already have been accomplished, the destruction of the monarchy of King Jerome. It was then to return towards Westphalia, Hanover, and Holland. Finally Blucher and the Prince of Schwarzenberg, with about one hundred and sixty thousand men, had hastened in pursuit of Napoleon's army, Blucher being directed upon Eisenach, from whence he was to proceed, not to Frankfort, but to Wetzlar, in order to prevent Napoleon, when he should be cut off from the Mayence route, from throwing himself upon that of Coblenz. The grand army of Bohemia, divided into two portions, was to march, the one part by Eisenach, Fulde, and Frankfort, upon Mayence; the other part by Gotha, Smalkalden, and Schweinfurt upon Wurzburg.

The allied forces having been thus distributed, each portion of them proceeded in pursuit of the French army; and on the 26th and 27th of October Oudinot's and Mortier's rear guard, composed of the Young Guard, was attacked by the impetuous Blucher, the result of the action being a loss of about a thousand men on each side.

On the 26th, Napoleon slept at Vach, beyond the Thuringian defiles. On the 27th at Hünfeld, on the 28th at Schlüchtern. When we had reached the slope of the Thuringian forest which looks towards the Rhine the enemy's pursuit became much less vigorous, the reason being that Blucher had turned to the right for the purpose of marching by Wetzlar upon the Rhine, whilst the Prussians and Russians had proceeded on the left towards Wurzburg. On the 27th information reached Schlüchtern that General Wrède was at Wurzburg, which he was bombarding, and from whence he had but a step to take to cut off the route leading from Hanau to Mayence. An advanced guard of our troops was now sent forward with such portions of our baggage train and stragglers as could be collected, in order that the movements of the army might be as free as possible from incumbrance; and during the 27th and 28th of October from fifteen to eighteen thousand of our disorganized troops were enabled by the prudent measures taken by Marshal the Duke de Valmy to reach Mayence. But on the 29th the road was

completely closed, for General Wrède, despairing of overcoming the resistance made by General Thareau, the governor of Wurzburg, had left a simple detachment to blockade this fortress, and had then proceeded to Hanau with sixty thousand men, half of whom were Bavarians, half Austrians. Having arrived there he had moved a division upon Frankfort, and had posted himself with the bulk of his forces before Hanau in the forest of Lamboy, through which the grand route passes.

On the 29th Napoleon, having arrived at Langen-Sebold learnt that the head of the army had been driven back upon him, and that the Austro-Bavarian troops to the number of fifty or sixty thousand men were pretending to close the Rhine route against him. Indignant at such impudence, he resolved to hasten his march on the 30th, and to proceed himself at the head of his Old Guard to re-open the route. Unfortunately there remained of his army at this time no more than about forty or fifty thousand men under arms, so greatly had disorganization increased amongst his troops during the last marches; and even of these forty or fifty thousand Napoleon had no more than a third at his immediate disposal on the 30th. Nevertheless, he resolved to throw himself upon the Bavarian army and to make it repent its temerity; for it was important that the route should be opened before the obstacle which closed it should have had time to increase and become consolidated. On the morning of the 30th, accordingly, he set out from Langen-Sebold and marched upon Hanau.

When they had advanced some distance our troops fell in with General de Wrède's advanced guard, which was posted at Rückingen, and having driven this back and pursued it with vigour, they came upon the Austro-Bavarian army itself, in front of the forest of Lamboy, through which passes the great Mayence route. Napoleon immediately hastened up in person at the head of his advanced guard to reconnoitre the enemy's dispositions. He had at his immediate disposal at this moment only the cavalry of the advanced guard, and the five thousand infantry still remaining to Macdonald and Victor. Posting on the right under General Charpentier, the infantry of Macdonald's corps, and on the left under General Dubreton, that of Marshal Victor, he ordered them to spread *en tirailleurs* amongst the woods; and then took up his own position with the whole of his cavalry on the grand route. Our tirailleurs speedily gained ground upon the flank of the troops which supported the enemy's artillery, and compelled them to fall back. Soon afterwards a portion of our own artillery having been brought up, directed a vigorous fire upon that of the Bavarian army, and forced it

to retire. In this manner the enemy had been driven into the interior of the forest, the greater portion of which we had traversed in their track, when, the division Curial of the Old Guard having come up, Napoleon threw two battalions of this division upon the enemy's retreating column, and by this means completely drove them out of the forest into the plain. On reaching the outskirts of the wood Napoleon perceived some fifty thousand hostile troops drawn up in battle array in front of Kinzig, resting on one side on the pont de Lamboy, and on the other on the city of Hanau. Napoleon awaited, before debouching from the wood, the arrival of the whole of his artillery as well as of the infantry and cavalry of the Old Guard; he then ranged eighty pieces of artillery on the outskirts of the forest, extended to the left the great bear-skin hats of the division Friant, and to the right the cavalry of Sebastiani, Lefebvre-Desnouette, and Nansouty.

After some moments of a violent cannonade Napoleon threw the whole of his cavalry upon that of General Wrède, and drove it back by a single charge upon the Austrian squadrons. The latter charged in their turn, but the exasperation of our cavalry was at its height, and overwhelming all that came in its way it drove back the left of the Austro-Bavarian army upon the Kinzig and Hanau. At the centre the enemy's cavalry in the course of these repeated charges, threw themselves for a moment upon the eighty pieces of artillery of the Guard; but when our infantry had hastened up to their rescue they found that Druot and his artillerymen had already driven them back.

Driven back upon the Kinzig, General de Wrède could see no other course open to him save that of throwing back his army towards his right for the purpose of making it repass the Kinzig at the pont de Lamboy. To favour this movement and procure the space he needed to effect it in, he attempted an attack upon our left, where were posted Friant's grenadiers, who fully shared the exasperation of the whole of the army, and who, supported by Marmont's troops, which had begun to come up, attacked the Bavarians at the point of the bayonet, and driving them back upon the troops now occupied in effecting the passage of the Kinzig, struck down with their bayonets some seven or eight hundred of them. De Wrède repassed the Kinzig in disorder, leaving in our hands ten or eleven thousand dead, wounded, or prisoners; our own loss in this brilliant action, in which the majesty of the French army was worthily avenged, having been at the most no more than three thousand.

We had no time, however, to lose in counting our trophies, for General de Wrède having fallen back with forty thousand

men behind the Kinzig might easily perceive the smallness of our force, and debouch from Hanau for the purpose of barring our road. On the following day, the 31st, Napoleon set out with Sebastiani, Lefebvre-Desnoette, Macdonald, and the Old Guard, to open the Mayence route, leaving Marmont on the banks of the Kinzig for the purpose of preventing the enemy from debouching from Hanau.

On the morning of the 31st Marshal Marmont took possession of Hanau, which the enemy in his terror had almost entirely evacuated, and then marched onwards, confiding the guard of this post to General Bertrand, who followed him. On the morning of the 1st of November General de Wrède attempted to debouch from the Kinzig, traversing the pont de Lamboy on our left and endeavouring to retake Hanau on our right. In front of the pont de Lamboy Bertrand had placed the division Guilleminot, in the centre the division Morand, and partly in Hanau, partly along the bank of the Kinzig, the Italian division.

At daybreak de Wrède attacked the Italians in Hanau, and entered the town driving them upon the pont de la Kinzig, which he attempted to seize, but in vain, for Morand firing from behind the Kinzig upon his column in flank covered it with projectiles, and the Italians taking courage, returned to the charge, and drove the Bavarians into Hanau; de Wrède receiving a wound of so serious a nature that it was supposed to be mortal.

An attempt made at the same moment on our left by the Austro-Bavarian troops to cross the Kinzig by the half burnt chevalets of the pont de Lamboy, being equally unsuccessful, our cannon were at length free to pass along the Mayence road which was so covered with dead bodies that they rolled, as an illustrious eyewitness (Marshal Gérard) expressed it, in a trench of human flesh.

General Bertrand's corps had been the last to take the Hanau route; for Marshal Mortier, with the Young Guard, having been informed of the difficulties to be encountered on this road had made a détour to the right, and had reached Frankfort in safety. On the 4th of November, the grand army completed its entrance into Mayence, mournfully triumphant!

And thus we returned to the Rhine, which had become so wholly our own, that six months before we should have considered it a great proof of our moderation if we had been willing to permit it to bound our empire! That Rhine which it was now doubtful if we could defend! Napoleon had thought so much of conquest and so little of the defence of his kingdom, that it was almost entirely undefended.

Even the vast preparations which had been ordered by M. de Bassano after the battle of Dennewitz, had been countermanded by Napoleon on account of the expense and of the alarm which he feared they might be the means of spreading through the districts on the Rhine. Of all the fortresses on this frontier which should have been the first object of our care, Mayence alone contained the means of defence. But to have defended it an army would have been necessary, and that which now entered it, although it was the grand army, could not furnish more than forty thousand effective troops.

Napoleon wishing to keep at Mayence the best of his troops, left there the 4th corps under General Bertrand; intending that it should form the advanced guard of the future army which he hoped to form. At this time it only numbered fifteen thousand troops, but within a few days by great exertions it was raised to the number of twenty and odd thousand men. Lefebvre-Desnouette was attached to it with the light cavalry of the Guard and the old dragoons of the 5th corps, comprising altogether some three or four thousand horse. It was also furnished with a good supply of cannon. The defence of the Rhine was divided between the three Marshals, Marmont, Macdonald, and Victor; Marshal Marmont being charged with the defence of so much as lay between Landau and Coblenz, whilst Marshal Macdonald was sent to Cologne, and Marshal Victor was established at Strasbourg.

After having remained a week at Mayence, Napoleon set out for Paris on the 7th of November, that he might at the centre of his government prepare the means for carrying on a new and last campaign. And whilst he was occupied in making unheard of efforts to draw from exhausted France the resources which it still contained, and to hold in check upon its frontiers the enemy whose long continued impression had rendered it implacable against us, he had upon the Rhine and the Vistula, besieged or blockaded by the legions of allied Europe, soldiers sufficient to have formed one of the best armies he had ever assembled. He had left at Modlin three thousand men, at Zamosa three thousand, at Dantzic twenty-eight, at Glogau eight, at Custrin four, at Stettin twelve, at Dresden thirty, at Torgau twenty-six, at Wittenberg three, at Magdebourg twenty-five, at Hambourg forty, at Erfurt six, at Wurzburg two, amounting altogether to a force of one hundred and ninety thousand serviceable troops, (for we have omitted in this enumeration the sick and wounded) and capable of forming, could they only have been concentrated, an army equal to any that had ever followed the French flag. By Napoleon's error, however, in withdrawing from the Elbe without also withdrawing the garrisons,

they had been sacrificed—sacrificed to a blind confidence in victory and to a disastrous desire of re-establishing in a single day the fortunes shattered by the irreparable faults of years.

These garrisons might still have been saved, however, had some bold and fortunate general, finding himself at the head of one of them, sallied forth from his fortress, and cutting his way through the blockading troops rallied the other garrisons in succession, and by this means have enabled himself, probably, considering the small number of troops left by the allies in their rear, to have reached the Elbe and the Rhine, and entered France at the head of a considerable force. And if we examine the circumstances attending each of the several fortresses in question, we shall find that it was at Dresden, by Marshal Saint-Cyr, that a plan of this sort might most reasonably have been expected to be formed. In the first place, Dresden was not a fortress where there could be any hope of making a protracted defence against a besieging force, but rather a mere military post which Napoleon had only expected to preserve for a time, and the evacuation of which he had all but ordered when he directed Marshal Saint-Cyr, should unforeseen circumstances prevent his continuance in Dresden, to move upon Torgau. The natural idea, indeed, on the arrival at Dresden of the information that Napoleon had retreated to the Rhine, would seem to be to evacuate it. An additional reason would be, that this fortress, after the departure of the grand army, had no further importance, since it covered nothing, remained entirely isolated, and was entirely destitute of provisions. In two days' march its garrison might have reached Torgau, where it would have found twenty-six thousand men, of whom eighteen thousand were excellent French troops, and together with whom it would have formed a force numbering forty-eight thousand men, superior to all the hostile troops on the banks of the Elbe. Three thousand would have been obtained from Wittenberg, and in two days Magdebourg might have been reached, where there were some eighteen or twenty thousand more. On his arrival at Hambourg, Marshal Saint-Cyr would have found himself at the head of a force of one hundred and ten thousand men; and what, then, could have prevented him from reaching the Rhine? If then the one hundred and seventy thousand French troops, left by a deplorable error of Napoleon's on the Vistula, the Oder, and the Elbe, had any chance of being saved, it could only have been, as respects at least one hundred thousand of them, by means of some spontaneous resolution of Marshal Saint-Cyr's. Such a resolution, however, he did not take, and from the

facts themselves must be judged whether he was sufficiently justified in not having taken it.

Napoleon had scarcely quitted Dresden for Düben when incessant movements had taken place of the enemy's troops around Dresden, and they had rapidly disappeared, leaving before this city a force of very insignificant strength. Marshal Saint-Cyr had immediately perceived the disappearance of the enemy's troops and had taken the very legitimate and praise-worthy resolution of inflicting a blow on the feeble blockading corps which had been left before him. Some days afterwards, no information having arrived from the grand army, he and those around him began to be uneasy, and to entertain the idea of leaving Dresden, where, if they remained, they could do nothing but perish. This idea having become widely spread Marshal Saint-Cyr summoned a council of war, composed of the Count de Lobau, General Durosnel, General Mathieu, and some others, in which the Count de Lobau advised a retreat upon Torgau, where they would find a numerous garrison, an abundant supply of provisions, and the Magdebourg route still open. To this the other generals, afraid of assuming the responsibility of a retreat, objected that the time had not come when they could fairly consider themselves abandoned, and take so decisive a step. Soon, however, the undissembled joy of the Saxons, and the communications of the enemy, who were interested in inspiring us with despair, informed our generals of the disaster of Leipzig and Napoleon's forced retreat upon the Rhine; and henceforth, it was evident that there was only one step to be taken, and that immediately, before all the routes should be closed.

Marshal Saint-Cyr, however, still hesitated, and proved on this occasion that the possession of very noble qualities may not necessarily lead a man to pursue the wisest course under certain circumstances, for, instead of adopting some decided plan of action, he sent a messenger to Torgau to enquire whether his troops could be supplied there with provisions should he fall back upon that place; and his agent having succeeded in reaching Torgau, received there an answer in the affirmative, but on attempting to return was stopped. The consequence was, that Marshal Saint-Cyr received no reply, and remained in a state of hesitation not only during the latter part of October, but even during the first days of November. At length, after the lapse of two weeks, all hope of succour having vanished, and the line of blockade having been drawn closer, he adopted the plan of sending Count Lobau on to Torgau, by the right bank of the Elbe, with fourteen thousand troops, resolving, if these should succeed

in reaching Torgau, to follow them with the remainder of his army. The Count de Lobau very justly objected, that the enterprise, which would have been certain of success fifteen days before and with the whole of the corps d'armée, would be a very hazardous matter at the present moment with only half of the corps. Nevertheless, he obeyed the orders he had received, and set out from Dresden on the 8th of November, taking with him as his lieutenant the brave and talented General Bonnet. At some leagues from Dresden on the right bank of the river, he encountered the enemy's advanced posts, and having continued his march in spite of these, found farther on a well-defended position which could evidently be carried only at the expense of considerable loss, but which presented no insurmountable obstacle. At the same time the movements of the enemy showed that they were moving upon the rear of our troops for the purpose of preventing their return to Dresden, and that in their desire to effect this object, they were of their own accord leaving open the Torgau route. Had the whole corps d'armée been now together such a movement on the part of the enemy would have been one highly favourable to ourselves, but as one half of the corps d'armée still remained in Dresden it could not but cause our generals considerable anxiety, and they hastened to return to this city lest they should be cut off from the troops which still remained there.

When the Count de Lobau's column had re-entered Dresden the false step which had been taken was considered as sufficient condemnation of any enterprise in the direction of Torgau, and as there was no other which could be for a moment entertained, our troops awaited in a state of the deepest despondency, the issue of the deplorable position in which they found themselves. Provisions began to fail and the frightful contagion which spread from the Elbe to the Rhine raged through the city. The inhabitants, still submissive, but rendered desperate by the long continuance of our stay, entreated us to withdraw from their capital; and on the 11th, no hope remaining to them except that of a glorious death, our troops capitulated on conditions which could not but be regarded as favourable. The garrison were to lay down their arms, and to march back to France, with permission to serve again after they had been exchanged. Those who had signed these terms were able to flatter themselves that they had escaped from the disastrous situation in which they had been involved on conditions very injurious neither to themselves nor to France, which they would soon be in a condition to defend. Our troops set out, therefore, with more hope than despondency; but they had scarcely

quitted Dresden, when General Klenau, to the general consternation, made known to them, with many excuses, that the Emperor Alexander refused to agree to the terms of the capitulation, and demanded that the garrison should regard themselves as prisoners of war, without permission to return to France. Marshal Saint Cyr exclaimed against this conduct with the most indignant vehemence, but the only reply he received was the ironical one, that if he chose to return to Dresden, and place himself in his old position, he was quite welcome to do so. As if such a return were possible into the midst of a city delighted at our withdrawal, and most disinclined to receive us again, and where our means of defence were either destroyed or exposed.

As no measure for effecting their rescue had been set on foot at Dresden, the only point at which there existed any considerable body of French troops, with a general of elevated rank, and recognised capacity, it remained as a necessary consequence that each of our garrisons must perish miserably in its fortress, succumbing either to hunger, typhus fever, or captivity. Torgau indeed, where there were more than 26,000 men, under the brilliant Count de Narbonne, and which was well provided with all kinds of provisions, was in a position to make a protracted defence, for a fall from his horse having compelled General Bernard to remain there for a time, he had joined there Count de Narbonne with the utmost zeal in taking every measure that could enable the garrison to effect a most determined resistance. But the most formidable of enemies had sprung up within the walls, and not only carried off the garrison by thousands, but included in its ravages the Count de Narbonne himself, who died most deeply regretted by his troops and all who had known him. He was replaced as governor of the fortress by General Dutailis, who displayed the utmost valour, but could do but little more than witness the slow agonies of a garrison almost equal to an army.

At Wittenberg General Lapoype being well supplied with provisions, and having but few sick within the walls of his fortress, was prepared with the 3000 men under his command to make a protracted defence. At Magdebourg General Lemarois being in similar circumstances, had taken a like resolution. At Hambourg, Marshal Davoust, who had returned thither when the movement which he had commenced with 32,000 troops upon Berlin had been rendered impossible by the result of the battles of Gross-Beren and Dennewitz, was resolved with the 40,000 soldiers at his disposal, to maintain a long siege, or rather, for such was its

real nature, a defensive campaign calculated to cover lower Germany, Holland, and the Lower Rhine.

On the river Oder the fortresses Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau still held out, but simply for the honour of the French arms, defending themselves against all hope, simply for the glory of the flag under which they fought. And what is thus true of them, is even more so, if possible, of the immortal garrison of Dantzic, which, having been uninterruptedly blockaded since the month of January, had only once received any news from France. On retiring into the fortress in December 1812, after the retreat from Russia, General Rapp had shut himself up there with about 36,000 effective troops, and some thousands of wounded; but of this number almost 4,000 had been speedily carried off by the terrible *fevre de congelation*, which was produced by exposure to cold, as the *hospital fever* was by moisture and bad air. The troops which remained were inured to arms, and well commanded, but insufficient for the defence of the immense works of Dantzic, which consisted of the fortress itself, an entrenched camp, and the citadel of Weichselmunde, situated at the mouth of the Vistula. The first proceeding which General Rapp had found it necessary to take on entering the fortress, was to break the ice on the waters of the Vistula, which surrounded all its works, and which would have enabled the enemy to have advanced up to its walls, and carried it by escalade. Having prepared the preliminary defensive works, the garrison had driven back the enemy, and by a series of adventurous excursions to the isles of the Vistula, procured an abundant supply of every kind of provisions. On the resumption of hostilities after the armistice, it numbered some 25,000 effective troops, thoroughly prepared to undergo the fatigues of a siege. The exterior works, after having been valiantly defended, had been ultimately lost; but General Rapp, assisted by skilled officers of the engineers, had constructed some well planned, and well armed redoubts, which, taking the enemy's trenches in flank, had rendered them untenable. After a series of desperate combats around these redoubts, the enemy, at length, despairing of being able to carry them, resolved to have recourse to a bombardment, and directed against Dantzic the most formidable artillery that had ever been levelled against any besieged place—the fire of a hundred English gun-boats being added to that of the land batteries. During the whole of October the most terrific bombardment ever known continued without pause and without mercy, and on the 1st November, the timber yards of Dantzic having been set on fire, there ensued a fearful con-

flagration, which was not extinguished until three-fourths of the vast depôt of wood which the town contained had been consumed. In the meantime General Rapp, not caring to consider what must be the issue of this war after the disaster of Leipzig, only adhered to the instructions he had received, and which were to the effect that he was only to surrender Dantzic when he should receive an order so to do, written and signed by Napoleon's own hand. Modlin and Zamosa, after having been well defended, had capitulated, and the Polish garrisons had been led away into captivity.

Thus had lived or died on the Elbe, the Oder, and the Vistula, the 190,000 troops left so distant from the Rhine which they might have rendered invincible. And thus had terminated this campaign of 1813, by means of which Napoleon had resolved to repair the disasters of the campaign of 1812, and by means of which he might indeed have repaired them, had he only known how to put bounds to his desires.

This great and terrible campaign, which is unequalled in the history of the world, whether we regard the immensity of the struggles, the variety of its combinations, or the terrible effusion of human blood which resulted from it, is marked, as respects Napoleon, by one peculiar and significant trait, which we have already pointed out, which is the fact that it ended in his losing everything, simply because he attempted to regain at a single throw all that he had already lost. If after the victories at Lutzen and Bautzen, when victory had been restored to his arms by his genius and the courage of his young soldiers, he had driven back the Russian and Prussian armies as far as the Vistula, without accepting the armistice of Pleiswitz, he would have separated them from the Austrians, and inflicted a fatal blow upon the coalition. But to have done this effectually, it would have been necessary that he should have given some satisfactory reply to Austria, who pressed him to give some decided explanation relative to the terms on which he would make peace. And what Napoleon's motive was in accepting this armistice, we cannot but too well remember. It was, as has been already described in these pages, that he might have time to prepare an army against Austria, and put himself in a position in which he might safely refuse to submit to any, even the most moderate, conditions she might propose.

We have seen, also, how easy it would have been for Napoleon, even during the armistice, by the sacrifice of the Duchy of Warsaw, which could not possibly survive the Russian campaign, of the Protectorate of the Rhine, which was simply an aimless insult to Germany, and by the restoration of independence to the Hanseatic towns—to have

secured the possession of Piedmont, Tuscany, and Rome, as French departments, and Westphalia, Lombardy, and Naples, as kingdom vassals of the French Empire. And when he had resolved upon continuing the war, had he only taken advantage of the armistice to withdraw from Zamosa, Modlin, Dantzig, Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau, the sixty thousand men there was no reason, either political or military, for leaving there, all might still have been well. But in this matter, as in many others, carried away by the desire of re-establishing everything by a single victory on the Oder or the Vistula, Napoleon persisted in making this deplorable sacrifice which involved so many others. In order to keep up communications with his garrisons, he extended the circle of this concentric war, to forty leagues on the side of Goldberg, to fifty in the direction of Berlin, and obtained the glorious victory of Dresden; but at the moment when he was reaping the firstfruits of this triumph at Kulm he was called away by the disasters of his lieutenants, left at too great a distance from himself, marched to their assistance, arrived too late, passed two months in exhausting himself and his troops in useless expeditions, and finally, instead of making a simple retreat upon the Elbe, which, by enabling him to collect the troops left upon the Elbe, might still have saved him, being still led away by the desire of restoring his fortunes by some one brilliant stroke, attempted on Düben a series of brilliant manœuvres which, admirably conceived as they were, failed, because the means by which he attempted to execute them, were not proportioned to the boldness of his enterprise. And then, caught as it were in the snare of his own combinations, he was at length forced to succumb on the plains of Leipzig, after the most terrible battle recorded in history, in which, horrible to say, there perished more than a hundred thousand men.

It is very certain that in these disastrous days Napoleon was no less fertile in great combinations, no less energetic, no less imperturbable in the hour of danger than he had ever been, but he was always the ambitious man whose insatiable desires disturbed and perverted the immensity of his genius. In 1812, in consequence of attempting the impossible, he suffered a gigantic check. In 1813, not for the purpose merely of repairing this reverse, but with the object of utterly and instantaneously effacing it, he took steps which led to another as disastrous and more irreparable. And now when a single step further would lead him into the abyss, would Napoleon pause upon the fatal slope? The allies remaining immovable when they had reached the

bank of the Rhine, trembled at the idea of crossing this formidable boundary, and were resolved to offer to Napoleon France, truly so called, the country which the Rhine and the Alps so greatly embrace and protect, and with which, after Marengo and Hohenlinden, he had been contented. Would he be contented with it in 1814? Such was the last question which the Sphinx of destiny was to propose to his pride. According to the answer which he should make to this question, would his career end on the greatest of earthly thrones, or in the depths of human misfortune. Let us forget for a moment that history of 1814 and 1815 which we all know but too well, let us efface the echo which resounded in our ears, young then, of that glorious throne; let us place ourselves in that month of December, 1813, let us endeavour to ignore all that took place in 1814, and put to ourselves the question which was now put to Napoleon. And then? which of us, after having read the recital of the Russian and Saxony campaigns, could doubt what must be the answer? Alas! men have within themselves a destiny which they seek around them, above them, everywhere, in short, except in their own hearts, where it really abides, and which, according as they obey their passions or their reason, either destroys or saves them, whatever they may do, whatever may be their genius. And when they are lost, they exclaim against their soldiers, their generals, their allies, against mankind, against Heaven, and declare that these betrayed them, when, in fact, they betrayed themselves.

END OF VOL. XVI.



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